June 26, 2017

Archives for April 27, 2017

Colorado Rules of Judicial Discipline Amended in Rule Change 2017(03)

On Wednesday, April 26, 2017, the Colorado State Judicial Branch released Rule Change 2017(03), amending the Colorado Rules of Judicial Discipline. The rules were amended on April 20, 2017, and will become effective on July 1, 2017.

The rule changes were quite extensive. A redline is available here.  Several definitions were added to Rule 2, “Definitions,” and many other rules in Part A were changed, including Rule 4, “Jurisdiction and Powers,” Rule 5, “Grounds for Discipline,” Rule 6.5, “Confidentiality and Privilege,” and more. Part B was amended to change the title of the Part from “Preliminary Proceedings” to “Informal Proceedings,” and the rule changes in Part B were significant. There were minor changes to Part C, “Disability Proceedings.”

For a redline of Rule Change 2017(03), click here. For all of the Colorado Supreme Court’s adopted and proposed rule changes, click here.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Court Overrides Presumption of Fit Parent by Specifying Methods to be Used for Punishment

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in In re Marriage of Dean and Cook on Thursday, April 20, 2017.

Parenting TimeContemptEvidenceTranscriptsMagistrateExceeding AuthorityHearingAttorney FeesReasonableness.

Dean (mother) and Cook (father) divorced in 2006. Father filed a contempt motion on the basis that mother denied his parenting time. On May 19, 2014, the court set the contempt hearing over and ordered mother to engage in therapy. On November 3, 2014, the court found mother in contempt of court, ordered that she could purge the contempt by allowing father to have the children during their 2014 Thanksgiving break, and ordered her to pay father’s attorney fees. Sentencing occurred on January 8, 2015, at which time the court ordered mother to pay father’s attorney fees.

On appeal, mother first contended that the magistrate improperly reconsidered the May 19 order when, on November 3, she changed the nature of the sanctions imposed. On May 19, the magistrate simply adopted the parties’ stipulation for mother to engage in therapy; the order was not imposed to force mother to comply with the parenting time stipulation. No sanctions were imposed until November 3, when the magistrate found mother guilty of remedial contempt.

Mother also challenged the evidence presented at the contempt and sentencing hearings, the weight the magistrate placed on that evidence, and the findings and inferences the magistrate made in her orders. Mother failed to provide a copy of the transcripts from the contempt and sentencing hearings to the district court when she sought review of the magistrate’s orders under C.R.M. 7(a). Therefore, it is presumed that the record supports the magistrate’s orders that mother failed to comply with the parties’ stipulation and was thus in remedial contempt.

Mother also contended that the magistrate exceeded her authority when she ordered mother to restrict the children’s privileges if they did not comply with her instructions to go to father’s home for parenting time. By specifying the methods mother must employ to obtain the children’s compliance, the magistrate’s order improperly disregards the presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children. Therefore, that portion of the order was stricken.

Mother further argued that the magistrate demonstrated bias against her and should have been disqualified. Mother’s allegations were based only on the magistrate’s legal rulings and the resolution of conflicting evidence, which are not bases for disqualification. Further, mother did not seek to have the magistrate disqualified under C.R.C.P. 97.

Lastly, mother argued that the magistrate should have held a hearing on the reasonableness of father’s attorney fee affidavit. Mother objected to father’s fee affidavit on the basis that it was ambiguous and lacked clarity, and she requested a hearing on the issue of reasonableness. Once she raised these assertions, the magistrate should have held a hearing on this issue.

The judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case was remanded with directions.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Vacation and Sick Leave are Pecuniary Losses Compensable to Victim Under Restitution Act

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Perez on Thursday, April 20, 2017.

RestitutionVacationSick LeaveProximate CausePecuniary Loss.

Perez pleaded guilty to leaving the scene of an accident resulting in serious bodily injury. After the court sentenced Perez, the prosecution requested restitution based on the victim missing 55 days of work after the accident, including use of vacation and sick leave. Perez argued that the victim’s expenditure of leave was not compensable and that he was not the proximate cause of the victim’s losses because he pleaded guilty to leaving the scene of an accident resulting in serious bodily injury but not to any crime establishing that he was the proximate cause of the victim’s injury. The district court held that Perez was the proximate cause of the victim’s losses and ordered restitution.

On appeal, Perez claimed that the district court erred in holding that his actions were the proximate cause of the victim’s injuries because it did not make an express finding on the issue. The court’s rejection of Perez’s proximate cause contention necessarily implied that it found Perez to be the proximate cause of the victim’s injuries, and the record supports that finding. The conduct underlying the charge of leaving the scene of an accident resulting in serious bodily injury was Perez hitting the victim with his car. The crime for which Perez pleaded guilty arose from acts that injured the victim. Therefore, there was no error in this finding.

Perez next contended that vacation and sick leave are not compensable under the Restitution Act (the Act) because the loss of leave is not a pecuniary loss. The court of appeals concluded that expenditure of vacation and sick leave is a loss of employee benefits comparable to lost wages that is compensable under the Act.

Lastly, Perez contended that the court erred in calculating his restitution to the victim by five work days. The award of an additional five days of missed work was not supported by the record and results in a windfall to the victim, and must be reduced.

The order was affirmed in part and the case was remanded for reduction of the restitution award.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Administrative Fire Chief Engaged in Fire Protection Duties Under FPPA

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Dolan v. Fire & Police Pension Association on Thursday, April 20, 2017.

FirefighterInjuryOccupational Disability BenefitsFire and Police Pension AssociationPolicemen’s and Firemen’s Pension Reform ActFire ChiefAmended Complaint.

Dolan joined North Metro Fire Rescue in 1986, and in 2007, he sustained an injury that prevented him from passing the physical tests for firefighting duties. After approximately two years of attempted rehabilitation, North Metro terminated Dolan. Dolan promptly filed for occupational disability benefits with the Fire and Police Pension Association (FPPA).

While working for North Metro, Dolan also worked for the Elk Creek Fire Protection District: he was Elk Creek’s paid fire chief from 1998 through 2003; he returned as a volunteer in 2008; and in 2010, he was again hired as a paid fire chief.

Dolan initially received disability benefits, but these were later revoked based on a finding that because his position at Elk Creek had involved fire protection, he was ineligible for benefits under the Policemen’s and Firemen’s Pension Reform Act (the Act). A hearing officer recommended that Dolan repay the benefits he received after he signed his employment contract with Elk Creek in 2010, and the FPPA’s Board of Director’s (Board) affirmed the recommendation. Dolan filed for C.R.C.P. review of the Board’s decision in district court and also asserted several common law claims against FPPA. The district court affirmed the Board’s decision. Dolan then moved to amend his complaint, which was denied as untimely, and a trial was held on his remaining common law claims. The court found for FPPA and entered final judgment against Dolan.

On appeal, Dolan argued that the Board and the district court misapplied the law in discontinuing his disability benefits because, since his termination from North Metro, he was never re-employed in a position directly involved with the provision of fire protection under the Act. Re-employment in a full-time salaried position that directly involves the provision of fire protection precludes a firefighter from collecting disability benefits. Because Dolan acted in a command capacity at the scenes of fires and accidents, the hearing officer concluded it was not necessary to find that he was involved in “hands on” firefighting or medical care to conclude that his position was directly involved with the provision of fire protection. The Board adopted the hearing officer’s conclusions of fact and law that Dolan’s duties as Elk Creek fire chief directly involved fire protection. Because nothing in the Act suggests that re-employment at a position directly involved with the provision of fire protection must be limited to physically fighting fires, the district court and the Board did not misapply the law in determining that Dolan was no longer eligible for disability benefits after re-employment at Elk Creek.

Dolan also argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to amend his complaint when it determined his claim was untimely. Dolan sought leave to amend his complaint on August 30, 2013, approximately one year after he filed his initial complaint, seven months after the district court initially found in favor of the FPPA, and four months after the district court finalized its C.R.C.P. 106 order. Because Dolan presented the district court with an as-applied challenge to the FPPA regulations, the court correctly determined that claim was time barred by C.R.C.P. 106(b). Further, even if Dolan’s claim presented a facial challenge to the FPPA regulations, the court’s denial of his claim was not error because Dolan failed to show that his delay in bringing the claim was justified.

The judgment was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Announcement Sheet, 4/27/2017

On Thursday, April 27, 2017, the Colorado Court of Appeals issued no published opinion and 33 unpublished opinions.

Neither State Judicial nor the Colorado Bar Association provides case summaries for unpublished appellate opinions. The case announcement sheet is available here.

Tenth Circuit: Unpublished Opinions, 4/26/2017

On Wednesday, April 26, 2017, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued no published opinion and five unpublished opinions.

Craine v. National Science Foundation

Kincaid v. Bear

United States v. Batton

United States v. Thomas

Baker v. City of Loveland

Case summaries are not provided for unpublished opinions. However, some published opinions are summarized and provided by Legal Connection.