October 20, 2017

Colorado Court of Appeals: District Court Erred in Calculating Defendant’s Presentence Confinement Credit

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Jim on Thursday, September 21, 2017.

Sentencing—Presentence Confinement Credit—Residential Community Corrections Placement.

Defendant was sentenced to 18 months in community corrections. He escaped two months after reporting to community corrections. Following his arrest, the district court resentenced him to 18 months in the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC), and he was given 67 days of presentence confinement credit (PSCC) for the time he was confined in the county jail before his initial sentencing and 23 days of PSCC for the time he spent in jail between his arrest and resentencing. The court denied defendant’s request for PSCC related to the time he spent in community corrections because he had escaped.

On appeal, defendant contended and the People conceded that the court erred by not awarding him PSCC for the time he spent in the residential community corrections program. Time spent by a defendant in jail, in a DOC facility, or as a resident in a community corrections facility constitutes confinement under C.R.S. § 18-1.3-405, because those facilities limit an individual’s liberty. Thus, when a defendant is resentenced to DOC custody after revocation of a direct sentence to community corrections, he is entitled to credit for time served in a residential community corrections placement. Here, defendant is entitled to 62 days of PSCC for the 62 days he spent in a residential community correction placement. Further, his escape from community corrections did not negate his right to PSCC because C.R.S. §18-1.3-301(1)(k) does not apply to PSCC awards.

The order was reversed and the was case remanded for the district court to correct the mittimus to reflect that defendant is entitled to a total of 152 days of PSCC.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Trial Court Not Required to Impose Consecutive Sentences for Attempted Murder Counts

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Espinoza on Thursday, September 21, 2017.

Arson—Attempted Murder—Custody—Motion to Suppress—Consecutive Sentences—Identical Evidence—Crime of Violence—Concurrent Sentences—Discretion.

Espinoza set fire to an apartment complex. As part of the investigation, police transported Espinoza to the police station, where he waited for several hours before being interviewed. Police ended the interview when Espinoza invoked his right to counsel. Espinoza filed a motion to suppress his statements from the videotaped interview with police, alleging that he was in custody and police failed to give him Miranda warnings. The trial court denied the motion. A jury found Espinoza guilty of 10 counts of attempted murder, 23 counts of first degree arson, 10 crime of violence counts, and multiple misdemeanors.

On appeal, Espinoza contended that the trial court failed to consider several factors in finding that he was not in custody at the police station, including the several-hour wait in the interview room, the presence of two armed detectives during the interview, and the confrontational question near the end of the interview. The record showed that Espinoza agreed to speak with the detectives, consented to a pat-down search, and rode unrestrained to the police station. The detectives told Espinoza that he was not under arrest and was free to leave, Espinoza was not physically restrained, and the tone of the interview was conversational. The trial court’s detailed factual findings, supported by the record, show that Espinoza was not in custody when interviewed by the detectives.

Espinoza next contended that the trial court misapprehended the applicable law when it ruled that it was required to impose consecutive sentences for his attempted first degree murder convictions. Despite naming different victims, Espinoza’s 10 attempted murder convictions were supported by identical evidence because the same evidence (the single act of fire-setting) formed the basis of each conviction. The court of appeals held that separately named victims do not create separate crimes of violence under C.R.S. § 18-1.3-406(1)(a) when identical evidence supports each conviction, and in such circumstances, a court has discretion to impose concurrent sentences under C.R.S. § 18-1-408(3). Here, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences under the mistaken belief that it had no discretion to impose concurrent sentences.

The judgments of conviction were affirmed. The sentence was vacated, and the case was remanded for resentencing.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Unlawful Sexual Contact is Lesser Included Offense of Sexual Assault

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Page v. People on Monday, September 11, 2017.

Double Jeopardy—Lesser Included Offenses.

In this case, the supreme court considered whether unlawful sexual contact is a lesser included offense of sexual assault. Because establishing the elements of sexual assault by means of penetration necessarily establishes the elements of unlawful sexual contact, the Court concluded that unlawful sexual contact is a lesser included offense of sexual assault. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case with instructions to vacate defendant’s conviction for unlawful sexual contact.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Prospective Juror’s Silence Properly Construed as Rehabilitation

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Clemens on Monday, September 11, 2017.

Juror Rehabilitation—Voir Dire—Silence.

In this case, the Colorado Supreme Court considered whether a prospective juror’s silence in response to rehabilitative questioning constitutes evidence sufficient to support a trial court’s conclusion that the juror has been rehabilitated. The court concluded that it does when, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the context of that silence indicates that the juror will render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence submitted to the jury at the trial. The court further concluded that, applying this test, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defense counsel’s challenges for cause. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals was reversed.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: No Rational Basis Existed in Evidence to Grant Lesser Included Offense Instruction Request

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Naranjo on Monday, September 11, 2017.

Criminal Law—Lesser Non-Included Offenses—Jury Instructions.

The supreme court reviewed the court of appeals’ opinion reversing defendant’s convictions for felony menacing on the ground that defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser non-included offense of disorderly conduct with a deadly weapon. Under the supreme court’s case law, a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a lesser non-included offense where there exists a rational basis in the evidence to simultaneously acquit the defendant of the greater charged offense and convict the defendant of the lesser offense. Here, based on the evidence presented at trial, there was no rational basis for the jury to simultaneously acquit defendant of felony menacing and convict him of disorderly conduct. The court of appeals’ judgment was reversed.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Denial of Defendant’s Requested Lesser Included Offense Instruction Not Harmless Error

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Rock on Monday, September 11, 2017.

Criminal Law—Lesser Included Offenses.

The People sought review of the court of appeals’ judgment reversing Rock’s convictions for second degree burglary and theft. The trial court denied Rock’s request for an additional, lesser included offense instruction on second degree criminal trespass on the ground that second degree criminal trespass is not an included offense of second degree burglary. The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals’ reversal. The court held that (1) the district court erred in denying Rock her requested instruction on second degree criminal trespass on the ground that it was not a lesser included offense of the charged offense of second degree burglary, and (2) erroneously denying Rock’s requested instruction was not harmless with regard to either of her convictions.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Damages Clause Not Void Where Non-offending Party Offered Choice of Actual or Liquidated Damages

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Ravenstar, LLC v. One Ski Hill Place, LLC on Monday, September 11, 2017.

Freedom of Contract—Liquidated Damages Clauses—Contractual Damages.

In this case, the Colorado Supreme Court considered whether a liquidated damages clause in a contract is invalid because the contract gives the non-breaching party the option to choose between liquidated damages and actual damages. The court concluded that such an option does not invalidate the clause. Instead, parties are free to contract for a damages provision that allows a non-breaching party to elect between liquidated damages and actual damages. However, such an option must be exclusive, meaning a party who elects to pursue one of the available remedies may not pursue the alternative remedy set forth in the contract. Therefore, under the facts of this case, the liquidated damages clause in the contracts at issue is enforceable. Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: 42 U.S.C. § 1988 Damages Not Properly Awarded Under Colorado Election Code

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Frazier v. Williams, Colorado Secretary of State on Monday, September 11, 2017.

Election Proceedings under C.R.S. § 1-1-113—42 U.S.C. § 1983—Supremacy Clause.

The Colorado Supreme Court held that claims brought under C.R.S. § 1-1-113 are limited to those alleging a breach or neglect of duty or other wrongful act under the Colorado Election Code. The language of C.R.S. § 1-1-113 limits claims that may be brought to those alleging a breach or neglect of duty or other wrongful act under “this code,” meaning the Colorado Election Code. The court emphasized that Colorado courts remain entirely open for adjudication of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) claims, including on an expedited basis if a preliminary injunction is sought, and therefore C.R.S. § 1-1-113 does not run afoul of the Supremacy Clause. To the extent that Brown v. Davidson, 192 P.3d 415 (Colo. App. 2006), holds to the contrary, it is overruled.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: § 1983 Claim May Not Be Brought in Colorado Election Code Proceeding

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Williams, Colorado Secretary of State v. Libertarian Party of Colorado on Monday, September 11, 2017.

Election Proceedings under C.R.S. § 1-1-113—42 U.S.C. § 1983—Supremacy Clause.

As held in Frazier v. Willaims, 2017 CO 85, ___ P.3d ___, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) claim may not be brought in a proceeding under C.R.S. § 1-1-113.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Restitution Statute Does Not Require Prosecution’s Requested Specificity for Setoff

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Stanley on Thursday, September 7, 2017.

Traffic Accident—Unapportioned Settlement—Crime Victim Compensation Program—Restitution—Setoff—Burden of Proof.

Stanley’s automobile insurer, Geico Indemnity Co. (Geico), entered into a “Release in Full of All Claims” (release) with the victim and her husband. Under the settlement, Geico paid the victim $25,000 for all claims related to and stemming from the accident in exchange for a full and final release of all claims against Stanley and Geico. Thereafter, Stanley pleaded guilty to felony vehicular assault, driving under the influence, and careless driving. The prosecution filed a motion to impose restitution and attached a report from the Crime Victim Compensation Program (CVCP). It showed that the CVCP had paid the victim $30,000, the maximum amount allowable by statute, for pecuniary losses proximately caused by Stanley’s criminal conduct. The Court awarded Stanley a $25,000 setoff against restitution for the amount paid by Geico, and ordered him to pay the $5,000 net amount.

On appeal, the prosecution argued that Stanley should not receive a setoff for the settlement funds because the release was an unapportioned settlement that did not “earmark” the proceeds for the same expenses compensated by the CVCP, leaving open the possibility that the victim used the proceeds for losses not compensated by the CVCP. When a victim receives compensation from a civil settlement against a defendant, the defendant may request a setoff against restitution “to the extent of any money actually paid to the victim for the same damages.” For purposes of a setoff, however, the court cannot allocate proceeds from an unapportioned civil settlement agreement without “specific evidence that the settlement included particular categories of loss,” because in civil cases victims may recover both pecuniary losses covered by the restitution statute and other damages specifically excluded under the restitution statute. Because the information needed to determine whether a victim has been fully compensated or has received a double recovery is known only by the victim, once a defendant has shown that a civil settlement includes the same categories of losses or expenses as compensated by the CVCP and awarded as restitution, the defendant has met his burden of going forward, and the prosecution may then rebut the inference that a double recovery has occurred. Here, Stanley met his burden of proving a setoff, but the victim may have used some or all of the settlement proceeds for losses not compensated by the CVCP.

The order was affirmed, and the case was remanded to permit the prosecution to show that the victim did not receive a double recovery from the settlement proceeds and the CVCP payment.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Payment Obligation Under Marital Agreement Terminates at Death of Either Party

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in In re Estate of Williams on Thursday, September 7, 2017.

Dissolution of Marriage—Premarital Agreement—Separation Agreement—Maintenance—Estate.

Husband and wife executed a premarital agreement providing that husband would pay wife “during her lifetime” and wife would be entitled to receive from husband “during her lifetime” monthly payments on the filing of a petition for dissolution. In exchange for the monthly payments, wife waived maintenance. Husband and wife’s marriage ended in 1996, and husband consistently made monthly payments to wife under their separation agreement until his death. When husband’s estate refused to continue making the payments, wife filed the underlying action. The district court ruled that the premarital and separation agreements obligated the estate to continue making the monthly payments to wife until her death or remarriage. The court also awarded wife attorney fees and costs under the prevailing party provisions of the agreements.

On appeal, the estate contended that the district court erred in ruling that husband’s obligation under the premarital and separation agreements to make monthly payments to wife survived his death as an obligation of his estate. The premarital and separation agreements reflect agreement regarding the duration of the monthly payments relative to the life or marital status of the wife, but say nothing about what would happen on husband’s death. The separation agreement also released the parties and their estates from claims and demands. Therefore, husband’s personal obligation to pay ended when he died, absent a clear indication to the contrary, which neither the premarital nor separation agreement provided.

The estate also contended that the district court erroneously awarded wife attorney fees and costs and that it should have been awarded its own attorney fees under the prevailing party provisions of the agreements. The Colorado Court of Appeals agreed.

The order and judgments were reversed and the case was remanded with directions.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: UCCJEA Required Trial Court to Conduct Further Inquiries Before Assuming Jurisdiction

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People in Interest of C.L.T. on Thursday, September 7, 2017.

Termination of Parental Rights—Dependency and Neglect—Jurisdiction—Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act—Emergency Jurisdiction.

C.L.T., a child, was adjudicated dependent and neglected. Thereafter, the Denver Department of Health and Human Services moved to terminate the parental rights of mother and father, alleging that they had not complied with their treatment plans and that both of them were unfit parents. The trial court found that although reasonable efforts had been made to rehabilitate mother, her treatment plan had not been successful, she was not fit to parent the child, and she was not likely to become fit within a reasonable period of time. The court made similar findings regarding father. Then it terminated the parental rights of both mother and father.

On appeal, mother contended that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to terminate her parental rights because it failed to comply with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). She argued that because a child welfare case remained open in Texas when the Colorado case was filed, the Colorado court could exercise only emergency jurisdiction unless and until it acquired ongoing jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. The information in the record, which was limited but contained at least some indication that the court may not have had the requisite jurisdiction, was insufficient to establish whether the trial court had jurisdiction to enter any order beyond the temporary emergency order.

The judgment was vacated, and the case was remanded for the trial court to undertake further inquiries about proceedings concerning the child in other states, confer with courts in other states as appropriate, and make express findings about its UCCJEA jurisdiction.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.