December 9, 2016

Colorado Court of Appeals: Announcement Sheet, 11/3/2016

On Thursday, November 3, 2016, the Colorado Court of Appeals issued six published opinions and 24 unpublished opinions.

People v. Harris

Red Flower, Inc. v. McKown

People v. Sena

Anderson v. Applewood Water Association, Inc.

In re Estate of Shimizu

Mt. Hawley Insurance Co. v. Casson Duncan Construction, Inc.

Summaries of these cases are forthcoming.

Neither State Judicial nor the Colorado Bar Association provides case summaries for unpublished appellate opinions. The case announcement sheet is available here.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Donor and Transferee Are One Entity for Conservation Easement Tax Credit Purposes

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Medved v. Colorado Department of Revenue on Thursday, October 20, 2016.

Conservation Easement Tax Credit—Statute of Limitations—Notice of Disallowance.

The Medveds purchased a conservation easement (CE) tax credit from Whites Corporation (Whites). The appraised value of the tax credit was $130,000. Whites was the CE donor and the Medveds were the CE transferees. On October 23, 2006, the Medveds filed their 2005 Colorado tax returns and claimed a $130,000 credit based on the CE. On October 30, 2007, Whites filed a Colorado State C Corporation income tax return and claimed a $260,000 credit based on the same CE.

On March 4, 2011, the Colorado Department of Revenue (Department) issued a notice of disallowance to Whites and the Medveds, disallowing the credit in its entirety. The Medveds appealed to the district court and argued the notice of disallowance was barred by the four-year statute of limitation in C.R.S. § 39-21-107(2). The Department argued that the Medveds and Whites were subject to the same statute of limitations that was triggered when the donor filed its tax return under C.R.S. § 39-22-522(7)(i). The district court found that the donor and the transferee were a single entity and were bound as to all issues concerning the tax credit to the four-year statute of limitations, which was triggered by the donor’s tax claim. Because Whites filed its return on October 30, 2007, the Department’s notice of disallowance was within the statute of limitations.

On appeal, the Medveds claimed they were not bound by the same statute of limitations as Whites. The court of appeals agreed with the Department that a donor and transferee are considered a single entity under the statute and are bound by the same statute of limitations. The Medveds also argued that the first claim filed triggers the four-year statute of limitations. Finding the statutory language ambiguous, the court considered its legislative intent and purposes and concluded that the General Assembly intended that the first claim filed, either by the donor or transferee, begins the four-year statute of limitations period. Because the Department’s notice of disallowance was beyond the four-year limitations period, the Department’s disallowance was untimely and statutorily barred.

The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for dismissal.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Construction Defect Claims Filed Against Subcontractors were Time-Barred

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Sopris Lodging, LLC v. Schofeld Excavation, Inc. on Thursday, October 20, 2016.

Construction Defect—Summary Judgment—Time Bar.

TDC was the general contractor for construction of a hotel owned by Sopris Lodging (Sopris). On March 11, 2011, Sopris sent TDC a notice of claim regarding alleged construction defects at the hotel. On May 24, 2013, Sopris filed a complaint in district court asserting construction defect claims against one of the subcontractors of the hotel and against TDC’s individual principals, who had guaranteed TDC’s performance. On the same date, Sopris and TDC entered into an agreement to toll the statute of limitations for Sopris’s claims against TDC.

In 2014, TDC filed third-party claims against several subcontractors including Schofield and CEC for breach of contract, negligence, contribution, and indemnification. CEC and Schofield moved for summary judgment, asserting the claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations in C.R.S. § 13-80-102. TDC did not dispute that the claims accrued on or before March 11, 2011 but argued C.R.S. § 13-80-104(1)(b)(II) tolled the statute of limitations for a defendant’s third-party clams until 90 days after a settlement or final judgment on the plaintiff’s claims against the defendant. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of CEC and Schofield.

On appeal, Sopris (standing in the shoes of TDC following a settlement and assignment of the third-party claims) argued it was error to find the claims time-barred. C.R.S. § 13-80-104(1)(b)(II) gives a contractor the option to bring indemnity or contribution claims against subcontractors in a separate lawsuit after the underlying claims are resolved and tolls the statute of limitations for such claims. But because TDC asserted third-party claims in the original construction defect litigation, the tolling section does not apply. Thus TDC’s third-party claims were time barred.

The judgment was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: C.R.C.P. 106 Action Inappropriate for Challenge to Temporary Protection Order

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Martin v. Arapahoe County Court on Thursday, October 20, 2016.

C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4)—Temporary Civil Protection Order—Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

The county court entered a temporary civil protection order pursuant to C.R.S. § 13-14-104.5 against Martin based on L.O.’s complaint. Martin filed a motion to vacate the temporary order and dismiss L.O.’s complaint. The motion was denied, but the hearing on the permanent order was continued to allow briefing from the Attorney General’s office on the constitutionality of the statutes. Before the rescheduled hearing, Martin filed this action in district court, naming as defendants the Arapahoe County Court and magistrates of that court and seeking review of the temporary protection order under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4).

The county court defendants moved to dismiss the C.R.C.P. 106 action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that (1) the temporary order was not a final decision reviewable under C.R.C.P. 106 and (2) Martin had other adequate remedies because he could challenge the temporary order at the permanent order hearing and appeal the permanent order if one was issued. The motion to dismiss was granted.

On appeal, Martin argued it was error for the trial court to find it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Colorado Court of Appeals disagreed, ruling on this as an issue of first impression. The court found that a temporary protection order issued under C.R.S. § 13-14-104.5 is not the county court’s final decision on a plaintiff’s request for a civil protection order and is therefore not subject to review in a C.R.C.P. 106 action. It also found that the permanent order hearing and ordinary appellate review procedures provide adequate alternative remedies for challenging a temporary restraining order.

The judgment was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Claim Preclusion Bars Relitigation of Attorney Fee Issue in CDARA Case

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Layton Construction Co., Inc. v. Shaw Contract Flooring Services, Inc. on Thursday, October 20, 2016.

Summary Judgment—Claim Preclusion.

Layton Construction Co., Inc. (Layton) hired Shaw Contract Flooring Services, Inc. (Shaw) to perform work on a project for BCRE, the property owner. BCRE subsequently terminated its contract with Layton and gave Layton notice of numerous construction defects, a few of which related to Shaw’s work. Layton sued BCRE, alleging BCRE had failed to pay for work and seeking damages. BCRE counterclaimed for defective workmanship. Layton then added claims against various subcontractors, including Shaw.

Pursuant to a clause in the subcontract, Layton sought indemnification from Shaw for all damages and costs arising from any liability it might have to BCRE, including Shaw’s failure to provide a defense or pay Layton’s costs. Later, after BCRE specifically identified Shaw’s allegedly defective work, Layton moved to dismiss its indemnification claim against Shaw with prejudice. Layton’s motion stated the dismissal would include “those claims that have been or could have been asserted in this lawsuit.” The district court dismissed Layton’s claims with prejudice.

After a subsequent bench trial, the court entered an award for Layton on its claims against BCRE. The subcontractors remaining in the case were found liable to Layton under the indemnification provisions in their subcontracts.

Layton then filed this case against Shaw and other subcontractors, asserting claims for contractual and common law indemnity and declaratory judgment seeking an award of attorney fees, costs, and expenses it had incurred in defending BCRE’s claims in the prior case. Layton asserted the indemnification claim against Shaw under C.R.S. § 13-80-104 of the Construction Defect Action Reform Act (CDARA). Shaw moved for summary judgment, arguing Layton’s indemnification claims were barred by claim preclusion because they had been dismissed with prejudice. The district court granted the motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals noted that for a judicial proceeding to be precluded by a previous judgment, there must exist finality of the first judgment, identity of subject matter, identity of claims for relief, and identity or privity between parties to the actions.

Layton argued that its claims were not identical to those asserted against Shaw in the prior case. Because Layton could have asserted an indemnity claim for attorney fees and costs in the prior case there is identity of claims.

Layton also argued that CDARA modifies the doctrine of claim preclusion in the construction defect context by requiring splitting of indemnification claims. The Court found nothing in CDARA that abrogates the doctrine of claim preclusion in this case.

Layton further argued that various exceptions to the claim preclusion doctrine applied. The Court found that the exceptions to the doctrine of claim preclusion do not apply to this case.

Shaw requested attorney fees incurred on appeal, arguing that Layton’s appeal was substantially frivolous and vexatious. The Court agreed that the appeal was substantially frivolous and found that Layton’s assertion that it raised “novel” issues was “nothing more than a reflection of their futility.”

The judgment was affirmed and the case was remanded for the district court to determine the reasonable amount of Shaw’s attorney fees incurred on appeal.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Denver’s Civil Service Commission May Impose Burden on Employee in Adverse Personnel Action

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Marshall v. Civil Service Commission of the City & County of Denver on Thursday, October 20, 2016.

Burden of Proof—Adverse Personnel Action.

Police officer Marshall was suspended by the Executive Director of Safety (Director). He appealed the Director’s decision, and a hearing officer found that he proved the Director’s actions to have been clearly erroneous. The Director appealed to the Civil Service Commission of the City and County of Denver (Commission), which reversed the hearing officer’s decision. Marshall then challenged the Commission’s decision in district court, and the court upheld the Commission’s decision. Marshall appealed.

Marshall’s sole contention on appeal was that the Commission violated the Denver City Charter (Charter) by imposing, by rule, the burden on him to show that the Director’s action was clearly erroneous.

The Court of Appeals noted that the Charter does not expressly address the burden of proof and it delegates unlimited rulemaking authority to the Commission regarding hearing procedures. The burden of proof in a hearing is a matter of procedure. The Commission may place the burden of proof on the employee by rule as long as the rule is consistent with the Charter. Here, the Court discerned no inconsistency.

The judgment was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Distribution of Cryopreserved Embryos in Dissolution Proceeding Subject to Contract and Balancing Approaches

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in In re Marriage of Rooks on Thursday, October 20, 2016.

Dissolution of Marriage—Possession of Cryogenically Frozen Embryos.

The parties had three children together, and it was undisputed that wife used her last eggs to create embryos. The parties’ storage agreement with the fertility clinic provided that in the event of a dissolution of marriage, unless they could agree on who would get the embryos, the trial court would award the embryos. In their dissolution of marriage proceeding, wife argued that the embryos should remain frozen so that she could have another child in the future, and husband argued they should be discarded. The trial court entered a lengthy, detailed, and carefully reasoned decision awarding the embryos to husband. Wife appealed.

This appeal presented an issue of first impression in Colorado: how to determine the disposition of a couple’s cryogenically frozen embryos on their dissolution of marriage. Because there is not case law in Colorado on this issue, the Colorado Court of Appeals reviewed the three different approaches adopted by other jurisdictions for determining the disposition of divorcing spouses’ cryopreserved embryos: (1) the contract approach, which enforces a valid agreement entered into between the parties as to disposition of the embryos; (2) the balancing of interests approach, which the court applies when there is no such agreement between the parties; and (3) the contemporaneous mutual consent approach, under which the court will not allocate the embryos in the absence of an agreement between the parties (the embryos are left in storage indefinitely until the parties can agree to their disposition). The trial court had applied the contract and balancing of interests approaches in awarding the embryos to husband.

On appeal, wife argued that the trial court erred in interpreting the written storage agreement. The court agreed, but concluded that the storage agreement left it to the dissolution court to decide which party should receive the embryos in the event of dissolution of their marriage. Because the contract gave no guidance for this decision, the court construed it to require the trial court to exercise its inherent equitable powers if the parties could not agree. Because the trial court had to apply its equitable discretion, it necessarily had to use the balancing of interests approach.

Wife also argued that some factors the trial court applied in its balancing approach were legally erroneous and others violated her constitutional rights. Based on its review of the record, the court found the trial court’s conclusion that husband’s interest in not producing additional offspring prevailed over wife’s interest in having a fourth child to be reasonable.

The judgment was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Photos May Be Considered “Erotic Nudity” if Recipient Uses Them for Sexual Satisfaction

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People in Interest of T.B. on Thursday, October 20, 2016.

Juvenile Sexual Exploitation of a Child—Delinquency Adjudication.

T.B. used his cell phone to solicit, receive, and store nude photographs of teenage girls who were 15 and 17 years old. He also texted them photographs of his erect penis. Among other offenses, the prosecution charged T.B. with sexual exploitation of a child. The sexual exploitation counts were severed. A jury acquitted him of the remaining counts.

After a bench trial on the sexual exploitation counts, the court adjudicated T.B. delinquent, sentenced him to sex offender probation, and required him to register as a sex offender.

On appeal, T.B. asserted that the evidence was insufficient to support his delinquency adjudication. He argued that because the girls did not take the photos for their own sexual satisfaction, the photos did not depict “erotic nudity,” a necessary component of the crime of sexual exploitation of a child. He also contended that the statutory reference to “persons involved” in the definition of erotic nudity necessarily means that the people displayed in the photograph must be sexually stimulated. The Colorado Court of Appeals disagreed, citing the Colorado Supreme Court’s rejection of the contention that the focus of the overt sexual gratification component of the definition of erotic nudity could only be the persons depicted in the photograph. The court of appeals concluded that the statutory requirement was met.

T.B. also argued that the chain of custody was insufficient to show that he knew that he possessed the nude photos on his cell phone. He contended that the chain of custody linking his cell phone and the photographs was insufficient because it did not show that the photographs were accurate copies of the photographs that were on his phone. The court found that the photos were found by the police on the T.B.’s cell phone, they were identified by the girls as photos they had taken of themselves and texted to him, and T.B. had complimented one of them on the photos. A digital forensic officer testified that the data in T.B.’s phone had not been tampered with, and the photographs had been opened and viewed. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to prove that T.B. knowingly possessed the nude photos.

T.B. also argued that because there was no “sexual abuse of a child” in the photos, the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. The court found that the clear and unambiguous language of the statute does not contain such a requirement.

T.B. further argued that the statute does not cover “teen sexting.” The court found nothing in the language of the statute to support such an argument.

T.B. also contended that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his request for a jury trial. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because its decision fell within a range of reasonable options.

Finally, T.B. argued that he was being selectively prosecuted because he was a male and the trial court should have dismissed the sexual exploitation charges. The court found that the prosecution was not motivated by a discriminatory purpose and concluded that the trial court’s decision was not manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.

The delinquency adjudication was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: CCIOA Requires Substantial, not Strict, Compliance when Subdividing Units

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Perfect Place v. Semler on Thursday, October 20, 2016.

Colorado Common Interest Ownership Act—Strict or Substantial Compliance—Quiet Title—Unclean Hands—Fraudulent Conveyance—Attorney Fees.

This action concerns title to three parking spaces. In 2000, Blake Street Condominium (Blake Street) bought a mixed use residential and commercial building and recorded a written declaration subjecting the property to the provisions of the Colorado Common Interest Ownership Act (CCIOA). A majority interest in the building was sold to Quail Street Company, LLC (Quail Street). Quail Street’s sole shareholder was Watson. Watson made multiple changes to the building, including subdividing the garage into three individual parking spaces (C, D, and E) by painting yellow dividing lines on the garage wall. Spaces C and D were normal sized, and E was able to accommodate only a motorcycle or very small car.

Watson sold the individual parking spaces, as part of condominium units, to different buyers who subsequently sold or mortgaged them. The City and County of Denver taxed each space individually, the Blake Street homeowners association (association) separately assessed dues for each space, and title insurance separately insured the spaces.

Semler claimed title to space C from a 2007 foreclosure proceeding and space D through a different foreclosure proceeding. In 2010, the association’s attorney notified Semler and Perfect Place, LLC (Perfect Place) of clouded title concerning spaces D and E. Semler paid for a quitclaim deed from the former record owner of space D and recorded that in 2012. He claimed title to space E from a different deed in lieu of foreclosure.

Perfect Place is a member of the association. Perfect Place claimed title to all three spaces from a 2011 quitclaim deed it received and recorded from Watson. Watson issued a correction deed in 2013 (correction deed). It also claimed title to spaces D and E from a series of conveyances originating from a wild deed.

Perfect Place sued to quiet title to the three parking spaces in the Blake Street property. The trial court found that Watson subdivided the garage into three parking spaces and that Perfect Place procured the 2011 deed by fraud, concealment, and unclean hands. The court concluded that Semler owned spaces C and D. Title to space E was resolved in favor of Perfect Place by agreement of the parties. The court ordered Semler to draft a proposed amendment to the Blake Street declaration memorializing the decision.

Semler submitted a proposed map allotting space C 132 square feet, space D 132 square feet, and space E 90 feet. Semler relied on the historical boundaries of spaces C and D and the dimensions of space E set forth in a recorded parking space agreement. Perfect Place objected, a hearing was held, and the court allotted space C 129 square feet, space D 114 square feet, and space E 122 square feet. Perfect Place appealed the trial court’s finding that Semler owned parking spaces C and D. Perfect Place argued that the absence of a formal application to the association’s board describing reapportionment of the common elements, as well as the absence of an amended declaration or condominium map that strictly complies with CCIOA, violates C.R.S. § 38-33.3-213. Semler argued that Watson substantially complied with CCIOA when he subdivided the garage into three spaces.

The Colorado Court of Appeals looked at the plain language of C.R.S. § 38-33.3-213 and the purposes of CCIOA as a whole to find that substantial rather than strict compliance with the provision was required. In particular, it noted that statutory interpretation of CCIOA should give way to flexibility where strict adherence to provisions that create uniformity would render title unmarketable. Here, because Watson was the majority owner and board member of the homeowners association, any application that he would have submitted would have been submitted to himself. The declaration also gave him the authority, as the first purchaser from the grantor, to subdivide the garage. Moreover, a map identifying the spaces (though not their dimensions) was recorded. All of this amounted to substantial compliance.

Both parties asserted that the trial court abused its discretion in crafting equitable relief. Perfect Place contended that the court abused its discretion in (1) reforming the deeds of Watson and Quail Street to validly convey property and (2) voiding the 2011 quitclaim deed from Watson to Perfect Place by declaring it a fraudulent conveyance. Semler argued that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to increase the size of space E at the expense of space D, thereby benefitting Perfect Place, a party it had found to have unclean hands. The trial court’s reformation of deeds from Quail Street to grantees (that should originally have been from Watson to grantees) was not an abuse of discretion based on the finding that any conveyance errors by the grantors was inadvertent. The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in finding the 2011 quitclaim deed from Watson to Perfect Place was a fraudulent conveyance. Watson believed he was merely correcting a technical defect in title and Perfect Place’s attorney fostered that belief (which was false). Thus the record supported the finding that the quitclaim deed was obtained by “fraud in the factum” and was therefore void. But the court of appeals held that the award of additional area to space E and Perfect Place was an abuse of discretion because this equitable remedy benefitted a party with unclean hands.

Semler also sought attorney fees under the CCIOA. The court found the trial court erred in denying Semler’s request for attorney fees because he was required to defend his title under the provisions of CCIOA.

The judgment quieting title to spaces C and D in Semler was affirmed. The judgment adjusting the boundaries of spaces D and E was reversed. The case was remanded for the trial court to return the boundaries of spaces D and E to their historical dimensions and to determine and award Semler attorney fees.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Announcement Sheet, 10/27/2016

On Thursday, October 27, 2016, the Colorado Court of Appeals issued no published opinion and 44 unpublished opinions.

Neither State Judicial nor the Colorado Bar Association provides case summaries for unpublished appellate opinions. The case announcement sheet is available here.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Impoundment of Vehicle Unlawful Where Driver Was Not Arrested

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Brown on Thursday, October 20, 2016.

Carl Brown was pulled over for failing to make a complete stop at a stop sign. The officer who pulled him over discovered Mr. Brown was driving with a suspended license. The officer decided to issue Mr. Brown a summons, but not arrest him. The officer then impounded Mr. Brown’s car and conducted an inventory search, which revealed drugs. At that time, Mr. Brown was arrested, charged with, and ultimately convicted of possession of a controlled substance (over two grams) and possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute.

On appeal, Mr. Brown argued that the inventory search violated the Fourth Amendment, and the contents of that search should therefore have been suppressed. Mr. Brown argued several other points of error, but because the Colorado Court of Appeals agreed with him that the initial search was illegal, it did not address his remaining contentions.

The court evaluated the impoundment statute, which allows for police to impound a vehicle when the impoundment occurs to further public safety, community caretaking functions, or to remove disabled or damaged vehicles. The officer who pulled Mr. Brown over testified that Mr. Brown’s vehicle was off the road, not blocking traffic. He testified that he impounded the vehicle because Mr. Brown’s license was suspended. The court found this insufficient to survive a Fourth Amendment analysis. The court noted that because the officer decided not to arrest Mr. Brown, there was no reason why Mr. Brown could not have stayed with his vehicle and either called a friend to drive the car or called a tow truck himself. Because the officer did not give Mr. Brown the choice of whether to take care of the vehicle himself or have the police impound it, the seizure was unlawful in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The court of appeals reversed and remanded with orders for the trial court to grant the motion to suppress and for proceedings consistent with their opinion.

Colorado Supreme Court: Presence of Juvenile Defendant’s Parent Satisfies Statutory Requirement

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People in Interest of A.L.-C. on Monday, October 24, 2016.

The juvenile defendant, A.L.-C., was charged with sexual assault on a child after his little sister, B.O., reported that he had touched her inappropriately and had intercourse with her. Defendant’s mother, also the mother of B.O., had accompanied him to his forensic interview. During a recorded exchange in which Defendant, his mother, and his step-father discussed whether he would waive his Miranda rights, Defendant’s mother asked him if he understood his rights and he said he did. She informed him that she had to protect B.O. and chided him for never paying attention. Defendant told his mother that he would rather keep quiet. It was disputed whether he meant he would rather not talk to his mother or the detective.

Defendant’s mother was present for the entire forensic interview. At first, Defendant denied B.O.’s allegations, but after being confronted with details from an earlier interview with B.O., Defendant confessed. He was charged with sexual assault on a child.

Before trial, Defendant sought to suppress his statements in the forensic interview, arguing that that his mother’s presence did not satisfy the requirement in C.R.S. § 19-2-511(1) that a parent be present at the interview because his mother did not hold his interests “uppermost in mind.” The trial court agreed and suppressed Defendant’s statements. The People filed an interlocutory appeal with the Colorado Supreme Court regarding whether the statute required more than Defendant’s parent’s presence at the interview.

The supreme court analyzed the statute and determined its plain language required nothing more than a parent’s presence during advisement and interrogation. Defendant argued that the statute requires not only a parent’s presence, but also that the parent hold the defendant’s interest “uppermost in mind,” citing several cases. The supreme court distinguished case law advanced by Defendant, noting that in those cases it was not a parent present at the interview. The supreme court held that the shared interest analysis from the prior cases was inapposite because a parent was already in one of the statutorily defined categories. 

The court noted that although its holding may seem to differ from People v. Hayhurst, 571 P.2d 721 (Colo. 1977), it was actually in line with Hayhurst. In that case, the supreme court held that a parent could not fulfill his statutory role if his interests were adverse to his child’s. However, the court also held that the fact that the father was upset with his son did not necessarily mean their interests were adverse.

The supreme court reversed the trial court’s suppression order and remanded for further proceedings.