The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Curtis on Thursday, August 14, 2014.
Sexual Assault on a Child—Joinder—Motion to Suppress Evidence.
Curtis appealed the judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of two counts of sexual assault on a child and two counts of aggravated incest, all arising from sexual acts with his two daughters, S.C. and C.C. These assaults began when the victims were 9 or 10 years old and continued until they were removed from the home several years later.
On appeal, Curtis contended that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the prosecution to join for trial the charges involving the two victims. Sexual assault offenses may be joined if the evidence of each offense would be admissible in separate trials. Here, the evidence of Curtis’s assaults of the two victims would have been admissible in separate trials under both CRE 404(b) and CRS §16-10-301. The evidence at issue related to material facts, including Curtis’s intent and the fact that he was engaged in a common plan, scheme, or design, and this evidence was relevant because it made it likely that Curtis had committed the crimes charged. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the prosecution to join the charges pertaining to both victims.
Curtis also contended that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the statements that he made during his interview with an agent from the Colorado Bureau of Investigation. Curtis claimed these statements were involuntary and were made after he had invoked his right to silence. However, Curtis voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, agreed to take a polygraph examination, was not in custody during the examination, and did not unambiguously invoke his right to silence. In addition, the officer’s conduct was not coercive. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Curtis’s motion to suppress.
Finally, Curtis contended that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of his conduct concerning S.C.’s stillborn baby after its birth (specifically, that Curtis removed the stillborn baby from S.C.’s room and concealed it in a box and then in a jar). Curtis’s conduct after the stillborn birth reflected efforts to conceal that birth, shows consciousness of guilt, explained how the abuse continued leading to S.C.’s second pregnancy, and undermined Curtis’s defense that he was unaware he had intercourse with S.C. because she had drugged and sexually assaulted him. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence at issue here. The judgment was affirmed.