The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Juarez on April 29, 2011.

Vehicular Homicide—Driving Under the Influence—Driving While Ability Impaired—Careless Driving—Jury Verdict—Polling—C.RE. 606(b).

Defendant Benito Juarez appealed the judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of vehicular homicide, driving under the influence (DUI), and careless driving. The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for new trial.

After deliberation, the jury returned verdicts finding Juarez guilty of vehicular homicide, careless driving, and driving while ability impaired (DWAI). The district court, on its own initiative, determined that the verdicts finding Juarez guilty of vehicular homicide and DWAI were “inconsistent.” The district court reasoned that to be guilty of vehicular homicide, a defendant must be found guilty of DUI. The district court then polled and questioned the jury to ascertain the reason for the inconsistent verdicts. After the court’s questioning, the district court provided the jury with written and oral supplemental instructions and directed the jury to resume deliberations. Subsequently, the jury returned a second set of verdicts, finding Juarez guilty of vehicular homicide, DUI, and careless driving.

Juarez contended that the district court should have granted his motion for a directed verdict because the initial jury verdicts were inconsistent. An inconsistency in the first verdicts did not necessarily render the entire verdict unenforceable. However, the lack of unanimity did.

Juarez contended that the manner in which the district court polled the jury created reversible error. Extensive or coercive questioning of the jurors regarding their deliberative process is improper even if the district court perceives jury confusion regarding the applicable law. Here, the jury shared its mental processes only after the district court continued to probe. Moreover, the court itself may have influenced the jury’s second set of verdicts. Therefore, the manner in which the district court polled Juarez’s jury regarding the perceived inconsistent verdicts exceeded the bounds of C.R.E. 606(b). Accordingly, the fundamental fairness of the trial itself was called into question, the judgment of conviction was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial.

This summary is published here courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer. Other summaries by the Colorado Court of Appeals on April 29, 2011, can be found here.

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Duran on April 29, 2011.

First-Degree IndifferenceMurder—Reckless Manslaughter—Evidence—Principal—Complicitor—Lesser-Included Offense—Jury Instructions.

Defendant Dominic Dale Duran appealed the judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of attempted first-degree extreme indifference murder and reckless manslaughter. The judgment was vacated in part and reversed in part, and the case was remanded.

Defendant drove himself, Angelo Montoya, and two others to a party. A fight broke out, Montoya brandished a gun, and defendant and his friends fled from the house. At defendant’s joint trial with Montoya, the prosecution presented evidence that Montoya’s weapon held ten bullets, that Montoya shot five bullets at the house while running in the yard (first round), and that either Montoya or defendant shot five bullets from Montoya’s gun toward the house from defendant’s car as they drove from the scene (second round). A bullet struck the victim, who was in the house, killing her.

Defendant contended that the evidence was insufficient to support a determination by the jury that he was liable either as a principal or as a complicitor for recklessly causing the death of the victim. The People’s theories are based on surmise, speculation, or conjecture about the victim’s actions during the shooting; they are not supported by the evidence or reasonable inferences from it. Therefore, the evidence was insufficient to support a conclusion by the jury that a bullet from the second group of gunshots, which indisputably occurred after the victim was on the floor, caused her death. Further, there was no evidence that defendant aided, abetted, advised, or encouraged Montoya when he fired the first group of gunshots at the house. Accordingly, defendant could not be convicted of reckless manslaughter either as a principal or complicitor (assuming he drove his car while Montoya fired the shots) for the second group of shots.

Defendant also contended that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict finding him guilty of attempted first-degree extreme indifference murder. There was sufficient evidence that defendant fired the second group of five gunshots from the car at the house, which was filled with people, as he and Montoya sped away. This supports a determination that defendant took a substantial step toward causing the death of the victim and supports the jury’s guilty verdict for attempted extreme indifference murder of the victim.

Defendant claimed the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the crime of attempted extreme indifference murder as a lesser-included offense. He argued that the instruction constituted a constructive amendment of the indictment. As a matter of law, a defendant has adequate notice of an uncharged offense that meets the definition of a lesser-included offense. Here, attempted first-degree extreme indifference murder is a lesser-included offense of extreme indifference murder, which was contained in the indictment. Accordingly, the trial court committed no error by instructing the jury on the attempt crime as a lesser-included offense.

Defendant claimed the trial court also erred by instructing the jury to consider completed and attempted reckless manslaughter of the named victim as lesser-non-included offenses of completed and attempted first-degree extreme indifference murder. Reckless manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of first-degree extreme indifference murder, and attempt to commit reckless manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of attempt to commit first-degree extreme indifference murder. Therefore, instructing the jury on reckless manslaughter and attempt to commit reckless manslaughter as non-included offenses was error.

Defendant argued that the trial court erred by using the terms “justified” and “justifiably” in the self-defense instruction by instructing the jury that it “may” consider self-defense, and by instructing the jury on the provocation and initial aggressor concepts of self-defense law. The language of the instruction substantially mirrors the language of the statute and informed the jury that defendant’s belief must have been reasonable. Therefore, there was no error.

The judgment of conviction for reckless manslaughter was vacated and the judgment of conviction for attempted first-degree extreme indifference murder was reversed. The case was remanded for a new trial on the attempted murder charge.

This summary is published here courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer. Other summaries by the Colorado Court of Appeals on April 29, 2011, can be found here.