June 18, 2018

Colorado Court of Appeals: Announcement Sheet, 6/14/2018

On Thursday, June 14, 2018, the Colorado Court of Appeals issued five published opinions and 36 unpublished opinions.

People v. Thompson

People v. Tee

People v. Sabell

Hogan v. Board of County Commissioners

City of Lafayette v. Town of Erie Urban Renewal Authority

Summaries of these cases are forthcoming.

Neither State Judicial nor the Colorado Bar Association provides case summaries for unpublished appellate opinions. The case announcement sheet is available here.

Tenth Circuit: Unpublished Opinions, 6/14/2018

On Thursday, June 14, 2018, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued one published opinion and one unpublished opinion.

Palomarez v. Young

Case summaries are not provided for unpublished opinions. However, some published opinions are summarized and provided by Legal Connection.

Colorado Supreme Court: Defendant’s Statements Admissible Under Two-Part Seibert Test

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Verigan v. People on Monday, June 11, 2018.

Suppression of Statements—Two-Step Interrogation—Plurality Supreme Court Opinions—Miranda Warnings.

This case required the supreme court to decide (1) whether the U.S. Supreme Court’s fractured opinion in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), created a precedential rule that could be applied to future cases, and (2) whether statements made by petitioner after she was given Miranda warnings should be suppressed because the statements were made after petitioner provided unwarned, incriminating statements to the police.

The court concluded that Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Seibert, which created an exception to the framework established in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), for cases involving a deliberate two-step interrogation aimed at undermining the efficiency of the Miranda warning, is the controlling precedent to be applied. Applying Justice Kennedy’s test here, the court concluded that the officers in this case did not engage in a two-step interrogation in a deliberate attempt to undermine the effectiveness of Miranda warnings provided to petitioner. Therefore, the court concluded that the Elstad framework applies, and because petitioner’s pre- and post-warning statements were indisputably voluntary, the court concluded that the division correctly determined that petitioner’s post-warning statements were admissible.

Accordingly, the court affirmed the court of appeals division’s judgment.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Arbitration Agreement Need Only Substantially Comply with Statutory Notice Requirements

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Colorow Health Care, LLC v. Fischer on Monday, June 11, 2018.

Health Care Availability Act—Statutory Construction—Alternative Dispute Resolution.

C.R.S. § 13-64-403 of the Health Care Availability Act governs arbitration agreements between patients and healthcare providers. Under C.R.S. § 13-64-403(4), such agreements must contain a certain notice to patients to help ensure that they enter the agreements voluntarily, and the notice must be emphasized by at least 10-point font and bold-faced type. The agreement here contained the notice in 12-point font, but it was not bold-faced. The court of appeals determined the statute requires strict compliance and that the agreement therefore failed for lack of bold-faced type.

The supreme court held that C.R.S. § 13-64-403 requires only substantial compliance. The court further concluded the agreement here substantially complied with the formatting requirements of C.R.S. § 13-64-403, notwithstanding its lack of bold-faced type. Accordingly, the court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Public Defender Lacks Statutory Authority to Represent Defendant in Civil Forfeiture Action

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in In re People v. Shank on Monday, June 11, 2018.

Public Defender Representation—Statutory Interpretation.

In this case, the supreme court determined whether the Office of the State Public Defender has statutory authority to represent an indigent defendant in a civil forfeiture matter. Reviewing the plain language of the relevant statutes, the court concluded that the Office of the State Public Defender was not statutorily authorized to enter its appearance in the underlying civil forfeiture matter.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Tenth Circuit: Unpublished Opinions, 6/13/2018

On Wednesday, June 13, 2018, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued no published opinion and two unpublished opinions.

Carns v. McNally

Amaro v. State of New Mexico

Case summaries are not provided for unpublished opinions. However, some published opinions are summarized and provided by Legal Connection.

Colorado Supreme Court: No Fraud Where Assignment Clause Made Clear that Buyers Could Assign Interests

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Rocky Mountain Exploration, Inc. v. Davis, Graham & Stubbs, LLP on Monday, June 11, 2018.

Undisclosed Principals—Fraud—Breach of Fiduciary Duty—Restatement (Third) of Agency.

This case arose out of a sale of oil and gas assets by petitioners to a buyer who was acting as an agent for a third company. The third company was represented by respondents, but due to a prior, contentious business relationship between petitioners and the third company, neither the buyer, the third company, nor respondents disclosed to petitioners that the buyer was acting on behalf of the third company in the sale.

After the sale was complete, petitioners learned of the third company’s involvement and sued respondents, among others, for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and civil conspiracy. The district court ultimately granted summary judgment for respondents, and a division of the court of appeals affirmed.

The supreme court here decided whether (1) petitioners could avoid their sale agreement for fraud when the buyer and respondents purportedly created the false impression that the buyer was not acting on behalf of the third company; (2) an assignment clause in the transaction documents sufficiently notified petitioners that the buyer was acting on behalf of others, such that the third company would not be considered an undisclosed principal under the Restatement provision on which petitioners’ contract avoidance argument is exclusively premised; (3) petitioners stated a viable claim for fraud against respondents; and (4) prior agreements between petitioners and the third company negated any joint venture relationship or fiduciary obligations between them.

The court first concluded that the assignment clause in the pertinent transaction documents made clear that the buyer had partners in the transaction to whom it could assign a portion of its interests. As a result, the third company was not an undisclosed principal under the Restatement provision on which petitioners’ rely, and petitioners’ contract avoidance argument and the civil conspiracy claim that flows from it fail as a matter of law. The court further concluded that, even if the Restatement provision did apply, the record did not support a finding that either the buyer or respondents created a false impression that the buyer was not acting on behalf of an undisclosed principal. For this reason as well, petitioners’ civil conspiracy claim failed as a matter of law.

The court next concluded that, as a matter of law, petitioners did not demonstrate the requisite false representation or reasonable reliance to support a viable claim for fraud against respondents.

Finally, the court concluded that the controlling agreements between petitioners and the third company expressly disavowed any pre-existing joint ventures and fiduciary obligations between the parties, and therefore the district court properly granted summary judgment for respondents on petitioners’ claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty.

Accordingly, the court affirmed the court of appeals division’s judgment.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: No Error in Court’s Refusal to Release Sealed Records to Newspaper

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in In re People v. Owens on Monday, June 11, 2018.

Constitutional Law — Public Access to Court Records.

In this original proceeding, the supreme court considered and rejected a news organization’s contention that a trial court erred in refusing to grant public access to certain records maintained under seal in a capital murder case. The court emphasized that, while presumptive access to judicial proceedings is a right recognized under both the state and federal constitutions, neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the Colorado Supreme Court has ever held that records filed with a court are treated the same way. The court thus declined the invitation to hold that unfettered access to criminal justice records is guaranteed by either the First Amendment or Article II, section 10 of the Colorado Constitution.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Tenth Circuit: Unpublished Opinions, 6/12/2018

On Tuesday, June 12, 2018, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued one published opinion and five unpublished opinions.

Wichita Fireman’s Relief Association v. Kansas City Life Insurance Co.

Chiddix Excavating, Inc. v. Colorado Springs Utilities

United States v. Howard

Davis v. Bryant

United States v. Molina-Varela

Case summaries are not provided for unpublished opinions. However, some published opinions are summarized and provided by Legal Connection.

Colorado Supreme Court: Announcement Sheet, 6/11/2018

On Monday, June 11, 2018, the Colorado Supreme Court issued five published opinions.

In re People v. Shank

Colorow Health Care, LLC v. Fischer

Verigan v. People

Rocky Mountain Exploration, Inc. v. Davis, Graham & Stubbs, LLP

In re People v. Owens

Summaries of these cases are forthcoming.

Neither State Judicial nor the Colorado Bar Association provides case summaries for unpublished appellate opinions. The case announcement sheet is available here.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Settlement Including Reduction for MedPay Amounts Enforceable Post-Calderon

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Arline v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. on Thursday, May 31, 2018.

Uninsured/Underinsured Settlement and Release Agreement—C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) Dismissal.

Arline submitted claims to American Family Mutual Insurance Company (American) under insurance policies that provided $5,000 in MedPay coverage and $50,000 in individual underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage. American paid $5,000 in MedPay benefits on Arline’s behalf and negotiated Arline’s damages under her UIM coverage to be $27,000, after subtracting the $5,000 in MedPay benefits already paid. In November 2015, Arline, represented by counsel, accepted the $27,000 payment and signed a release agreement (Agreement) releasing American under the UIM policy.

In November 2016, the Colorado Supreme Court held for the first time in Calderon v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 2016 CO 72, that C.R.S. § 10-4-609(1)(c) prohibits insurers from reducing the UIM benefits paid on a claim by the amount of MedPay benefits paid on that claim, which the court deemed a “setoff.” (Counsel in that case now represents Arline.)  Arline then sued American for breach of contract and seeking class certification, asserting that American had unlawfully reduced UIM payments using a MedPay setoff. American responded that the Agreement was a complete bar to the cause of action and moved to dismiss. The district court found the Agreement enforceable and granted American’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing.

On appeal, Arline argued that the district court erred in dismissing her complaint because American’s payment pursuant to the Agreement caused her to suffer an injury-in-fact to a legally protected interest. Though the supreme court held that C.R.S. § 10-4-609(1)(c) prohibits policy provisions allowing a setoff from other coverage, it did not hold that the statute extended to settlement agreements. An insured may agree to a settlement and release as long as the terms do not violate statutory prohibitions or public policy. If a release agreement is valid, dismissal of claims encompassed by the agreement is proper. Here, Arline entered into the Agreement voluntarily while represented by counsel who was fully informed that certiorari had been granted in Calderon. She negotiated her damages benefits and agreed that the UIM benefit amount paid compensated her sufficiently to warrant releasing American from any further claims. In addition, Colorado public policy favors the settlement of disputes when the settlement is fairly reached. Arline signed a valid release agreement that is not void as against public policy or prohibited by statute. The district court properly dismissed her claim.

The judgment was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Determining Ownership Requires Examining Right to Possess, Use, and Control Property

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Kelly v. Board of County Commissioners on Thursday, May 31, 2018.

Property Tax—Residential Land—Common Ownership—Vacant Land—C.R.S. § 39-1-102(14.4)(a).

Kelly purchased two adjacent parcels of land in Summit County. She built a home on one parcel and left the subject parcel vacant. Sometime later, Kelly placed the residential parcel in an irrevocable trust and the subject parcel in a revocable family trust. Kelly was the settlor, trustee, and beneficiary of both trusts.

For tax purposes, the Summit County Assessor classified the residential parcel as residential land but the subject parcel as vacant land, which is taxed at a higher rate. In 2016, Kelly appealed the subject parcel’s classification to the Summit County Board of County Commissioners, requesting that it be reclassified as residential under C.R.S. § 39-1-102(14.4)(a), and sought a tax abatement for the tax years 2014 and 2015. The County denied the petition. The Board of Assessment Appeals (BAA) affirmed, finding that because the two parcels were owned by two separate trusts, they were not commonly owned and therefore the subject parcel did not qualify under the statutory section.

On appeal, Kelly contended that the BAA erred in concluding that the subject parcel was not residential land. She argued that the BAA misconstrued the “common ownership” element of C.R.S. § 39-1-102(14.4)(a). The statute does not define common ownership, and the Property Tax Administrator has neither defined nor offered guidance to assessors on determining whether parcels are under common ownership. The BAA and the County interpreted “common ownership” to mean the same record titleholder. The court of appeals focused its analysis on the meaning of “ownership,” noting that ownership goes beyond mere record title and focuses on who has the power to possess, use, enjoy, and profit from the property. It concluded that ownership of contiguous parcels for purposes of C.R.S. § 39-1-102(14.4)(a) depends on a person’s or entity’s right to possess, use, and control the contiguous parcels. Here, the unchallenged testimony that Kelly was the beneficiary, trustee, and settler of both trusts established that Kelly held legal title to and was the equitable owner of both parcels. Further, Kelly testified that she only placed the parcels in the trusts on the advice of counsel for tax and estate planning purposes and that she possessed, controlled, and used the parcels before and after they were placed in trust. The Assessor testified that she considered the parcels separate simply because the names on the trusts were different. The court of appeals concluded that the parcels were under common ownership for tax years 2014 and 2015 and the BAA erred in denying the request to reclassify the subject property.

Kelly also argued that the BAA abused its discretion when it rejected the parties’ stipulation that the contiguous parcels element was not at issue. The BAA’s decision to reject the signed stipulation two months after the close of evidence and without notice to the parties was manifestly unfair.

The BAA’s order was reversed and the case was remanded with directions for the BAA to reclassify the subject parcel as residential land.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.