February 22, 2012

Spark the Discussion: Organize! The Rising Role of Unions in Colorado’s Medical Marijuana Industry

“Spark the Discussion” is a monthly Legal Connection column highlighting the hottest trends in the emerging field of medical marijuana law. This column is brought to you by Vicente Sederberg, LLC, a full-service, community-focused medical marijuana law firm.

Recently, the United Food and Commercial Worker’s Union, Colorado’s largest labor organization, announced it had unionized its first medical marijuana shop in Denver—with more than a dozen shops predicted to follow suit in the upcoming weeks.

According to Colorado’s UFCW President Kim Cordova, “the Union is committed to representing the hard working and compassionate workers in the Medical Cannabis retail centers and promoting guidelines to safeguard the interests of our members and the communities our members work in.”

What does it mean for Colorado’s medical marijuana industry to have union shops?

Colorado’s newest industry is in a tough position.  It faces near-constant attacks from various branches of the federal government including the IRS, Treasury, and, most recently, the Department of Justice.  Just last month, the United State attorney in Colorado, John Walsh, launched an attack on state-legal medical marijuana providers by sending 23 letters to centers, informing them that that were in areas deemed problematic by the federal government and would have to shut down in 45 days or face property seizure and criminal prosecution.

In the face of these mounting problems, the medical marijuana industry needs allies.  And they have found a powerful one in the Union.

At a basic level, labor unions allow workers to organize and engage in “collective bargaining” to promote better wages, benefits, and working conditions.  There is no denying the vast role that unions have played in positively shaping the American workforce with these organizations leading the charge to end child labor, secure a minimum wage and sick leave, and establish workplace safety measures as far back as the 1800’s.

But perhaps the most important role that unions play is their heavy influence over politics.  Beyond pushing for the interests of workers, unions have long been engaged in successful political campaigns, using lobbying and traditional campaign tactics to ensure the longevity of the industries they represent.  Through sophisticated political maneuvering, labor unions have played a crucial role throughout history in helping to establish and legitimize businesses—a lesson that medical marijuana shops may want to heed.   With the public backing of a state and national powerhouse like the UFCW, these fledgling businesses may be viewed in a new light by legislators, many of whom owe their elections in large part to the political backing of unions.

At the dawn of this new industry in Colorado, having mainstream partners such as labor unions may be crucial to the medical marijuana industry’s legitimacy and, quite possibly, its longevity.

Brian Vicente, Esq., is a founding member of Vicente Consulting, LLC, a law firm providing legal solutions for the medical marijuana community. He also serves as executive director of Sensible Colorado, the state’s leading non-profit working for medical marijuana patients and providers. Brian is the chair of the Denver Mayor’s Marijuana Policy Review Panel, serves on the Colorado Department of Revenue Medical Marijuana Oversight Panel, and coordinates the Colorado Bar Association’s Drug Policy Project.

The opinions and views expressed by Featured Bloggers on CBA-CLE Legal Connection do not necessarily represent the opinions and views of the Colorado Bar Association, the Denver Bar Association, or CBA-CLE, and should not be construed as such.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Attorney Who Continues Representing Client After Firm Dissolves Does So on Firm’s Behalf; Contingent Fee Subject to Fee-Sharing Agreement at Time of Dissolution

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in LaFond v. Sweeney on February 16, 2012.

Limited Liability Company— Attorney—Contingency Fee—Dissolution.

Defendant Charlotte N. Sweeney appealed the trial court’s judgment in favor of plaintiff Richard C. LaFond. The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

LaFond and Sweeney are attorneys who formed a firm that was organized as an LLC. After forming the LLC, LaFond and Sweeney orally agreed to share equally in all the firm’s profits, without regard to who brought cases into the office or who did work on them. LaFond brought a contingent-fee case (Maxwell) into the law firm, and considerable work was done on the case. The law firm dissolved on June 1, 2008, and LaFond continued to represent Maxwell. However, there was no written agreement that generally described how the law firm’s assets should be distributed after dissolution. The trial court ultimately awarded Sweeney $298,589.94 of the Maxwell settlement, based on an hourly valuation of attorney time and costs expended by the firm as of June 2008.

Sweeney argued that the court employed the wrong legal standard for calculating the value of the Maxwell case, and that she and the law firm are entitled to half the entire contingent fee awarded in the Maxwell case. An attorney who carries on the representation of a client on an existing case after a law firm dissolves does so on the firm’s behalf. Thus, income received by a member for completing any unfinished business belongs to the dissolved firm. Absent a contrary agreement, members of a law firm organized as a partnership or an LLC cannot convert ongoing client matters to new firm business, and a contingent fee earned during the dissolution of an LLC is subject to the fee-sharing arrangement that existed at the time of dissolution. Here, Maxwell did not seek new counsel after the firm dissolved. Rather, LaFond continued to represent Maxwell. By doing so, LaFond had a duty to complete unfinished business of the dissolved law firm, including continuing to represent Maxwell. Additionally, Maxwell was required to pay the contingent fee when the case settled, rather than a fee based on quantum meruit, because the agreed on legal services had been completed. Therefore, the contingent fee allocated to LaFond in the Maxwell case is the law firm’s asset. Because LaFond and Sweeney orally agreed to share equally in all the firm’s profits, without regard to who brought cases into the office or who did work on them, each is entitled to an equal share of the contingent fee obtained by LaFond in the Maxwell case.

This summary is published here courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer. Other summaries for the Colorado Court of Appeals on February 16, 2012, can be found here.

SB 12-058: Creating the Venture Capital Advisory Board

On January 13, 2012, Sen. Rollie Heath introduced SB 12-058 – Concerning the Creation of the Venture Capital Advisory Board. This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.

The bill establishes the venture capital advisory board. The advisory board is required to create a report regarding venture capital investment in the state, provide the report to the general assembly, and present the report to the economic and business development committee of the House of Representatives and the business, labor, and technology committee of the senate. A copy of the report will be available on the web site maintained by the Colorado economic development commission. On February 1, the Business, Labor, and Technology Committee referred the unamended bill to the full Senate for consideration on 2nd Reading.

Since this summary, the bill passed a 2nd Reading and has been laid over daily for 3rd Reading.

Summaries of other featured bills can be found here.

SB 12-052: Increasing the Business Personal Property Tax Exemption

On January 13, 2012, Sen. Mark Scheffel and Rep. Kevin Priola introduced SB 12-052 – Concerning a Property Tax Exemption for Business Personal Property. This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.

Under current law, the amount of the exemption from property tax for business personal property listed on a single personal property schedule is $5,500 for the current property tax year cycle, $7,000 for the next property tax year cycle, and an inflation-adjusted amount for each property tax year cycle thereafter. The bill increases the business personal property exemption to $14,000 for the next property tax year cycle, which in turn increases the future inflation-adjusted amount of the exemption.

For a period of 10 years, the bill also exempts a portion of the business personal property of a state-assessed public utility through the creation of a valuation cap. The valuation cap is based on the actual value of the public utility’s operating property and plant for the 2011 property tax year, or a later property tax year in the case of a new public utility, with an incremental increase each year thereafter during the 10-year period. The value of property above the cap is deemed attributable to business personal property, unless the property tax administrator determines otherwise. The bill is assigned to the Finance Committee; the bill is scheduled for committee review on Thursday, February 16 Upon Adjournment (generally, sometime between 9:30 a.m. and 12:00 p.m.

Since this summary, the bill was postponed indefinitely by the Senate Finance Committee.

Summaries of other featured bills can be found here.

HB 12-1088: Allowing Deadly Force to Be Used Against an Intruder of a Business

On January 17, 2012, Rep. Chris Holbert and Sen. Kevin Grantham introduced HB 12-1088 – Concerning the Use of Deadly Physical Force Against a Person Who Makes an Illegal Entry Into a Place of Business. This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.

The bill extends the right to use deadly force against an intruder under certain conditions to include owners, managers, and employees of businesses. The unamended bill passed 2nd Reading in the House on February 9.

Since this summary, the bill passed a third reading in the House and moved to the Senate. It was assigned to the State, Veterans, & Military Affairs Committee.

Summaries of other featured bills can be found here.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Piercing the Corporate Veil of Single-Member LLC; Three-Prong Test

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Martin v. Freeman on February 2, 2012.

Limited Liability Company—Veil Piercing

In this limited liability company (LLC) veil-piercing case, defendants Dean C.B. Freeman and Tradewinds Group, LLC appealed the trial court’s judgment in favor of plaintiff Robert C. Martin. The judgment was affirmed.

Freeman managed Tradewinds Group, LLC as a single-member LLC. Tradewinds contracted to have Martin construct an airplane hangar. In 2006, Tradewinds sued Martin for breaching the construction agreement. In 2007, while the litigation was pending, Tradewinds sold its only meaningful asset, an airplane, for $300,000 and the proceeds were diverted to Freeman, who paid Tradewinds’ litigation expenses. In 2008, a judgment was entered in favor of Tradewinds. Martin appealed. Another division of the Court of Appeals found that Tradewinds’ damages were speculative, and remanded the case with directions to enter judgment in Martin’s favor. On remand, Martin was awarded $36,645.60 in costs. The LLC had no assets and Martin instituted this action to pierce the LLC veil. Following a bench trial in 2010, the court pierced the veil and found Freeman personally liable for the cost award against Tradewinds. Tradewinds appealed, arguing it was error to pierce the LLC veil. The Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the judgment.

To pierce the LLC veil, the court must conclude (1) the corporate entity is an alter ego or mere instrumentality; (2) the corporate form was used to perpetrate a fraud or defeat a rightful claim; and (3) an equitable result would be achieved by disregarding the corporate form. Tradewinds challenged whether the first and second prongs were met.

As to the alter ego prong, the trial court found that: assets were commingled; negligible corporate records were kept; the records concerning substantive transactions were inadequate; there was a single-member/manager-facilitated misuse; the entity was thinly capitalized; undocumented infusions of cash were required to pay all operating expenses; Tradewinds was never operated as an active business; corporate formalities were disregarded; Freeman paid its debts without characterizing the transactions; assets were used for non-entity purposes; and Tradewinds was operated as a mere assetless shell. The Court held that these findings fully supported a conclusion that Tradewinds was Freeman’s alter ego.

Tradewinds argued that the second prong was not met because the trial court did not find wrongful intent or bad faith. The Court found no case, and defendant cited none, requiring a showing of wrongful intent. Therefore, it concluded that a showing that the corporate form was used to defeat a creditor’s rightful claim is sufficient. Here, Tradewinds sold its only asset and diverted the proceeds to Martin during the litigation. Transferring all of the assets to defeat a rightful creditor’s potential claim is sufficient to support piercing the corporate veil.

Tradewinds also argued that Martin waived the ability to collect litigation costs by not contesting the amount of the cost bond filed. The Court disagreed, concluding that Martin’s failure to contest the cost bond did not constitute an unequivocal act manifesting intent to relinquish the right to collect costs. The judgment was affirmed.

This summary is published here courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer. Other summaries for the Colorado Court of Appeals on February 2, 2012, can be found here.

Tenth Circuit: Although Corporation Made False or Misleading Statements to the Market, It Did Not Act with Scienter

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in In re Level 3 Communications Inc. Securities Litigation on Monday, February 6, 2012.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. This case arises from allegations that certain officers of Level 3 Communications, Inc. engaged in securities fraud. The lead plaintiff filed a class action complaint on behalf of all purchasers or acquirers of Level 3 securities between October 17, 2006, and October 23, 2007. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants made false or misleading statements of material fact to the market during the class period regarding Level 3’s progress in integrating several entities it had acquired.

Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, it is unlawful to “use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe.” Additionally, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 prohibits “mak[ing] any untrue statement of a material fact.” On appeal, Plaintiff “argues that the district court should be reversed because the amended complaint adequately pleaded false statements of material fact made by [D]efendants, as well as facts sufficient to raise a strong inference of scienter. Although [the Court agreed] with [P]laintiff that at least a few of the complaint’s 237 paragraphs include materially false statements, [it affirmed] the district court’s dismissal of the complaint based on [the] conclusion that it fails adequately to plead scienter.”

According to the Court, “[t]he importance of integration to Level 3 and its investors does not mean that everything [D]efendants said on the topic was material. Many of the statements in [P]laintiff’s complaint are, as a matter of law, nothing more than puffery. . . . [B]road claims by [D]efendants regarding integration efforts and the customer experience overall are likewise non-actionable.” However, “on occasion [D]efendants’ comments regarding Level 3’s integration progress did cross the line from corporate optimism and puffery to objectively verifiable matters of fact” that could be actionable. Three of the statements were found to be false or misleading when made. However, “it is not enough for [P]laintiff to point out misleading statements of material fact. Under the heightened pleading standards of the PSLRA, [P]laintiff must state with particularity facts ‘giving rise to a strong inference’ that the [D]efendants acted with scienter, which we define as ‘a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud, or recklessness.’” The Court concluded that no cogent inference of scienter could be drawn from the complaint.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Petitioner Entitled to Attorney Fees and Costs for Piercing the Corporate Veil

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Swinerton Builders v. Nassi on February 2, 2012.

Attorney Fees—Breach of Contract—Pierce Corporate Veil

Plaintiff Swinerton Builders (Swinerton) appealed the district court’s order denying its motion to recover the attorney fees and costs that it incurred in successfully piercing Beauvallon Corporation’s (Beauvallon) corporate veil. The order was reversed and the case was remanded.

Swinerton entered into a construction contract with Beauvallon in 2001 that contained an arbitration clause and fee-shifting provision. After the construction project was completed, Swinerton filed a demand for arbitration, asserting breach of contract claims against Beauvallon and its president, defendant Craig Nassi, and an unjust enrichment claim against Beauvallon. Ultimately, the arbitrators ordered Beauvallon to pay Swinerton more than $1 million in damages, interest, attorney fees, and costs, and the district court confirmed this award. Thereafter, the district court ruled in favor of Swinerton, concluding that Swinerton could pierce Beauvallon’s corporate veil and hold Nassi personally liable for the arbitration award against Beauvallon.

Swinerton contended that the district court erred in refusing to award it the attorney fees and costs that it incurred in its successful veil-piercing action. A party who prevails in an action to pierce the corporate veil of a corporation may recover the attorney fees and costs incurred in that action if (1) the action was brought to enforce a breach of contract judgment against the corporation; and (2) the contract underlying the judgment authorized an award of fees and costs for enforcing the judgment against the corporation.

Here, Swinerton’s action to pierce the corporate veil was not a separate and independent claim. Rather, it was a procedural mechanism to enforce the arbitration award against Beauvallon in the underlying breach of contract action. Thus, the veil-piercing lawsuit was, in effect, an enforcement action against Beauvallon. When the district court determined that Swinerton could pierce Beauvallon’s corporate veil, Nassi became liable for, among other things, Beauvallon’s contractual obligations under the fee-shifting provision. Accordingly, Swinerton was entitled to recover the reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in the veil-piercing action. The case was remanded to the district court for a determination and award of the appropriate amount of such fees.

This summary is published here courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer. Other summaries for the Colorado Court of Appeals on February 2, 2012, can be found here.

SB 12-024: Residential Non-Profit Corporations — Open Meeting Provision Clarification and Limitation of Conditions Under Which Member Refunds Due

On January 11, 2012, Sen. Ted Harvey introduced SB 12-024 – Concerning the Obligations of a Residential Non-Profit Corporation to its Residential Members, and, In Connection Therewith, Clarifying Open Meeting Provisions and Limiting the Conditions Under Which the Corporation Must Refund Moneys Paid By a Residential Member. This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.

The bill relieves a residential nonprofit corporation of its current obligations to:

  • Refund the entrance fee of a residential member within 90 days after the member’s resignation, termination, expulsion, or suspension from the corporation; and
  • Hold a member or his or her heirs harmless from liability for any periodic payments due more than 30 days after the member’s termination due to death or another reason beyond the member’s control.

This bill specifies that meetings of a committee of the board of directors that is not authorized to take final action on the board’s behalf are not subject to open meeting and published agenda requirements. The bill passed unamended from the Senate Local Government Committee; bill awaits 2nd Reading.

Since this summary, the bill has passed a second and third reading in the Senate unamended.

Summaries of other featured bills can be found here.

HB 12-1029: Exempting Business Personal Property Purchased in 2013 from Property Taxes

On January 11, 2012, Rep. Holbert and Sen. Scheffel introduced HB 12-1029 – Concerning an economic stimulus through a property tax exemption for business personal property, and, in connection therewith, enacting the “Save Colorado Jobs Act.” This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.

The bill exempts business personal property that is purchased at any time during the 2013 calendar year from the levy and collection of property tax. Assigned to the Finance Committee.

Since this summary, the House Committee on Finance referred the bill unamended to the House Committee of the Whole. The House Second Reading was laid over to January 26.

Summaries of other featured bills can be found here.

Secretary of State Launches Password Protection for Business Filers

On Thursday, January 26, 2012, Colorado Secretary of State Scott Gessler began allowing business owners and filers to password protect their filings to help safeguard against business identity theft. As business filers incorporate in Colorado or file their annual reports online, they will now have the option to create their own password to prevent unauthorized changes to their records.

According to the press release, the state first uncovered business identity theft in 2010, when identity thieves targeted businesses by illegally manipulating data on secretaries of state websites. After hijacking business identities, they took out credit using the company’s good name, forcing businesses to rebuild their credit history.

Implementation of the system follows the passage of HB 11-1095 last year, which allowed the Secretary of State’s office to implement a password protected business filing system.

Current business filers can now add password protection to their filings by going to their business’ summary page and clicking “Set Up Secure Business Filing.” From there, simply request a PIN that will be mailed to the address already on file. New businesses registering can set up a password as part of their registration. Click here for more information.

Tenth Circuit: Bank Owed No Duty of Care to Petitioner and Claim Preempted by Strict Liability

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in Abbasid, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of Santa Fe on Tuesday, January 24, 2012.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. Petitioner was the sole officer and shareholder of Abbasid, Inc., which opened Azhar’s Oriental Rugs in Santa Fe in August 2004. Petitioner was rarely in New Mexico and, in his absence, his wife took on a role at the rug store. Petitioner’s wife deposited a portion of the store’s receipts—both checks and cash—in the account of her cousin and used some money from that account for personal expenses. Petitioner and his wife later divorced. Petitioner sued the Bank to recover the money that he said had been wrongfully taken. He claimed conversion and negligence in accepting deposits to the cousin’s account, alleging that the Bank took checks from a person not entitled to enforce the checks or receive payment. The negligence claim alleges that the Bank injured Petitioner by failing to act with proper care in accepting the checks for deposit or payment without proper authority. The district court dismissed the negligence claim on the grounds that the Bank owed no duty of care to Petitioner and that the claim was preempted by strict liability. After trial, the jury returned a special verdict that the Bank did not convert any of Petitioner’s checks.

On appeal, Petitioner made the following assertions of error: “(1) the district court improperly denied its motion for new trial claiming that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; (2) the court improperly excluded evidence of the Bank’s check-handling policies; (3) the court improperly instructed the jury on mitigation of damages and improperly admitted evidence on the issue; (4) the court improperly rejected Abbasid’s requested jury instruction on authority; (5) the court improperly granted the Bank summary judgment on the negligence claim; and (6) the court improperly permitted postjudgment discovery.” The Court found that the claims of error need not be addressed on the merits because the arguments were not been properly preserved, or any error was mooted by the verdict. The remaining claims failed on the merits.