May 19, 2013

Colorado Court of Appeals: No Violation of Laws or Constitution When District Offers Scholarships to Students of Private Schools

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Taxpayers for Public Education v. Douglas County School District on Thursday, February 28, 2013.

Choice Scholarship Program—Standing—Public School Finance Act of 1994—Colorado Constitution.

In 2011, the Douglas County Board of Education (County Board) adopted the Choice Scholarship Program (CSP). Pursuant to the CSP, parents of eligible elementary school, middle school, and high school students residing in the Douglas County School District (District) may choose to have their children attend certain private schools, including some with religious affiliation. The District would pay parents of participating students “scholarships” covering some of the cost of tuition at those schools, and the parents would then remit the scholarship money to the schools.

Plaintiffs are nonprofit organizations, Douglas County taxpayers, District students, and parents of District students. They filed suit to enjoin implementation of the CSP, claiming that it violates the Public School Finance Act of 1994, CRS §§ 22-54-101 to -135 (Act), and various provisions of the Colorado Constitution.

Plaintiffs claimed that the CSP violated the Act because the District will impermissibly use state money distributed by the Colorado Department of Education to pay for private school tuition at private schools. The Court of Appeals did not reach the merit on this claim, however, because it found that plaintiffs did not have standing to bring a private cause of action seeking enforcement of the Act.

Plaintiffs further contended that the court erred in rejecting their claim alleging a violation of article IX, § 2, of the Colorado Constitution, which requires the General Assembly to “provide for the establishment and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of free public schools throughout the state.” Article IX, § 2 plainly is not violated where a local school district decides to provide educational opportunities in addition to the free system the Constitution requires. It also is not violated merely because some students’ parents may choose to have their children forego the available opportunity to attend a school within the system the Constitution requires. Therefore, plaintiffs failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the CSP violates the Colorado Constitution.

Plaintiffs also contended that the court erred in rejecting their claim alleging a violation of article IX, § 3, of the Colorado Constitution because the public school fund is used for private schools. There was no record support for this argument. Therefore, the Court assumed that the CSP was funded out of the 95% of total per-pupil revenue that does not come from the public school fund.

Plaintiffs further argued that the CSP violated article IX, § 15, of the Colorado Constitution, and that the district court erred in ruling to the contrary. However, article IX, § 15, does not apply to the CSP because the directors of the boards of education of local school districts have control of instruction in the public schools of their respective districts.

Plaintiffs also argued that the CSP violated article II, § 4; article V, § 34; and article IX, §§ 7 and 8, of the Colorado Constitution. The CSP is neutral toward religion generally and toward religion-affiliated schools specifically. The CSP is intended to benefit students and their parents, and any benefit to the participating schools is incidental. Further, the CSP does not compel anyone to do anything, much less attend religious services. To the extent students would attend a particular private school or religious services at that school, they would do so as a result of parents’ voluntary choices. Therefore, the CSP does not violate the Colorado Constitution.

Finally, plaintiffs argued that the CSP violated article V, § 34, of the Colorado Constitution by providing funds to private schools and religious organizations. The General Assembly appropriates state money for elementary and secondary education to the Colorado Department of Education, which in turn distributes it to local school districts in the form of total per pupil revenue. At that point, ownership of the funds passes to the local school districts. The District’s expenditure of funds under the CSP, therefore, does not constitute an appropriation by the General Assembly. As a result, the CSP does not violate article V, § 34.

Summary and full case available here.

Spark the Discussion: The “Amendment 64 Implementation Task Force”

Spark the Discussion” is a monthly Legal Connection column highlighting the hottest trends in the emerging field of marijuana law. This column is brought to you by Vicente Sederberg, LLC, the country’s first national medical marijuana law firm.

By Joshua Kappel, Esq. and Rachelle Yeung

When Governor Hickenlooper signed Amendment 64 into law, proclaiming marijuana legal to use, possess and purchase for adults 21 years-old or older in Colorado, advocates barely paused to celebrate their victory – and opponents barely recognized their defeat.

Instead, all sides immediately began working on implementing this historic initiative through the Governor’s “Amendment 64 Implementation Task Force.” The Task Force, created by an Executive Order of the Governor, is comprised of 26 members, which were selected for their wide range of interests and expertise – from representatives of the Attorney General’s Office and the Department of Revenue to medical marijuana industry groups and other stakeholders.[1]

The Task Force is assisted by committees, or “Working Groups,” each of which is co-chaired by a member of the Task Force and made up of additional stakeholders and members of the public. The five Working Groups are:

  1. Regulatory Framework
  2. Local Authority and Control
  3. Tax/Funding and Civil Law
  4. Criminal Law
  5. Consumer Safety and Social Issues

The various Working Groups have discussed a large range of issues, some of the issues are already addressed in the text of Amendment 64 while other issues appear almost unrelated. A full list of all the issues discussed, agendas, meeting times, and audio recordings are available on the Department of Revenue’s Amendment 64 Task Force website. The Task Force is scheduled to make its recommendations to the Governor, the State Legislature, and the Department of Revenue by the end of February.

During its first meeting, members of the Criminal Law Working Group came to a consensus that they should avoid tackling issues of driving under the influence of drugs (DUID) and industrial hemp.  Despite being tasked with these issues, the Working Group decided discussing these would be a waste of valuable time and resources.  In fact, Brian Connors, co-chair of the Working Group and representative of the Public Defender’s Office, noted, revisiting the DUID issue would be not only time-intensive, but redundant. The legislature and the Colorado Commission on Criminal & Juvenile Justice have been researching the question for well over two years, and have developed far more familiarity with the topic. In fact, a marijuana related DUID bill was recently introduced in the state legislature that appears to strike a compromise between the various stakeholders.

Instead, the Criminal Law Working Group will focus on determining legal definitions and confronting law enforcement issues. For example, can evidence of marijuana alone be the basis for probable cause? In the event of a dismissal or ‘not guilty’ verdict, do law enforcement agencies have a duty to maintain seized marijuana plants? This Working Group has also veered off path to discuss completely unrelated issues such as requiring drug tests for all minors who apply for a driver’s license.

The Tax/Funding and Civil Law Working Group, among other things, addressed the issue of banking for state licensed marijuana businesses. Because marijuana is still illegal under federal law, most banks are fearful of handling funds related to marijuana. However, all parties involved, from marijuana business owners to representatives of the Colorado Bankers Association agreed that the fledgling marijuana industry could not depend entirely on cash transactions. Unfortunately, the Working Group was faced with a serious shortage of viable alternatives, and in the end, resolved only to write to the Federal Government, requesting further guidance.

The Regulatory Framework Working Group kicked off its first meeting by examining existing regulatory frameworks and deciding which framework to model recreational marijuana on – specifically, whether to base it on our medical marijuana code or our alcohol/liquor code. Amusingly, one of the first issues to come up was whether to require vertical integration, which the medical marijuana code mandates, or prohibit it, which is the case with liquor.

One suspect issue was also brought up by the Regulatory Framework Working Group: whether to recommend a residency requirement for those who are going to purchase marijuana from a licensed store.  This issue caught many people by surprise as Amendment 64’s personal protection clause makes clear that “possessing, using, displaying, purchasing, or transporting marijuana” is now legal under state law for persons over the age of 21. The plain language of Amendment 64 applies to all adults aged 21 or older.

In addition to the issues covered by the other Working Groups, the Local Authority and Control Working Group is working to resolve:  What can local jurisdictions regulate? What will be the local controls regarding advertising?  What/who is the local authority over fines and licensing?  Lastly, the Consumer Safety/Social Issues Working Group is working to resolve issues associated with: advertising and marketing to minors; product labeling and packaging; product testing; and consumer, public, and industry education.

Surprisingly, a significant number of vocal marijuana opponents managed to secure positions on the Governor’s Task Force and in the working groups; however, the Task Force is not supposed to debate the merits of Amendment 64 or impede its implementation. Additionally, not all issues discussed by the Task Force will or should become recommendations of the Task Force, let alone a bill or regulation. The Task Force should only make recommendations that are both legally sound and good public policy. For example, a residency requirement on marijuana purchases, although discussed by one of the working groups, would be bad public policy because it would only perpetuate another black market and derive the state of tax revenue – exactly what the voters of Colorado wanted to prohibit with Amendment 64. Additionally, such a significant statutory limitation on Amendment 64 may not withstand legal scrutiny.[2]

Considering the Task Force has a mandate from the 55% of our electorate that voted for Amendment 64 and that they have less than a month now to make their recommendations, we can only hope that the proponents and opponents of marijuana reform can work together, stay on track, and focus on implementing the will of the voters. Nonetheless, we will all have to wait and see on what the Task Force actually recommends.

 


[1] It is worth noting that the Task Force really doesn’t have to address any issues besides funding the Department of Revenue to make rules because Amendment 64 is self-executing.

[2] Generally in Colorado, self-executing initiatives cannot be narrowed, impaired, or limited by the legislature. Yenter v. Baker, 126 Colo. 232, 236-237 (Colo. 1952); See also Zaner v. City of Brighton, 917 P.2d 280, 283 (Colo. 1996).

Joshua Kappel, Esq. is the Associate Director of Sensible Colorado, the leading state-wide non-profit working to educate the public about sensible marijuana policy. Mr. Kappel is also the senior associate at Vicente Sederberg, the first nation-wide medical marijuana law firm.

Rachelle Yeung is currently in her third year at the University of Colorado School of Law and a law clerk at Vicente Sederberg LLC.

The opinions and views expressed by Featured Bloggers on CBA-CLE Legal Connection do not necessarily represent the opinions and views of the Colorado Bar Association, the Denver Bar Association, or CBA-CLE, and should not be construed as such.

Spark the Discussion: Top Five Myths About the Drug-Free Workplace Act

Kimberlie Ryan Head ShotSpark the Discussion” is a monthly Legal Connection column highlighting the hottest trends in the emerging field of marijuana law. This column is brought to you by Vicente Sederberg, LLC, the country’s first national medical marijuana law firm.

By Kimberlie Ryan, Esq.

Headlines screamed across the country when Colorado became the first state to recognize the Constitutional right to use marijuana for any reason by adults ages 21 and older.

One headline reported a CEO’s panic that “legal pot will make it hard to hire, devastate the economy.”  This CEO claimed that “if you sell to the federal government or state government, you are required to certify that you have a drug-free workplace,” so “if you smoke pot, I still can’t hire you.”

These statements confirm a fundamental misunderstanding of the federal Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988 (DFWA), and such proclamations perpetuate unfounded myths about this law.

Myths like these could deprive unwitting employers of excellent employees – and might give rise to legal claims against companies that violate workers’ rights.  Due to space constraints this article is limited to a discussion of the DFWA, so let’s get to it and set the record straight.

Before we get to the myths and the realities, a brief background on the DFWA is in order.  President Reagan signed the Drug-Free Workplace Act nearly 25 years ago in 1988.  The Act defines a “drug-free workplace” as a site for the performance of work done by a federal contractor or grantee in connection with a specific federal contract or grant at which employees are prohibited from engaging in the unlawful manufacture, distribution, dispensing, possession or use of any controlled substance.  At this time “controlled substance” still includes marijuana.  But that is not the end of the analysis.

By definition, the DFWA limits the “workplace” to the work site for certain “covered” employers and by its terms does not include any other location where work for the contract is not performed. It does not allow employers to prohibit the use of marijuana completely, and it does not apply to all employers or employees.  Now to the myths.

1. Myth #1 – The DFWA applies to all private employers.

Reality:  The DFWA only applies to certain federal contractors and grant recipients.  A company is subject to the Act only if the value of a single contract is more than $100,000, or if it has any federal grant.  Individuals with grants or contracts from any U.S. Federal agency are covered by the Act, regardless of dollar volume.  Last year, only 21.7% of federal contracting dollars went to small businesses.  Unless employers meet the specific requirements for coverage, the DFWA does not apply to them.  The Act does not apply to those that do not have contracts or grants from the federal government, and it does not apply to employees who are not directly engaged in the performance of the covered contract or grant.

2. Myth #2 – The DFWA requires employers to drug test employees. 

Reality: The DFWA does not require or authorize drug testing.  In fact, the legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress did not intend to impose any additional requirements beyond those set forth in the Act, which are very limited as discussed below. Specifically, the legislative history precludes the imposition of drug testing of employees as part of the implementation of the Act.

3.  Myth #3 – The DFWA requires employers to fire employees who use marijuana at home as authorized by Colorado Constitutional Amendments 20 and 64.

Nothing in the DFWA requires employers to fire workers for exercising their Constitutional rights to use marijuana while off-duty and outside the workplace.  The law requires only that in case of a conviction for a criminal drug offense resulting from a violation occurring in the workplace, the employer may take one of two types of action. The employer may take disciplinary action, which may be a less severe penalty than termination, or may refer the employee for rehabilitation or drug abuse assistance program. The choice of which basic course to choose, as well as the specific discipline or treatment option, is left to the employer’s discretion and may be made on a case-by-case basis, provided all state and local laws are followed.  “Conviction” is defined by the Act as limited to afinding of guilt, including a plea of no contest, or imposition of sentence, or both, by any judicial body charged with the responsibility to determine violations of the Federal or state criminal drug statutes.

4. Myth #4 – The DFWA requires employers to report positive drug tests to the federal government.

The Act does not require employers to report positive drug tests to the federal government.  The only reporting requirement is triggered solely if an employee is convicted of a drug offense occurring at the workplace.

5.  Myth #5 – The DFWA preempts state and local laws.

The requirements of the Act “coexist with state and local law,” according to the United States Department of Labor.  Colorado does not have any state statute governing drug testing in employment, and adults have a Constitutional right to use marijuana in Colorado.  The City of Boulder Ordinance 5195 prohibits employee drug testing except in clear cases of probable cause, and where a written policy has already been provided to the work force.  In general, Colorado employers should update their drug testing policies to account for the Constitutional right, or expect legal challenges.

6.  Bonus Myth #6 – Employers who recognize Colorado’s Constitutional right of employees to use marijuana at home while off duty will automatically lose federal contracts.

Nothing in the DFWA governs the use of marijuana outside of the covered workplace for companies.  A company that is covered by the DFWA will be subject to penalties only if: 1) it fails to implement the six steps required to establish a drug-free workplace; or 2) the head of the agency determines that the company employs a sufficient number of individuals convicted of a criminal drug offense occurring in the workplace to indicate that the contractor has failed to make a good faith effort to provide a drug-free workplace.  Even then, the head of the agency may waive any possible penalties in certain circumstances, and violations may not result in contract termination or loss of payments.

What does the DFWA actually require?  Only 6 steps. Covered employers must:

  1. Publish and give a policy statement to all covered employees informing them that the unlawful manufacture, distribution, dispensation, possession or use of a controlled substance is prohibited in the covered workplace and specifying the actions that will be taken against employees who violate the policy.
  2. Establish a drug-free awareness program to make employees aware of a) the dangers of drug abuse in the workplace; b) the policy of maintaining a drug-free workplace; c) any available drug counseling, rehabilitation, and employee assistance programs; and d) the penalties that may be imposed upon employees for drug abuse violations.
  3. Notify employees that as a condition of employment on a Federal contract or grant, the covered employee must a) abide by the terms of the policy statement; and b) notify the employer within five calendar days if he or she is convicted of a criminal drug violation in the workplace.
  4. Notify the contracting or granting agency within 10 days after receiving notice that a covered employee has been convicted of a criminal drug violation in the workplace.
  5. Impose a penalty on – or require satisfactory participation in a drug abuse assistance or rehabilitation program by—any employee who is convicted of a reportable workplace drug conviction.  The “penalty” is up the discretion of the employer, and it may consist of a disciplinary warning – termination of employment is not uniformly mandated to comply with the DFWA.  Employers should evaluate penalties on a case-by-case basis and seek legal counsel to avoid violating state law or the Americans with Disabilities Act in imposing any discipline.
  6. Make an ongoing, good faith effort to maintain a drug-free workplace by meeting the requirements of the Act.

Employers have wasted millions of dollars on ineffective, invasive, and unnecessary drug testing that is not required by the DFWA.  Drug tests cannot show impairment, if any, or even when marijuana use occurred. Many employers have relied on information provided by drug testing promoters who have an inherent conflict of interest on the topic.  It has long been recognized that widely cited cost estimates of the effects of drug use on U.S. productivity are based on questionable assumptions and weak measures, according to a report of the National Academy of Sciences.  It is a challenge to locate a single case that has imposed liability on a private employer for opting out of drug testing, and despite beliefs to the contrary, the preventative effects of drug testing programs have never been adequately demonstrated.

The use of marijuana is a Constitutional right in Colorado.  Companies should join employers who are embracing a more sensible approach to drug policies today and seek to understand what the Drug-Free Workplace Act really does – and does not – require.  Only then can they release the unfounded myths of yesterday and work with their employees for a more productive tomorrow.

Kimberlie Ryan is the founding member of Ryan Law Firm, LLC, where she practices all aspects of employment law and has represented workers and advised employers regarding medical marijuana and the workplace.  In addition to her law practice, she serves as a television legal analyst and is frequently called upon to write and speak about cutting-edge employment issues.  This article is for educational purposes only, and it should not be construed as legal advice for a particular situation.  Consult with competent legal counsel for specific questions.

The opinions and views expressed by Featured Bloggers on CBA-CLE Legal Connection do not necessarily represent the opinions and views of the Colorado Bar Association, the Denver Bar Association, or CBA-CLE, and should not be construed as such.

Spark the Discussion: Amendment 64: The Ripples Here at Home

Spark the Discussion” is a monthly Legal Connection column highlighting the hottest trends in the emerging field of marijuana law. This column is brought to you by Vicente Sederberg, LLC, the country’s first national medical marijuana law firm.

By Joshua Kappel, Esq.

On Election Day, the voters of Colorado made history with the passage of Amendment 64—the Regulate Marijuana Like Alcohol Act of 2012.

Amendment 64, which received 55% of the vote, legalizes marijuana under Colorado law for adults over the age of 21. Specifically, it removes all civil and criminal penalties under Colorado law for the limited possession, use, and cultivation of marijuana by adults over the age of 21. This measure also requires the Colorado Department of Revenue to create a regulatory system for the production and distribution of marijuana in a manner similar to alcohol.

The passage of Amendment 64 made waves across the world and made headlines from England to India.  Just this week, a handful of Latin America leaders called for a review of international drug policy in light of these measurers passing.  Politically, the 10 point passage of Amendment 64 has prompted other states to consider similar measures, and has even spurred bi-partisan action by Colorado’s congressional delegation to exempt states’ marijuana laws from the federal Controlled Substance Act.

This historic victory also made waves here in Colorado.  Colorado Governor Hickenlooper’s responded with his now infamous comments, telling voters not to “break out the Cheetos” yet because marijuana remains illegal federally.  The Governor’s comments hinted at a lack of interest in fighting on behalf of Colorado voters and led many to wonder what, if any, effect Amendment 64 will have here at home.

The state vs. federal nature of this law change will continue to be of great interest to both legal scholars and voters.  A full analysis of this issue will be saved for another post, but to be clear, the federal government cannot force our state to criminalize anyone – including those who use or produce marijuana.

The removal of criminal penalties for adults using, possessing and cultivating marijuana goes into effect once the election is certified (probably sometime around January 6th), although retail stores won’t be able to open until late 2013 or early 2014.

We still have time before the measure goes into effect, but already, Amendment 64 is making ripples in our communities. This week both the Boulder District Attorney and the Denver District Attorney announced they will dismiss all marijuana charges related to actions that would have been protected by Amendment 64.  In the interest of justice, we hope more District Attorneys follow suit. According to long standing Colorado law, a change in a criminal law that reduces a sentence or eliminates the violation all together should apply retroactively in the interest of justice to all convictions not yet final. C.R.S. § 18-1-410(1)(f); Colo. Crim. P. Rule 35; People v. Thomas, 185 Colo. 395 (1974).  Even if a stubborn district attorney was lucky enough to convict an adult for possessing marijuana now, the case should be dismissed by the trial judge or on appeal once Amendment 64 goes into effect.

Although Amendment 64 is not yet in effect, for the adults currently caught in the system for marijuana offenses, the ripples of last Tuesday are already being felt.

Joshua Kappel, Esq. is the Associate Director of Sensible Colorado, the leading state-wide non-profit working to educate the public about sensible marijuana policy. Mr. Kappel is also the senior associate at Vicente Sederberg, the first nation-wide medical marijuana law firm.The opinions and views expressed by Featured Bloggers on CBA-CLE Legal Connection do not necessarily represent the opinions and views of the Colorado Bar Association, the Denver Bar Association, or CBA-CLE, and should not be construed as such.

Beat the Crowds on Election Day—Early Voting and Mail-In Ballots

It may seem distant now, but last year at this time the election focus was on Egypt and the elections in that country. Citizens lined up in very long queues to have the opportunity to vote for their leader. The images are striking, representing the sanctity of choice and election.

In this country, we do not usually have to wait in lines longer than city blocks in order to cast our votes. Poll centers are conveniently located, and we even have early voting and mail-in ballots. Still, there are frequently lines on Election Day, some that may seem interminable.

If you would prefer to avoid the lines on Election Day, there are some excellent options. Early voting locations are scattered throughout Colorado; click here to find one in your county. You can find your Election Day voting location here as well.

Mail-in ballots are another great way to beat the crowds. If you requested a mail-in ballot, you have until 7 p.m. on November 6, 2012 to get it to a drop off center. If you already mailed your ballot in and it has been returned for correction, you can submit your corrected ballot any time up to 7 p.m. on November 6. You can even track the progress of your mail-in ballot at www.govotecolorado.com.

If you are undecided on the ballot issues and would like more information, you can get the official Blue Book 2012 here. Or, for information on judicial retention, go to the Know Your Judge website. Another good website, Just Vote Colorado, provides nonpartisan information and resources. Vote early, vote by mail, vote on Election Day—just vote.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Secretary of State Exceeded Rulemaking Authority by Promulgating Rules that Modify or Contravene Statutory or Constitutional Provisions

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Colorado Common Cause v. Gessler, Secretary of State on August 30, 2012.

Rulemaking Authority—Campaign Finance Laws.

This case arose out of a challenge to the Colorado Secretary of State’s (Secretary) rulemaking authority brought by plaintiffs, Colorado Common Cause and Colorado Ethics Watch, pursuant to CRS § 24-4-106. The Secretary appealed the trial court’s order finding he exceeded his rulemaking authority in promulgating Rule 4.27. [Rule 4.27 has since been renumbered as Rule 4.1, 8 Code Colo. Regs. 1505–6.] The order was affirmed.

In 2002, Colorado voters adopted the Campaign and Political Finance Amendment (Amendment), which sets forth specific disclosure requirements that apply to various categories of participants in the elections process. The Amendment also regulates “issue committees” that advocate for or against ballot issues or questions. The Amendment incorporates the registration and disclosure requirements set forth in the Fair Campaign Practices Act (Act). In November 2010, a panel of the Tenth Circuit held in Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2010), that the financial burden of complying with the registration and reporting requirements for issue committees was substantial and the public interest in such information was minimal.

In response to Sampson, the Secretary commenced a rulemaking process to implement the decision. As part of this process, the Secretary published proposed Rule 4.27, which ultimately was adopted.Rule 4.27 states that “[a]n issue committee shall not be subject to any of the requirements of [the Amendment] or [the Act] until the issue committee has accepted $5,000 or more in contributions or made expenditures of $5,000 or more during an election cycle.” The contributions and expenditure made before reaching this threshold are not required to be reported.

Plaintiffs sued under CRS § 24-4-106. The trial court held that the Secretary had exceeded his rulemaking authority and dismissed the Secretary’s counterclaim for a declaration that the definition of issues committee is unenforceable until such a rule is adopted.

The Court of Appeals noted that an agency does not have authority to promulgate rules that modify or contravene statutory or constitutional provisions. Rule 4.27 creates a contribution and expenditure threshold of $5,000 that triggers an issue committee’s duty to register and disclose. The Act establishes a threshold of $200. On its face, Rule 4.27 conflicts with the clear requirements of Colorado law. Thus, unless Sampson abrogated the $200 threshold, the Secretary lacked the authority to promulgate the rule. The Secretary argued Sampson did just that. The Court disagreed.

The Tenth Circuit declined to address the facial challenge to Colorado’s campaign finance laws, holding only that the application of those laws under the specific facts of Sampson unconstitutionally burdened their freedom of association. The Circuit specifically acknowledged that Colorado campaign finance laws may be constitutionally applied outside of the context presented in Sampson. Consequently, Rule 4.27 sweeps far too broadly. The rule was set aside as void and the order was affirmed.

Summary and full case available here.

Spark the Discussion: Medical Marijuana and Contracts

“Spark the Discussion” is a monthly Legal Connection column highlighting the hottest trends in the emerging field of medical marijuana law. This column is brought to you by Vicente Sederberg, LLC, a full-service, community-focused medical marijuana law firm.

By Brian Vicente, Esq. and Rachelle Yeung

If a contract is found to be valid under state law, one would assume a judge would order that both parties must carry out their legal obligations under that agreement.  However, one judge in Arapahoe County recently argued that this basic principle of contract law doesn’t apply to our state’s newest licensed businesses—if they sell medical marijuana.

Over a period of several months in 2010, a medical marijuana grower delivered approximately $40,000 worth of product to Blue Sky Care Connection, a regulated dispensary in Littleton. Blue Sky promised to compensate the grower either in cash or with a share of a potential business partnership. When Blue Sky did not follow through with either, the grower sued.

The judge quickly determined that the parties had indeed entered into a valid contract – applying a simple analysis from his first year law school days (offer, acceptance, and consideration). However, the Court complicated the straightforward dispute by inquiring sua sponte whether the contract should be found unenforceable for being against public policy.

The Court went on to reason that, despite medical marijuana being legal according to Colorado Law, the sale of medical marijuana is against public policy because it violates federal law. Though the Court’s analysis could have reasonably stopped there, it goes beyond the “case and controversy” and further finds that federal law preempts Colorado’s medical marijuana law.

Because this opinion was issued by a district court, its ruling is not binding. However, the opinion has left many within the medical marijuana industry wondering how far-reaching its effects could be. Does this opinion find that only this particular contract for this particular sale of medical marijuana was unenforceable? Or can it be expanded to be read that all contracts for the sale of medical marijuana are unenforceable? Or that all contracts related to medical marijuana are unenforceable?  This last scenario would effectively dismantle a regulated industry that both the Colorado legislature and the Colorado Department of Revenue have been carefully building for the past several years.

The people of Colorado voiced their opinion on the public policy of the state in support of medical marijuana in 2000, by the democratic adoption of Amendment 20. The legislative and executive branches further endorsed public policy in favor of medical marijuana by enacting and signing HB 10-1284, the Colorado Medical Marijuana Code, in 2010.  This Code, and implementing legislation and regulations, accounts for well over one hundred pages of strict rules governing every stage of transaction—from seed to sale—for these Colorado businesses.

Shockingly, the judge’s opinion failed to take into account the Colorado Medical Marijuana Code, which became effective July 2, 2010 – approximately one week after the grower made the first of several deliveries to Blue Sky. The Code actually requires certain legal relationships between growers and medical marijuana centers that would not be possible without enforceable contracts. Substantive issues aside, the fact that the Court fails to consider the most relevant piece of law in its analysis leaves one questioning the incomplete legal framework of the opinion.

There are currently seventeen states with medical marijuana laws.  Massachusetts, Arkansas, and North Dakota are primed to pass similar laws this November. Hopefully, one state judge’s hastily drafted opinion won’t pave the way to dismantle these compassionate-use laws.

Brian Vicente, Esq., is a founding member of Vicente Consulting, LLC, a law firm providing legal solutions for the medical marijuana community. He also serves as executive director of Sensible Colorado, the state’s leading non-profit working for medical marijuana patients and providers. Brian is the chair of the Denver Mayor’s Marijuana Policy Review Panel, serves on the Colorado Department of Revenue Medical Marijuana Oversight Panel, and coordinates the Colorado Bar Association’s Drug Policy Project.

The opinions and views expressed by Featured Bloggers on CBA-CLE Legal Connection do not necessarily represent the opinions and views of the Colorado Bar Association, the Denver Bar Association, or CBA-CLE, and should not be construed as such.

Spark the Discussion: No Love Supreme – Colorado Courts Continue to Rule Against Medical Marijuana Patients

“Spark the Discussion” is a monthly Legal Connection column highlighting the hottest trends in the emerging field of medical marijuana law. This column is brought to you by Vicente Sederberg, LLC, a full-service, community-focused medical marijuana law firm.

By Brian Vicente, Esq. and Rachelle Yeung

Leonard Charles Watkins has long suffered pancreatitis, which causes him debilitating chronic pain and for which he has been hospitalized three times. Watkins’ doctor recommended he use marijuana to reduce his suffering, so Watkins lawfully applied and qualified to be a medical marijuana patient. In February 2012, the Colorado Court of Appeals revoked Watkins’ ability to treat his illness with this state-approved medicine.

In 2008, Watkins pled guilty to a class three felony – unrelated to any controlled substances – for which he received six years’ probation. His probation conditions required that Watkins “not use or possess any narcotic, dangerous or abusable substance without a prescription,” and that he “not commit another offense” for the duration of his probation. However, after Watkins explained his medical condition to his judge, the trial court issued an order approving his use of medical marijuana.

The Arapahoe District Attorney filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied in an extensive written order. The Prosecution then appealed the denial and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order, thus denying Watkins the use of this medicine.

Under Colorado law, trial courts are required to set as a condition of probation that probationers “not commit another offense.” C.R.S. 18-1.3-204(1). The Court of Appeals wrote in its opinion that “[t]he Colorado statute itself does not define the term [offense].” People v. Watkins, — P.3d —, 2012 WL 310776 (Colo. App. 2012). However, the Colorado Criminal Code – where the probation statutes can also be found – defines “offense” as “a violation of, or conduct defined by, any state statute for which a fine or imprisonment may be imposed.” C.R.S. 18-1-104(1). It is undisputed that Watkins’ use of medical marijuana was permissible within state law. Yet, despite this straightforward practice in statutory interpretation, the Court of Appeals expanded the meaning of “offense” beyond its unambiguous definition and determined that it included violations of federal law.

To be clear, this is not a broad determination that federal law preempts state medical marijuana laws – simply that the Court of Appeals interpreted one particular statute to take federal prohibition into account.

Relying heavily on its recent decision in Beinor, the Court of Appeals affirmed that marijuana could not be legally “prescribed,” and that therefore Watkins’ lawful medical use of marijuana was a violation of the condition that he not use or possess “any narcotic, dangerous or abusable substance without a prescription.” Beinor v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 262 P.3d 970 (Colo. App. 2011). Without further reasoning, the Court of Appeals again echoed the Beinor opinion and held that Amendment 20, Colorado’s original medical marijuana law, did not extend a constitutional right to patients, but merely protected patients from criminal prosecution under limited circumstances.

Recently, the medical marijuana advocacy group, Sensible Colorado, teamed up with the ACLU to file an appeal on Watkins behalf. The Colorado Supreme Court denied this appeal and brandished Watkins, and other sick medical marijuana patients like him, probation violators if they use their doctor-recommended medicine. Specifically, the Watkins decision set forth a sweeping precedent that “neither Petitioner [Watkins] nor any other probationer in Colorado – regardless of the underlying offense, the circumstances of the probationer’s illness, or the trial court’s view – may use medical marijuana.” Petition for Writ of Certiori at 4, Watkins, — P.3d — (Colo. App. 2012).

Despite this seemingly bleak decision, medical marijuana patients are not always condemned to suffer while on probation. It is still the law that a trial court judge’s decision to not revoke probation cannot be appealed, regardless of any probation violations. It may be little comfort, but patients can still hope that sympathetic trial court judges will simply refuse to revoke their probation for medical marijuana use. The passage of Amendment 64, the Act to Regulate Marijuana Like Alcohol, which is on the statewide ballot this November, may further prompt the judicial branch to align their decisions with the will of the People.

Brian Vicente, Esq., is a founding member of Vicente Consulting, LLC, a law firm providing legal solutions for the medical marijuana community. He also serves as executive director of Sensible Colorado, the state’s leading non-profit working for medical marijuana patients and providers. Brian is the chair of the Denver Mayor’s Marijuana Policy Review Panel, serves on the Colorado Department of Revenue Medical Marijuana Oversight Panel, and coordinates the Colorado Bar Association’s Drug Policy Project.

The opinions and views expressed by Featured Bloggers on CBA-CLE Legal Connection do not necessarily represent the opinions and views of the Colorado Bar Association, the Denver Bar Association, or CBA-CLE, and should not be construed as such.

Spark the Discussion: Supreme Court Leaves Patients Behind

“Spark the Discussion” is a monthly Legal Connection column highlighting the hottest trends in the emerging field of medical marijuana law. This column is brought to you by Vicente Sederberg, LLC, a full-service, community-focused medical marijuana law firm.

By Brian Vicente, Esq. and Rachelle Yeung

Jason Beinor was a street sweeper, assigned to sweep the 16th Street Mall with a broom and dustpan. He had a clean employment record, with no written reprimands or warnings. Yet he was fired from his job and disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits.

Beinor suffers from debilitating migraine headaches – a lasting, painful consequence of a prior assault. Like 96,000 other Coloradans, Beinor is a legal medical marijuana patient, and occasionally uses this substance in an off-work capacity to ameliorate his suffering. Unfortunately for Beinor, a random drug test in February 2010 tested positive for marijuana, costing him his job.

Beinor never used or possessed marijuana while on the job, and his private medical use never interfered with his job performance. However, under his employer’s zero-tolerance policy, the residual, non-psychoactive THC in Beinor’s system was considered an illegal drug, and Beinor was immediately terminated. Because Beinor believed he had been fired through no fault of his own – his marijuana had been doctor-recommended and lawfully-obtained – he filed for unemployment compensation benefits. He was denied, the Colorado Court of Appeals upheld the decision. Beinor v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 262 P.3d 970 (Colo. App. 2011). Recently, the Colorado Supreme Court denied to review the case.

Under Colorado statutes “[t]he presence in an individual’s system, during working hours, of not medically prescribed controlled substances” disqualifies that employee from benefits. Beinor had THC metabolites, the non-psychoactive reside of marijuana – in his system during working hours. But he thought he was safe because it had been medically recommended to him. Unfortunately, the written documentation physicians provide their patients recommending medical use of marijuana is specifically not a “prescription”. This is where federal law comes into play.

Doctors across the country must be registered with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in order to lawfully prescribe medication. However, because of marijuana’s classification as a Schedule I drug under the federal Controlled Substances Act, registered doctors cannot prescribe marijuana, but only recommend it. Indeed, their recommendations must clearly state, “[t]his assessment is not a prescription for the use of marijuana.” Thus, Beinor’s medical marijuana was considered “not medically prescribed.”

In the grand scheme of things, legal technicalities such as whether a doctor’s written recommendation is considered a “prescription” wouldn’t matter if Beinor and other patients had a constitutional right to use marijuana. However, the majority of the Colorado Court of Appeals in Beinor did not interpret Amendment 20, Colorado’s original medical marijuana law passed in 2000, to grant that right. Instead, it determined Amendment 20 only created limited exceptions to state criminal laws for patients, primary caregivers, and physicians concerning the medical use of marijuana.

The Court pointed specifically to a clause in Amendment 20 that reads: “Nothing in this section shall require any employer to accommodate the medical use of marijuana in any work place.” As Judge Gabriel, who dissented from the majority, astutely pointed out, Beinor never used marijuana in his work place, and that provision does not logically include “the presence of marijuana in one’s blood after the lawful use of medical marijuana at home.” Judge Gabriel further observes that, under such an interpretation of the law, “many patients who are eligible to use medical marijuana would likely abandon their right to do so, because even lawful use at home would put their benefits, and perhaps even their jobs, at risk.”

The majority’s decision has significantly deteriorated the rights and protections that medical marijuana patients believed they had. On a positive note, there is another case before the Colorado Supreme Court, regarding a patient whose probation was revoked due to his lawful, medical use of marijuana. If the Supreme Court grants review to that case, it may be able to begin reversing a dangerous growing trend of discrimination against medical marijuana patients, perpetuated by the Court of Appeals.

Another way to solidify the rights of patients would be the passage of Amendment 64, the Act to Regulate Marijuana Like Alcohol, which Coloradans will vote on in November. Unlike the medical marijuana amendment, whose ambiguous language left it vulnerable to manipulation, Amendment 64 clearly declares adult use of marijuana to be legal, thereby circumventing any restrictive interpretation such as was seen in the Beinor.

Brian Vicente, Esq., is a founding member of Vicente Consulting, LLC, a law firm providing legal solutions for the medical marijuana community. He also serves as executive director of Sensible Colorado, the state’s leading non-profit working for medical marijuana patients and providers. Brian is the chair of the Denver Mayor’s Marijuana Policy Review Panel, serves on the Colorado Department of Revenue Medical Marijuana Oversight Panel, and coordinates the Colorado Bar Association’s Drug Policy Project.

The opinions and views expressed by Featured Bloggers on CBA-CLE Legal Connection do not necessarily represent the opinions and views of the Colorado Bar Association, the Denver Bar Association, or CBA-CLE, and should not be construed as such.

Colorado Supreme Court: Reasonable Suspicion Existed to Justify Investigatory Stop; Order Suppressing Evidence Reversed

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Funez-Paiagua on May 21, 2012.

Fourth Amendment—Suppression of Evidence—Reasonable Suspicion—Investigatory Stop.

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order suppressing evidence seized from defendant. The Court held that officers had reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop of Adolph Funez-Paiagua. The facts and circumstances known to the officers at the time of the stop were: (1) it was 1:15 a.m.; (2) criminal activity recently had increased in the area; (3) Funez-Paiagua was standing on the private property of an auto body shop; (4) the shop was closed; (5) no other businesses in the area were open; (6) no other people were nearby; (7) the officer heard a loud crash; (8) Funez-Paiagua fled; and (9) Funez-Paiagua was carrying bags.

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. and Colorado Constitutions holds that warrantless seizures generally must be supported by probable cause, but an investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion is an exception to this general rule. The Court held that the facts of the case created reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop.

Summary and full case available here.

Colorado Court of Appeals: “Colorado Day of Prayer” Proclamations Violated Preference Clause of State Constitution

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Hickenlooper on May 10, 2012.

Taxpayers—Religion—Proclamation—Preference Clause of the Colorado Constitution—Standing.

Plaintiffs, Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. (FFRF) and four of its members (taxpayers), appealed the trial court’s determination that the Governor’s proclamations did not violate the Preference Clause, which is Colorado’s equivalent of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. The Governor cross-appealed the trial court’s conclusion that FFRF and the taxpayers had standing to bring this case. The Court of Appeals reversed the order in part and affirmed it in part, and remanded the case.

The taxpayers are citizens of Colorado who pay Colorado taxes. FFRF is a Wisconsin nonprofit organization that is registered to do business in Colorado. Each year from 2004 to 2009, Colorado’s Governor issued an honorary proclamation for the first Thursday of May to be the “Colorado Day of Prayer.” Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the proclamations violated the Preference Clause of the Religious Freedom section in Colorado Constitution, Article II, § 4, and asked the court to issue an injunction enjoining the Governor from issuing such proclamations in the future.

The Governor contended on appeal that FFRF and the taxpayers do not have standing. The claim herein arises out of a legally protected interest under the Constitution. Further, there is a nexus between the taxpayers and the governmental action of issuing the Colorado Day of Prayer proclamations. Specifically, the record shows that, although the exact amount is not clear, state funds were spent each year to issue the proclamation. Such a nexus, though slight, is sufficient for standing in Colorado. Therefore, the taxpayers had standing to bring this claim.

The Court determined that the six Colorado Day of Prayer proclamations at issue here were governmental conduct that violated the Preference Clause. The Court concluded that the proclamations (1) express the Governor’s support for their content, which is predominantly religious; (2) lack a secular context; and (3) constitute a government endorsement of religion over non-religion. Accordingly, the court’s order entering summary judgment in favor of the Governor was reversed.

Summary and full case available here.

Colorado Supreme Court: Proposed Ballot Initiative Contains Single Subject and Thus Complies with Colorado Constitution and Statutes

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in In the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title, and Submission Clause for 2011–2012 #45: Kemper v. Hamilton on April 16, 2012.

Ballot and Election—Single Subject—Clear Title.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Title Board’s determination that proposed initiative 2011–2012 #45 contains a single subject—“public control of waters.” The initiative thus complies with the Colorado Constitution and with CRS § 1-40-106.5. In addition, the initiative’s title, ballot title, and submission clause clearly and fairly express the single subject of the initiative, and therefore comply with the Colorado Constitution and with CRS § 1-40-106.

Summary and full case available here.

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