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Archives for January 4, 2016

The 2015 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Part 1 of 3)

Bill_Groh

Editor’s Note: This is Part 1 of a three-part series discussing the 2015 changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Part 2 will discuss the changes to Rule 26 and Part 3 will discuss the changes to Rules 30, 31, 33, 34, 37, 55, and 84. 

By William C. Groh, III

New and important changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules) took effect on December 1, 2015 and apply to all newly filed cases as well as currently pending cases “insofar as just and practicable.”[1] The changes affect Rules 1, 4, 16, 26, 30, 31, 33, 34, 37, 55, and 84. They deal primarily with the scope of discovery, case management, and preservation of electronically stored information (ESI). The amendments generally reflect an effort to refocus litigants’ ongoing obligation to conduct discovery efficiently and in appropriate proportion to the needs of the case at issue. The redline version of the 2015 amendments, with committee notes, is available for download at www.uscourts.gov/file/18481/download.

Rule 1

Rule 1 previously was a rule of construction that required the courts to administer the Federal Rules to ensure “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination” of civil actions.[2] The wording placed responsibility on the courts. New Rule 1 expressly requires the courts and the parties to construe, administer and employ the Federal Rules to achieve these goals.[3]

Rule 4

Rule 4 has changed to provide a mandatory form to be used for requesting waiver of service. Prior Rule 4 contained an example waiver form but permitted other formats as long as they followed the rule’s substantive requirements. The waiver of service form provided with New Rule 4 is now mandatory. The Rule 4 form can be downloaded at www.cod.uscourts.gov/Portals/0/Documents/Forms/CivilForms/notice-n-waiver-of-serv-summons.pdf.

Rule 16

The amendments to Rule 16 are designed to encourage speedier scheduling and greater court involvement in ensuring the preservation of ESI. New Rule 16(b)(1)(B) does away with the provision allowing communication by “telephone, mail, or other means” to substitute for a Rule 16(b) scheduling conference. The parties and the court must engage in direct simultaneous communication, either in person, by telephone, or by other means.[4]

New Rule 16 shortens the deadline for the court to issue its scheduling order. While the deadline was 120 days under Prior Rule 16, New Rule 16 requires the court to issue the court scheduling order within 90 days after service of the complaint or 60 days after the appearance of any defendant. The court may extend this deadline upon a finding of good cause.

Prior Rule 16(b)(3)(B) included a list of items for consideration in entering the court scheduling order. New Rule 16(b)(3)(B) adds to this list, providing that the court may also include protocols for preservation of ESI. This change is apropos considering the changes to Rule 37 governing sanctions for failure to preserve ESI, discussed below. The new rule also permits the court to add agreed protocols for dealing with the disclosure of privileged information under FRE 502, and to require the parties to request a conference before the court before filing discovery motions. In light of these new items, Rule 26(f)(3) has also been changed to require the parties to address these issues at their Rule 26(f) conference.

 


[1]. See J. Roberts order adopting amendments subject to congressional approval at 15 (April 29, 2015), www.uscourts.gov/file/document/congress-materials,  P. 15 (“the foregoing amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall take effect on December 1, 2015, and shall govern in all proceedings in civil cases thereafter commenced and, insofar as just and practicable, all proceedings then pending.”).

[2]. See Prior Rule 1. The prior rule required that the federal rules “should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”

[3]. New Rule 1.

[4]. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (with Committee Notes) at 7, www.uscourts.gov/file/18481/download (2015 Committee Notes).


 

Bill Groh is an experienced commercial litigator who has represented individuals and small businesses in a variety of fields since 2005. Mr. Groh frequently handles matters involving both intellectual property and commercial litigation issues, including trademark infringement, copyright infringement, trade secret infringement, civil disputes involving breach of contract, business partnerships, allegations of breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, civil theft, actions for dissolution of partnership interest, and other such disputes that are increasingly common in modern business.

Tenth Circuit: Plaintiff Bears Burden to Prove Constitutional Violation of Clearly Extant Law in Qualified Immunity Case

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Cox v. Glanz on Tuesday, September 8, 2015.

Charles Jernegan surrendered at the David L. Moss Criminal Justice Center in Tulsa, Oklahoma in July 2009, and was asked several questions related to his physical and mental health as part of the intake process by the booking officer and nurse Faye Taylor. He reported that he was taking medication for paranoid schizophrenia but did not express any suicidal ideation. The next day, he filed a medical request through the jail’s kiosk system, reporting he needed to “speak to someone about problems.” Two days later, healthcare employee Sara Sampson attempted to check on him but because he had been moved to a different cell block she never contacted him. That same morning, Jernegan hanged himself and was found dead in his cell.

His mother, Carolyn Cox, brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the Tulsa County Sheriff, Stanley Glanz, in his individual and official capacities, and also against the company that provided healthcare services to the jail and several of the jail’s healthcare employees, including Sampson and Taylor. As relevant to Sheriff Glanz, Ms. Cox alleged that his failure to provide adequate and timely mental health screening and care constituted deliberate indifference to Jernegan’s serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. For the individual capacity claim, Ms. Cox relied on a supervisory-liability theory, alleging Glanz failed to properly train and supervise jail employees, including Sampson and Taylor. For the official capacity claim, Ms. Cox averred that Glanz had promulgated and administered an unconstitutional policy of providing insufficient mental health evaluation and treatment.

The sheriff moved for summary judgment, contending he was entitled to qualified immunity on the individual capacity claim because Ms. Cox had not established that any jail employee acted with deliberate indifference to Jernegan’s medical needs, he had not acted with the requisite state of mind to support a deliberate indifference claim, and he had not created any policy that produced constitutional harm. The district court denied Glanz’s motion, ruling that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. The district court did not explicitly focus on the framework of qualified immunity in its ruling. Glanz filed an interlocutory appeal.

The Tenth Circuit first addressed whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the sheriff’s interlocutory appeal, acknowledging that Ms. Cox’s jurisdictional arguments had merit because the district court did not follow the settled mode of decision-making regarding qualified immunity. Because the sheriff accepted Ms. Cox’s version of the facts as true, the Circuit had jurisdiction to evaluate the legal issues presented by the agreed-upon facts. The Tenth Circuit noted that the appropriate two-fold test for qualified immunity was whether there was a constitutional violation and whether that constitutional violation was grounded in clearly established law. The Tenth Circuit commented that neither party adequately briefed the question of whether the law was clearly established at the time of Jernegan’s suicide.

Turning to the merits of the appeal, the sheriff argued the district court committed reversible error when it denied him qualified immunity on his individual capacity claim and when it denied him summary judgment on his official capacity claim. The Tenth Circuit declined to reach the second argument, noting it lacked jurisdiction and declined to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit dismissed the sheriff’s appeal on the official capacity claim.

As to the individual capacity claim, the Tenth Circuit elected to review whether clearly established law prohibited the constitutional violation suffered by Jernegan, i.e., whether an inmate’s right to proper suicide screening was clearly established in 2009. The Tenth Circuit noted that Ms. Cox failed to produce any case law support for her proposition, but conducted an independent review. The Tenth Circuit noted that its standard for the requisite state of mind for deliberate indifference was established in the mid-1990s and had not changed by 2009. The trend in the circuit was to require inmate-specific knowledge of suicide risk, and the circuit declined to hold jail officials responsible when the inmate did not demonstrate a particularized risk of suicide. Because Jernegan did not present a specific risk of suicide, no jail employee could have been found to have acted with deliberate indifference, so the sheriff could not be found to have acted with deliberate indifference under a supervisor liability theory. The Tenth Circuit held that Ms. Cox failed to satisfy the clearly-extant law prong of the qualified immunity analysis, and therefore the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity on the individual capacity claim.

The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on the individual capacity claim against the sheriff and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the sheriff, and dismissed the part of the appeal related to the official capacity claim.

Tenth Circuit: Unpublished Opinions, 12/31/2015

On Thursday, December 31, 2015, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued no published opinion and two unpublished opinions.

Anderson v. Seven Falls Co.

Hackford v. State of Utah

Case summaries are not provided for unpublished opinions. However, published opinions are summarized and provided by Legal Connection.