September 24, 2017

Application Period Open for Bankruptcy Judgeship in District of Colorado

BankruptcyCourtThe U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado announced that it is accepting applications for a bankruptcy judge in the District of Colorado. The position is located in Denver and will be available January 4, 2017, pending successful completion of a background investigation. Bankruptcy judges are appointed for 14-year terms pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 152.

Qualified applicants must be members in good standing of the highest bar of at least one state, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and must be in good standing in every bar in which the applicant is a member. Applicants must possess, and have a reputation for, integrity and good character; possess, and have demonstrated, a commitment to equal justice under the law; possess, and have demonstrated, outstanding legal ability and competence; indicate by demeanor, character, and personality that the applicant would exhibit judicial temperament if appointed; and be of sound physical and mental health sufficient to perform the essential duties of the office. Applicants must have been engaged in the practice of law or other suitable law-related occupation for the last five years, must not be related by blood or marriage to any judge of the Tenth Circuit or District of Colorado or a member of the Tenth Circuit Judicial Council, must comply with financial disclosure requirements, and must be willing to serve.

Application forms are available on the Tenth Circuit website and will be accepted through August 15, 2016. For more information, click here.

Tenth Circuit: Guarantors May Be Liable for More than Loan Amount in Bankruptcy

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in In re Gentry: FB Acquisition Property I, LLC v. Gentry on Tuesday, December 8, 2015.

Susan and Larry Gentry are the sole shareholders, officers, and directors of Ball Four Inc., a sports complex in Adams County. In 2005, Ball Four received a $1.9 million loan from FirsTier Bank, which was secured with various Ball Four assets and personally guaranteed by the Gentrys. After four years, Ball Four stopped making payments to FirsTier. FirsTier initiated foreclosure proceedings, and Ball Four filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Ball Four proposed a reorganization plan that provided for the bank’s lien to be paid in full. Ball Four’s plan was approved in 2011.

Meanwhile, the Colorado Division of Banking closed FirsTier and the FDIC was appointed as receiver. The FDIC assigned its rights to SIP, and in December 2014 SIP was replaced by FB Acquisition.

In October 2010, one month after Ball Four filed for bankruptcy, FirsTier sued the Gentrys in Colorado state court to collect the guarantees. The Gentrys filed their Chapter 11 case in November 2011. The Gentrys filed disclosures and an amended plan, asserting that the Gentrys’ liability on the 2005 loan would be satisfied by Ball Four. The bankruptcy court confirmed the Gentrys’ plan in 2013.

FB Acquisition appealed two decisions of the bankruptcy court to the Tenth Circuit: first, that the Gentry plan was feasible, and second, that under the plan language, the Gentrys’ liability mirrors Ball Four’s liability. The Tenth Circuit first addressed the feasibility of the Gentry plan. Although FB Acquisition argued the Gentry plan did not offer a reasonable assurance of success, the Tenth Circuit noted that even though the bankruptcy court’s findings were brief, they were sufficient to satisfy a clear error inquiry.

The Tenth Circuit next addressed FB Acquisition’s contention that the bankruptcy court erred in limiting the Gentrys’ liability to the amount that Ball Four owed. The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the bankruptcy court’s evaluation of the Gentrys’ liability. The bankruptcy court found no provisions in the loan contract creating a greater obligation for the Gentrys than that owed by Ball Four, but the Tenth Circuit found three. Because the bankruptcy court misunderstood its duty to confer liability for the entirety of the debt on the guarantors, the Tenth Circuit remanded for the bankruptcy court to determine the amount of FB Acquisition’s claims under the guarantees. The Tenth Circuit noted the bankruptcy court should also reevaluate the feasibility of the plan.

The bankruptcy court’s ruling was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

Tenth Circuit: Severance Payments to Terminated President Not Avoidable Under § 548

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in In re Adam Aircraft Industries, Inc.: Weinman v. Walker on Thursday, October 15, 2015.

Joseph Walker was the president and a board member for Adam Aircraft Industries (AAI). On February 1, 2007, George “Rick” Adam, AAI’s board chair, informed Walker that the board had decided to replace him as president and requested his resignation in lieu of terminating his employment. AAI was engaged in debt financing negotiations with Morgan Stanley for an $80 million loan and did not want to imperil its negotiations with bad publicity from Walker’s termination. Walker returned to his office late that night to collect his belongings, and sent an email to the board chair and another board member outlining requests for his resignation. His replacement as president started working for AAI on February 2. Over the next two weeks, AAI and Walker negotiated the terms of his separation and eventually entered into Separation Agreement I and a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on February 13, 2007. On March 20, 2007, AAI refunded Walker’s security deposit for an airplane, plus interest, and on May 18, 2007, the parties entered into Separation Agreement II. AAI continued to make twice-monthly severance payments to Walker between February 2007 and February 2008.

On February 15, 2008, AAI filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy, and the trustee, Weinman, sold substantially all of AAI’s assets for a gross purchase price of $10 million in April 2008. Walker filed a proof of claim in AAI’s bankruptcy case for $134,931.00, including $10,950.00 as a priority-employee claim based on wages, salaries, and commissions under the MOU and Separation Agreements. AAI filed a complaint in January 2010, seeking to avoid and recover transfers to Walker under the MOU and Separation Agreements. The bankruptcy court held a trial in February 2013 and entered its order in June 2013, ruling that Walker ceased to be a statutory insider on February 1, 2007, and did not meet criteria for a non-statutory insider; the transfers to Walker did not occur under an employment contract; and Walker gave reasonably equivalent value for the transfers. AAI appealed to the BAP, which affirmed the bankruptcy court, and again appealed to the Tenth Circuit.

AAI argued to the Tenth Circuit that its transfers to Walker were avoidable under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1). The Circuit iterated five prongs that AAI must meet to prove its transfers were avoidable: (1) the transfers must have occurred within two years of the bankruptcy filing; (2) Walker must have been an insider either when the transfers were negotiated or when the money was paid; (3) the transfers must have been made under an employment contract; (4) AAI must have received less than equivalent value for the transfers; and (5) the transfers must have been made outside the ordinary course of business. The Tenth Circuit noted that the burden was on AAI to prove all five prongs, and failure to prove even one prong would mean AAI could not prevail. Since the parties did not dispute the first factor, the Tenth Circuit began its analysis by looking at whether Walker was an insider when the transfers were negotiated or the money was paid.

The bankruptcy court concluded that Walker’s insider status ceased as of February 1, 2007, and the Tenth Circuit agreed. AAI argued that because the MOU listed March 1, 2007, as Walker’s termination date, the first Separation Agreement and MOU were entered into while Walker retained insider status. The bankruptcy court found, however, that Walker did no further work for AAI after that date, he did not return to the AAI premises, and his replacement started on February 2. The Tenth Circuit found no clear error in the bankruptcy court’s determinations. The bankruptcy court also held Walker could not qualify as a non-statutory insider, which AAI argued was applicable because Walker proposed the initial terms of his separation, which AAI ultimately accepted. The Tenth Circuit found this was insufficient to satisfy AAI’s burden. The Tenth Circuit similarly rejected AAI’s contention that refusing to classify Walker as an insider would frustrate the purpose of BAPCPA, noting it could not imagine Congress intended the BAPCPA to allow businesses to negotiate separation terms with an employee, which the employee fulfilled, then avoid any reciprocal obligations to the employee.

AAI next argued its payments to Walker were recoverable under the “non-insider” portions of § 548. The statute allows avoidance of transfers if AAI received less than equivalent value at the date of each transfer and AAI was insolvent. The Tenth Circuit again noted that failure of one prong would negate the possibility of avoidance. The bankruptcy court had found that the antecedent debt created by the MOU and Separation Agreements for the severance package constituted “reasonably equivalent value” because Walker had agreed to resign instead of facing termination in order not to imperil the debt financing with Morgan Stanley and had not retained employment with competing companies. As for the airplane deposit and stock purchase refund, the Tenth Circuit found no error in the bankruptcy court’s determination that these transactions were not avoidable.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court.

Tenth Circuit: No Avoidance of Transaction Made Within Ordinary Course of Business

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in In re C.W. Mining Co.: Jubber v. SMC Electrical Products, Inc. on Monday, August 10, 2015.

C.W. Mining was forced into bankruptcy after creditors filed a petition for involuntary bankruptcy on January 8, 2008. In June 2007, C.W. had entered into an agreement with SMC Electrical Products, Inc., to purchase equipment in order to switch from a continuous method of mining to a longwall method. On September 18, 2007, SMC submitted an invoice to C.W. for $808,539.75, due in 30 days. C.W. made a $200,000 payment on the invoice on October 16, 2007, two days before it was due. The bankruptcy trustee initiated an adversary proceeding to avoid the transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). The bankruptcy court granted SMC summary judgment and rejected the trustee’s claim on the grounds that the transfer was made in the ordinary course of business. The BAP affirmed, and the trustee appealed to the Tenth Circuit.

The Tenth Circuit analyzed avoidance and the ordinary course of business exception, including the scrutiny applied to first-time transactions. The Tenth Circuit explained the purpose of the ordinary course of business transaction in detail, and examined its application as to both parties in the business transaction. Applying its analysis to the circumstances of this case, the Tenth Circuit found that the transaction between C.W. and SMC was within the ordinary course of business. The purchase was an arms’ length transaction for the purpose of assisting in mining operations. The Tenth Circuit dismissed the trustee’s arguments, characterizing them as an argument against a first-time transaction and finding that was not enough to avoid the transfer.

The bankruptcy court’s ruling was affirmed.

Tenth Circuit: Bankruptcy Exemption for Retirement Plan Property Not Applicable When Property Withdrawn from Plan

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in In re Gordon: Gordon v. Wadsworth on Friday, June 26, 2015.

In this bankruptcy appeal, the Gordons claimed $2,051 in their savings account as an exempt asset under C.R.S. § 13-54-102(1)(s) because the money represented a lump-sum distribution from their retirement plan and had not been commingled with other funds. The bankruptcy trustee objected on the ground that the exemption for retirement plans does not apply once the money is withdrawn from the plan. The bankruptcy judge agreed with the trustee’s objection and denied the Gordons’ motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado affirmed, as did the Tenth Circuit.

The Tenth Circuit evaluated the language of C.R.S. § 13-54-102(1)(s), which exempts property held in or payable from retirement plans from levy and sale under writ of execution. The Gordons argued that the legislature intended to create an exemption from all retirement funds, regardless of whether they remained in the plan. The Tenth Circuit disagreed, finding the plain language of the statute precluded this reading. The Tenth Circuit found no statutory support for the Gordons’ argument.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court and denied the Gordons’ request to certify questions of law to the Colorado Supreme Court.

Tenth Circuit: Sole Shareholders Should Not Be Discouraged from Infusing Capital Into Failing Businesses

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in In re Alternate Fuels, Inc.: Redmond v. Jenkins on Friday, June 12, 2015.

Alternative Fuels, Inc. (AFI) is a Kansas corporation that formerly engaged in surface coal mining operations in Missouri. AFI filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in Kansas in 1992 and briefly continued operations while its bankruptcy was pending. John Warmack acquired 100% of AFI’s stock and formed Cimarron Energy Co. to continue the mining operations for which AFI still held permits. Mr. Warmack provided the State of Missouri with new reclamation bonds to assure that AFI would reclaim the mining land when its mining operations were finished. The bonds were secured with 24 certificates of deposit, worth approximately $1.4 million.

Mr. Warmack finished mining in 1999 and entered into an agreement with Mr. Jenkins where Mr. Jenkins would fulfill the reclamation obligations and obtain the proceeds of the 24 certificates of deposit and Cimarron’s remaining mining equipment. Mr. Jenkins paid Mr. Warmack $549,250 in exchange for 100% of AFI’s stock and 99% of Cimarron’s stock, certain equipment owned by Cimarron, and the 24 certificates of deposit. On the same day, AFI executed a promissory note for $500,000 to Mr. Jenkins. AFI executed three promissory notes to Mr. Jenkins altogether—two for $500,000 and one for $1,000,000. In 2002, AFI filed a lawsuit against certain state officers and employees, alleging tortious interference with the reclamation efforts. AFI assigned $3,000,000 of its potential recovery to Mr. Jenkins.

Judgment entered for AFI in the tort suit for $6.4 million, which, following an appeal and payment of attorney fees and costs, resulted in a recovery of about $5 million. AFI’s creditors began making claims against the proceeds, and in 2009 AFI applied for help from the bankruptcy court in distributing the funds. Mr. Jenkins filed a proof of claim against AFI’s estate for about $4.3 million. Exercising discretion and applying the Tenth Circuit test for recharacterization, the bankruptcy court recharacterized the transfers evidenced by the promissory notes as equity infusions and found he no longer held a claim secured by the alleged assignment of the suit proceeds. The bankruptcy court held in the alternative that Mr. Jenkins failed to provide sufficient documentation to prove the amount of his claim, and additionally held in the alternative that equitable subordination would be appropriate since Mr. Jenkins had acted inequitably to the detriment of AFI’s creditors and his claim should be subordinated to the level of an unsecured creditor. Mr. Jenkins appealed. The Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed, and Mr. Jenkins again appealed.

The Tenth Circuit first rejected Mr. Jenkins’ argument that two recent Supreme Court decisions overruled Tenth Circuit precedent in In re Hedged Investments. The two cases relied on by Mr. Jenkins dealt with disallowance, not recharacterization, so the Tenth Circuit found the 13-step Hedged Investments recharacterization test applied. The bankruptcy court found three steps superficially supported treating Mr. Jenkins’ advances as loans: the names given to the certificates evidencing indebtedness, no increased participation in management as a result of the advances, and the extent to which the advances were used to acquire capital assets. The Tenth Circuit agreed that these three steps supported treating the advances as loans, but averred they did so more than superficially.

The Tenth Circuit found little support for the bankruptcy court’s determination that other factors necessitated recharacterization. It discounted the bankruptcy court’s decision that the ninth factor, the identity of interest between creditor and shareholder, pointed to recharacterization, finding that because there was only one shareholder this factor did not apply. As for the second factor, the presence or absence of a fixed maturity date, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the court’s finding that the notes lacked a maturity date, finding instead they each required full payment after five years. The fact that Mr. Jenkins did not seek repayment did not render the requirement meaningless. Concerning the eighth factor, recapitalization, the Tenth Circuit found that placing too much emphasis on the factor could discourage investors from funding “rescue efforts” for failing businesses. As to the seventh factor, the intent of the parties, the Tenth Circuit found the parties intended the capital contributions to be treated as loans. The Tenth Circuit balanced the remaining factors and decided the bulk of the Hedged Investments factors weighed against recharacterization. The Tenth Circuit painted a picture of Mr. Jenkins as a sole shareholder loaning money to a failing business in hopes of keeping it afloat.

The Tenth Circuit similarly rejected the bankruptcy court’s alternative holding discharging Mr. Jenkins’ claim because he failed to meet his burden of persuasion as to amount. The Tenth Circuit found the copies of the three promissory notes proved his claim amount. The Tenth Circuit also declined to accept the bankruptcy court’s determination that if Mr. Jenkins’ claim were allowed to proceed it should be equitably subordinated. The Tenth Circuit noted that equitable subordination is an extraordinary remedy that should be employed sparingly and only if three factors are present: inequitable conduct, injury to the other creditors, and consistency with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The Tenth Circuit further noted that the inequitable conduct warranting subordination must be egregious, tantamount to fraud, or involving moral turpitude. The Tenth Circuit found no such conduct from Mr. Jenkins.

The Tenth Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court’s judgment, finding neither recharacterization nor equitable subordination appropriate to Mr. Jenkins’ claims. Judge Phillips wrote a thoughtful and detailed dissent.

Tenth Circuit: Debtor’s Participation in Tax Evasion Scheme was Willful

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in In re Vaughn: Vaughn v. United States on Tuesday, August 26, 2014.

In the mid-1990s, James Charles Vaughn was the CEO of FrontierVision Partners, L.P., a cable television acquisitions company. In 1999, Vaughn sold FrontierVision for roughly $2.1 billion. He received approximately $20 million cash and $11 million in the purchasing company’s stock from this transaction. Vaughn contacted KPMG LLP regarding tax planning and learned of a tax strategy called Bond Linked Issue Premium Structure (“BLIPS”), in which relatively small cash contributions were made to an investment fund with a non-recourse loan and loan premium in order to facilitate a high tax loss without a corresponding economic loss. Vaughn utilized the BLIPS strategy for his 1999 taxes. In September 2000, the IRS issued Revenue Bulletin Notice 2000-44, which specifically disclaimed BLIPS-type practices, although not naming BLIPS. Vaughn was notified of the IRS’s position by KPMG in 2000. In 2001, another BLIPS participant was audited by the IRS, and contacted Vaughn to inform him of the audit. KPMG was audited in 2002, and at that time informed Vaughn that he likely would face an audit as well. KPMG representatives suggested to Vaughn that he participate in an IRS voluntary disclosure program.

Meanwhile, Vaughn divorced his first wife, Cindy Vaughn, in 2001, and the couple’s assets were divided. Vaughn married Kathy St. Onge shortly thereafter and made large purchases with her. In 2002, three weeks before filing his voluntary disclosure with the IRS, Vaughn created an irrevocable trust for his stepdaughter and transferred $1.5 million to the trust. Vaughn and St. Onge spent large amounts of money from 2001 through 2003. When the couple divorced in 2003, St. Onge received many of the remaining assets.

The IRS notified Vaughn in 2003 that Cindy had requested innocent spouse relief for her 1999 tax return. Vaughn requested the same relief, stating that the divorces had depleted his assets but neglecting to mention the trust for the stepdaughter or the unequal division of assets in his divorce from St. Onge. In June 2004, the IRS notified Vaughn of an approximately $8.6 million tax deficiency relating to the BLIPS transaction, and notified him of a further $200,000 deficiency regarding carryover from 2000.

Vaughn filed his Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in November 2006. The IRS subsequently filed a proof of claim in that action for the 1999 and 2000 tax deficiencies for approximately $14.3 million. Vaughn initiated an adversary proceeding, seeking to have the taxes declared dischargeable. The bankruptcy court found that Vaughn had both filed a fraudulent tax return and willfully evaded his taxes, and his tax liabilities were non-dischargeable. Vaughn appealed to the federal district court, which affirmed the bankruptcy court. Vaughn then appealed to the Tenth Circuit, arguing that the district court erroneously employed a “holistic” review to support the bankruptcy court’s determination of willful evasion of taxes, and also arguing that the bankruptcy court’s finding of willful evasion was based on conduct that was negligent, not willful.

The Tenth Circuit first addressed the “holistic” review argument, and noted that the bankruptcy court made no mention of employing a “holistic” review, instead applying a two-pronged approach. Turning next to the argument that Vaughn’s conduct was negligent, not willful, the Tenth Circuit found that the bankruptcy court made specific findings regarding Vaughn’s intentions in participating in the BLIPS scheme. The Tenth Circuit rejected Vaughn’s argument that his conduct was negligent because he did not know the exact amount of taxes due, finding instead that the assessment of tax is not required for debtor’s conduct to be willful.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court and the bankruptcy court.

Bankruptcy Plan Modification by Debtor’s Counsel – Part of Bankruptcy Update 2014

In any three- to five-year period, many of us face unanticipated financial obstacles – medical expenses, educational expenses, dependent expenses. For a bankruptcy debtor, these unexpected financial burdens can derail a payment plan. Thankfully, the Bankruptcy Code at 11 U.S.C. § 1329 allows post-confirmation plan modifications so that debtors can adapt to changing life circumstances.

Section 1329 permits a debtor, trustee, or holder of an unsecured loan to request modification to increase or reduce payments to a particular class; prolong or shorten the time for those payments; alter the amount of distribution to a creditor in order to account for another payment not covered by the plan; or reduce payments in order to cover health insurance expenses for the debtor.

Experienced bankruptcy attorney Andrew S. Trexler offers some of the common scenarios in which his clients have requested post-confirmation plan modification:

  • To remove unpaid mortgage arrears following a mortgage loan modification and reduce plan length;
  • To bring payments current and reduce payments to account for change in projected disposable income, such as from retirement;
  • To allow for debtor to transition from one job or business to another through temporary reduction in monthly payment and provide for post-petition mortgage and HOA arrears;
  • To provide for pre-petition priority support arrears and cram down secured debt;
  • To surrender property securing Class 2 or 3 debts (Note: this is explicitly allowed by Judge Tallman so long as in good faith but disallowed by Judge Campbell);
  • Generally, to accommodate any significant decrease in disposable income caused by reduction in hours, job loss, increase in taxes due to end of payroll tax holiday in 2013 or increased medical bills, insurance costs, lawsuit defense, etc.; or
  • To allow for the purchase of health insurance (now generally required by the Affordable Care Act), so long as the debtor complies with § 1329(a)(4).

Trexler also provides the sample modification request motions and projected plans for several of these scenarios. He will present on this topic at Friday’s CLE program – Bankruptcy Update 2014 – along with several bankruptcy court judges and other area bankruptcy attorneys. Click the links below to register or call (303) 860-0608.

CLE Program: Bankruptcy Update 2014

This CLE presentation will take place on June 6, 2014. Click here to register for the live program and click here to register for the webcast. You can also register by phone at (303) 860-0608.

Can’t make the live program? Order the homestudy here — CD homestudy • MP3 audio downloadVideo OnDemand

New Study Examines Overlooked Process for Selecting Key Federal Judges

Quality Judges, an initiative of IAALS, the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System at the University of Denver, has just released A Credit to the Courts: The Selection, Appointment, and Reappointment Process for Bankruptcy Judges. This study provides the first in-depth examination of the process for selecting U.S. bankruptcy judges, highlighting the similarities and differences among the regional circuits.

Unlike other federal judges, bankruptcy judges are not appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Since 1984, they have been chosen by the judges of the federal circuit in which they will serve. According to U.S. Judicial Conference regulations, the judicial council in each federal circuit may appoint a merit selection panel to review applications for bankruptcy judge vacancies and make recommendations regarding potential nominees to the council. But until now, no empirical study has explored whether the judicial councils use such panels, who serves on these panels, and how the panels’ screening processes work.

“Despite the number of cases processed in these high-volume courts, and their significance in the financial lives of individuals and businesses alike, very little was known about how the judges who preside over these courts come to be on the bench,” said Malia Reddick, Director of the Quality Judges Initiative at IAALS.

The IAALS study is based on interviews with 25 bankruptcy judges and 11 participants in the selection process—including circuit and district judges, bankruptcy practitioners, and academics, as well as questionnaires completed by the 12 regional circuit executives.

Researchers learned that the judicial council in every circuit uses a merit selection panel in screening applicants for bankruptcy judge vacancies, but these panels vary extensively in composition and operation. For instance, while merit selection panels in some circuits are composed only of judges, other circuits exclude judges from participating on these panels. Panels also range in size from three to nine members. Additional differences, as well as similarities, in bankruptcy judge selection processes across the circuits are highlighted in the report.

Participants were unanimous in praising the products of the selection process. As one now-chief bankruptcy judge who has been on the bench for more than two decades summed it up: “They generally pick the best person, and it truly is merit selection. I’m proud of the way bankruptcy judges are selected. To me it is the best merit selection process we have.”

Quality Judges is an initiative of IAALS dedicated to advancing empirically informed models for choosing, evaluating, and retaining judges that preserve impartiality and accountability.

IAALS, the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System at the University of Denver, is a national, independent research center dedicated to continuous improvement of the process and culture of the civil justice system.

Alli Gerkman is Director of Communications for IAALS, the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System at the University of Denver. IAALS is a national, independent research center dedicated to continuous improvement of the process and culture of the civil justice system.

The opinions and views expressed by Featured Bloggers on CBA-CLE Legal Connection do not necessarily represent the opinions and views of the Colorado Bar Association, the Denver Bar Association, or CBA-CLE, and should not be construed as such.

Bankruptcy Court Closure on Tuesday, December 18, 2012

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado announced that it will be closed from 11:30 a.m. to 12:45 p.m. on Tuesday, December 18, 2012. The closure is so that the court staff can have a holiday luncheon. The court requests that all paper filings and telephone calls be avoided during this time.

The bankruptcy court will also be closed Monday and Tuesday, December 24 and 25, for Christmas, and December 31 and January 1, for New Year’s.

Bankruptcy Court Announces Revised Chapter 13 Plan Form, Effective February 1, 2013

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado has amended its Chapter 13 Plan form. A General Protective Order will enter to make the form effective February 1, 2013. The changes are generally related to formatting, but there are also some substantive changes, which are highlighted on the PDF version of the form.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court judges welcome input on the form. To submit feedback, please email comments and suggestions to webmaster@cob.uscourts.gov.

The form is available in MS Word and Adobe Acrobat PDF. Download the form from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court webpage or click here for the PDF.

U.S. Bankruptcy Court Closed Christmas Eve and New Year’s Eve

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado announced that it will be closed on Monday, December 24, 2012 and Monday, December 31, 2012, so that the judges and staff may spend more time with their families.

The court will also be closed on Tuesday, December 25, in honor of the Christmas holiday, and Tuesday, January 1, in honor of the New Year’s holiday. Click here to see GPO 2012-06, signed by Chief District Judge Wiley Y. Daniel and Chief Bankruptcy Judge Howard R. Tallman, which authorizes the closure.