September 24, 2017

Tenth Circuit: 18 U.S.C. § 3583 Allows Sentences Greater than One Year for Violations of Terms of Supervised Release

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in United States v. Collins on Tuesday, February 14, 2017.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had to determine if the maximum allowable term of incarceration following a second violation of the terms of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) refers to the original crime or the violation of the terms of the supervised release. Howard Collins was originally convicted of a Class B felony for knowingly and intentionally distributing more than five grams of (in this case) crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(ii). After his initial period of incarceration, he was granted supervised release. After violating his supervised release once before, upon his second violation of the terms of his release, the court sentenced him to one-year re-incarceration under the belief that § 3583(e)(3) permitted a one-year maximum term.

Section 3583(e)(3) stipulates the maximum allowable period of re-incarceration where supervised release has been revoked is the length of the supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in the supervised release. On appeal, the government asserted that the district court improperly read the statute to preclude a re-incarceration period over one year. The government argued that the language of the statute relating to the “offense that resulted in such term of supervised release” referred to the original offense for which Collins was convicted (which would allow for a three year maximum), not the violation of his supervised release. In interpreting the statute, the court noted that revocation of supervised release, while often leading to incarceration, is not in and of itself a crime and is only subject to a preponderance of the evidence standard. As incarceration for a criminal offense under a standard less than beyond a reasonable doubt would be a violation of the Due Process Clause, the court reasoned that the “offense” referenced in the statute was the original offense for which Collins was charged.

Looking to the holding in the Supreme Court case of Kellogg Brown & Root Servs. Inc. v. United States ex rel. Carter, the court stated that the interpretation of the term “offense” to be the original offense for which someone was convicted is applicable to the entirety of Title 18, (at issue here). At the outset, Collins argues that the court’s interpretation of the term original must, in his case, relate to his violation of the terms of supervised release because the phrase “resulted in” requires actual causation, and “but for” his first violation of supervised release he would no longer be on a term of supervised release to violate. The court rejects this contention, stating that Collins’ reading of the statute and the holding in Burrage v. United States to require actual and proximate cause, if adopted, would require the court to to over look the aforementioned due process issues. Furthermore, the court states that ‘but-for’ his original conviction, he could not have been sentenced to a term of supervised release upon either revocation.

In further opposition to the court’s interpretation, Collins supports his own interpretation by asserting that the statutory history of § 3583(e)(3) and (h), including its cross-reference to § 3553(a)(1) leads to an interpretation that the term ‘offense’ means violation of his supervised release. The court, again citing Kellogg to reject Collins’ interpretation, said that because the term ‘offense’ under Title 18 has been interpreted to mean the original offense for which he was convicted, the cross-reference to § 3553 (a)(1) would also carry that interpretation. In Collins’ final challenge to the court’s interpretation, he asserted that because prior to a 1994 amendment the statute referred to “the offense for which the person was convicted” (emphasis added), as opposed to the current iteration that replaced ‘convicted’ with ‘offense’, Congress specifically intended to include violations of the terms of statutory release. The court also rejected these arguments under Kellogg, stating that because Title 18 refers to crimes as the original ‘offense’, the term must be given the same meaning throughout the statutory scheme. Furthermore, the court added, the amendment worked to actually expand the sentencing court’s authority, and an interpretation that limited the court’s ability to sentence a term of imprisonment for revocation of supervised release would be inconsistent with that intention.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the sentencing order of one-year, and remanded the case with the instruction that the court vacate its revocation judgment and resentence Collins.

Print Friendly, PDF & Email

Speak Your Mind

*