April 27, 2017

Colorado Supreme Court: Membership Interest of Non-Colorado LLC Member Located in Colorado for Charging Order Purposes

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. McClure on Monday, April 10, 2017.

Limited Liability Companies—Membership Interests—Charging Orders—Priority.

This case concerns the relative priority of competing charging orders filed by multiple judgment creditors against a foreign judgment debtor’s membership interests in several Colorado limited liability companies (LLCs). The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that for purposes of determining the enforceability of a charging order, a membership interest of a non-Colorado citizen in a Colorado LLC is located in Colorado, where the LLC was formed. The court further concluded that when, as here, a judgment creditor obtains a foreign charging order that compels certain action by a Colorado LLC, the charging order is ineffective as against the LLC until the creditor has taken sufficient steps to obligate the company to comply with that order. Although the authorities are not uniform as to the steps to be taken, under any of the applicable scenarios, the charging orders obtained by the petitioner did not become effective until after the respondents had obtained and served their competing charging orders. Accordingly, the court concluded that respondents’ charging orders are entitled to priority over petitioner’s competing charging orders and therefore affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Trial Court Correctly Found that Crop Recovery Claims were Equitable in Nature

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Farm Credit of Southern Colorado, ACA v. Mason on Thursday, April 6, 2017.

Credit Agreement—Jury Demand—Equitable—Non-Disclosure—Abandonment—Estoppel—Waiver—Consent—Conversion—Bankruptcy—Collateral Estoppel—Damages.

Zachary funded his farming operations with loans from Farm Credit of Southern Colorado, ACA and Farm Credit of Southern Colorado, FLCA (collectively, Farm Credit). Zachary was having difficulty paying his debt to Farm Credit and had planted crops on seven farms for the coming harvest. Written agreements between Farm Credit and Zachary granted Farm Credit a perfected security interest in Zachary’s crops (Crop Collateral) and their proceeds. Farm Credit refused to continue funding Zachary’s farming operations and Zachary was unable to cultivate the Crop Collateral. Zachary’s father, James, thereafter took over the cultivation of the Crop Collateral. James never attempted to transfer the Crop Collateral or its proceeds to Farm Credit. Farm Credit filed a complaint for various claims against Zachary and other parties, but not James. Zachary thereafter filed for bankruptcy. As part of a bankruptcy adversary proceeding, Farm Credit filed an amended complaint alleging that Zachary transferred the Crop Collateral to James. Farm Credit later amended the state trial court complaint to add James as a defendant. Ultimately, the trial court entered a judgment against James, finding him liable for converting the Crop Collateral and awarding Farm Credit damages plus interest.

On appeal, James argued that the trial court erred in striking his demand for a jury trial. Based on the complaint, Farm Credit’s remedy was in the nature of a foreclosure, an equitable action. Because the basic thrust of the underlying action was equitable and not legal in nature, the trial court did not err in striking James’s demand for a jury trial.

James also asserted that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Zachary’s debt because Farm Credit did not disclose it before trial, and this nondisclosure was intentional and material. However, this nondisclosure was harmless because the amount of debt far exceeded the most optimistic estimate given for the Crop Collateral’s value at the time of conversion. Therefore, James was not denied an adequate opportunity to defend against Farm Credit’s assertion that the value of the outstanding debt exceeded the value of the collateral, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss the action as a result of this nondisclosure.

James next contended that the trial court reversibly erred when it determined that the defenses of abandonment, estoppel, waiver, and consent did not relieve him of liability for conversion. The written agreements evidencing Farm Credit’s perfected security interest in the Crop Collateral were “credit agreements” within the meaning of the Credit Agreement Statute of Frauds. Thus, any waiver involving Farm Credit’s rights to the Crop Collateral, including proceeds, would need to be in writing to be effective. Here, there was never a written waiver. Additionally, while the record shows that Farm Credit acquiesced to James’s cultivation and harvest of the otherwise doomed Crop Collateral, it does not show that Farm Credit consented to its security interest being completely extinguished. Finally, there is no evidence in the record showing Farm Credit manifested intent, or took action, to abandon the Crop Collateral and related claims at any point, including during the bankruptcy adversary proceeding. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in rejecting James’s defenses of waiver, consent, abandonment, and estoppel.

James further contended that the trial court erred when it determined that the bankruptcy court’s decision did not preclude Farm Credit from recovering on its claims and denied James’s motion for a directed verdict. Here, the legal issues before the bankruptcy court were different from those before the trial court. Because the issues litigated in the two proceedings at issue were not identical, the trial court correctly determined that collateral estoppel did not apply to the legal issues before it and properly denied James’s motion for a directed verdict.

Lastly, James argued that the trial court misapplied the law when assessing damages by determining that the date of conversion was the date of harvest rather than when James took over the crops’ cultivation. Because the trial court applied the correct standard in assessing damages and the record supports the trial court’s factual findings, there was no error with the damages award.

The orders and judgment were affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Holder of Evidence of Debt May Initiate Foreclosure with Copy of Evidence of Debt

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Edwards v. Bank of America, N.A. on Thursday, August 25, 2016.

Mortgage—Foreclosure—Standing—Summary Judgment—Affidavit.

Plaintiff obtained a loan to finance the purchase of property. When she defaulted on the loan, defendant sold the house through foreclosure. During the foreclosure proceedings, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that defendant lacked standing to file a C.R.C.P. 120 motion and to commence foreclosure proceedings. The district court granted defendant’s summary judgment motion and subsequently denied plaintiff’s motion to reconsider the judgment.

On appeal, plaintiff contended that the district court erred in granting defendant’s summary judgment motion. The holder of an evidence of debt may initiate foreclosure proceedings with a copy of the evidence of debt and deed of trust, rather than the original documents. Here, defendant produced sufficient evidence to establish that it was entitled to foreclose and that plaintiff failed to demonstrate there was a genuine issue of material fact as to defendant’s standing to foreclose. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff also contended that the district court erred in denying her motion to reconsider summary judgment because the court prematurely granted summary judgment without giving her sufficient opportunity to conduct discovery. C.R.C.P. 56(f) allows a party who cannot produce facts essential to its opposition to a motion for summary judgment to submit an affidavit explaining why it cannot do so. Plaintiff did not submit a C.R.C.P. 56(f) affidavit. Accordingly, the district court properly denied plaintiff’s motion to reconsider summary judgment.

The judgment was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Economic Loss Rule Bars Tort Claims Against Mortgage Lender

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Miller v. Bank of New York Mellon on Thursday, June 16, 2016.

Dual Tracking—Failure to State a Claim for Relief—Economic Loss Rule—Implied Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing—Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress—Fraud—Negligence.

The Millers obtained a note and deed of trust in 2004 to purchase a house, and the loan was transferred several times. They began missing payments in 2007 and filed for bankruptcy and received discharges in 2009. Bank of America, N.A. (BANA) then told the Millers to vacate their house, but they stayed and eventually entered into negotiations with BANA regarding a loan modification. In February 2012, Bank of New York Mellon (BNY Mellon) moved for an order authorizing the public trustee to proceed with a foreclosure sale, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 120. While this Rule 120 action was pending, the Millers filed a complaint against five financial institutions (collectively, the Banks) to quiet title to the house in their favor. The Millers alleged that the Banks improperly subjected them to dual tracking (a process under which banks pursue foreclosure on a home while negotiating a loan modification) in violation of the consent judgment that resulted from the National Mortgage Settlement, which generally prohibits dual tracking. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief. The court in the Rule 120 action authorized the sale in July 2012, but the Millers kept negotiating a loan modification with BANA. In 2013, BANA and the Millers agreed to a loan modification, the Millers began making payments, and BNY Mellon dismissed the Rule 120 action. In October 2014, the Millers amended their complaint, asserting claims for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and negligence. The Banks moved to dismiss, and the court granted the motion.

On appeal, the Millers argued that the court erred in determining that the economic loss rule barred their tort claims. The economic loss rule provides that “a party suffering only economic loss from the breach of an express or implied contractual duty may not assert a tort claim for such a breach absent an independent duty of care under tort law.” Here, the consent judgment in a federal case challenging dual tracking did not create a private cause of action for third parties and there was no special relationship between the parties that established an independent duty.

The Millers also argued that the court erred in dismissing their contract claim, because they had a reasonable expectation that the Banks would not engage in dual tracking and would modify their loan. Although there is an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in every contract, there was no reasonable expectation on the part of the Millers that their loan would be modified or that the Banks would refrain from dual tracking. Neither allegation has any basis in their contractual agreement.

The judgment was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Property Titled in Name of Revocable Trust Also Can Be Debtor’s Property

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Pandy v. Independent Bank on Monday, June 20, 2016.

Revocable Trust—Settlor—Judgment Lien.

This case principally concerns whether property titled in the name of a judgment debtor’s co-settled revocable trust is subject to a judgment lien against the debtor. The petitioners are co-settlors and co-trustees of a revocable trust that holds title to certain real property in Colorado. Respondent obtained two judgments against one of the petitioners in another state. After domesticating those judgments and recording transcripts of the Colorado judgments, respondent filed an action to quiet title and for a decree of foreclosure. The petitioner moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that respondent’s complaint was barred by what the petitioner argued was the applicable statute of limitations set forth in C.R.S. § 13-80-101(1)(k). The district court denied the motion, a division of the Court of Appeals granted leave to file an interlocutory appeal and affirmed that ruling, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

The Court concluded that as a settlor of a revocable trust, the petitioner held an ownership interest in the trust’s assets. Accordingly, respondent could properly seek to enforce its judgment against the petitioner in this case, and its action was not barred by the statute of limitations set forth in C.R.S. § 13-80-101(1)(k).

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: CUFTA Limitations Period May Be Tolled by Express Agreement

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Lewis v. Taylor on Monday, June 20, 2016.

Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act—Limitation of Actions—Agreements Tolling Limitation.

Under the Colorado Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (CUFTA), CRS §§ 38-8-101 to -112, any action to avoid an intentionally fraudulent transfer is extinguished if not brought within four years after the transfer was made or, if later, within one year after the transfer was or could reasonably have been discovered. Here, the Supreme Court held that these time limitations may be tolled by express agreement. Because the parties to this case signed a tolling agreement, and petitioner’s CUFTA claims were properly brought within the tolling period, the Court concluded that his claims were timely filed and were not barred by CUFTA’s limitations period. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Written Extensions of Acknowledgments of Debt Extended Statute of Limitations for Foreclosure

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Hutchins v. La Plata Mountain Resources, Inc. on Monday, June 20, 2016.

Limitations of Actions—Acknowledgments of Existing Debt—Form and Essential Elements of Acknowledgements.

Hutchins and Gasper petitioned for review of the Court of Appeals’ judgment affirming the district court’s ruling in favor of La Plata Mountain Resources, Inc. (La Plata), in an action brought by La Plata to collect on certain debentures issued by Leadville Mining and foreclose on a deed of trust securing the debts. Although Leadville’s authorized agent had signed documents acknowledging its obligations for the amounts owed on other similar debentures held by Hutchins and Gasper, which were secured by the same deed of trust, the Court of Appeals reasoned that because these documents lacked the two-thirds consent required for modification of the debentures, the included acknowledgments were insufficient to restart the applicable limitations period. The Court of Appeals therefore concluded that the statute of limitations had run on any action by Hutchins and Gasper to collect on the debts or foreclose on the deed of trust.

The Supreme Court reversed. The documents in question were in writing, were signed by Leadville, and contained a clear and unqualified acknowledgement of the debt owed to Hutchins and Gasper. Therefore, they constituted a new promise to pay, establishing a new accrual date and effectively extending the limitations period on collection of the debt.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Choice of Law Provision Unambiguously Governs Contract

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Mountain States Adjustment v. Cooke on Thursday, May 19, 2016.

Summary Judgment—Debt Collection—Choice of Law Provision.

In August 2004, Cooke signed a note (Note) with Commercial Federal Bank (CFB) for a home equity loan. Cooke resided in Colorado and the home that was collateral for the Note (subject property) was in Colorado. CFB was headquartered in Nebraska and the Note stated that it was “governed by federal law, and to the extent applicable, the laws of Nebraska.”

CFB merged into Bank of the West, a California bank, in December 2005. Cooke’s  repayment terms under the Note didn’t change as a result nor was he asked to sign a new agreement. In April 2009, the company holding the first mortgage on the subject property commenced foreclosure proceedings. Bank of the West did not participate, but on June 19, 2009, Bank of the West sent a “30 Day Notice of Demand and Intent to Accelerate” letter to Cooke.

On February 14, 2014, Bank of the West assigned Cooke’s note to Mountain States Adjustment (MSA). On July 15, 2014, MSA filed this collection action against Cooke in Denver District Court. Cooke answered and alleged an affirmative defense that MSA’s claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

In January 2015, MSA filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that Cooke admitted to being the signatory under the Note and that the facts were undisputed that he was in default. Cooke filed a cross-motion for summary judgment asserting that MSA’s claim was barred by the five-year statute of limitations set forth in Nebraska law. The district court decided that Colorado law and its six-year statute of limitations applied and entered summary judgment in MSA’s favor. The sole issue on appeal was whether it was error to hold that Colorado law applied.

The Court of Appeals found the choice of law terms in the Note were clear, express, and unambiguous. As a matter of law, Nebraska law governs the statute of limitations issue because the undisputed record shows both that Nebraska had a substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and that there was a reasonable basis for the contracting parties’ choice of law. Because it was undisputed that MSA filed its complaint outside of the applicable Nebraska limitations period, MSA’s claim was barred and Cooke was entitled to entry of judgment in his favor.

The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Holder-in-Due-Course Status Does Not Preclude Forgery Defense

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Liberty Mortgage Corp. v. Fiscus on Monday, May 16, 2016.

Negotiable Instruments—Holders in Due Course—Forgery—Ratification—Negligent Contribution.

Respondent Fiscus’s wife forged his name on three powers of attorney and used them to procure a promissory note that was ultimately assigned to petitioner Branch Banking and Trust Company. The note was secured by a deed of trust purporting to encumber property held in Fiscus’s name alone. Branch Banking and Trust claimed holder-in-due-course status under Article 3 of Colorado’s Uniform Commercial Code, and Fiscus raised a forgery defense. The Court of Appeals held that Article 3 does not apply to deeds of trust because they are not “negotiable instruments” as defined in the Code. The Supreme Court held that, even assuming Article 3 applies to such deeds of trust, holder-in-due-course status does not preclude a purported maker from asserting a forgery defense. Thus, because Fiscus had a valid forgery defense, not barred by any negligence or ratification on his part, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals but on different grounds. The Court did not address the negotiability of deeds of trust that secure promissory notes under Article 3.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Long Appropriations Bill, SCFD Bill, and Many More Signed by Governor

On Wednesday, May 4, 2016, Governor Hickenlooper signed 24 bills into law. Many of the bills signed Wednesday addressed transfers of moneys and financing. Some of the other bills signed Wednesday include a bill addressing the location where competency evaluations should be completed, a bill enacting statutory changes recommended by the Child Support Commission, and a bill regarding transfers of property rights on death.

Additionally, on May 3, Governor Hickenlooper signed the Long Appropriations Bill for 2016-17, HB 16-1405, and on April 29, Governor Hickenlooper signed SB 16-016, which will allow the submission of a ballot question to voters regarding extending the funding for the Scientific and Cultural Facilities District for twelve more years. To date, the governor has signed 167 bills this legislative session. The bills signed by Governor Hickenlooper this past week are summarized here.

April 29, 2016

  • SB 16-016 – Concerning the Scientific and Cultural Facilities District, and, in Connection Therewith, Amending the Ballot Question Concerning the Extension of the District to be Submitted to the Voters and Modifying Statutory Provisions Concerning the Administration of the District, by Sens. Pat Steadman & Bill Cadman and Reps. Dickey Lee Hullinghorst & Polly Lawrence. The bill allows the SCFD to submit a ballot question to district voters at the 2016 or 2017 November election authorizing the extension of the tax for 12 years through June 30, 2030, and changes the SCFD funding formula.

May 2, 2016

  • HB 16-1405 – The 2016-17 Long Appropriations Bill, by Rep. Millie Hamner and Sen. Kent Lambert. The bill sets forth the budget for the 2016-17 fiscal year.

May 3, 2016

  • HB 16-1048 – Concerning Modifications to the Business Enterprise Program to be Administered by the Department of Labor and Employment Under its Authority to Administer Vocational Rehabilitation Programs, by Rep. Dianne Primavera and Sen. Kevin Lundberg. The bill establishes a working group in the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment to study ways to expand opportunities for Business Enterprise Program vendors.
  • HB 16-1158 – Concerning Continuation Under the Sunset Law of the Identity Theft and Financial Fraud Board, by Rep. Pete Lee and Sen. Chris Holbert. The bill extends the sunset of the Identity Theft and Financial Fraud Board until September 1, 2025.
  • HB 16-1159 – Concerning Continuation Under the Sunset Law of the Colorado Fraud Investigators Unit, by Rep. Pete Lee and Sen. Chris Holbert. The bill extends the sunset of the Colorado Fraud Investigators Unit until September 1, 2025.
  • HB 16-1165 – Concerning Statutory Changes Based on the Recommendations in the Report of the 2013-2015 Colorado Child Support Commission, by Reps. KC Becker & Lois Landgraf and Sen. Larry Crowder. The bill amends child support guidelines and related statutes based on the findings of the Colorado Child Support Commission, including allowing discovery of insurance claims, requiring an annual exchange of financial information between parents, changing the formula to determine gross income, limiting the period in which a party can seek retroactive child support, and more.
  • HB 16-1268 – Concerning District Attorney’s Representation in Certain Hearings Arising from Interstate Supervision Contracts, by Rep. Mike Foote and Sen. John Cooke. The bill clarifies that a district attorney must appear on behalf of the state and counties of his or her district in any probable cause hearing for a matter under the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision or the Interstate Compact for Juveniles.
  • HB 16-1298 – Concerning Changes in Permissible Vehicle Dimensions, by Rep. Jovan Melton and Sen. John Cooke. The bill changes the maximum permissible vehicle dimensions.
  • HB 16-1317 – Concerning Clarifying the Types of Transactions that May Be Included in a Motor Vehicle Service Contract, by Rep. Angela Williams and Sen. Chris Holbert. The bill authorizes certain services to be included in a motor vehicle service contract, including tire and windshield repair, key fob repair, and more.
  • HB 16-1379 – Concerning the Criteria Under Which the State Board of Psychologist Examiners May Award Professional Development Credit for Specific Activities Currently Included in the Continuing Professional Development Program for Licensed Psychologists, by Rep. Tracy Kraft-Tharp and Sen. Beth Martinez Humenik. The bill clarifies and amends portions of the continuing professional development program for licensed psychologists, including allowing credit hours for teaching or giving presentations; allowing credit hours for writing, editing, or reviewing psychology publications; and limiting the award of credit hours to review of peer review journal articles.
  • HB 16-1406 – Concerning Department of Corrections Reimbursement of Expenses of County Coroners, and, in Connection Therewith, Making an Appropriation, by Rep. Dave Young and Sen. Kevin Grantham. The bill requires the Department of Corrections (DOC) to reimburse a county for reasonable and necessary costs related to investigations or autopsies for persons who were in the custody of the DOC at the time of their death. Costs may include transportation, refrigeration, and body bags.
  • HB 16-1407 – Concerning the Continuation of the Medicaid Payment Reform and Innovation Pilot Program, and, in Connection Therewith, Changing the Time Frames, Eliminating the Repeal Date of the Pilot Program, Enhancing the Reporting Requirements of the Department of Health Care Policy and Financing, and Making an Appropriation, by Rep. Dave Young and Sen. Kevin Grantham. The bill removes the July 1, 2013, deadline for HCPF to review and select payment projects for inclusion in the Medicaid Payment Reform and Innovation Pilot Program, and removes the June 30, 2016, deadline by which payment projects must be completed.
  • HB 16-1408 – Concerning the Allocation of Cash Fund Revenues to Health-Related Programs, and, in Connection Therewith, Modifying and Streamlining the Allocation of Tobacco Litigation Settlement Moneys by Replacing the Current Two-Tier Allocation System that Includes Both Percentage-Based and Fixed Amount Allocations of Settlement Moneys with a Single Set of Exclusively Percentage-Based Allocations and Replacing Settlement Moneys Funding for Specified Programs with Marijuana Tax Cash Fund Funding; Allocating Additional Settlement Moneys to the University of Colorado Health Sciences Center for Cancer Research Only; Transferring a Specified Amount from the Children’s Basic Health Plan Trust to a Newly Created Primary Care Provider Sustainability Fund on July 1, 2016; and Making and Reducing Appropriations, by Rep. Bob Rankin and Sen. Pat Steadman. The bill establishes a new formula for the allocation of the annual payment received by the state as part of the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, allocating revenue by percentage shares, rather than the hybrid scheme of fixed dollar amounts and capped percentage shares in multiple tiers.
  • HB 16-1409 – Concerning the Transfer of Forty-Two Million Eight Hundred Thousand Dollars on June 30, 2016, from the Unclaimed Property Trust Fund for State Programs, by Rep. Bob Rankin and Sen. Pat Steadman. The bill transfers $42,800,000 out of the Unclaimed Property Trust Fund and places it in the General Fund and the Adult Dental Fund.
  • HB 16-1410 – Concerning Matters Related to the Location Where a Competency Evaluation is Conducted, and, in Connection Therewith, Making and Reducing Appropriations, by Rep. Dave Young and Sen. Kevin Grantham. The bill changes procedures around competency evaluations in criminal proceedings, including requiring the court to order the evaluation to take place on an outpatient basis or, if the defendant is in custody, at the place where the defendant is in custody.
  • HB 16-1411 – Concerning the Supportive Residential Community Program Operated at the Fort Lyon Property, and, in Connection Therewith, Requiring a Longitudinal Evaluation of the Program; and Making an Appropriation, by Rep. Bob Rankin and Sen. Pat Steadman. The bill repeals the supportive residential community for individuals who are homeless at the Fort Lyon property in Bent County, and requires a longitudinal study of the program prior to its repeal.
  • HB 16-1413 – Concerning the Financing of the Water Pollution Control Program, and, in Connection Therewith, Making an Appropriation, by Rep. Bob Rankin and Sen. Kevin Grantham. The bill repeals the Water Quality Control Fund and creates a separate cash fund for each of the six clean water sectors, which will receive the fees specific to its sector.
  • HB 16-1415 – Concerning the Manner in which the State Funds Driver and Vehicle Services by the Division of Motor Vehicles in the Department of Revenue, and, in Connection Therewith, Making and Reducing an Appropriation, by Rep. Millie Hamner and Sen. Pat Steadman. The bill changes the way the state funds driver and vehicle services in the DMV, by increasing the fees charged for services, allowing for funding through the Highway Users Tax Fund, eliminating the end of the year transfer of the excess reserve from the Licensing Services Cash Fund to the HUTF, and exempting the LCSF from the limit on cash reserves.
  • HB 16-1417 – Concerning Capital-Related Transfers of Moneys, by Rep. Millie Hamner and Sen. Kent Lambert. The bill makes three FY 2016-17 transfers to the Capital Construction Fund from several sources.
  • HB 16-1418 – Concerning a Transfer from the Marijuana Tax Cash Fund to the General Fund, by Rep. Bob Rankin and Sen. Pat Steadman. The bill transfers $26,277,661 from the Marijuana Tax Cash Fund (MTCF) to the General Fund.
  • HB 16-1419 – Concerning a Reduction in the Amount of the General Fund Reserve Required for the Fiscal Year 2015-16, by Rep. Millie Hamner and Sen. Kent Lambert. The bill reduces the FY 2015-16 statutory General Fund reserve from 6.5 percent to 5.6 percent.
  • SB 16-058 – Concerning the Regulation of Certain Foods, and, in Connection Therewith, Exempting Certain Food Producers from Licensure, Inspection, and Other Regulation, and Making an Appropriation, by Sen. Owen Hill and Rep. KC Becker. The bill modifies the “Colorado Cottage Foods Act,” which allows homemade food producers to sell certain food products directly to consumers, by eliminating the tiered system and the State Board of Health’s authority to make rules governing the production of tier two foods, which currently consist of pickled vegetables, and by expanding the type of foods that may be sold by producers under the Cottage Foods Act to include other nonpotentially hazardous foods and encouraging, rather than mandating, a producer to take a food safety course.
  • SB 16-126 – Concerning Parity of State-Chartered Banks with Federally Chartered Banks Regarding Frequency of Meeting, by Sen. Ellen Roberts and Reps. Alec Garnett & Dan Nordberg. Under current law, the board of directors for a state bank is required to meet monthly. This bill requires those meetings to be held at least quarterly unless the board specifies a different schedule.
  • SB 16-133 – Concerning the Transfer of Property Rights Upon the Death of a Person, and, in Connection Therewith, Clarifying Determination-of-Heirship Proceedings in Probate, by Sen. Jack Tate and Reps. Dan Pabon & Yeulin Willett. The bill changes procedures for affirming the death of a decedent with shared ownership of real property, and makes changes to probate law for determining heirs, devisees, and property interests. It changes the definition of “interested person” to include an owner by descent or succession and to exclude any person holding a non-ownership interest in a decedent’s property. The bill also enacts portions of the “Uniform Power of Appointment Act.”
  • SB 16-137 – Concerning a Clarification of the Authority of the Parks and Wildlife Commission to Enter Into an Agreement with a Private Landowner, by Sens. Mike Johnston & Jerry Sonnenberg and Rep. Timothy Dore. The bill clarifies that the preference program does not limit the Colorado Parks and Wildlife Commission from entering into an agreement with a private landowner for public hunting and fishing and including the issuance of a hunting license in that agreement.

For a complete list of Governor Hickenlooper’s 2016 legislative decisions, click here.

Tenth Circuit: Guarantors May Be Liable for More than Loan Amount in Bankruptcy

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in In re Gentry: FB Acquisition Property I, LLC v. Gentry on Tuesday, December 8, 2015.

Susan and Larry Gentry are the sole shareholders, officers, and directors of Ball Four Inc., a sports complex in Adams County. In 2005, Ball Four received a $1.9 million loan from FirsTier Bank, which was secured with various Ball Four assets and personally guaranteed by the Gentrys. After four years, Ball Four stopped making payments to FirsTier. FirsTier initiated foreclosure proceedings, and Ball Four filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Ball Four proposed a reorganization plan that provided for the bank’s lien to be paid in full. Ball Four’s plan was approved in 2011.

Meanwhile, the Colorado Division of Banking closed FirsTier and the FDIC was appointed as receiver. The FDIC assigned its rights to SIP, and in December 2014 SIP was replaced by FB Acquisition.

In October 2010, one month after Ball Four filed for bankruptcy, FirsTier sued the Gentrys in Colorado state court to collect the guarantees. The Gentrys filed their Chapter 11 case in November 2011. The Gentrys filed disclosures and an amended plan, asserting that the Gentrys’ liability on the 2005 loan would be satisfied by Ball Four. The bankruptcy court confirmed the Gentrys’ plan in 2013.

FB Acquisition appealed two decisions of the bankruptcy court to the Tenth Circuit: first, that the Gentry plan was feasible, and second, that under the plan language, the Gentrys’ liability mirrors Ball Four’s liability. The Tenth Circuit first addressed the feasibility of the Gentry plan. Although FB Acquisition argued the Gentry plan did not offer a reasonable assurance of success, the Tenth Circuit noted that even though the bankruptcy court’s findings were brief, they were sufficient to satisfy a clear error inquiry.

The Tenth Circuit next addressed FB Acquisition’s contention that the bankruptcy court erred in limiting the Gentrys’ liability to the amount that Ball Four owed. The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the bankruptcy court’s evaluation of the Gentrys’ liability. The bankruptcy court found no provisions in the loan contract creating a greater obligation for the Gentrys than that owed by Ball Four, but the Tenth Circuit found three. Because the bankruptcy court misunderstood its duty to confer liability for the entirety of the debt on the guarantors, the Tenth Circuit remanded for the bankruptcy court to determine the amount of FB Acquisition’s claims under the guarantees. The Tenth Circuit noted the bankruptcy court should also reevaluate the feasibility of the plan.

The bankruptcy court’s ruling was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

HB 16-1356: Modifying the Treatment of a Line of Credit Secured with Real Property

On March 11, 2016, Reps. Tracy Kraft-Thorp and Dan Nordberg, and Sens. Cheri Jahn and Chris Holbert introduced HB 16-1356Concerning Requirements Related to the Satisfaction of Indebtedness Secured by Real Property. The bill was introduced into the House Business Affairs and Labor Committee, where it passed unamended. It passed Second and Third Reading in the House unamended and was introduced into the Senate Finance Committee. It passed through the Senate Finance Committee unamended and is awaiting Second Reading in the Senate.

This bill establishes for indebtedness consisting of a line a credit secured by a lien on real property, any lien on real property securing that line of credit continues, and no lien release is required, until the line of credit expires and all indebtedness has been satisfied, unless, before expiration of the line of credit, all outstanding indebtedness is satisfied and the debtor relinquishes in writing all right to make any further draw upon the line of credit.

Further, the debtor relinquishes the right to make a further draw by either requesting in writing that the line of credit be closed by the creditor, or by written notification by the debtor, or his or her designee, that the real property is being conveyed upon payment of all indebtedness. Upon satisfaction of all indebtedness in connection with the conveyance of the real property and notice to the creditor or holder of the conveyance, the creditor or holder shall terminate the line of credit, record the release of the lien on real property, or in the case of a deed of trust, file with the public trustee the documents required for release, and return all papers and personal property.

Max Montag is a 2016 J.D. Candidate at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law.