December 11, 2017

Archives for September 8, 2017

Lawyers Run for Kids on October 1, 2017

Run for a good cause! The 2017 Hot Chocolate 5K/15K will take place on October 1, 2017. You can support the Rocky Mountain Children’s Law Center while you run — the Children’s Law Center arranged with Hot Chocolate to invite you, your business, and its clients to run in a fun and chocolate-filled race against other businesses in the Denver metro area. Join Lawyers Run for Kids with employees or clients to race against other businesses for bragging rights, all while making a difference in a child’s life.

The Children’s Law Center Lawyers Run for Kids lets you:

  • Create teams with your colleagues and build office camaraderie (we encourage professionals in all work
    sectors and industries to participate!)
  • Invite your clients to join you for a fun, relationship-building event
  • Race against other businesses for fabulous prizes – there’s more than one way to win!
  • Run with your friends and make a tax-deductible donation through your sponsorship to help the kids we serve!

Perks for you:

  • Every runner will receive a Lawyers Run for Kids tech t-shirt, with all teams business logos on back of shirt
  • Hot Chocolate Swag including a soft, tech-fabric pullover, goodie bag, chocolate medal and finish line hot chocolate fondue and dippers
  • Children’s Law Center prizes for fastest (and slowest) male, female and coed teams as well as an elite prize for the firm with the most teams
  • Prominent recognition via: Law week Colorado post-race color ad, Children’s Law Center social media platforms, website, & quarterly newsletter
  • Special rates for government employees, non-profit employees, and CLC Junior Board members!

Registration information is available here. Register individuals and teams by September 13 in order to have your logo printed on the Lawyers Run for Kids shirt. Click here to register, and use coupon code MTQJYBFMQP to have your registration completed by the Children’s Law Center.

Tenth Circuit: Protective Sweep Not Permissible Absent Suspicion of Another Person Hiding in Home

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in United States v. Nelson on Thursday, August 17, 2017.

A warrant was issued for the arrest of Stephen M. Nelson after he violated terms of his probation. Although Nelson’s whereabouts were originally unknown, the United States Marshals Service were informed that Nelson often spent time at a home owned by Antonio Bradley. Bradley was instructed to inform the Deputy Marshal when Nelson arrived at his home, which Bradley ultimately did, giving consent for deputy marshals to “go inside and search for” Nelson.

Upon entry, the deputies searched three of the four levels of the home before one deputy saw movement on the first floor. One deputy began shouting for Nelson to come out and show himself. After Nelson complied with the orders, he was put into custody and brought to the second floor as one deputy searched the first floor. The deputy found two firearms under a pile of clothing on a bed. Because Nelson had two previous felony convictions, the government charged him with possession of a firearm by a felon.

Nelson moved to suppress the firearms charge, arguing that the deputies violated the Fourth Amendment by continuing to search the residence after arresting him. In response, the government made two arguments relevant on appeal: (1) Bradley, the owner of the residence, consented to the search; and (2) the deputy lawfully searched the first level under the protective-sweep doctrine. Under the first exception to the general rule that police must obtain a warrant to search a home, the police may, in conjunction with an arrest in a home, “as a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched.” Under the second exception, police may conduct a “protective sweep” beyond areas immediately adjoining the arrest if there are “articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.”

The district court concluded that the protective sweep was valid under the second prong. Nelson appeals, arguing that the district court erred in relying on the second prong because the deputy had no reason to believe that there was a third person hiding in the residence.

This court holds that under the second prong, the government is required to articulate specific facts giving rise to the inference of a dangerous third person’s presence. There could always be a dangerous person concealed within a structure, but that cannot justify a protective sweep. The government argues that the deputies were informed that there was another person in the home, which, this court finds, would be the sort of specific, articulable information that might have permitted the deputy to search the first level after arresting Nelson; however, for that information to be relevant, the deputy had to have it before he conducted the protective sweep, which he did not. The court found that the first-level search was not a valid protective sweep under the second prong.

Next, the government argues that the first prong validates the first-level search under two theories: (1) the deputies arrested Nelson on the first level, so the search of the bed on that level occurred immediately adjacent to the arrest; and (2) even if the deputies arrested Nelson on the second level, the first level nevertheless immediately adjoins the second level. This court declines to consider the arguments, as the government failed to make the specific arguments below, and courts do not generally address arguments presented for the first time on appeal.

The government then argues that Owens’ search “was close enough to the line of validity that an objectively reasonable officer would have acted” in the same way. The court declines to consider this argument because the Supreme Court has “limited [the good-faith] exception to circumstances where someone other than a police officer has made the mistaken determination that resulted in the Fourth Amendment violation.” The government neither suggests that the deputies relied on a third party’s mistake in deciding to search the first level, nor explains why this case might present the “very unusual circumstances” that would convince us to “extend th[e] good-faith exception beyond its pedigree.”

Finally, the government argues that Bradley consented to a search of his entire residence. Whether a search remains within the boundaries of the consent is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances by the trial court. Although the government raised this argument below, the district court declined to conduct the fact finding necessary for us to resolve this issue on appeal. We therefore remand for it to do so.

The Tenth Circuit VACATED the district court’s order denying Nelson’s motion to suppress and REMANDED for the district court to determine whether the deputies exceeded the scope of Bradley’s consent when they continued searching his residence after they arrested Nelson.

Tenth Circuit: Unpublished Opinions, 9/7/2017

On Thursday, September 7, 2017, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued one published opinion and no unpublished opinions.

Case summaries are not provided for unpublished opinions. However, some published opinions are summarized and provided by Legal Connection.