The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Cespedes v. Lynch on Thursday, November 19, 2015.
Jose Ramon Cespedes, a native and citizen of Venezuela, became a conditional lawful permanent resident of the United States in 2012. He was later charged with domestic violence in Utah state court, and in April 2013, that court issued a protective order against him. In November 2013, Cespedes pleaded guilty to an attempted violation of the protective order under its no-contact provision.
In May 2014, the Department of Homeland Security brought a charge to remove under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) against Cespedes for violation of the protection order. In a hearing before an immigration judge (IJ), Cespedes argued his conduct was not covered by § 1227. The IJ rejected his argument and ordered him removed from the United States. The BIA affirmed, relying on Matter of Strydom, 25 I. & N. Dec. 507, 510 (2011), in which Strydom was ordered removed for violating a no-contact order, and the BIA determined that no-contact orders “provided protection against threats of violence,” which could include contact in violation of a no-contact order.
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Cespedes conceded that Strydom would apply to his case but argued it was wrongly decided. The Tenth Circuit held that it was. The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that it owed the BIA deference under Chevron, and found that Cespedes’ contact in violation of the protective order violated § 1227.
Addressing Cespedes’ next argument, the Tenth Circuit found that “as purely a matter of English, the argument makes some sense,” but reading the language in context, the Tenth Circuit found that Congress would not have intended a state court to explain the purpose of each clause of a protective order. The Tenth Circuit recognized that all a state court would need to do is to find a violation of a protective order and the IJ and BIA would do the rest.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the BIA and IJ.