June 28, 2017

Colorado Supreme Court: Announcement Sheet, 6/26/2017

On Monday, June 26, 2017, the Colorado Supreme Court issued three published opinions.

Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Corrections v. Fetzer

Mesa County Public Library District v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office

N.M. v. Trujillo

Summaries of these cases are forthcoming.

Neither State Judicial nor the Colorado Bar Association provides case summaries for unpublished appellate opinions. The case announcement sheet is available here.

Tenth Circuit: District Court Did Not Abuse Discretion in Refusing to Enforce Subpoena

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. TriCore Reference Laboratories on February 27, 2017.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is empowered to investigate charges of discrimination and enforce both Title VII, which prohibits employers from discriminating based on sex, including pregnancy, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, which prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of their disability and requires employers to make “reasonable accommodations” to qualified individuals. When investigating charges of discrimination, the EEOC may obtain evidence that relates to unlawful employment practices covered by Title VII and is relevant to the charge under investigation. If the employer refuses to comply, the EEOC may issue a subpoena compelling production. If the employer does not respond to the subpoena, the EEOC may apply to a federal district court for an order compelling the employer to comply.

Kellie Guadiana worked for TriCore Reference Laboratories as a phlebotomist. She requested accommodations due to her rheumatoid arthritis, which was exacerbated by her pregnancy. TriCore’s human resource department determined Ms. Guadiana could not perform the essential functions of her position safely. The HR department offered her the opportunity to apply to other positions within the company. When Ms. Guadiana did not apply to a new position, TriCore terminated her.

Ms. Guadiana filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC alleging that TriCore discriminated against her due to her disability (rheumatoid arthritis) and sex (pregnancy). TriCore explained to the EEOC that it had provided reasonable accommodations by offering her the chance to apply to a new position within the company. EEOC explained that this was a violation of the ADA because the ADA required TriCore to reassign Ms. Guadiana rather than merely provide her with the opportunity to apply to a new position. TriCore statement led the EEOC to suspect that TriCore had a company policy or practice of refusing to provide reassignment as a reasonable accommodation. Due to this, the EEOC informed TriCore in a letter that it was expanding the scope of its investigation to include the failure to accommodate persons with disabilities and failure to accommodate women with disabilities due to pregnancy.

The EEOC sent TriCore another letter requesting a complete list of TriCore employees who had requested an accommodation for disability and a complete list of TriCore employees who had been pregnant while at TriCore and whether they sought or were granted accommodations. TriCore refused to comply. The EEOC subpoenaed the information. When TriCore refused to comply, the EEOC submitted an application to the US District Court for the District of New Mexico requesting an order to show cause why the subpoena should not be enforced. The district court denied the EEOC’s application noting that the EEOC’s real intent in requesting the information was difficult to pin down.

The issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in declining to enforce the EEOC’s subpoena. The Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the enforcement of either the disability request, which the EEOC asserted was relevant to its investigation into whether TriCore had a policy of discrimination (i.e., pattern-or-practice evidence), or the pregnancy request, which EEOC asserted was relevant to the investigation whether TriCore treated Ms. Guadiana less favorably than similarly situated employees (i.e., comparator evidence).

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, the EEOC is empowered to investigate charges of discrimination. But the EEOC has the burden to demonstrate the relevancy of the information sought in a subpoena. The Tenth Circuit referenced the Supreme Court’s decision in University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, when stating the law that the EEOC does not need to provide a “specific reason” for requesting the information. However, the Tenth Circuit further cites that case for the law that the EEOC still bears the burden of showing the relevancy of the subpoenaed information.  To do so, the Tenth Circuit held that the EEOC must show that it has a realistic expectation that the information requested would advance the investigation. The EEOC must also establish a link between the EEOC’s investigatory power and the charges of discrimination.

The Tenth Circuit held that the EEOC’s intent was difficult to pin down. With regard to the pattern-or-practice evidence, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the EEOC’s request. The Tenth Circuit held that TriCore’s admission that it did not reassign Ms. Guadiana did not justify the EEOC’s expanded investigation beyond its initial investigation into Ms. Guadiana’s individual case. The Tenth Circuit held that the EEOC’s letter informing TriCore of its expanded investigation did not constitute a “charge” of discrimination, which is required under § 2000e-8 for the EEOC to seek information about alleged discrimination.  The EEOC had not alleged anything suggesting a pattern or practice of discrimination by TriCore. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding TriCore’s alleged violation of the ADA, without more, was insufficient to warrant the EEOC’s expanded investigation. The EEOC did not satisfy its burden to justify its expanded investigation.

Next, the Tenth Circuit held that the EEOC waived the disability request part of its comparator-evidence argument on appeal. This was due to the fact that the EEOC limited its comparator-evidence argument on appeal to the pregnancy request.  Therefore, the Tenth Circuit considered only the pregnancy request.

The Tenth Circuit held that the EEOC’s pregnancy request could seek information that was potentially relevant to Ms. Guadiana’s charge, which could tend to prove she was denied an accommodation on the basis of her disability. However, the EEOC did not present those relevance arguments in district court. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit held that the EEOC failed to meet its burden of explaining how the pregnancy request would offer information relevant to Ms. Guadiana’s charge. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding.

Tenth Circuit: Unpublished Opinions, 6/26/2017

On Monday, June 26, 2017, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued one published opinion and two unpublished opinions.

Vargas v. Bear

Wall v. Tanner Clinic

Case summaries are not provided for unpublished opinions. However, some published opinions are summarized and provided by Legal Connection.

Tenth Circuit: Unpublished Opinions, 6/23/2017

On Friday, June 23, 2017, the Tenth Circuit issued one published opinion and six unpublished opinions.

United States v. Arnold

Crespo-Gutierrez v. Resendiz Ramirez

Requena v. Sheridan

Kellams v. Berryhill

United States v. Delgado-Ornelas

Heard v. Chavez

Case summaries are not provided for unpublished opinions. However, some published opinions are summarized and provided by Legal Connection.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Multiple Errors from Prosecutorial Overreach Did Not Influence Outcome of Trial

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Howard-Walker on Thursday, June 15, 2017.

Batson Challenges—Peremptory Strikes—Jurors—Testimony—Expert Opinion—Lay Witness—Prosecutorial Misconduct—Jury Instructions—Cumulative Error Doctrine.

Defendant was charged with first degree burglary and conspiracy to commit first degree burglary. Among other evidence presented, his girlfriend and Detective Garcia testified at his trial. He was convicted as charged and sentenced.

On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred when it denied his challenges, under Batson v. Kentucky, to the prosecutor’s peremptory strikes excusing three prospective jurors—one who identified himself as African-American and two who identified themselves as Hispanic—asserting that the prosecutor’s “race-neutral” reasons for removing the jurors were not worthy of belief. One challenged juror was disinterested, the second juror had a negative experience with law enforcement and a belief that police officers sometimes misidentify suspects, and the third juror had previously faced criminal charges from the same district attorney’s office and had a negative view of law enforcement. Therefore, the trial court’s Batson findings are supported by the record.

Defendant next argued that the admission of several portions of Garcia’s testimony constituted reversible error: (1) Garcia was not admitted as an expert witness, but gave opinions regarding whether the gun depicted in the video surveillance was real. Although this was improper, it did not constitute plain error. (2) Garcia testified about the manner in which the gun was being used. Any error in admitting this testimony was harmless. (3) It was not error for Garcia to identify defendant. No specialized knowledge is necessary to recognize an individual in a video and this evidence was probative of a material fact. (4) Garcia testified regarding probable cause, which was not relevant; however, this was not plain error. (5) Garcia testified but had no personal information about the reasons why defendant’s girlfriend was crying during the police interview. This testimony was not obviously improper and did not undermine the fairness of the trial. (6) Garcia opined about defendant’s statement regarding another perpetrator. Even if this was improper, it did not undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial. (7) Garcia opined about the truthfulness of defendant’s statements to police. Though this testimony was improper, it does not rise to the level of plain error because there was other sufficient evidence to support his conviction.

Defendant next asserted that the prosecutor engaged in reversible misconduct. Although the prosecutor stepped over the line when he repeatedly suggested that the girlfriend was committing perjury, the prosecutor did not threaten or coerce her, and any misconduct was not reversible. The prosecutor also commented on the girlfriend’s truthfulness. The evidence supported a reasonable inference that her testimony was false, and thus these comments were proper. Finally, although the court did not condone the prosecutor’s comment on defendant’s decision not to testify, the comment did not amount to plain error.

Defendant further argued that the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the predicate crime of theft and when it failed to define the word “intent.” While the jury instructions were deficient, (1) the record demonstrates that the specification of the underlying crime was not a controverted element of the burglary offense; therefore, the court’s failure to instruct the jury on theft was not plain error, and (2) under the circumstances of this case, the court’s failure to define the culpable mental state similarly did not constitute plain error.

Finally, defendant argued that the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors and prosecutorial misconduct violated his right to a fair trial. The errors were relatively small events occurring over a two-day trial during which substantial evidence was presented. Defendant received a fair trial in spite of the identified errors.

The judgment was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Attempts to Tamper with Witness Need Not Actually be Communicated to Victim

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Brooks on Thursday, June 15, 2017.

Assault—Witness Tampering—Evidence—Attempt—Judicial Notice—Plea of Guilty—Grossly Disproportionate.

Brooks discovered that his girlfriend (the victim) was pregnant with another man’s child, and then argued with and assaulted her. While in jail, Brooks repeatedly telephoned the victim and others in an attempt to persuade them either to not testify against him on the domestic violence charge or to give false testimony. He also wrote letters to the victim to persuade her either to not testify or to testify falsely on his behalf. These letters were intercepted by a jail officer, and as a result, the victim did not receive them. Brooks was convicted of two counts of assault in the third degree against the victim, two counts of assault in the second degree against a peace officer, resisting arrest, violation of a protective order, and two counts of tampering with a witness or victim. The second tampering count was based on the letters. The court adjudicated Brooks a habitual criminal and imposed a mandatory 24-year sentence. Brooks requested and received an abbreviated proportionality review of the mandatory sentence. After that hearing the district court concluded that Brooks’s sentence was not disproportionate and denied him an extended proportionality review.

On appeal, Brooks argued that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the second count of tampering with a witness or victim based on the letters because the victim never received them. The tampering with a witness or victim statute does not require that the “attempt” to tamper actually be communicated to the victim or witness. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to convict Brooks on this charge.

Brooks also argued that the district court abused its discretion in taking judicial notice of the complete case files of his prior felony convictions and that without such improper judicial notice, there was insufficient evidence to support the habitual criminal adjudication. The registers of actions relevant to this case showed that Brooks’s two prior felony convictions were for distinct criminal offenses that occurred months apart. Thus, sufficient evidence supported his habitual criminal conviction.

Brooks further argued that his plea of guilty to felony theft from a person was constitutionally invalid and thus could not support his habitual criminal conviction. Brooks’s plea to theft was constitutionally valid because he entered it voluntarily and knowingly. The district court did not err in finding that it was a valid prior felony conviction under the habitual criminal statute.

Finally, Brooks argued that the district court erred in concluding that his sentence was not grossly disproportionate to his crimes and in not granting him an extended proportionality review. Tampering with a witness or victim is not a per se “grave or serious” offense. However, the facts underlying these crimes were grave or serious. The prosecution identified at least 250 phone conversations in which Brooks attempted to tamper with a witness or victim. Brooks continued tampering with the victim after the prosecution charged him with the first count of tampering and his phone privileges were discontinued. His conduct demonstrated a blatant disregard for the law and thus constituted a grave or serious offense. The Court of Appeals considered all of the convictions and the underlying circumstances as a whole and concluded that Brooks’s mandatory sentence was not grossly disproportionate.

The judgment and sentence were affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Tenth Circuit: Unpublished Opinions, 6/22/2017

On Thursday, June 22, 2017, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued no published opinion and five unpublished opinions.

Becker v. Cline

United States v. Burton

Rice v. Trump

Vernon v. Dickson

Farris v. Allbaugh

Case summaries are not provided for unpublished opinions. However, some published opinions are summarized and provided by Legal Connection.

Colorado Supreme Court: Self-Defense is Not Affirmative Defense to All Crimes Requiring Intent, Knowledge, or Willfulness

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Roberts v. People on Monday, June 19, 2017.

Affirmative Defenses—Traverses—Self-Defense—Harassment.

In this case, the supreme court reviewed the district court’s order affirming petitioner’s county court conviction for harassment. Petitioner asserted that pursuant to People v. Pickering, 276 P.3d 553 (Colo. 2011), self-defense is an affirmative defense to all crimes requiring intent, knowledge, or willfulness. She thus contended that (1) she was entitled to a self-defense affirmative defense instruction to the specific intent crime of harassment, and (2) the county court’s refusal to give such an instruction constituted reversible error. Because Pickering does not establish the broad, bright-line rule that petitioner asserts and thus does not require a trial court to give a self-defense affirmative defense instruction in every case requiring intent, knowledge, or willfulness, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Public Utilities Commission Properly Imposed Tariff After Billing Error

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Carestream Health, Inc. v. Colorado Public Utilities Commission on Monday, June 19, 2017.

Public Utilities—Tariffs—Standing—Injury-in-Fact.

In this appeal, the supreme court considered two issues from the district court’s review of a decision of the Colorado Public Utilities Commission. Both issues pertain to a billing error that led Public Service Company of Colorado to undercharge Carestream Health, Inc. for gas it received over the course of a three-year period. The first issue is whether the Commission properly interpreted Public Service’s tariff, specifically the requirement to “exercise all reasonable means” to prevent billing errors. The court concluded that determining what means are “reasonable,” as that term is used in the tariff, necessarily requires considering what errors are foreseeable. The court therefore held that the Commission properly interpreted the tariff and acted pursuant to its authority. The second issue is whether Carestream had standing to challenge Public Service’s use of its tariff to recover a portion of the undercharge from its general customer base. Because Carestream suffered no injury from that action, it lacks standing to challenge it. The court accordingly affirmed the district court’s judgment.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Announcement Sheet, 6/22/2017

On Thursday, June 22, 2017, the Colorado Court of Appeals issued no published opinion and 23 unpublished opinions.

Neither State Judicial nor the Colorado Bar Association provides case summaries for unpublished appellate opinions. The case announcement sheet is available here.

Tenth Circuit: Unpublished Opinions, 6/21/2017

On Wednesday, June 21, 2017, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued one published opinion and six unpublished opinions.

Pauly v. Vasquez

United States v. Hsu

United States v. Ortiz Fernandez

United States v. Rabieh

Collins v. Bear

United States v. Ramirez

Case summaries are not provided for unpublished opinions. However, some published opinions are summarized and provided by Legal Connection.

Colorado Supreme Court: Manufacturing Marijuana Prohibited for Individuals Under Amendment 64

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Lente on Monday, June 19, 2017.

State Constitutional Law—Personal Use of Marijuana.

The supreme court held that the prohibition on processing or manufacturing  marijuana or marijuana concentrate under C.R.S. § 18-18-406(2)(a)(I) is not unconstitutional as applied to Austin Lente, who used butane to extract hash oil from marijuana. Although “processing . . . marijuana plants” is a protected personal activity under Colorado’s Amendment 64, “manufacturing . . . marijuana” is protected only as a facility-operation activity that requires a license. At the time Amendment 64 was  approved, Colorado law established that extracting hash oil was manufacturing, not processing, and the supreme court assumes Amendment 64 adopted that settled meaning. Because Lente was unlicensed, he could not manufacture hash oil under cover of the constitution. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s order that ruled the statute is unconstitutional as applied to Lente.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.