Rule 16.1—Simplified Procedure
Rule 16.1(f) and (h)—Case Management Orders and Certification of Compliance. The amendments to Rule 16.1 regarding simplified procedure are minimal, but provide another incentive to use that method of dealing with lawsuits under $100,000. Sections 16.1(f) and (h) incorporate by reference some provisions from Rule 16. Because some of the incorporated provisions of Rule 16 have been renumbered, the corresponding provisions in Rule 16.1 have been renumbered to remain consistent. The significant change in Rule 16.1 is that the parties under Simplified Procedure do not have to prepare or file a proposed order or attend a case management conference unless they wish to. This exception was designed to maintain the simplified procedure with minimal paperwork for these smaller, less complicated cases.
Rule 26—General Provisions Governing
Discovery and Duty of Disclosure
The amendments to Rule 26 relating to discovery and disclosures are the most significant of all the new amendments. As described in “Part I: A New Paradigm,” these amendments are central to a nationwide effort to change the litigation culture from “discover all you want” to “discover only what you need.” They are intended to enforce the urgent need to make cases just, speedy, and inexpensive; to reopen genuine access to the judicial system for many parties that have been priced or delayed out of their ability to use or interest in using the courts to resolve disputes; and to reinvigorate confidence and trust in the courts and judges. As stated in the 2015 Comment to Rule 26, these amendments “allow discovery of what a party/lawyer needs to prove its case, but not what a party /lawyer wants to know about the subject of a case“—the amendments “emphasize the application of the concept of proportionality to disclosure and discovery, with robust disclosure followed by limited discovery.” (Emphasis in original.)
These changes should persuade parties and counsel to sharpen their focus; to relinquish the idea that they must discover every conceivable fact that may have some remote relevance to their general dispute; to recognize that justice delayed is justice denied; and to acknowledge that unchecked expense is more frequently used as an unjust sword than a shield against injustice. The cultural change is not expected to be immediately popular with some trial lawyers, or clients with unlimited litigation budgets, but the change may help lawyers to become better trial lawyers when they learn they must focus their cases and use thoughtful cross-examination in place of discovery paper blizzards.
As detailed below, the amendments call for more precise early disclosures—of both the favorable and the harmful information. They redefine discoverable information to limit it to that which relates to the claims and defenses of the specific case and, more significant, require that discovery be proportional to the needs of the case at issue. At this initial disclosure stage, the information to be disclosed is that which is “then known and reasonably available to the party.” In complex cases with many possible witnesses and multitudes of documents, the limitation to those things “then known and readily available” should be reasonably applied, while recalling that this initial disclosure does not terminate the continuing requirement of disclosure. Disclosures must be supplemented under Rule 26(e) “when a party learns that the information is incomplete or incorrect,” unless complete and correct information has already been provided in discovery responses. However, nothing permits information subject to mandatory disclosure to be withheld while waiting to see whether the opposing party will request it in discovery.
Although subject to change by the court, considering proportionality, the amendments limit the numbers of expert witnesses, call for more comprehensive written expert disclosures, limit discovery of communications between counsel and their experts, and limit expert testimony to that which has been previously disclosed. The amendments reduce the normal deposition times from seven hours to six hours.
The Good, the Bad and the Ugly
The first visible change in this subsection is to make clear what should have been the standard for years. The opening sentence requires parties to make initial disclosures, without awaiting a discovery request, of four categories of information: identification of possible witnesses; production of certain documents; description of categories of damages, in addition to computations of economic damages; and production of potential insurance agreements. The clarification in this initial amendment is that the information is to be disclosed “whether or not supportive of the disclosing party’s claims or defenses.”
In 2000, the Federal Rules were amended to limit disclosure to information “a disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses.” Colorado declined to adopt that limitation, thus requiring disclosure of all of the information listed in Rule 26(a)(1). One of the reasons for declining to adopt the federal limitation was the belief of the Civil Rules Committee that failure to produce adverse information would only cause delay while waiting for the opposing party to request such adverse information in its initial set of interrogatories and document requests. Thus, for example, in an employment discharge case, the employer must produce not only memos, notes, and e-mails criticizing the plaintiff–employee’s behavior, but also the memos, notes, and e-mails praising the employee’s performance.
Some lawyers complain that this clarification is contrary to their ethical obligation to represent their clients. However, lawyers must also recall that they act as “an officer of the legal system,” and in that light, among other things, have professional responsibilities to bring or maintain meritorious claims, to expedite litigation, to be candid with the tribunal, to be fair to opposing parties and counsel, and to be truthful in statements to others. The fact that any of these obligations may impinge on a client’s interests or desires does not weaken their application to the lawyer.
Subsections 26(a)(1)(A) (identity of individuals) and (B) (documents) have both been revised to require disclosures not just of names and documents concerning “disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings,” but to disclose names and documents relevant to the “claims and defenses of any party.” Therefore, in an automobile collision negligence case with a statute of limitations defense, both the plaintiff and defendant must provide names of individuals “likely to have discoverable information” about both the collision and the statute of limitations.
Subsection (A) (list of individuals) has also been amended to require more than the name, address, and “subjects of information.” Too often parties may provide a list (frequently as many names as the party can think of) with a description of the subject of their knowledge such as “these individuals may have information about the claims in this case.” This, of course, is useless and often is intentionally designed to make it difficult for the opposing party to have any real idea of who it might want to depose or interview. The revised subsection (A) now requires, in addition to the names, addresses, and phone numbers of disclosed individuals, a “brief description of the specific information” the individual in “known or believed to possess.” (Emphasis added.) The wording of this provision is not designed to require binding disclosures used to limit the scope of possible trial testimony, such as is required from testifying experts. Rather, it is designed, for example, to reveal who was responsible for deciding to discharge the plaintiff/employee; who directly participated in negotiating the key contractual provision; and who hired the allegedly negligent company truck driver. For essentially the same reasons, subsection (B) (list of documents) now requires that a listing of the subject matter of documents be provided in addition to the category of documents.
Challenging Inadequate Disclosures
An important change is found in the last sentence of the second paragraph of Rule 26(a)(1), which was imported from the experience gained from CAPP. Motions challenging the adequacy of another party’s disclosures may no longer be filed prior to the initial case management conference. There are several reasons for this limitation. First, the parties are to note concerns relating to the other party’s disclosures in the proposed order (Rule 16(b)(9)) so that these issues can be addressed at the case management conference. The process of listing the asserted shortcomings will, itself, create the need for counsel to confer about these issues and perhaps resolve some of them. The identification of asserted failures to disclose should be much shorter than a motion to compel. Further, one of the court’s significant tasks at the case management conference is to determine the appropriate level of proportionality for disclosure and discovery purposes. The court’s ruling on this issue may indicate that some of the alleged shortcomings in disclosures are not proportional to the case and need not be disclosed for that reason alone. Additionally, the court can probably resolve the issues and concerns while conducting the case management conference without any need for briefing of a motion to compel.
Rule 26(a)(2)—Disclosure of Expert Testimony
The disclosure rules for witnesses providing opinion testimony continue to provide different requirements for disclosures of two classes of persons allowed to render opinion testimony. Persons retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony are referred to in Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(I) as “retained experts.” Persons who are not specially retained or employed to give expert testimony in the case but who are expected to present testimony concerning their personal knowledge of relevant facts, along with their opinion testimony relating to those facts, are referred to in Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(II) as “other experts.”
The major differences in the amended rule are that summaries of expert testimony are no longer allowed, and experts will be allowed to testify on direct examination only about matters “disclosed in detail,” in conformity with the rule. This limitation was included in CAPP and judges enforced it rather strictly. These witnesses are not required to anticipate issues or areas of inquiry that may be brought up in cross-examination, and may testify about such areas without prior disclosure. Indeed, the knowledge that witnesses may testify only as to opinions disclosed in their reports should allow opposing parties to plan much more focused, precise, and concise cross-examinations.
Experience with summaries of expert testimony has revealed that there can be so much background that is omitted that either the opposing party is blind to what testimony to expect or, as is usually the case, needs to take an extensive deposition to try to flesh out the expert’s testimony. These more extensive depositions add significant cost to the party taking the deposition, both in the hours preparing for and the time actually spent deposing the expert. Furthermore, once a deposition is taken, many courts will not limit testimony to the summary if the subject was or could have been covered in the deposition itself. The fundamental objectives here are to require parties using retained experts to fully disclose their opinions and bases for those opinions so that the parties can more accurately evaluate the strength of their cases and to reduce or eliminate the need to take the expert’s depositions in the first place.
Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(I)—Retained Experts
The revised rule now requires full written reports of the expert’s expected testimony. There is no requirement that the expert must personally prepare the report because frequently lawyers work closely with the experts to tailor and limit the testimony to what is most necessary for the case. Determining who is responsible for selecting each word of the report is not deemed significant. What is significant is that the expert witness must sign the report and thereby accept responsibility for both what the report says and includes and what it omits.
Much of the remainder of the changes in this portion of the rule is a clarification of certain required portions of expert reports that have been in existence for years. The most critical part of the report will be the complete statement of all opinions and the basis and reasons for those opinions. The word “complete” here supports the requirement that experts be limited in their direct testimony to what is disclosed in the report. This does not require a proposed transcript of the witness’s direct examination. However, before the report is complete, lawyers should plan that direct examination in detail to make sure nothing crucial is omitted. Lawyers should not rely on the assumption that the opposing party will depose the expert and open the door for further “supplementation” of the witness’s opinions.
Other amendments clarify that the data and other information considered by the witness in forming opinions is listed but need not be included. The information considered, however, should be both that which is relied on and that which was rejected in forming the opinions. Likewise, literature to be used during the expert’s testimony needs to be identified and referenced in the report, but need not be provided. On the other hand, copies of exhibits to be used must be provided with the report, along with the expert’s qualifications, a list of publications authored by the witness within the prior ten years, and a list of deposition or trial testimony given by the expert within the preceding four years.
The amended rule now mandates more information about the compensation to be paid the retained expert. Experts have been known to testify that they are to be paid $___ per hour, but they are not sure how many hours have been spent yet, or they have only been paid a small portion of their fee because most of their billings have not been rendered or paid yet. Now, reports must include the expert’s fee agreement or schedule for the study, preparation, and testimony, and an itemization of the fees incurred, whether or not actually billed or paid. The time spent must be included in the report and must be supplemented fourteen days before trial. In short, jurors are entitled to know what the expert’s true, total compensation is, not just what may have been paid to the expert as of the day of the expert’s initial report.
Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(II)—Other Experts
These witnesses are frequently investigating police officers at accident or crime scenes; treating physicians; and employees such as business owners, accounting personnel, supervisors, mechanics, and construction personnel with specialized, relevant background and experience, as well as personal knowledge of the events in suit. Especially for those who are not employees of a party, it is often difficult to arrange for the necessary time for them to prepare extensive reports of their planned testimony. Testimony from non-specially retained or employed witnesses who will give opinions must be disclosed either by written reports signed by the witness, or by statements prepared and signed by counsel or by any unrepresented party. The allowance of statements prepared and signed by counsel recognizes that frequently, witnesses such as police officers or treating doctors cannot or will not make time available to review or sign a written disclosure statement. In either event, the witness will be limited to testifying on direct about matters disclosed in detail in the report or statement. Again, the report or statement must include all opinions to be expressed, together with the bases and reasons therefor. Thus, a statement that the treating physician “will testify about the patient’s medical records and their impact on the physician’s treatment of the patient” will not meet this test. Additionally, the report or statement must list any qualifications of the witness needed to support allowing the witness to have and express admissible opinions, and must include copies of any exhibits to be used to support the opinions.
A feature of “other [non-retained] experts” is that they are not called to testify in the case because they have been specially retained as independent experts to offer opinions. They are called as fact witnesses with personal information relating to the case, and through training or experience are qualified to offer opinions useful to the jury based on facts they observed. In short, as noted in the Supreme Court’s 2015 Comments, non-retained experts are people whose opinions are formed or reasonably derived from or based on their occupational duties with respect to the matter at issue in the case. Even though their opinions and supporting factual bases and reasons must be disclosed in detail in their report or statement, they are not required or expected to prepare and sign a full report containing the other information only required from retained experts. For example, in addition to the opinions and diagnoses reflected in the plaintiff’s medical records, a treating physician may have reached an opinion as to the cause of those injuries gained while treating the patient. Those opinions may not have been noted in the medical records but, if appropriately disclosed, may be offered at trial without the witness having first prepared a full, retained expert report.
Rule 26(a)(2)(B)—Limitations of Trial Testimony
Both of the revised subsections of Rule 26(a)(2)(B) relating to retained experts and other experts contain the same last sentence: “The witness’s direct testimony shall be limited to matters disclosed in detail in the report [or statement].” This is a new provision based in part on the experience from CAPP and on the desire to continue holding down the cost of trial preparation. One of the justifications for the perceived necessity to take expert depositions is that trial courts frequently do not limit experts to their reports at trial so that the deposition is necessary to uncover unreported opinions (or belatedly conceived opinions), which the trial judges might allow in evidence.
With the revised rule, trial courts are instructed to limit direct testimony. This does not preclude opinions for which the opposing party opens the door by cross-examining on opinions held by the witness beyond those disclosed in the report or statement. Not only does this provide a rule-based requirement that the trial courts limit testimony, but it also enforces the requirements that reports or statements in fact be complete. This limitation is also bolstered by the supplementation requirements of Rule 26(e) in those situations where depositions are taken.
Rule 26(b)—Discovery Scope and Limits
Before discussing the significant change in subsection 26(b)(1), it is important not to overlook the opening phrase of section 26(b): “Unless otherwise modified by order of the court . . .”; In other words, the court is not bound to treat discovery in all cases the same. Some cases may actually have more stringent limitations placed on their discovery than the presumptive limitations in subsection 26(b)(2). Conversely, larger and complex cases may need and can be given significantly more discovery than that which is set out as the presumptive discovery limitations, as appropriate.
Rule 26(b)(1)—In General
The amended portion of Rule 26(b)(1) is taken verbatim from the new Federal Rule. It makes one fundamental change and two significant but lesser revisions to the prior Colorado Rule 26(b)(1).
Proportionality. Previously, there were four factors in Rule 26(b)(2)(F) for courts to consider when determining whether good cause existed to justify modifying the presumptive limits on discovery. The third of those factors was whether the expense of discovery outweighed its likely benefit, “taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.” Very few reported cases ever discussed this obscurely located provision.
In 2009, the ACTL/IAALS Final Report lit the wildfire. It stated “Proportionality should be the most important principle applied to all discovery.” Thereafter, proportionality of discovery became a key issue at the Duke Conference. Then, the Federal Rules Advisory Committee joined in, concluding that “What is needed can be described in two words—cooperation and proportionality—and one phrase.” CAPP, along with many other pilot projects, also incorporated the concept of proportionality. When the Federal Rules Advisory Committee proposed its revisions to Rule 26(b)(1), it lifted the list of factors to establish good cause from Federal Rule 26(b)(2). It then specifically referred to this language as involving proportionality, and placed it directly into the very definition of what is discoverable. Thus, it is not enough any longer to contend that information is discoverable simply because it is relevant to a claim or defense. Such information must also be “proportional to the needs of the case.”
In evaluating the “needs of the case,” the Advisory Committee also adjusted the order of some of the factors to be considered when determining proportionality. It switched the order of “the amount in controversy” and “the importance of the issues at stake in the action” so that the amount of money was listed after the importance of the issues. This change was made to place less emphasis on the amount of money at stake as the leading factor (even though all of the factors must be considered if significant). The Advisory Committee also moved the issue of whether the burden or expense outweighed the likely benefit of the additional discovery from being a main issue in considering good cause (as phrased in Federal Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) and Colorado Rule 26(b)(2)(F)(iii)) to being simply another factor to be considered. Thus, as revised, the federal and Colorado provisions regarding the scope of discovery are virtually identical and state:
Subject to the limitations and considerations contained in subsection (b)(2) of this Rule, parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. (Emphasis added)
This new rule is patently designed to limit “full discovery” in all but the larger, more important and more complex cases. This is an important brick in the new paradigm of giving parties only what they need rather than whatever they want.
The Supreme Court’s 2015 Comments to Rule 26 emphasize the case-by-case considerations that may impact proportionality. All the listed factors should be thought about, but individual factors may carry very different weights depending on the case and claims. The amount in controversy may not be as much of a factor as the desired enforcement of fundamental civil or constitutional rights. The public interest may demand resolution of issues in the case. In employment and professional liability cases and for the amount of damages, for example, the parties’ relative access to key information may prove to justify more discovery for one party than to the other on selected issues.
Other limitations on the scope of discovery. In addition to the requirement that discovery be proportional to the needs of the case, a second change in both the Federal and Colorado Rules was to delete the authority of a court to “order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action,” as allowed in the previous version of Rule 26(b)(1). This, too, strikes a blow at potentially vast discovery of material even less directly relevant to the specific claims and defenses of the lawsuit. Discovery as the fishing expedition to find out whether a party can uncover new causes of action should no longer be available.
The third change in Rule 26(b)(1) is a clarification relating to information that is not admissible at trial. The last sentence of this section still allows discovery of information that may not be admissible, but only if the information sought is “within the scope of discovery.” Thus, such inadmissible information must still be relevant to the parties’ claims and defenses, not just to the “subject matter involved in the action,” and must still be proportional to the needs of the case.
Rule 26(b)(2)—Limitations [on Discovery]
This Rule retains Colorado’s previous basic limitations on the use of the various discovery devices. It retains the ability to expand or contract the uses of those devices “for good cause shown,” but also imports the proportionality factors of subsection (b)(1).
The only change is in subsection (b)(2)(F)(iii)—the subsection describing the factors to be considered in determining “good cause,” and the subsection from which the proportionality factors were removed for relocation into subsection (b)(1). This new consideration in reworded (b)(2)(F)(iii), taken verbatim from the proposed Federal Rule amendment, is whether the proposed additional discovery is “outside the scope permitted by C.R.C.P. 26(b)(1).” However, subsection (b)(2) specifically allows exceptions to its limits on use of discovery methods for good cause. Thus, this factor in (b)(2)(F)(iii) does not mean that good cause cannot be shown in situations if discovery is sought beyond subsection (b)(1)’s scope of discovery. If the broader discovery is sought, however, the other considerations in (b)(2)(F)(i), (ii), and (iv) will need to be quite persuasive.
Rule 26(b)(4)—Trial Preparation: Experts
Depositions of Experts. The subject of expert depositions has, from the beginning of CAPP, been a hotly debated topic. Opponents of expert depositions have argued that with requirements for disclosures of full expert reports and limiting their testimony to what is disclosed in detail, depositions of experts are unnecessary, expensive, and counterproductive. They argue that the main result of deposing experts is to “educate and make them smarter” and better able to prepare for and to withstand cross-examination at trial. Proponents of expert depositions counter that depositions allow lawyers to get a feel for the quality of the expert as a person, prospective witness, and expert in the designated field. They contend that the added cost of the deposition is not great in the overall expense of expert study and preparation, and that expert depositions enhance settlement once the lawyers have seen how well the expert can withstand intense examination. Finally, as noted above, a number of lawyers claimed that depositions were necessary because they could not rely on the judges to limit the expert’s testimony to the report or summary.
Although the Civil Rules Committee ultimately recommended that depositions for retained experts should be limited to three hours, the Supreme Court decided to apply the standard of six hours to all experts, as well as to all other deponents. Because of the varying importance of expert testimony in cases, this rule specifically authorizes trial courts to expand or limit deposition time in accordance with proportionality.
Disclosures and Discovery About the Preparation of Expert Opinions and Reports. In 2010, Federal Rules 26(b)(4)(B) and (C) were added to preclude discovery of drafts of expert reports or disclosures made pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2) and to provide work-product protection to communications between a party’s attorneys and the party’s retained experts and the expert’s assistants. The discovery bar does not extend to other information gathered by the expert or to questions about alternative analyses or approaches to the issue on which the expert is testifying. Discovery may extend to communications relating to the expert’s compensation for study or testimony; facts and data provided by the attorney that the expert considered in forming the opinions expressed; or assumptions that the attorney provided and the expert relied on. Among other things, these rules were adopted to prevent game playing with experts, such as counsel telling them to never make notes of what they discuss, to not prepare and send drafts, and to always make revisions to the original version of the report while deleting all portions that had been changed.
After this amendment was adopted in the Federal Rules in 2010, the Colorado Civil Rules Committee was prepared to recommend a similar change. However, it decided that such a change might adversely impact the information that was to be gained from the study of how CAPP worked and, therefore, the amendment was not further considered until the study of CAPP was concluded. Although there are slight variances in language between new subsection 26(b)(4)(D) of the Colorado Rules and subsections 26(b)(4)(B) and (C) of the Federal Rules, the substance of the changes is identical.
Rule 26(c)—Protective Orders
This Rule allows courts to issue a variety of protective orders to protect against annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. The new amendment to Colorado Rule 26(c)(2), taken verbatim from the amendment to Federal Rule 26(c)(1)(B), now also gives courts the authority to allocate the expenses of discovery among the requesting and delivering parties (or non-parties) where appropriate. This amendment does not mandate any allocation, but simply adds this tool to the court’s tool box of alternatives. Indeed, the Committee Note relating to the Federal Rule change provides that “recognizing the authority to shift the costs of discovery does not mean that cost-shifting should become a common practice,” and that “[c]ourts and parties should continue to assume that a responding party ordinarily bears the costs of responding.”
Rule 26(e)—Supplementation of Disclosures,
Responses, and Expert Reports and Statements
A provision has been added to the requirement to supplement expert reports or statements where a party intends to have the expert testify on direct examination about matters disclosed for the first time during the expert’s deposition, but that are not in the expert’s report or statement. The supplementation must be a specific description of the deposition testimony to be offered and relied on. This additional supplementation is intended to allow the court to determine from the expert’s Rule 26(a)(2) report and its supplementation whether the direct testimony offered at trial has or has not been properly disclosed. These provisions are designed to avoid the court’s need to read scattered portions of the deposition before ruling on admissibility of the new testimony. It also avoids the opponent arguing surprise because it did not understand what deposition testimony was going to be offered as additional and admissible expert testimony.
When the expert report is properly supplemented with this subsequent deposition opinion testimony, Rule 26(e) instructs the trial courts that those supplemented opinions must be permitted, unless the court finds that the opposing party has been unfairly prejudiced by the failure to have made disclosure in the original expert report.
Rule 30—Depositions Upon Oral Examination
The only changes of note in Rule 30 are contained in subsection 30(d)(2). They shorten the standard deposition for all witnesses from one day of seven hours to one day of six hours (unless otherwise ordered by the court). With the usual practice now being to clock deposition times to the minute (not counting breaks for consultation or bathroom breaks), seven hours has frequently devolved into about ten hours of actual time spent at the deposition. Furthermore, many felt that six hours of solid time, leaving out boilerplate questions, was still normally sufficient to get the genuinely necessary evidence. If more is likely to be needed, the parties should determine that before the deposition and request the court’s permission for more time.
After the Civil Rules Committee agreed on the changes to Rule 34 for the reasons described below, those changes seemed to be equally applicable to responses to interrogatories. Thus, Rule 33(b) was amended to add the requirements that objections to interrogatories specify the grounds for objection and to state whether responsive information is being withheld on the basis of the objection. Such objection also stays the need to answer those objectionable portions pending a ruling by the trial court and without filing a motion for a protective order.
Rule 34—Production of Documents
Over time, litigants have developed the habit of making a string of boilerplate objections to requests for production of documents. The objections are then incorporated verbatim, or by reference, at the beginning of the response to each document request. (To be fair, these responses are often invited by equally boilerplate definitions and instructions in the opposition’s request.) Thus, the requesting party has no real information about which of the objections are intended to apply or why they are being made. This confusion can then be aggravated by the boilerplate comment to the effect that “notwithstanding these objections, and without waiving them, [defendant] is producing the following documents.” With this response, the requesting party has no idea whether the responder is providing all the documents it has or whether it really is withholding some of them and, if so, how many are being withheld and the basis on which the responder is refusing to produce them.
Colorado Rule 34(b) and Federal Rule 34(b)(2) are being amended with virtually identical language. First, the amended rules provide that the response to each request must “state with specificity the grounds for objecting to the request.” The objections must then be specific, not generic, and relevant to the precise request to which objection is being made. Second, the amended rules require that an objection state whether any responsive materials are actually being withheld on the basis of that objection.
Separately, the rules are also being amended to allow production of materials instead of offering inspection of the materials. Essentially, this simply recognizes what has for many years been the practice in most cases, at least where the produced documents are not especially numerous or burdensome.
Finally, Colorado Rule 34(b) adds a new provision to clarify the effect of a fairly common practice. When a party objects to production of certain documents, it has been unclear whether the objecting party also must request a protective order under Rule 26(c) or whether the requesting party must file a motion to compel production. The newly amended Colorado Rule now specifies that an objection to production stays the obligation to produce these documents until the court resolves the objection and that no motion for protective order is necessary. Frequently, when the requesting party receives an objection, especially if some responsive documents are produced, the requesting party will decide that it is unnecessary to fight for more documents or the parties can reach an acceptable compromise as to what documents will be produced. Thus, it seems appropriate to await the requesting party’s determination that it really is worth the effort to obtain the withheld documents rather than requiring the objecting party to move for protection and involve the court on matters that the requesting party may no longer need.
Rule 37—Failure to Make Disclosure
or Cooperate in Discovery: Sanctions
Rule 37(a)(4)(A) and (B) have allowed courts to award reasonable expenses, including awarding attorney fees in favor of prevailing parties and against opposing parties and their attorneys, unless the court finds certain factors that ameliorate against such an award, including “other circumstances that make an award of expenses unjust.” Experience has shown that courts, which historically have been unwilling to award monetary sanctions, have used this latter escape valve to justify the lack of monetary sanctions.
The CAPP rules, however, required that courts grant sanctions “unless the court makes a specific determination that failure to disclose in a timely and complete manner was justified under the circumstances or [was] harmless.” Judges handling CAPP cases found this extra pressure to impose sanctions helpful in some instances, although they still felt that encouraging compliance and emphasizing that attorneys cooperate with each other was ultimately more desirable.
After struggling with this dichotomy at some length, the subcommittee of the Civil Rules Committee, the full Committee, and ultimately the Supreme Court chose the path of encouraging courts to be more aggressive with the imposition of sanctions, but not to go as far as CAPP went. Thus, rather than making the mere determination that other circumstances made monetary sanctions unjust—a low standard for avoiding monetary sanctions—Rule 37(a)(4)(A) and (B) were amended to allow that reprieve from imposing sanctions only where it would be manifestly unjust to award monetary sanctions to the prevailing party.
Under these rules, however, courts may still decline to impose sanctions where the movant did not make a good-faith effort to obtain compliance before seeking court action or where the accused party was substantially justified for the nondisclosure, response, or objection. Indeed, those findings might trigger a sanction against the complaining party or its counsel. This counter-provision significantly increases the pressure on parties seeking these sanctions to meet, confer in person, and diligently endeavor to reach a reasonable resolution.
Conversely, Rule 37(c)(1) has authorized preclusion at trial or for summary judgment of nondisclosed information required to be disclosed by Rules 26(a) or (e), unless such failure is harmless. Because it is so easy to articulate some kind of harm, this rule has caused preclusion of evidence that failed to cause significant harm or where the harm caused by the nondisclosure would be substantially outweighed by the harm resulting from preclusion. The amended subsection 37(c)(1) prohibits preclusion as a sanction simply upon allegations of some harm. Thus, preclusion for nondisclosure may not be imposed where the failure has not and will not cause significant harm or where the preclusion is disproportionate to the alleged harm.
Rules 54 and 121 § 1-22—Costs
Although only tangentially related to the issue of amending pretrial procedures to increase access to the judicial system by advancing the concept that cases should be just, speedy, and inexpensive, the Civil Rules Committee also submitted two amendments relating to controlling costs awarded to prevailing parties. First, in Rule 54(d), as approved by the Supreme Court, awarded costs must be reasonable considering any relevant factors that may include the needs and complexity of the case and the amount in controversy. Second, Rule 121 § 1-22 is amended to allow hearings on bills of costs where the requesting party has identified the issues to be heard and where the court has concluded that a hearing would be of material benefit to the court in ruling on the bill of costs.
With the revisions and amendments to the foregoing Rules, Colorado has moved to address the increasingly severe problem of a litigation culture that appears to be driven by and has thrived on frequently excessive demands for information. These demands can add substantial unnecessary expense and foreclose the societal benefits of efficient judicial systems for the peaceful resolution of disputes and wrongdoing. By encouraging and expediting a new culture focused on the genuine and limited needs of clients and not their (or their lawyers’) desires—a culture trained in and dedicated to the prompt and efficient handling of disputes—it is hoped that civil litigation can indeed incorporate a new paradigm.
 See Holme, “Back to the Future—New Rule 16.1: Simplified Procedure for Civil Cases Up to $100,000,” 33 The Colorado Lawyer 11 (May 2004), www.cobar.org/tcl/tcl_articles.cfm?articleid=3427.
 FRCP 26(a)(1)(A)(i) and (ii). See Advisory Committee Notes re 2000 Amendment.
 Colo. RPC, Preamble and Scope at .
 Colo. RPC 3.1.
 Colo. RPC 3.2.
 Colo. RPC 3.3.
 Colo. RPC 3.4.
 Colo. RPC 4.1.
 See discussion of Rule 26(e), infra.
 CRCP 26(b)(2)(F)(iii).
 ACTL/IAALS, supra note 24 at 7. See “Part I: A New Paradigm,” supra note 2 at 46.
 See Holme, supra note 3 at 46 and notes 35 to 37 and accompanying text.
 Advisory Comm. Memo at B2 to B3. See Holme, supra note 3 at 46.
 PPR 9.1. See Holme, supra note 3 at 47.
 FRCP 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
 See Advisory Comm. Notes re: 2010 Amendments to FRCP 26(b)(4).
 Id.; FRCP 26(b)(4)(C)(i) to (iii).
 See 2014 Rules Report, supra note 26 at 26.
 PPR 3.7.