May 25, 2013

Tenth Circuit: Denial of Application for Asylum Vacated

The Tenth Circuit published its opinion in Karki v. Holder on Tuesday, April 30, 2013.

Petitioner Narendra Raj Karki, a native and citizen of Nepal, petitioned for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming an order of the immigration judge (IJ) that denied his application for asylum and restriction on removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT).

Karki argued that the BIA and IJ erred in concluding he failed to show past persecution, a well-founded fear of future persecution, and a nexus between the alleged persecution and his political opinion. Karki had presented evidence that he was beaten badly by a group of Maoists who attacked him because of his political opinions. He also presented evidence that a vehicle in which he should have been traveling was bombed by the Maoists and that he was their intended target. The BIA concluded that the Maoists’ actions toward Karki were motivated only by their desire to extort money or recruit him and that “[t]he record does not reflect that Maoists had the intention to persecute [Petitioner] even partly because of his political opinion or a political opinion imputed to him.” The Tenth Circuit held that this conclusion was incorrect so the BIA’s decision could not be upheld on that ground.

The court also held that Karki “suffered past persecution, giving rise to a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution.” The court granted Karki’s petition for review and remanded the case for determination of “whether Petitioner’s past persecution was sufficiently severe that he did not need to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution, and, if not, (2) whether changed country conditions or the possibility of internal relocation are sufficient to rebut the presumption that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”

Karki also argued that the BIA and IJ erred in concluding he had not established his entitlement to relief under the CAT. The IJ and BIA concluded that Karki was not entitled to relief because he had not demonstrated that government officials would be likely to acquiesce in his torture upon his return to Nepal. Karki presented evidence that the Nepalese government is aware of and does not prevent frequent acts of torture committed by Maoists. Karki was not required to show the government would turn a blind eye to specific threats of torture against him in particular.

The court vacated BIA’s affirmance of the ALJ’s decision and remanded on both the petition for asylum and the CAT claim.

Tenth Circuit: Unpublished Opinions, 5/2/13

On Thursday, May 2, 2013, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued no published opinions and one unpublished opinion.

United States v. Hee

No case summaries are provided for unpublished opinions. However, published opinions are summarized and provided by Legal Connection.

Tenth Circuit: Unpublished Opinions, 5/1/13

On Wednesday, May 1, 2013, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued no published opinions and three unpublished opinions.

Grissom v. Werholtz

United States v. Rodriguez

Ehimika v. Astrue

No case summaries are provided for unpublished opinions. However, published opinions are summarized and provided by Legal Connection.

Tenth Circuit: Federal Court Had No Power to Examine State Court Conviction Using Writ of Coram Nobis

The Tenth Circuit published its opinion in Rawlins v. State of Kansas on Tuesday, April 30, 2013.

Damaris Rawlins was convicted in 2001 in Kansas state court for battery of a police officer. The Kansas court sentenced Rawlins to three years’ probation. Rawlins timely challenged her conviction in the Kansas courts both through direct appeals and through Kansas’s collateral review system, arguing that certain constitutional errors tainted her conviction. Those state-court proceedings lasted for an unusually long period of time, finally concluding with a denial of relief in 2011. Because Rawlins was not in state custody (including probation) at the conclusion of her collateral review proceedings, she could not bring a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition in federal court. Rawlins therefore petitioned the District of Kansas for a writ of audita querela or, in the alternative, a writ of coram vobis. The Tenth Circuit discussed the history of these writs and chose to use the term coram nobis in its opinion.

The district court found the writ of audita querela was the writ that applied and denied her petition after examining her constitutional claims as if she had brought a § 2254 petition. The Tenth Circuit held that was the incorrect writ because audita querela addresses unanticipated situations that arise after judgment. Coram nobis, however, addresses defects that existed before the judgment, and United States v. Morgan makes clear that such defects include those that would otherwise be raised in habeas proceedings but for the petitioner no longer being in custody.

While Morgan permits federal courts to entertain coram nobis applications in “extraordinary cases presenting circumstances compelling its use to achieve justice,” it only applies to a federal court reopening its own case. A federal court cannot apply the writ to a state court case, or even another federal court. Because the district court had no power to examine Rawlins’ conviction, the Tenth Circuit vacated the decision and remanded for dismissal due to lack of jurisdiction.

Tenth Circuit: Unpublished Opinions, 4/30/13

On Tuesday, April 30, 2013, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued two published opinions and ten unpublished opinions.

Gibbons v. National Real Estate Investors

Davis v. Cline

Van Ross v. Shelton

Fleming v. Evans

Houck v. Gurich

Houck v. Heaton

QEP Energy Co. v. Sullivan

United States v. Walters

Allen v. Corrections Corp. of America

Ankeney v. Zavaras

No case summaries are provided for unpublished opinions. However, published opinions are summarized and provided by Legal Connection.

Tenth Circuit: Rules of Evidence Apply to Admission of First Trial’s Testimony at Second Trial; Dismissal Without Prejudice Proper for Violation for Speedy Trial Act

The Tenth Circuit published its opinion in United States v. Toombs on Friday, April 26, 2013.

In 2008, a jury found Marlo Toombs guilty on seven counts of drug and firearm felony offenses. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded his case for violations of the Speedy Trial Act. After the district court dismissed Toombs’ indictment without prejudice, the government filed a new indictment and a jury subsequently found Toombs guilty of six charges.

On appeal, Toombs argued that the district court abused its discretion by admitting his entire testimony from the first trial into evidence at the second trial. The Tenth Circuit held that while the district court should have evaluated the first trial testimony under the Rules of Evidence before admitting it in the second trial, the admission was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence against Toombs and the limiting instruction given.

Toombs also argued the district court erred by dismissing the first indictment without prejudice. After considering the factors contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) that govern dismissals for violation of the Speedy Trial Act, the court found no abuse of discretion in the decision to dismiss without prejudice. Toombs’ offenses were serious and he failed to establish the delay was “a result of intentional dilatory conduct or a pattern of neglect.”

Tenth Circuit: Unpublished Opinions, 4/29/13

On Monday, April 29, 2013, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued no published opinions and four unpublished opinions.

United States v. Herrera

Gomez v. Davis

United States v. Avitia-Bustamante

United States v. Aniles-Marquez

No case summaries are provided for unpublished opinions. However, published opinions are summarized and provided by Legal Connection.

Tenth Circuit: Unpublished Opinions, 4/26/13

On Friday, April 26, 2013, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued one published opinion and three unpublished opinions.

Jones v. Astrue

Nasious v. City & County of Denver

Mizusawa v. United States Dept of Labor

No case summaries are provided for unpublished opinions. However, published opinions are summarized and provided by Legal Connection.

Tenth Circuit: Unpublished Opinions, 4/25/13

On Thursday, April 25, 2013, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued no published opinions and two unpublished opinions.

United States v. Ford

Esparza v. Bowman

No case summaries are provided for unpublished opinions. However, published opinions are summarized and provided by Legal Connection.

Tenth Circuit: Man Who Confessed to Aiding al-Quada in 9/11 Attacks Not Entitled to Good Conduct Time for When He Was Held as Enemy Combatant

The Tenth Circuit published its opinion in Al-Marri v. Davis on Wednesday, April 24, 2013.

On December 12, 2001, the FBI arrested Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri as a material witness to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States.

President George W. Bush later declared Mr. al-Marri to be an enemy combatant. He was transferred to a Naval Brig where he was detained for almost six years. Mr. al-Marri was eventually transferred to civilian custody, where a federal grand jury indicted him on two counts of providing material support or resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization (al-Qaeda). On April 30, 2009, Mr. al-Marri pled guilty to one count of providing material support or resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization.

Prior to sentencing, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) indicated that under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), it would only grant prior custody credit for the time Mr. al-Marri spent in pretrial criminal detention after he was transferred to civilian custody. BOP was unwilling to credit Mr. al-Marri for the 71 months he was held as a material witness and an enemy combatant.

Taking into account the BOP’s indication that it would deny Mr. al-Marri credit for the 71 months, the sentencing court reduced the period of confinement (180 months) by 71 months to reflect the periods of time for which he would not be credited by the BOP. The court further reduced the sentence by nine months to reflect the severe conditions at the Naval Brig.

After sentencing, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1), the BOP credited Mr. al-Marri for both periods spent in pretrial criminal detention (totaling 745 days), but refused to grant prior custody credit for the 71 months during which he was held as an enemy combatant.

Mr. al-Marri filed a § 2241 petition in the district court seeking a statutory calculation of GCT for the 71 months he was detained or, in the alternative, a calculation as an equitable remedy for his allegedly unconstitutional detention. The district court denied the petition. Mr. al-Marri appealed.

On appeal, Mr. al-Marri contended he was entitled to Good Conduct Time (GCT) for the 71 months he was held as an enemy combatant, either statutorily under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), or as an equitable remedy.

Statutory Entitlement to Good Time Credit

This argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992). Wilson held that a sentencing court does not have authority to grant prior custody credit under § 3585. Instead, that authority is vested with the Attorney General, acting through the BOP.

Mr. al-Marri was detained because the President declared him to be an enemy combatant; he was not detained for an alleged violation of the federal criminal code. Similarly, Mr. al-Marri was held as a material witness—not as punishment for providing material support to a terrorist organization. The purpose of his detention was preventative rather than punitive. In short, the Court reasoned, Mr. al-Marri’s 71-month detention as an enemy combatant did not constitute “prior custody” as required by § 3585(b), and he was therefore ineligible for Good Conduct Time.

Next, Mr. al-Marri argued that if the 71-month sentencing reduction did not constitute “prior custody” under § 3585(b), the period should still be awarded because it is ‘time served’ and therefore part of the ‘term of imprisonment’ within the meaning of the GCT. The Tenth Circuit held that the Bureau of Prison’s calculation of Good Conduct Time for Mr. al-Marri comported with the most natural reading of the statute—that it applies only to time served under the actual sentence. The Court therefore deferred to the BOP’s interpretation.

Good Time Credit as an Equitable Remedy

The Tenth Circuit held the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reconsider Mr. al-Marri’s argument that the BOP’s refusal to calculate GCT for his unlawful detention entitled him to equitable relief.

AFFIRMED.

Tenth Circuit: Unpublished Opinions, 4/24/13

On Wednesday, April 24, 2013, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued one published opinion and three unpublished opinions.

Siribuor v. UHS of Denver

Palmerin v. Johnson County, Kansas Board of County Commissioners

Newman v. T.K. Cozza-Rhodes

No case summaries are provided for unpublished opinions. However, published opinions are summarized and provided by Legal Connection.

Tenth Circuit: Federal Prisoner Barred by PLRA from Proceeding In Forma Pauperis in Future Civil Actions

The Tenth Circuit published its opinion in Childs v. Miller on Tuesday, April 23, 2013.

Terry Lee Childs, a federal prisoner in Oklahoma, filed this civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that defendants, who were all employees of the Lawton Correctional Facility , violated state and federal law by delaying the refilling of his asthma medication prescription in retaliation against him for exercising his federal constitutional right to file administrative grievances about his medical care. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The district court eventually dismissed all of Mr. Childs’ claims and Mr. Childs appealed.

Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) in 1996 in the wake of a sharp rise in prisoner litigation in the federal courts. The PLRA contains a variety of provisions designed to bring this litigation under control. One of these provisions is 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which Congress added to revoke, with limited exception, in forma pauperis privileges for any prisoner who has filed three or more lawsuits that fail to state a claim, or are malicious or frivolous.

Mr. Childs had accumulated three strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Accordingly as soon as the appellate process in this case has been completed, he will be barred from proceeding in forma pauperis in future civil actions or appeals in federal court unless he is “under imminent danger of serious physical injury,” § 1915(g), and he makes “specific [and] credible allegations” to that effect. Kinnell v. Graves, 265 F.3d 1125, 1127-28 (10th Cir. 2001).

AFFIRMED.

Protected

2013-05-25 11:31:14