The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in In re Marriage of Finn on Thursday, December 30, 2016.
Post-Dissolution Marriage Proceeding—Request for Stay—Romero v. City of Fountain.
Husband and wife had entered into a marital agreement. Wife later filed for dissolution of the marriage, and the trial court subsequently issued a detailed order directing husband to make certain payments to wife within 20 days. Husband filed a motion for post-trial relief pursuant to C.R.C.P. 59 and 60, which was denied. Husband appealed and also filed a motion for stay with the trial court and requested approval of his supersedeas bond; both requests were denied.
Pursuant to C.A.R. 8, husband sought a stay of the trial court’s orders requiring him to pay wife certain sums of money and to return her artwork and other personal property. Husband presented a redacted copy of a cashier’s check in the amount necessary for a supersedeas bond and represented that his counsel would deposit the check if his motion were granted.
Stays pending appeal are controlled by C.A.R. 8(a). Romero v. City of Fountain adopted a four-part test for determining whether a stay should be issued under CAR 8: (1) whether the moving party has made a strong showing that it is likely to prevail on the merits, (2) whether the moving party will suffer irreparable harm if a stay is not granted, (3) whether other interested parties would be harmed by granting the stay, and (4) whether the public interest will be harmed by granting the stay. Romero involved a motion to stay an order denying an injunction. Husband argued that Romero does not apply here.
A stay is an exercise of judicial discretion and not a matter of right. The Colorado Court of Appeals first concluded that posting a supersedeas bond alone is insufficient to mandate a stay in a family law case. As to both the monetary and nonmonetary orders, the court then determined that a court considering a stay of that part of a judgment involving marital and separate property must consider the first three Romero factors; the fourth factor, harm to the public interest, is ordinarily not relevant in the context of a dissolution of marriage. The court found that (1) husband had not made even a cursory showing as to why his appeal was likely to succeed on the merits; (2) husband’s contention that he faces “clear” irreparable harm if a stay is not granted was unpersuasive; and (3) wife would be harmed by the issuance of a stay, because she would be denied benefits she negotiated in the marital agreement.
The motion for stay was denied.
Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.