May 25, 2013

Tenth Circuit: Denial of Qualified Immunity Affirmed in Excessive Force Case

The Tenth Circuit published its opinion in Roosevelt-Hennix v. Prickett on Thursday, May 16, 2013.

Officer Shane Prickett of the Florence City Police Department used a taser on Lara Roosevelt-Hennix while Roosevelt-Hennix’s hands were cuffed behind her back and she was seated in the back seat of a police car. Roosevelt-Hennix brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Prickett subjected her to excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Prickett asserted qualified immunity, which the district court denied, thus giving Pickett the right to this interlocutory appeal.

The district court did not set out which opposing set of facts it relied on in denying Pickett’s motion for summary judgment. Pickett asserted that Roosevelt-Hennix actively resisted an order to place her legs outside the police vehicle so he could “hobble” her; Roosevelt-Hennix asserted that she informed the officers she could not physically move her legs to the requested position due to a back condition. She also asserted that the officers did not attempt to help her move her legs before tasing her. After Pickett forcefully hobbled her, the plaintiff became paralyzed and required surgery the next day.

The Tenth Circuit found that Pickett’s counsel failed in his duty of candor to the court by making factual contentions unsupported by the record. The court also urged district courts to set out which facts they have assumed in deciding summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The court drew all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor in finding “sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude Roosevelt-Hennix informed the officers she was physically unable to comply with their request to move her feet outside the patrol vehicle. It likewise contains sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude the officers never attempted to aid Roosevelt-Hennix in moving her feet before applying the taser.” The denial of summary judgment was affirmed.

Tenth Circuit: Summary Judgment for Defendants Affirmed in ADA Case

The Tenth Circuit published its opinion in Koessel v. Sublette County Sheriff’s Dep’t on Tuesday, May 14, 2013.

Kevin Koessel was terminated from his position as a deputy sheriff in Sublette County, Wyoming. In response, Koessel brought a suit in district court against the Sheriff and the County alleging they violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), breached his employment contract, and violated his substantive and procedural due process rights. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Koessel had a stroke in 2001 and was placed on administrative leave while he recovered. He eventually was cleared by his doctor for full-time work with a restriction of no overtime. He worked a desk job, although he was permitted to make traffic stops during his 40-mile commute. After his return to full-time work, some officers complained about Koessel to the Sheriff. One complaint was that he forgot a word during a traffic stop and became flustered. Others complained he lost his temper while on duty. In April 2009, the Sheriff placed Koessel on administrative leave and ordered him to undergo a medical examination by a neurologist, Dr. Moress. Dr. Moress found that “[s]trictly from a neurological standpoint he would be able to work, but there are potential problems to cognitive functioning that may have resulted from the stroke and should be investigated.”

At Moress’s recommendation, Koessel was seen by a psychologist, Dr. Enright, who gave him a standardized test. Koessel’s score was unchanged from when he had taken it pre-stroke. Dr. Enright recommended Koessel be placed in a position without high stress or regular contact with the public because his “‘mild to moderate fatigue, episodes of lightheadedness and episodes of emotional disinhibition (weeping)’ could interfere with the performance of some of his patrol officer duties.”

After returning to a different temporary job for a few weeks, Koessel was again placed on leave and then terminated. The termination letter stated the reason for termination was because Koessel was not medically cleared to perform any available position in the Sheriff’s office. The letter told Koessel he had five days to file a written request for a hearing, which he did not do.

On appeal, Koessel argued that the defendants fired him based on a perceived disability when he was not actually disabled. Despite the fact that this case was filed after the effective date of the ADAAA, the Tenth Circuit used the old definition of perceived as disabled. This ultimately made no difference in outcome because the court decided it need not address whether Koessel was disabled or perceived as disabled because he failed to show he could perform the essential functions of the job. The court also found Koessel failed to identify a vacant position he could have been reassigned to as a reasonable accommodation.

Koessel’s breach of contract claim was based on Wyoming law requiring cause to terminate a deputy sheriff related to ability and fitness to perform his or her duties. The court found that cause was present and he received the required notice and opportunity to be heard. The court rejected Koessel’s procedural due process claim for similar reasons. Finally the court rejected Koessel’s substantive due process claim and affirmed summary judgment on all claims.

Tenth Circuit: 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion Challenging Federal Sentence Not Second Motion So Prior Authorization to File Not Required

The Tenth Circuit published its opinion in In re Weathersby on Tuesday, May 14, 2013.

Keith V. Weathersby filed a motion for authorization to file a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Weathersby was convicted of two federal drug offenses in March 2002 and sentenced to 292 months in prison. The Tenth Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. He then filed a § 2255 motion for relief that the district court dismissed as untimely. After filing other motions and appeals, Weathersby alleged he successfully attacked six state court convictions that were used in calculating his federal sentence and sought to file another § 2255 motion challenging his federal sentence.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) limits second or successive motions under § 2255, requires that a defendant obtain circuit-court authorization before filing a second or successive motion, and limits the grounds for authorization. The Tenth Circuit found persuasive the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in a similar case and held that if the state court did not vacate Weathersby’s convictions until after his first § 2255 proceeding was concluded, this motion would not be a second motion. Given that the basis for challenging his federal sentence did not exist until the state court vacated the sentences, his proposed § 2255 claim did not exist at the time of the first § 2255 motion. The court dismissed the motion for authorization as unnecessary.

Tenth Circuit: Unpublished Opinions, 5/16/13

On Thursday, May 16, 2013, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued one published opinion and five unpublished opinions.

United States v. Embry

Berendes v. Geico Casualty Co.

Navarro v. Holder

Chambers v. Medina

Harmon v. Parnell

No case summaries are provided for unpublished opinions. However, published opinions are summarized and provided by Legal Connection.

Tenth Circuit: Unpublished Opinions, 5/15/13

On Wednesday, May 15, 2013, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued no published opinions and two unpublished opinions.

Parkhurst v. Wilson

Heinrich v. City of Casper

No case summaries are provided for unpublished opinions. However, published opinions are summarized and provided by Legal Connection.

Tenth Circuit: Unpublished Opinions, 5/14/13

On Tuesday, May 14, 2013, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued two published opinions and six unpublished opinions.

Thurman v. Martin

Goddard v. Heldt

United States v. Hamilton

Green v. Snyder

United States v. McConnel

United States v. Simpson

No case summaries are provided for unpublished opinions. However, published opinions are summarized and provided by Legal Connection.

Tenth Circuit: Denial of Application for Asylum Vacated

The Tenth Circuit published its opinion in Karki v. Holder on Tuesday, April 30, 2013.

Petitioner Narendra Raj Karki, a native and citizen of Nepal, petitioned for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming an order of the immigration judge (IJ) that denied his application for asylum and restriction on removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT).

Karki argued that the BIA and IJ erred in concluding he failed to show past persecution, a well-founded fear of future persecution, and a nexus between the alleged persecution and his political opinion. Karki had presented evidence that he was beaten badly by a group of Maoists who attacked him because of his political opinions. He also presented evidence that a vehicle in which he should have been traveling was bombed by the Maoists and that he was their intended target. The BIA concluded that the Maoists’ actions toward Karki were motivated only by their desire to extort money or recruit him and that “[t]he record does not reflect that Maoists had the intention to persecute [Petitioner] even partly because of his political opinion or a political opinion imputed to him.” The Tenth Circuit held that this conclusion was incorrect so the BIA’s decision could not be upheld on that ground.

The court also held that Karki “suffered past persecution, giving rise to a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution.” The court granted Karki’s petition for review and remanded the case for determination of “whether Petitioner’s past persecution was sufficiently severe that he did not need to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution, and, if not, (2) whether changed country conditions or the possibility of internal relocation are sufficient to rebut the presumption that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”

Karki also argued that the BIA and IJ erred in concluding he had not established his entitlement to relief under the CAT. The IJ and BIA concluded that Karki was not entitled to relief because he had not demonstrated that government officials would be likely to acquiesce in his torture upon his return to Nepal. Karki presented evidence that the Nepalese government is aware of and does not prevent frequent acts of torture committed by Maoists. Karki was not required to show the government would turn a blind eye to specific threats of torture against him in particular.

The court vacated BIA’s affirmance of the ALJ’s decision and remanded on both the petition for asylum and the CAT claim.

Tenth Circuit: Unpublished Opinions, 5/2/13

On Thursday, May 2, 2013, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued no published opinions and one unpublished opinion.

United States v. Hee

No case summaries are provided for unpublished opinions. However, published opinions are summarized and provided by Legal Connection.

Tenth Circuit: Unpublished Opinions, 5/1/13

On Wednesday, May 1, 2013, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued no published opinions and three unpublished opinions.

Grissom v. Werholtz

United States v. Rodriguez

Ehimika v. Astrue

No case summaries are provided for unpublished opinions. However, published opinions are summarized and provided by Legal Connection.

Tenth Circuit: Federal Court Had No Power to Examine State Court Conviction Using Writ of Coram Nobis

The Tenth Circuit published its opinion in Rawlins v. State of Kansas on Tuesday, April 30, 2013.

Damaris Rawlins was convicted in 2001 in Kansas state court for battery of a police officer. The Kansas court sentenced Rawlins to three years’ probation. Rawlins timely challenged her conviction in the Kansas courts both through direct appeals and through Kansas’s collateral review system, arguing that certain constitutional errors tainted her conviction. Those state-court proceedings lasted for an unusually long period of time, finally concluding with a denial of relief in 2011. Because Rawlins was not in state custody (including probation) at the conclusion of her collateral review proceedings, she could not bring a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition in federal court. Rawlins therefore petitioned the District of Kansas for a writ of audita querela or, in the alternative, a writ of coram vobis. The Tenth Circuit discussed the history of these writs and chose to use the term coram nobis in its opinion.

The district court found the writ of audita querela was the writ that applied and denied her petition after examining her constitutional claims as if she had brought a § 2254 petition. The Tenth Circuit held that was the incorrect writ because audita querela addresses unanticipated situations that arise after judgment. Coram nobis, however, addresses defects that existed before the judgment, and United States v. Morgan makes clear that such defects include those that would otherwise be raised in habeas proceedings but for the petitioner no longer being in custody.

While Morgan permits federal courts to entertain coram nobis applications in “extraordinary cases presenting circumstances compelling its use to achieve justice,” it only applies to a federal court reopening its own case. A federal court cannot apply the writ to a state court case, or even another federal court. Because the district court had no power to examine Rawlins’ conviction, the Tenth Circuit vacated the decision and remanded for dismissal due to lack of jurisdiction.

Tenth Circuit: Unpublished Opinions, 4/30/13

On Tuesday, April 30, 2013, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued two published opinions and ten unpublished opinions.

Gibbons v. National Real Estate Investors

Davis v. Cline

Van Ross v. Shelton

Fleming v. Evans

Houck v. Gurich

Houck v. Heaton

QEP Energy Co. v. Sullivan

United States v. Walters

Allen v. Corrections Corp. of America

Ankeney v. Zavaras

No case summaries are provided for unpublished opinions. However, published opinions are summarized and provided by Legal Connection.

Tenth Circuit: Rules of Evidence Apply to Admission of First Trial’s Testimony at Second Trial; Dismissal Without Prejudice Proper for Violation for Speedy Trial Act

The Tenth Circuit published its opinion in United States v. Toombs on Friday, April 26, 2013.

In 2008, a jury found Marlo Toombs guilty on seven counts of drug and firearm felony offenses. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded his case for violations of the Speedy Trial Act. After the district court dismissed Toombs’ indictment without prejudice, the government filed a new indictment and a jury subsequently found Toombs guilty of six charges.

On appeal, Toombs argued that the district court abused its discretion by admitting his entire testimony from the first trial into evidence at the second trial. The Tenth Circuit held that while the district court should have evaluated the first trial testimony under the Rules of Evidence before admitting it in the second trial, the admission was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence against Toombs and the limiting instruction given.

Toombs also argued the district court erred by dismissing the first indictment without prejudice. After considering the factors contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) that govern dismissals for violation of the Speedy Trial Act, the court found no abuse of discretion in the decision to dismiss without prejudice. Toombs’ offenses were serious and he failed to establish the delay was “a result of intentional dilatory conduct or a pattern of neglect.”

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2013-05-25 10:56:59