December 11, 2017

Introduction, and Lessons from Alzheimer’s Disease

Editor’s Note: CBA CLE Legal Connection welcomes Aaron Eisenach to the blog. Aaron Eisenach has specialized in long-term care planning and insurance-based solutions for 20 years. Read more below.

I am very excited to submit my first blog on CBACLELegalConnection.com! Some of you will recognize me from recent Elder Law and Estate Planning Retreats. Others may have heard me lecture at Senior Law Day or provide CLE courses on long-term care planning. Or perhaps you have read my chapters in Elder Law in Colorado and Senior Law Handbook. But in case our paths have never crossed, please allow me to further introduce myself.

I am a long-term care planning specialist representing myriad insurance companies and products that help people protect their family and finances from the greatest risk left in life: needing extended care.  I wear three hats in my professional life. First, I assist other advisors and agents that do not specialize in long-term care insurance and choose to trust me with their clients.  Second, I serve as a wholesaler of LTC planning products to agents in Colorado and many other states. And third, as an educator I am certified by the Colorado Division of Insurance to teach state-mandated continuing education courses that all resident agents must complete in order to offer LTC coverage. Whichever hat I’m wearing my goal is to help families mitigate the emotional, physical and financial consequences of an extended care event.  My steadfast belief is that everyone deserves a serious conversation about the potentially devastating emotional, physical and financial consequences needing long-term care can cause.

My passion for this niche in the insurance industry stems from witnessing my father’s and grandfather’s battles with Alzheimer’s disease and the lasting impact on family and finances. I remember occasionally visiting my grandfather, usually after Sunday morning church services, in the skilled nursing facility in which he lived for 10 years. I can still breathe the smells and hear the groans from residents in the hallways of the facility. I could hardly wait to get in the car and escape the image of the man that I only knew as a prisoner to a crippling, horrific disease.

Imagine the heartbreak when we started to realize that my father was beginning to show symptoms of the same condition. Thankfully, before signs of dementia crept in to rob him of his cognition, he took my advice and purchased long-term care insurance. Because of his familial experiences, my father realized that the coverage was not for him per se. It was for my mom, and his children and grandchildren more than it was ever for him. When dad resigned from a prestigious job, a few newspaper articles, banquets and receptions honored him while he was still mostly aware of his surroundings. When dad could no longer be left alone, my mom also quit her job and began her new vocation: full-time caregiver.

Dad’s long-term care insurance policy was structured to cover care at home, in an assisted living or skilled nursing facility, adult day care or hospice. Its benefits were unlimited: the coverage could never be exhausted regardless of how long he might have needed care.  Mom resisted turning on the benefits for many months (it seems she held sacred the “…for better or worse, for richer or poorer, in sickness and in health” part of the wedding vows) until she finally realized that she needed help in caring for dad. Eventually a home care agency was hired to help take care of him a few hours per day, freeing her to go to the grocery store, the doctor’s office, or see a grandchild’s piano recital. In other words, the long-term care insurance gave her some of her life back.

Eventually the combined care provided by mom and the agency wasn’t enough. After a health scare of her own, mom called me and wanted to know my feelings about placing dad in a nursing home permanently. Realizing that my dad’s chronic care needs were making my mother chronically-ill herself, I told her that she had my absolute encouragement to do so. At that point she said that she had already talked to the other children and that they also agreed. A facility was chosen that was close to the homes of three of the four children. Mom and dad’s house was sold, allowing mom to live closer to the facility so that she could be there every day possible as his loving wife and his personal care advocate, which is so vitally important regardless of the quality and reputation of the facility in which your loved one resides. As an example of her compassion, after dad had passed away in the very early morning hours she fed his roommate breakfast later that morning. All but $20 per day of dad’s 18-month stay was paid-for by his insurance policy. In fact, not a single penny of mom or dad’s retirement plans was spent on care.

These experiences and God’s hand led me to my passion for, and career in, telling others about the importance of planning ahead for the possibility of needing extended care services. For more than 20 years I have listened to clients tell me of their own stories of caregiving. The stories lead to similar conclusions: the emotional and physical strains and pressures of being a caregiver are devastating, adult children often do not contribute equally to the care needs of the parent(s) which can lead to resentment and in-fighting, the lifetime savings of the care recipient was depleted much quicker than ever imagined, relying on Medicaid should be avoided, the lack of planning leads to chaos, and more.

My next blog will focus on the premise that everyone needs a plan for care (not necessarily insurance), the components of a care plan, and common planning goals. I will also present the latest cost of care data for Colorado. Until then, if there is anything I can do for you or your clients, please visit www.AaronEisenach.com or call 303-659-0755.

 

Aaron R. Eisenach has specialized in long-term care planning and insurance-based solutions for 20 years. His passion for this topic stems from losing both his father and grandfather to Alzheimer’s Disease. As an insurance wholesaler, Mr. Eisenach represents ICB, Inc., the nation’s first general agency specializing in LTC insurance. As an educator, he provides workshops to consumers and teaches state-mandated continuing education courses to Colorado insurance agents selling LTC products. As a broker, Mr. Eisenach is the proprietor of AaronEisenach.com and partners with financial advisors and agents who trust him to work with their clients. He is the immediate past president of the Producers Advisory Council at the Colorado Division of Insurance, serves as president of the nonprofit LTC Forum of Colorado, Inc, and has appeared on 9News and KMGH Channel 7. He recently served as an expert witness in a court case and was a contributing author to the American College curriculum on long-term care insurance.

Show Me The Way: Using Headers More Effectively

Headers are helpful. Use them.[1]

Use Headers in a Statement of Facts

Think of all the good reasons you use headers in your argument section. Those same reasons apply to the Statement of Facts section. So use headers there too.[2]

When you do come across the rare Statement of Facts that uses headers, it often contains ones like these:

  1.  The December 22, 2010 Common Interest Agreement.
  2.  Defendant’s Negligence.

These are useless. The date and title of the document are probably irrelevant.[3] The header does not engage the reader because none of us want to read about common interest agreements. Neither header provides a fact essential to a court’s ruling. In fact, the second header is a legal conclusion (not a factual one). They are neither memorable nor relevant. In short, they say nothing about your case.

But it does not have to be this way. Ross Guberman provides a helpful example.[4] Watch how the government used headers in a Statement of Facts section to defend convictions in the Martha Stewart case.

  1.  The Government’s Case
    1.  “Get Martha on the Phone”
    2.  “Peter Bacanovic thinks ImClone is Going to Start Trading Downward”
    3.  Stewart Sells Her ImClone Stock
    4.  “Something is Going On With ImClone And Martha Stewart Wants To Know What”
    5.  Stewart’s Conversation With Mariana Pasternak
    6.  The Investigations Begin
    7.  The Tax Loss Selling Cover Story
    8.  January 3, 2002: Faneuil Lies to Investigators
    9.  Bacanovic Changes The Cover Story
    10.  January 7, 2002: Bacanovic Lies to Investigators
    11.  Stewart Alters Bacanovic’s Telephone Message
    12.  February 4, 2002: Stewart Lies to Investigators
    13.  February 13, 2002: Bacanovic Lies in Sworn Testimony
    14.  March 7, 2002: Faneuil Lies to Investigators Again
    15.  April 10, 2002: Stewart Lies to Investigators Again
    16.  Stewart’s False Public Statements
    17.  Faneuil Reveals The Truth[5]

When you read these headers, a story emerges. Not just any story, a story helpful to the prosecution.[6]

Let’s consider a simpler example. When you glance at a Table of Contents you see the following:

  1.  Farm Inc. Agreed to Deliver One Hundred Eggs to Pie Corp. Every Sunday.
  2.  One Sunday, Without Notice, Farm Inc. Delivered No Eggs.
  3.  Without Eggs Pie Corp. Could Not Bake or Sell Any Pies That Week.
  4.  That Week Pie Corp. Lost $1,000.

From these headers you can predict this lawsuit probably contains a breach of contract claim. The headers track the elements without using any legal terms, like “breach” or “causation.” More importantly, these four headers match the four factual findings needed to succeed on the claim.  If the court remembers nothing else except these four factual conclusions, the plaintiff’s statement of facts has done its job.

Phrase Argument Section Headers Persuasively

Frequently headers state a legal conclusion without any reasoning. For example,

  1.  The Complaint Fails to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted.
  2.  The Existence of a Disputed Material Fact Precludes Summary Judgment.
  3.  Defendant’s Negligence Caused Damages.

These headers could appear in any brief for any case involving these types of motions or claims. They are weak and add little. Remember, when your reader gets to these headers, the reader already knows what you want. The caption page and opening said what you want and why. So the reader knows you think the complaint does not state a claim when the reader gets to the header saying the complaint does not state a claim. Add something new and helpful.

Make your headers stronger by stating why you win:[7]

  1.  Because the Complaint Does Not Allege the Third and Fourth Elements of Negligence, It Fails to State A Claim for Negligence.
  2.  Conflicting Expert Testimony About Whether The Landfill Continues to Cause or Threaten Environmental Damage Creates a Disputed Material Fact.
  3.  When the Driver Became Distracted While Texting on Her Phone, She Crashed Into the Car.

The Integrated Header: Visual Cues For The Reader

Usually we think of headers as an indented sentence prefaced with an outline-symbol like a roman numeral. So headers are abrupt and obvious. Not quite.

Some briefs integrate headers into the main text. They use portions of headers to start paragraphs. These integrated headers are not in the Table of Contents. Weaker but also less disruptive than traditional headers, they function as helpful visual cues and transitions.[8] These headers are neither better nor worse than traditional headers. They are an option. Use them when you deem appropriate.

Former United States Solicitor General Seth Waxman has a knack for these. Take a look.

Example 1:

Summary of Argument

I.  Implied dedication requires two elements: (1) the property owner’s unequivocal intent to dedicate land for a particular public use; and (2) and acceptance of that land for that use by the public. Only the first element, the landowner’s intent, is at issue here. . . .

[several paragraphs]

II. Appellants have not come close to establishing that the City intended—much less unequivocally intended—to irrevocably dedicate the four parcels at issue as parkland. . . .[9]

The roman numerals are not part of a traditional header. They introduce full main text paragraphs. In doing so, they visually break up points for the reader. They function as transitions without a transition word or phrase.

Example 2:

3. Appellants’ rule is singularly inappropriate in this case where the
landowner is the City and the property at issue is a street.

Finally, Appellants’ bid to jettison owner intent in favor of public use as the north star of the implied dedication analysis . . .

a. By elevating long continued public use to the ‘main determinant’ of dedication, Appellants’ rule would eviscerate the distinction between prescriptive rights—those acquired through . . .

[another paragraph]

b. Appellants acknowledge that their vision of implied dedication rests not on the City’s actual intent regarding the status of the DOT Strips, but instead on . . . [10]

Here Waxman uses letters to achieve the same function as the roman numerals above. Rather than including a full sub-header, he uses each letter to start a new point and a new series of paragraphs.

Example 3:

8. Social Science Does Not Support Any Of The Putative Rationales For Proposition 8.

Proponents of laws like Proposition 8 have advanced certain social-science arguments that they contend support the exclusion of same-sex couples from civil marriage. The proponents’ main arguments are (1) deinstitutionalization: that allowing same-sex couples to marry will harm the institution of marriage by severing it from child-rearing; (2) biology: that marriage is necessary only for opposite-sex couples because they can procreate accidentally; and (3) child welfare: that children are better off when raised by two parents of the opposite sex. Each of these arguments reflects a speculative assumption rather than a fact, is unsupported in the trial record in this case, and has in fact been refuted by evidence.

Deinstitutionalization. No credible evidence supports the deinstitutionalization theory on which petitioners heavily rely. . . .

[multiple paragraphs]

Biology. There is also no biological justification for denying civil marriage to same-sex couples. . . .

[multiple paragraphs]

Child Welfare. If there were persuasive evidence that same sex marriage was detrimental to children, amici would give that evidence great weight. But there is none. . . .[11]

The introduction establishes three counterarguments in a numbered list. The brief assigns each counterargument a title using an italicized word. Those italicized titles later serve as visual transitions.


[1] For more information on using headers effectively see Stephen Armstrong & Timothy Terrell, Thinking Like a Writer: A Lawyer’s Guide to Effective Writing and Editing 121-25 (Practicing Law Institute 3d ed. 2008); Bryan A. Garner, Legal Writing In Plain English 20-22 (2d ed. 2013); Ross Guberman, Point Made, How to Write Like the Nation’s Top Advocates 73-80 (2d ed. 2014); Ross Guberman, Point Taken: How to Write Like the World’s Best Judges 108-11 (2015) (discussing use of headers and sub-headers in opinions).

[2] See Ross Guberman, Point Made, supra n. 1 at 73-76 (discussing use of headers in Statement of Facts section).

[3] “Lawyers love narrative – and they adore dates and places. . . . And when, pages later, [the date] turns out to be wholly irrelevant, the judge will feel duped – a feeling that often leads to irritability and impatience. I would consider that a less-than-desirable start for one’s case.” Judge William Eich, Writing The Persuasive Brief, Wisconsin Lawyer (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.wisbar.org/newspublications/wisconsinlawyer/pages/article.aspx?Volume=76&Issue=2&ArticleID=614; Ross Guberman, Point Made, supra n. 1 at 69-71 (discussing alternatives to dates in a Statement of Facts).; Ross Guberman, Point Taken: How to Write Like the World’s Best Judges 44-56 (2015) (discussing cutting irrelevant facts from court opinions).

[4] Ross Guberman, Free Martha? Not with these Headings!, Legal Writing Pro, https://www.legalwritingpro.com/articles/free-martha-not-headings/ (last visited August 3, 2017).

[5] Brief For the United States of America at 6-17, United States v. Martha Stewart and Peter Bacanovic, 433 F.3d 273 (2d Cir. 2006).

[6] Query whether the dates in these headers are needed. They might suggest several significant events in a short period.

[7] “The old test is still the best. Could a judge skim your headings and subheadings and know why you win?” Ross Guberman, Point Made, supra n. 1 at 93. For more advice on using headers in your argument section see id. at 93-106. See also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Making Your Case: The Art of Persuading Judges 89 (2008) (describing Table of Contents as “primarily a finding tool” but also noting “many judges look at it first to get a quick overview of the argument. That’s one reason you should make your section headings and subheadings full, informative sentence.”)

[8] Ross Guberman, Point Made, supra n. 1 at 73 (giving examples of integrated headers in Statement of Facts).

[9] Brief for Necessary Third-Party Appellant-Respondent New York University at 38-40, Deborah Glick, et al. v. Harvey, et al., 25 N.Y.3d 1175 (N.Y. 2015).

[10] Id. at 59-60.

[11] Brief of Amici Curiae Kenneth B. Mehlman et al. Supporting Respondents at 10-12, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).

 

Michael Blasie graduated from the New York University School of Law. He began his career as a commercial litigator and criminal defense attorney in the New York City office of Cooley LLP where he practiced in state and federal trial and appellate courts. After five years he moved to Denver where he currently works as a law clerk to the Honorable David J. Richman of the Colorado Court of Appeals. Michael also serves as a volunteer firefighter for the City of Golden.

Good Advice, Better Advice: Rethink How You Use Authority

Briefs are too long. Some cases warrant lengthy briefing. Most do not. Shorter briefs are more than judicial preference.[1] Brevity strengthens your writing, clarifies your points, and pleases your audience.[2]

A rarely addressed problem is citing too much authority. When proofreading, many attorneys check a citation’s format and confirm it supports a proposition. But few assess whether to cut the citation or replace it with a better one.

Citations are about judgment. Consider these points.

String Citations Are Not a Problem; They Are a Symptom of a Problem

Nearly every legal writing CLE has a PowerPoint slide dedicated to the irredeemable brutality of string citations. Usually the presenter provides an exaggerated illustration like this:

Parties cannot waive the defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006); Wisconsin Dep’t of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 382 (1998); Lightfoot v. U.S., 564 F.3d 625, 627 (3d Cir. 2009); American Fiber & Finishing, Inc. v. Tyco Healthcare Group, LP, 362 F.3d 136, 138 (1st Cir. 2004); Gardner v. U.S., 211 F.3d 1305, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Douglas v. E.G. Baldwin & Associates, Inc., 150 F.3d 604, 608 (6th Cir. 1998); Harris v. U.S., 149 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 1998); Chernin v. U.S., 149 F.3d 805, 812-13 (8th Cir. 1998).

Then the presenter condemns string citations for two to three minutes, with a verbal footnote that they are acceptable in rare circumstances like to survey multiple jurisdictions or to show a trend (or consistency) over time.

This advice is not wrong, but it can lead to wrong conclusions.

Astute attorneys hear the advice, return to the office, and dutifully apply it. They scan briefs for precisely what the presenter mentioned: a paragraph with a single sentence followed by a horde of citations spanning multiple lines. If they find a string citation, they cut it down or determine an exception applies. If they find no string citation, hurray! Either way, in the end the attorneys feel confident the number of citations used to support all the propositions is fine because there are no unhelpful string citations. That conclusion is a problem.

Worse, that conclusion misunderstands the problem. The CLE advice frames the problem as string citations. But the absence of unhelpful string citations only means there are no unhelpful string citations. It does not mean the number of citations is acceptable.

The problem is attorneys cite too much authority. Whether that authority appears in a string citation is irrelevant. After all, when does a series of citations become a string citation? After two? Three? Four? Do you restart the count after a new signal word? I do not know and I do not care because it does not matter. You must justify every citation, whether solitary or in a series.

Cutting one string citation from a brief fixes one spot and shortens your brief by a handful of lines. But editing all of your citations improves dozens of sections and can shed pages.

Less is More: Choose the Appropriate Type and Number of Authority

Shed your collegiate habits. Briefs are not a way to show how much research you did, or how smart you are. I understand the hours you spent researching the intricacies of replevin were tiring and frustrating. I understand how few people have the command of replevin you now possess. And I understand that this hard won mastery of replevin should go towards something. Fine, but not your brief.[3]

Your brief has one goal: persuade your audience.[4] If a citation does not help this goal, cut it. Have a reason for every citation you include.[5] Tie that reason to how the citation persuades your audience.

Not using every citation is counterintuitive. If you have the space you want to use every arrow in your quiver.  But too much authority weakens a brief.[6] Citations add length which means more time for your audience to lose focus and patience. You may lose credibility as your audience wonders why the brief is citing unnecessary authority. Too much authority also drowns substance in waves of citations.[7]

Consider a few examples.

Example 1:

A party must file an action for negligence within two years after the cause of action accrues. Section 13-80-102(1)(a), C.R.S. 2017; Colburn v. Kopit, 59 P.3d 295, 296 (Colo. App. 2002).

One proposition, two citations. Why cite two sources? Both are direct citations, meaning there is no signal (e.g. “see also”). The absence of a signal tells the reader the citations directly support the entire proposition. If they both support the entire proposition, you do not need two sources.

Choose one. If the General Assembly chooses a statute of limitations, it codifies this selection in statutes. These statutes bind courts. Here, the statute is clear. When Colburn states the statute of limitations, it is paraphrasing but not interpreting the statute. So the case adds nothing you do not get from the statute. The statute is the strongest authority. It is clear. Cut the case cite.

Example 2:

Courts dismiss negligence claims raised after the two year statute of limitations expires. Section 13-80-102(1)(a), C.R.S. 2017; Colburn v. Kopit, 59 P.3d 295, 296 (Colo. App. 2002).

Again one proposition, two citations. But the proposition is different. It speaks about the remedy courts apply to a tardy claim. The statute does not discuss (although perhaps it implies) the remedy. The case cites the statute, states the statute of limitations, and shows the remedy. It covers all the propositions you need.

Whether to also cite the statute is a judgment call. Although the case is probably sufficient, the statutory citation may help if a court wants to check for amendments or ensure Colburn correctly interprets the statute. This is a strategic decision and may depend on what your opponent contests.

Example 3:

A plaintiff may only succeed on a claim of denial of procedural due process if a state government injured or revoked a constitutionally protected property interest without proper procedural protections. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1; Schanzenbach v. Town of La Barge, 706 F.3d 1277, 1283-84 (10th Cir. 2013).

Only the case citation is necessary. The constitutional citation adds nothing. Case law, not the Constitution, establishes the contours of procedural due process. Unless your argument hinges on a textual analysis of the Due Process Clause (unlikely), there is no need to cite the clause.

Example 4:

The Due Process Clause prohibits state governments from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1. See also Schanzenbach v. Town of La Barge, 706 F.3d 1277, 1283-84 (10th Cir. 2013).

The citation to the Fourteenth Amendment without any signal tells the reader the Amendment directly states the proposition. The use of “see also” tells the reader the case supports the proposition, but does not directly state it. But a reader cannot tell why the case citation exists. It might add something; it might not. If you have a direct citation followed by a signal word with more authority, you will usually need to state why you included that new authority. Here, either add a parenthetical or cut the case citation.

Example 5:

A complaint must state with particularity the circumstances of a fraud.  F.R.C.P. 9(b).  Courts dismiss claims that fail to meet this heightened pleading standard. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Bar-S Food Co., 539 F. Supp. 710, 720 (D. Colo. 1982). This requirement protects defendants’ reputations and puts them on notice so they can form a defense. Tatten v. Bank of Am. Corp., 912 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1041 (D. Colo. 2012). Conclusory allegations are insufficient; the complaint must allege the time, place, and contents of the false representation. Conrad v. The Educ. Res. Inst., 652 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1182-83 (D. Colo. 2009). The failure to identify the party who made the false statements requires dismissal. Id.

Five citations from four sources. This paragraph explains the general law on pleading fraud. A trial court is probably already familiar with these propositions and does not need a full backstory. Even so, surely one case supports all of these propositions. Do not cite five different sources when one suffices.[8]

Showing several courts have dismissed complaints that plead fraud adds little. After all, what if the other side could cite more cases where courts did not dismiss such complaints? This is a fact-specific analysis. What matters is how the law applies to the complaint in your case. If the complaint’s allegations are close to a case you found, great. If not, more cases will not make a difference.

The ideal authority is one case that supports all these propositions and dismisses a complaint with the most analogous allegations to your case. Next best is one case that supports all these propositions and dismisses a complaint for the reason you advocate (e.g. not identifying who made the false statements) even though the allegations are very different.

Meaningfully Choose Your Authority

If the answer to “Why is this citation here?” is “Because it supports the proposition” then you have not thought it through. This answer explains why you have a citation (as opposed to no citation). But it does not answer why you included this citation. Consider the same question rephrased: of the universe of all authority that supports the proposition, why have you chosen this one?

Step 1: Choose the Appropriate Type of Authority. Often multiple authorities lend support: constitutions, statutes, regulations, case law, legislative history, treatises, dictionaries, articles, etc. Have a reason why you chose one type of authority over another. Why cite a statute and not a case? Why a case and not a treatise?

Step 2: Choose the Appropriate Source. Once you decide on the type of authority, choose a particular source. For example, after you decide to cite case law you must decide which case to cite. Why cite this case instead of that case when both support the proposition? Potential answers include:

  • It is the most recent high court decision which makes it the most authoritative case law on point.
  • It is the seminal case that all the other cases cite.
  • We rely heavily on this case later in the brief so it will make the court’s life easier by having fewer cases to examine.

No one answer is better than the other and this list is not exhaustive. Attorneys may differ. Bottom line: have a reason for everything you do.


[1] “With the docket the way it is—and growing (federal court appellate filings went up again last year)—we judges can only read briefs once. We cannot go back and re-read them, linger over phrases, chew on meanings. Your main points have to stick with us on first contact—the shorter and punchier the brief the better.” Patricia Wald, 19 Tips from 19 Years on the Appellate Bench, 1 J. App. Prac. & Process 7, 10 (1999). See also Judge William Eich, Writing The Persuasive Brief, Wisconsin Lawyer (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.wisbar.org/newspublications/wisconsinlawyer/pages/article.aspx?Volume=76&Issue=2&ArticleID=614 (estimating judges may only spend thirty minutes on the first reading of a brief).

[2] “Repetition, extraneous facts, over-long arguments (by the 20th page, we are muttering to ourselves, ‘I get it, I get it. No more for God’s sake’) still occur more often than capable counsel should tolerate. In our court counsel get extra points for briefs they bring in under the 50-page limit. Many judges look first to see how long a document is before reading a word. If it is long, they automatically read fast; if short, they read slower. Figure out yourself which is better for your case.” Wald, 1 J. App. Prac. & Process at 9-10.

[3] “You do not write for publication. You do not write to show your colleagues how smart you are, how well you know the subject matter, or how stupid you believe the judges to be. All this may well be true. But the name of the game is ‘persuade the judge.’ You don’t score points for anything else.” Ruggero J. Aldisert, Winning on Appeal: Better Briefs and Oral Argument, 24 (National Institute of Trial Advocacy, 2d ed. 2003). “You’re not writing a treatise, a law-review article, or a comprehensive Corpus Juris annotation. You are trying to persuade one court in one jurisdiction. And what you’re trying to persuade it of is not your (or your junior associate’s) skill and tenacity at legal research. You will win no points, therefore, for digging out and including in your brief every relevant case. On the contrary, the glut of authority will only be distracting. What counts is not how many authorities you cite, but how well you use them.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Making Your Case: The Art of Persuading Judges 125-26 (2008).

[4] Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Making Your Case: The Art of Persuading Judges 59 (2008) (“The overarching objective of a brief is to make the court’s job easier. Every other consideration is subordinate.”)

[5] “Conciseness doesn’t mean fewer words; it is the omission of needless words.” Eich, supra n. 1.

[6] “A brief that is readable and to-the-point will make it much easier for the judges to understand and quickly grasp your points, and they will be encouraged to spend more time with your arguments. Unnecessary length, on the other hand, will often result in your strongest points getting lost in the shuffle.” Eich, supra n. 1.

[7] See Alex Kozinski, The Wrong Stuff, 1992 BYU L. Review 325, 326 (1992) (“Keep in mind that simple arguments are winning arguments; convoluted arguments are sleeping pills on paper.”); Patricia Wald, 19 Tips from 19 Years on the Appellate Bench, 1 J. App. Prac. & Process 7, 9 (1999) (“The more paper you throw at us, the meaner we get, the more irritated and hostile we feel about verbosity, peripheral arguments and long footnotes.”)

[8] “As for governing authority, if the point you are making is relevant to your reasoning but is neither controversial nor likely to be controverted, a single citation (the more recent the better) will suffice. Anything more is just showing off to an unappreciative audience.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Making Your Case: The Art of Persuading Judges 126 (2008).

 

Michael Blasie graduated from the New York University School of Law. He began his career as a commercial litigator and criminal defense attorney in the New York City office of Cooley LLP where he practiced in state and federal trial and appellate courts. After five years he moved to Denver where he currently works as a law clerk to the Honorable David J. Richman of the Colorado Court of Appeals. Michael also serves as a volunteer firefighter for the City of Golden.

The Lawless Landscape of Legal Writing

Editor’s Note: CBA-CLE Legal Connection is pleased to present a new series of legal writing columns authored by Michael Blasie. Michael Blasie began his career as a commercial litigator for Cooley LLP in New York City. He recently moved to Denver, where he is a Law Clerk to Hon. David Richman of the Colorado Court of Appeals. Welcome, Michael!

Think. That’s the key. Good legal writing is not about following rules. Good legal writing is good judgment.[1] Test and improve your judgment with these two guidelines.

Have A Good Reason For Everything You Write

Many attorneys stop thinking about legal writing after a few years of practice. They form habits. They think they know what certain briefs should look like. They stop choosing and begin defaulting.[2] This is a problem.

Although you might not “always” or “never” write a brief a certain way, you should always have a good reason why you wrote a brief a certain way. Why did you write it this way instead of that way?

The reason may be responsive; e.g., at a recent CLE the judges of this court said they find it helpful when briefs do [x]. Or it may be pragmatic; e.g., the court’s rules require [y]. Or perhaps the reason comes from judgment; e.g., this citation warrants a fuller multi-sentence explanation rather than a parenthetical because [z]. All fine. Just have a reason, and make it a good one.

“Because that is how it is done” or “Because that is how [name of other attorney/institution] does it” are not good reasons. Here’s why.

Consider this standard introduction to a brief:

Defendants Profitable, Corp. (“Profitable”) and Not Me, Inc. (“Not Me”), (collectively “Defendants”), respectfully submit this brief in opposition to the motion filed by plaintiffs Harmed Corp. (“Harmed”) and XYZ, Inc. (“XYZ”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”), pursuant to C.R.C.P. 59(e), to amend the judgment filed herein on January 1, 2017 (“Judgment”).

I see this introduction in almost every brief. Why does it exist? You might say it identifies who wrote the document, what the document is, and what relief the authors’ seek. But I don’t think that is why people include it. That reasoning is engineered after-the-fact. Instead people probably write this paragraph because they always have. They saw it in every template they received as a young attorney and they have seen it in most briefs since. So we all do it, for no reason.

Reexamine this introduction in its full context:

 

County Court, Denver County, Colorado
1437 Bannock Street, Room 100
Denver, Colorado 80202, 720-865-7840
____________________________________________________________
Plaintiffs: HARMED CORP. and XYZ, INC.,

v.

Defendants: PROFITABLE, CORP. and NOT ME, INC.
____________________________________________________________

Charisma Genius, Esq.
All We Do Is Win, LLP
123 Main Street
Denver, CO 80204
____________________________________________________________

DEFENDANTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ C.R.C.P. 59(e) MOTION TO AMEND THE JUDGMENT

____________________________________________________________

Defendants Profitable, Corp. (“Profitable”) and Not Me, Inc. (“Not Me”), (collectively “Defendants”), respectfully submit this brief in opposition to the motion filed by plaintiffs Harmed Corp. (“Harmed”) and XYZ, Inc. (“XYZ”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”), pursuant to C.R.C.P. 59(e), to amend the judgment filed herein on January 1, 2017 (“Judgment”).

 

Recall the purported purposes of the paragraph: to identify who wrote the document, what the document is, and what relief the authors’ seek. I’ll accept it does that. Now explain why we have captions.

The same reasons.

This introduction is wholly redundant with the caption. I know who the authors are, what the document is, and the relief sought because it is in giant capital letters one inch above the introduction.[3]

Approach this introduction from a different angle. If you cut this paragraph what would happen? For starters, most readers would not notice because they reflexively glance over the paragraph anyway. It certainly would not confuse your readers. After all, you have never read an opinion that started with “This is an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts in the case of Smith v. Jones.” Level of confusion: zero. But cutting the paragraph would reduce your word count and provide a chance to hook your audience.

Although this introduction does not hurt your brief, it fails to strengthen it. It blows the opening. Liken it to comedians who open with “How is everyone doing tonight?” Wasted words, wasted time, wasted opportunity. You could have hooked your audience and you didn’t.

True, this introduction could be helpful in some cases. For example, if you represent a third party intervener, this opening could introduce the party and explain its relationship to the case. Or perhaps you use it to avoid confusion when several motions have been filed with similar titles. Use this introduction when you have a good reason.[4]

Lastly, a few stylistic points. Many attorneys compulsively define terms with quoted phrases inside parentheticals. Stop. Unless you have a good reason. Here, there is no need to define all the defendants in the case as “collectively ‘Defendants.’” Obviously the term “Defendants” refers to all the defendants in the case. Such a definition might be useful if you are referring to some, but not all, of the defendants (e.g. “the Colorado Defendants”). Similarly, you can shorten party names (“Not Me” and “XYZ”) throughout the brief without “defining” them and without any risk of confusion. Likewise, if there is only one judgment, then “Judgment” refers to it. This habit is one we think helps readers, but often causes more harm than good. [5] It is a tool that works sometimes. Use it when you have a good reason. Don’t when you don’t. Good writing is good judgment.[6]

Tie Your Reason to How You Will Persuade Your Audience

A good reason is not enough because not all good reasons persuade. You must tie that reason to how it persuades your audience.

For example, legal writing guru Bryan Garner advocates putting citations in footnotes. Garner cites benefits like increasing readability, exposing poor writing, and enhancing the main text discussion of authority.[7] These are good reasons.

But do not neglect your audience. Few judges sanction this practice. Most judges despise footnotes, or at least view them skeptically. Reading a brief with dozens of footnotes will certainly breach expectations and could cause intense frustration.

Suppose you are appealing a criminal conviction. In a lengthy but carefully compelling narrative you weave together the defendant’s unique circumstances, understandable actions, and unfair treatment during the case. Then you a raise a single issue about whether the trial court erred by denying a challenge to a juror who had difficulty understanding voir dire questions and difficulty communicating. Your compelling narrative may elicit sympathy and reflect a mastery of storytelling, but your reader will likely see it as wholly divorced from the legal issue. And a judge may view it as an appeal to emotion without arguing the applicable law.

Finally, most legal writing advice assumes a single audience—the court. But practitioners often have multiple audiences, like senior attorneys and clients. Consider all of these audiences when choosing a writing strategy.

 


[1] See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Making Your Case: The Art of Persuading Judges 59 (2008) (“But whenever you are convinced that departing from any of our recommendations, or from any convention, will make the court’s job easier, depart.”)

[2] See Robert M. Russel, Rhetoric for Appellateers 19 (Handout, March 2015).

[3] See id. at 92 (“Whatever you do, don’t allow this section [the introduction] to duplicate what is written elsewhere. Repetition bores, and boredom invites skimming.”)

[4] For ideas on other ways to start a brief, see Stephen Armstrong & Timothy Terrell, Thinking Like a Writer: A Lawyer’s Guide to Effective Writing and Editing 149-73 (Practicing Law Institute 3d ed. 2008); Ross Guberman, Point Made: How to Write like the Nation’s Top Advocates 3-11 (2d ed. 2014); Ross Guberman, Point Taken: How to Write Like the World’s Best Judges 3-39 (2015) (discussing introductions to opinions).

[5]“There also are lawyers who are singularly devoted to what I call double-identification. They love unnecessary parentheses; and the more unnecessary the better – even if the only sure result is the reader’s total loss of interest in what’s being said.” Judge William Eich, Writing The Persuasive Brief, Wisconsin Lawyer (Feb. 2003), available at www.wisbar.org/newspublications/wisconsinlawyer/pages/article.aspx?Volume=76&Issue=2&ArticleID=614.

[6] For advice about how to reference parties and when to define terms, see Bryan A. Garner, Legal Writing In Plain English 57-62 (2d ed. 2013); Alex Kozinski, The Wrong Stuff, 1992 BYU L. Review 325, 328 (1992); Guberman, Point Made, supra n. 4 at 288-89; Scalia & Garner, supra n. 1 at 120-22.

[7] Scalia &. Garner, supra n. 1 at 132-33.

 

Michael Blasie graduated from the New York University School of Law. He began his career as a commercial litigator and criminal defense attorney in the New York City office of Cooley LLP where he practiced in state and federal trial and appellate courts. After five years he moved to Denver where he currently works as a law clerk to the Honorable David J. Richman of the Colorado Court of Appeals. Michael also serves as a volunteer firefighter for the City of Golden.

The Addicted Lawyer: Is Alcoholics Anonymous For You?

Editor’s Note: This article originally appeared on Above the Law on October 14, 2016. Reprinted with permission.

If you or someone you know is struggling with addiction, please get help. The Colorado Lawyer Assistance Program provides confidential assistance — call (303) 986-3345 or visit coloradolap.org

briancuban-e1473974781722By Brian Cuban, Esq.

April 2007. I walk up to the door of the building where area Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings are held. My family is pushing hard for in-patient treatment but I refuse. My psychiatrist feels that a trip here is the first step to long-term sobriety. Lucky for me, the building is right next to his office. If it hadn’t been convenient, I might have just made excuses to not go at all. For an addict, excuses are often more plentiful than reasons for recovery. The present is more important than the future — the present of the high.

After pacing around outside the doorway for a long time, I finally peer down the long hallway into the room where people are gathering. I’m afraid of being recognized. My ego is still paramount in my worries. “I’m a lawyer. There are no lawyers in in AA or treatment. My one client left needs me!”

My mind flashes back to one of my favorite childhood movies, Willy Wonka & the Chocolate Factory. I suddenly imagine that as soon as I enter the meeting room, I’ll be carried away by a team of chanting Oompa Loompas determined to punish me for my bad habits. I have no desire to meet the Oompa Loompas on the other side of that door.

I finally walk down the hall into the meeting room, and I can smell the fumes of stale cigarette smoke and day-old coffee. My eyes lock onto the 1950s tile floor, ingrained with the dirt of countless feet. There are other people milling around in room. Are these the people with whom I was supposed to share my darkest secrets? Would I be made fun of, teased, or insulted? Who are these people? Skid row bums? That’s my perception of AA. I think of Nick Cage’s character, Ben, living in the sleazy “no-tell motel” as he drinks himself to death in Leaving Las Vegas. Dick Van Dyke’s character, Charlie, drunk, alone on the beach with no future in The Morning After.

Deep breath. Don’t look around. Eyes down at the floor. That fixed point. Watch the feet move forward. One baby step at a time to a waiting chair. It’s the way I’m able to accomplish things in life. It’s how I was able to finish eight marathons. Facing any difficult task, my best self is that part of me that can place one foot in front of the other until a goal is accomplished. Don’t look left. Don’t look right. Don’t think about the finish line. I sit down. I listen. I cry. At the end of the meeting, I take a desire chip. The most important journey in my life begins.

As you have probably figured out, I got sober in Alcoholics Anonymous. I know I am irritating some who believe we should not talk publicly about being in AA. I believe we should be empowered to share all aspects of our personal journey if we choose to. I find it perplexing that we as attorneys in recovery, who spend our lives engaged in critical thought and using data, will exclude AA from that process as if there is some magical healing power to not discussing both its benefits and flaws when there is no empirical data to support the notion that talking publicly about being in AA, then relapsing publicly, will cause someone to not enter the program.

Certain aspects of AA have worked for me to date. I completely disregard other aspects. The sober connections I found in group were, and are, important to me. The people. The stories that tell me I am not alone. I, however, have never been as keen on the spiritual aspects and certain rituals of the program. That’s just me. You may like that. You may need that. Those issues however, have never been a deterrent to me in my program like they are for some who reject AA as their mode of recovery.

In speaking to law students and other lawyers about recovery, while some embrace the program, some would rather find others ways to long-term sobriety and have. Through their church. Through non-12-step-based programs such as Smart Recovery. Through both 12-step-based and non-12-step-based residential treatment. Through collegiate recovery programs. Through informal local attorney support groups. I know a few lawyers who have gotten sober on their own, although I would never recommend that path to start. There are many paths to recovery available today that were not available in 1935 when AA was founded.  AA has also not been my only mode of therapy. I have been seeing a psychiatrist for over a decade. I take anti-depressant medication daily. Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) have been important in my recovery. Let’s not lose sight of the goal: To be a person in long-term recovery regardless of the path chosen. The most important decision of your life should be one of reflection and critical thought. It’s your journey. If it’s AA, that’s great. If it’s another path, get on it. Recovery awaits.

  1. http://www.americanbar.org/groups/lawyer_assistance.html
  2. http://collegiaterecovery.org/programs/
  3. http://www.aa.org/
  4. http://www.smartrecovery.org/
  5. http://www.celebraterecovery.com/

 

Brian Cuban (@bcuban) is The Addicted Lawyer. A graduate of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, he somehow made it through as an alcoholic then added cocaine to his résumé as a practicing attorney. He went into recovery April 8, 2007. He left the practice of law and now writes and speaks on recovery topics, not only for the legal profession, but on recovery in general. He can be reached at brian@addictedlawyer.com.

The opinions and views expressed by Featured Bloggers on CBA-CLE Legal Connection do not necessarily represent the opinions and views of the Colorado Bar Association, the Denver Bar Association, or CBA-CLE, and should not be construed as such.

The Addicted Lawyer: Silence is Deadly

Editor’s Note: This article originally appeared on Above the Law on September 16, 2016. Reprinted with permission.

September is Suicide Awareness Month. If you or someone you know is struggling with addiction or suicidal thoughts, please get help. The Colorado Lawyer Assistance Program provides confidential assistance — call (303) 986-3345 or visit coloradolap.org

briancuban-e1473974781722By Brian Cuban, Esq.

July 2005. A dark room. Table, desk, chairs. I’m with a staff psychiatrist of the Green Oaks Psychiatric Facility in Dallas, Texas. My brothers, Mark and Jeff, are sitting at the table across from me. I have a vague recollection of my younger brother rousing me from my bed. My .45 automatic lying on my nightstand.

The residuals of cocaine, Xanax, and Jack Daniels are still coursing through my veins. Questions from the attending psychiatrist pierce my fog and anger like tracer rounds. “What drugs have you taken? How are you feeling? Do you want to hurt yourself?”

In the back of my mind, what’s left of the lawyer takes over. I know that my family can’t commit me, but he can. Proceed with caution. I don’t mention that I had been “practicing” sticking the barrel of the gun in my mouth and dry-firing the gun.

Ripped back to reality. Voices in the room. The doctor is talking to me again. When was the last time I used cocaine? I’m pretty sure it has been recently, since it was all over the room when my brothers showed up. I had become the consummate liar in hiding the obvious cocaine habit and drinking problem from my family.

More questions. Do I think I need help? Will I go to rehab? Sure, whatever will get me out of here? I lash out again. They have no right to do this. I yell across the table. “You have no right to control my life! I am an adult! Mind your own business!” They quietly let me rant.

Blaming them for the darkness is so much easier than seeing the light. The doctor is asking calm, focused questions, to ascertain whether I am a danger to myself. At times I am calm in my answers. At times I am crying, angry at him, then at my brothers. Quit asking the same questions! I know your game! Quit treating me like an idiot!

An hour has passed. The room is getting brighter. The love and calm of my brothers soothes me. Quiets me, softens my edges. It’s always been there, but I wasn’t present enough to sense it. I was thinking only of myself: My next high. My next drink. Without the drugs, what am I going to see in the mirror each morning? The thought terrifies me. My brothers calm me, and I begin to focus on my love for my family. Arms are around me. Holding me. I begin to feel the love penetrating my shell. They are not the enemy. Should I go to rehab? What about twelve-step? I’m still on the defensive, but at least for the moment I can listen. Have to grab those moments. They don’t come often.

Sitting in that room during my first of two trips to a psychiatric facility seems so long ago. Today I am closing in on ten years of long-term recovery from addiction. I still deal with clinical depression and take medication daily. I see a psychiatrist weekly. I am also a lawyer. I am part of profession with an alarmingly high suicide rate. An alarmingly high rate of substance use, particularly alcohol. I’ve been there. I get it. I also talk to many in the profession weekly who are currently struggling. Some have contemplated suicide. I ask them what they are afraid of. What’s holding them back from taking that first step forward towards the light. It’s almost always about loss. Loss of license. Loss of job. Loss of family. Interestingly however, the fear of loss is generally attached to disclosure of the problem and not the possible consequences of the problem itself. That is what we know as the “stigma of addiction.” A problem that cuts across demographics but is particularly powerful in the legal profession. We are strong. We are hard chargers. We are “thinkers” who can problem solve our way out of any situation without disclosure. We are not vulnerable.

I am here to tell you that that emotional vulnerability is a good thing in taking that first step to get help. Reaching out is not weakness, it’s courage. Asking questions as a friend or family member is not intrusive, it’s compassionate.

September is Suicide Prevention and Awareness Month. Be vulnerable. Be compassionate. Ask questions. Provide resources. Learn what your state Lawyers Assistance Program (LAP) has to offer. Learn what your local bar association has to offer.  Above all, talk! Talking is healing. Silence can be deadly.

 

Brian Cuban (@bcuban) is The Addicted Lawyer. A graduate of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, he somehow made it through as an alcoholic then added cocaine to his résumé as a practicing attorney. He went into recovery April 8, 2007. He left the practice of law and now writes and speaks on recovery topics, not only for the legal profession, but on recovery in general. He can be reached at brian@addictedlawyer.com.

The opinions and views expressed by Featured Bloggers on CBA-CLE Legal Connection do not necessarily represent the opinions and views of the Colorado Bar Association, the Denver Bar Association, or CBA-CLE, and should not be construed as such.

Social Media Abuse of Elders

Editor’s Note: This post originally appeared on Barbara Cashman’s Denver Elder Law Blog on August 10, 2016. Reprinted with permission.

CashmanBy Barbara Cashman, Esq.

I recently came across this horrifying article published Monday in ProPublica, entitled “Federal Health Officials Seek to Stop Social Media Abuse of Nursing Home Residents.” It seems that some staff members of nursing homes are publishing photos, audio and video recordings of some residents in the social media like Snapchat, Facebook or Instagram, or sent in text messages as multimedia attachments. These pictures, audio, and video files often depict elder residents of the facilities in demeaning and humiliating ways so as to result in mental abuse. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services has recently sent out a memorandum concerning this to the State Survey Directors.

Do the skilled nursing facilities have prohibitions against such intrusions in place? Some evidently did not, but there can be little doubt that nearly all will have such protections in place soon in light of these disturbing developments. Here’s an article about such violations in Ohio nursing facilities.

The CMS memo referred to above defines mental abuse as that abuse which:

[M]ay occur through either verbal or nonverbal conduct which causes or has the potential to cause the resident to experience humiliation, intimidation, fear, shame, agitation or degradation.  Examples of verbal or nonverbal conduct that can cause mental abuse include but are not limited to: nursing home staff taking photographs or recordings or residents that are demeaning or humiliating using any type of equipment (e.g., cameras, smart phone, and other electronic devices) and keeping or distributing them through multimedia messages or on social media networks.  Depending on what was photographed or recorded, physical and/or sexual abuse may also be identified.

ProPublica has been following this following these developments for many months; this article from December 21, 2015 details some of the incidents this mental and physical abuse of incapacitated elders perpetrate by the nursing home staff members. In a case in New York where a nurse aide took photos of an incontinent resident’s genitals covered in fecal matter and shared them with another staff member on Snapchat, he was fired and pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor count of willful violation of health laws. What I found particularly disturbing was the comment of one home’s administrator to ProPublica that “[t]echnology is a problem for us, for everybody, these days… The resident involved was not harmed but certainly it was a serious incident.” Are incapacitated nursing home residents not entitled to any human dignity and to be free from such exploitation for someone’s entertainment?

One of the incidents described by ProPublica is from August 2015. It occurred in a rural area of Colorado and involved a youth volunteer at a nursing home who took a selfie which showed a 108-year-old resident urinating. The volunteer apparently shared the photo with her friends at school and the facility did not learn of the offending photo until months later. The volunteer was not monitored by the facility but did report to the local police, and was later charged with invasion of privacy.

What is human dignity when it cannot be defended by an incapacitated elder? What is human dignity when it is not readily apparent or recognized in places where people are institutionalized for the paramount concern of their safety?

Dignity, as in the legal right, is not easily defined. In fact, you would be hard pressed to find many references to it in our laws. International law, specifically the international law of human rights, has much more to say about human dignity, but that is another blog post!

I will close with just a couple observations and questions.

If humiliation is the opposite of being treated dignity and respect, is our system of laws really equipped to deal with this type of new frontier of the rights of incapacitated persons to be free from intrusions by others who humiliate them for sport or humor?

Is the dignity of or respect for elders a right in this context or is it overshadowed by our concerns for safety, and how does an incapacitated elder’s diminishing bailiwick of autonomy factor into this equation?

On this note, here is a link to an interesting article about the dignity of elders. More to come on this very challenging topic.

© 2016 Barbara Cashman  www.DenverElderLaw.org

 

Barbara Cashman is a solo practitioner in Denver, focusing on elder law, estate law, and mediation. She is active in the Trust & Estate and Elder Law sections of the CBA and is a past chair of the Solo/Small Firm section. She is a CAMP mentor and blogs weekly on her law firm blog, where this post originally appeared. She can be contacted at barb@DenverElderLaw.org.

The opinions and views expressed by Featured Bloggers on CBA-CLE Legal Connection do not necessarily represent the opinions and views of the Colorado Bar Association, the Denver Bar Association, or CBA-CLE, and should not be construed as such.

Let’s Raise Awareness About Elder Abuse!

Editor’s Note: This post originally appeared on Barbara Cashman’s Denver Elder Law blog on June 29, 2016. Reprinted with permission.

CashmanI wanted to circle back on the importance of raising awareness of elder abuse. You can read the Presidential Proclamation on June 15, 2016, for World Elder Abuse Awareness Day right here and if you’re curious about the language of the Elder Justice Act, passed as part of the Affordable Care Act (as Title VI subtitle H, §§ 6701, et seq.), read this link.

In Colorado, as in nearly all other states, adult protection units are responsible for the reporting and investigation of elder abuse (along with law enforcement agencies). The Elder Justice Act is federal legislation that requires the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services “to oversee the development and management of federal resources for protecting out seniors from elder abuse.” Additionally, the U.S. Department of Justice is charged with taking action to prevent elder abuse.

The effective coordination of these county, state, and federal efforts is of course a work in progress. What we do know about raising awareness of elder abuse and exploitation is that it will lead to more reporting of such abuse. Here is a link to a recent article in the Sacramento Bee which links the raised awareness of such abuse to a dramatic increase in reports to local law enforcement. This is important to bear in mind as the baby boomers begin to become a greater proportion of the cohort affected by elder abuse and exploitation. In my practice, I have unfortunately become familiar with national and international internet scams which relieve elders of their hard-earned retirement money. This is a particular area in which the federal government might play a unique role as so much of our law of the internet is based in federal law.

Another tragic side effect of the victimization of elders, besides the shame, victimization and impoverishment which results from financial exploitation is that these elders, along with elder victims of all types of elder abuse — including physical and sexual abuse — are likely to die much sooner than their peers who were not victimized. But many pieces of this puzzle remain unidentified due to the lack of long term studies which collect valuable statistics about elder abuse of various types! This is of course another aspect of the importance of raising awareness. Because so much of elder abuse still remains unreported, this is a major quality of life challenge not just for elders and their loved ones and community, but also for those of us of “a certain age” who might be looking forward to a safe and meaningful elderhood. How can we make things better for elders at risk now and in the future?

What is elder abuse and who are its primary victims of such elder abuse? By the numbers, they are largely women and the “old” of the elder population — meaning folks over 80. Sadly, the vast majority of the abusers are family members of the elder or trusted friends or advisors. Because most elders live in the community — not in institutions — this is a particular challenge for all of us who are community members to become familiar with the signs so that we can report concerns about safety, suspicious behaviors and the like to local law enforcement.

First — what are the kinds of elder abuse that we’re talking about? Here is a helpful listing from the U.S. government’s Administration on Aging website, which also has many helpful resources:

  • Physical Abuse—inflicting physical pain or injury on a senior, e.g., slapping, bruising, or restraining by physical or chemical means.
  • Sexual Abuse—non-consensual sexual contact of any kind.
  • Neglect—the failure by those responsible to provide food, shelter, health care, or protection for a vulnerable elder.
  • Exploitation—the illegal taking, misuse, or concealment of funds, property, or assets of a senior for someone else’s benefit.
  • Emotional Abuse—inflicting mental pain, anguish, or distress on an elder person through verbal or nonverbal acts, e.g., humiliating, intimidating, or threatening.
  • Abandonment—desertion of a vulnerable elder by anyone who has assumed the responsibility for care or custody of that person.
  • Self-neglect—characterized as the failure of a person to perform essential, self-care tasks and that such failure threatens his or her own health or safety.

And what about the warning signs of elder abuse of which we can be more aware?

  • Bruises, pressure marks, broken bones, abrasions, and burns may be an indication of physical abuse, neglect, or mistreatment.
  • Unexplained withdrawal from normal activities, a sudden change in alertness, and unusual depression may be indicators of emotional abuse.
  • Bruises around the breasts or genital area can occur from sexual abuse.
  • Sudden changes in financial situations may be the result of exploitation.
  • Bedsores, unattended medical needs, poor hygiene, and unusual weight loss are indicators of possible neglect.
  • Behavior such as belittling, threats, and other uses of power and control by spouses are indicators of verbal or emotional abuse.
  • Strained or tense relationships, frequent arguments between the caregiver and elderly person are also signs.
  • Changes in the elder’s personality or behavior, especially if the elder becomes withdrawn or despondent, questions to her or him can be very important in identifying a situation which may be the cause of the elder’s silent suffering.

Lastly, here is another helpful self-help resource specifically for Colorado residents – from Colorado Legal Services.  That’s all for now – but don’t forget . . . . Denver’s Senior law Day is coming up on Friday July 29, 2016 and will be held at the Denver Police Protective Association’s Event Center.  More details later.

© Barbara E. Cashman 2016   www.DenverElderLaw.org

Barbara Cashman is a solo practitioner in Denver, focusing on elder law, estate law, and mediation. She is active in the Trust & Estate and Elder Law sections of the CBA and is a past chair of the Solo/Small Firm section. She is a CAMP mentor and blogs weekly on her law firm blog, where this post originally appeared. She can be contacted at barb@DenverElderLaw.org.

The opinions and views expressed by Featured Bloggers on CBA-CLE Legal Connection do not necessarily represent the opinions and views of the Colorado Bar Association, the Denver Bar Association, or CBA-CLE, and should not be construed as such.

Bad Faith? Marijuana Inventory Is Insurable (For Now)

Editor’s Note: This post originally appeared on Above the Law on Monday, February 29, 2016. Reprinted with permission.

Hilary-BrickenBy Hilary Bricken

I recently chaired a webinar about marijuana and insurance issues, and I have already been roped into doing another one. I am well aware of how cannabis and insurance are a legally charged combination, and I expect to see an increase of cannabis insurance cases very soon. A federal court in Colorado just came down with an important cannabis insurance ruling in the case of Green Earth Wellness Center, LLC v. Atain Speciality Insurance CompanyThe case involves a cannabis company that sued its insurance company for failing to pay on claims and for bad faith. It’s important to note that I’m not talking about a cannabis company seeking coverage on a general liability insurance policy for something like a slip-and-fall or for damage to grow lights. To the contrary, this case is a big deal because Colorado Federal District Court Chief Judge Marcia S. Krieger ruled on a summary judgment motion that the actual inventory itself (i.e., the cannabis) is insurable under a general liability insurance policy.

Green Earth, which operates a medical marijuana dispensary as well as a commercial cultivation facility, obtained a general liability insurance policy from Atain in 2012. A few days before securing that policy, “smoke and ash from [a nearby wild fire] overwhelmed [Green Earth’s] ventilation system, eventually intruding into the growing operation and causing damage to Green Earth’s marijuana plants.” Green Earth made a claim under its Atain policy for damage done to its plants. Atain then investigated the claim for several months, and denied the claim in July 2013. Also in July 0f 2013, Green Earth’s grow facility was robbed, and Green Earth filed another claim with Atain for the damage done to its facility by the burglars. Atain again denied the claim, determining that the damage done to the grow facility did not exceed the applicable deductible. On December 20, 2013, Green Earth commenced its lawsuit against Atain, asserting the following three claims:

(i) breach of contract for Atain’s failure to pay the claims Green Earth made under the insurance policy;

(ii) a bad faith breach of insurance contract claim under C.R.S. § 10-3- 1104(h)(VII); and

(iii) a claim for unreasonable delay in payment under C.R.S. § 10-3-1115.

Atain argued that it should be exempt from paying Green Earth’s claims because of a provision in the insurance contract excluding coverage for “[c]ontraband, or property in the course of illegal transportation or trade.” Atain also argued that “public policy requires that coverage be denied, even if the Policy would otherwise provide it.” In turn, Atain asked the Court to resolve two questions:

(i) Whether, in light of [Colorado’s Medical Marijuana Act], federal law, and federal public Policy, it is legal for Atain to pay for damages to marijuana plants and products, and if so, whether the Court can order Atain to pay for these damages; and

(ii) “Whether, in light of [those same authorities], the Policy’s Contraband Exclusion removes Green Earth’s marijuana plants and marijuana material from the Policy’s coverage.”

Atain argued that the answer to its first question is “no” and the answer to its second question is “yes.”

The first important point of the Court’s ruling is what law it applied to the insurance contract. That contract mandates that disputes “will be governed by the law of the state in which the suit is brought.” So, the Court applied state law — as opposed to federal law — which is huge as this meant that the Court did not throw out the policy altogether on the basis of its apparent illegality under federal law.

The Court then held that because the insurance policy failed to define “contraband,” and Atain failed to prove Green Earth violated Colorado’s marijuana laws, and because the federal government has been giving mixed signals about federal marijuana enforcement, the “policy’s “Contraband” exclusion is ambiguous. The Court then looked to the “intention” of the parties regarding coverage for finished inventory and harvested plants and found nothing in the factual record showing that Atain sought to specifically exclude such coverage. In fact, the Court found that Atain knew Green Earth was a cannabis business and yet it issued its insurance policy to Green Earth regardless of federal laws, without making any unequivocal exemption, even under the “Contraband” provision, for finished inventory or harvested plants.

Atain then sought to invoke the federal Controlled Substances Act to argue that its own insurance policy was technically an illegal contract. The Court’s response to Atain’s illegality argument was that “Atain, having entered into the Policy of its own will, knowingly and intelligently, is obligated to comply with its terms or pay damages for having breached it.”

This ruling is a big step forward for the enforceability of marijuana-related contracts and another nail in the coffin for the “illegal cannabis contract” theory. This ruling also highlights the paramount importance of the choice of law, jurisdiction, and venue provisions in a marijuana contract.

Hilary Bricken is an attorney at Harris Moure, PLLC in Seattle and she chairs the firm’s Canna Law Group. Her practice consists of representing marijuana businesses of all sizes in multiple states on matters relating to licensing, corporate formation and contracts, commercial litigation, and intellectual property. Named one of the 100 most influential people in the cannabis industry in 2014, Hilary is also lead editor of theCanna Law Blog. You can reach her by email at hilary@harrismoure.com.

The opinions and views expressed by Featured Bloggers on Colorado CLE Legal Connection do not necessarily represent the opinions and views of the Colorado Bar Association, the Denver Bar Association, or Colorado CLE, and should not be construed as such.

Jeena Cho: What to Do When Everything Sucks

Editor’s Note: This post originally appeared on Above the Law on September 28, 2015. Reprinted with permission.

Jeena_ChoBy Jeena Cho

Most of us have experienced moments where everything just sucks. This can range from minor irritations such as standing behind the a**hole with 32 items in the express checkout line at the grocery store when the sign clearly says 12 item maximum, to major heartbreaks such as a loved one dying.

There’s a whole body of research that shows happiness or satisfaction with life has very little to do with external events and everything to do with how we interpret or perceive an event.

Shawn Achor, one of my favorite Harvard researchers and authors, said in his TED talk:

[I]f I know everything about your external world, I can only predict 10% of your long-term happiness. 90 percent of your long-term happiness is predicted not by the external world, but by the way your brain processes the world.And if we change it, if we change our formula for happiness and success, we can change the way that we can then affect reality. What we found is that only 25% of job successes are predicted by IQ, 75 percent of job successes are predicted by your optimism levels, your social support and your ability to see stress as a challenge instead of as a threat.

Which brings me to what to do when life just feels sucky. I often work with lawyers who are really unhappy with their jobs. Many of them are Biglaw lawyers trying to find some semblance of balance or find meaning in their work. One attorney I worked with had a crazy managing partner who had a tendency to scream, throw things, and slam the door to his office so hard that frames fell off the wall. Understandably, working for a mentally unstable person like this can make every moment of the workday feel like hell.

Yet, the research shows that much of her misery isn’t caused by the horrible managing partner but rather her reaction to his behavior. When we really examined the situation, it turns out, she had minimal contact with this managing partner — a couple of hours or less per week. Yet, she spent an inordinate amount of time fearing and thinking about this person and what he might do next. Obviously, she can’t control his behavior, but shecan limit how much airtime he got in her own head.

Additionally, when we carefully examined each interaction she had with this partner, not all interactions were negative. He didn’t always throw things, he didn’t always yell. However, because humans are hardwired toward a negativity bias and use cognitive shortcuts, she simply labeled him as the-most-horrible-human-being.

The way we interpret and frame a situation makes a huge difference in the way we experience it. For example, last week, I had an early morning networking meeting with another attorney. I got up extra early and spent well over an hour driving 20 miles in rush hour traffic. As I parked the car, I dropped him an email to let him know I was running few minutes late. He responded and said, “Sorry, I thought my secretary contacted you. I had a work emergency. I can’t make it this morning.” Needless to say, I was not very happy. I could notice my body and mind fill with irritation, frustration, and anger. My mind also started making up stories about the situation — he clearly doesn’t respect me or my time, he’s totally irresponsible, and so forth.

In mindfulness practice, we are taught to accept each moment, as is, without preference and judgment. In that moment, as I noticed all these negative emotions, narratives, and reactions bubble up to the surface, I was able to remind myself that I have absolute control over how I am going to feel about this situation. I can either allow the anger and frustration to take over or I can change my perception.

As I walked into Yerba Buena Gardens, a beautiful park in the heart of San Francisco, I practiced being in the moment. I looked up at the clear blue sky and took in the view of the park. I also noticed groups of tourists stopping to take pictures and realized how fortunate I was to call this place home. I also saw the many homeless people sleeping on the grass and thought but for the grace of God, I could be in their shoes.

I noticed my mind’s preference that I’d rather be at home, enjoying the extra hour of sleep, but also realized that’s like crying over spilled milk. I was awake; I was already here. I also noticed my mind’s judgment around this person’s behavior but also recognized how I, too, have been guilty of mismanaging my calendar or having unavoidable scheduling conflicts.

I found a park bench and sat in the sun (which is rare in San Francisco) and simply took in the beauty of this city. I was grateful for having this unexpected hour of free time. Then I noticed a hummingbird flying above my head, going from one flower to another. I sat there in the park enjoying the sounds of the birds chirping, listening to the sounds of the water fountain, and noticing the energy change as the city started waking up. The hummingbird, as if noticing my mood, stopped right in front of my face, just a few feet away, hovering. It felt as though I was being embraced by life.

So, my invitation to you, my dear reader is this: remember that the ability to find happiness in each moment lies within you. Instead of looking at all the ways in which the moment isn’t perfect, ask yourself — what am I grateful for?

Finally, I’ll leave you with words of wisdom from Rumi:

Be empty of worrying.
Think of who created thought!

Why do you stay in prison
When the door is so wide open?

Jeena Cho is co-founder of JC Law Group PC, a bankruptcy law firm in San Francisco, CA. She is also the author of the upcoming American Bar Association book, The Anxious Lawyer: An 8-Week Guide to a Happier, Saner Law Practice Using Meditation (affiliate link), as well as How to Manage Your Law Office with LexisNexis. She offers training programs on using mindfulness and meditation to reduce stress while increasing focus and productivity. She’s the co-host of the Resilient Lawyer podcast. You can reach her at smile@theanxiouslawyer.com or on Twitter at @jeena_cho.

The opinions and views expressed by Featured Bloggers on CBA-CLE Legal Connection do not necessarily represent the opinions and views of the Colorado Bar Association, the Denver Bar Association, or CBA-CLE, and should not be construed as such.

The Colorado Lawyer: Suicide Prevention

LorenBrownEditor’s Note: This article originally appeared in the September 2015 issue of The Colorado Lawyer. Reprinted with permission.

By Loren M. Brown

World Suicide Prevention Day is observed every September 10 to promote global action to prevent suicide. Various events and activities are held to raise awareness that suicide—a major cause of premature death—is preventable.

Suicide and Lawyers

Lawyers are not immune to suicide. In fact, numerous recent studies about suicide make clear that lawyers experience depression and substance abuse at higher rates than the general population. As a result, lawyers are at a greater risk for suicide.

Suicide is a very difficult subject to talk about. This is even more the case in a profession where we are constantly on guard and attempting to maintain an air of strength with our clients, with opposing counsel, within our firms, and within the profession. However, now is the time to speak about this issue—and speak loudly. The fact that attorneys have one of the highest suicide rates among professionals can no longer be ignored.

Suicide touches us all, from line deputy district attorneys and public defenders to 17th Street corporate transactions attorneys to solo and small firm practitioners throughout the state. I have felt the impact of suicide in both my personal and professional life. As a child, I grew up with stories of relatives who found themselves in dark places they were unable to escape. In my practice, I have suffered the loss of clients, opposing counsel, and friends at their own hands.

Through all of these experiences, the question that continues to ring out is, “Why?”

Why would someone do this?
Why does it keep happening?
Why have we not done more to combat this within our profession?

There is no good reason to continue to ask this last question, but there is every reason to address it head-on now. It is time for us to take immediate steps toward preventing suicide from occurring within the profession.

Remove the Stigma

One of the first steps to addressing the problem is removing the stigma of suicide. This is a matter of perspective that can easily be overcome.

Following 9/11, there were many unnecessary funerals, brought on by the unnecessary tragedy. I was fortunate not to lose anyone close to me on that fateful Tuesday fourteen years ago. I suppose that is one of the benefits of being landlocked in Colorado and never venturing too far from home. Nonetheless, the events of that day shook me to the core. One horrific aspect of that tragedy that has continued to plague me was the images of people high up in the towers who were forced to step out into nothingness toward a certain fate, as opposed to waiting for a more horrible and fiery death. Searching for meaning in the face of those deaths brought no answers.

Months later, I heard (I think on NPR) the story of a eulogy for a person who had committed suicide, unconnected to 9/11. The eulogist discussed the stigma attached to suicide. He discussed the disbelief, shock, and anger of the family and friends left behind, the impolite rumors and whispers that follow the death, and the speculation and judgment about the reasons for the act.

He discussed the spiritual conflict felt by many survivors trying to mediate the feelings of loss of their loved one and bear the pain of a belief that the person must now suffer a form of eternal damnation as a result of the act. The eulogy compared death by suicide with death suffered by victims of 9/11—the former victim chose a known fate and the latter waited and suffered an unknown one. The eulogist went on to say that the person who had taken his own life was really no different from those who chose to jump out of the building rather than remain inside and burn. On 9/11, each person was in a horrified and desperate state, with the fire licking at their heels. Instead of staying to face the fire, they chose temporary freedom by stepping out into the air; yet, there is no stigma attached to those who jumped from the towers.

The eulogist concluded by saying that the death by suicide was no different. The person who had died was in the throes of intense personal struggles he felt he was unable to successfully battle, which forced him to the brink. The eulogist ended by stating, “God help me that I could not see the flames.”

There are fires licking at the heels of many of our colleagues. As members of the profession, it is our job to try harder to see the flames and to do all we can to help put them out. If we are to effectively fight and prevent suicide, we must adopt the perspective expressed in the eulogy above. It is often said that depression is not a sign of being weak, but a sign of having been strong for too long. We must take a stand together and commit ourselves to helping others be strong when they can no longer be strong on their own. We cannot let others be isolated. We need to be a resource to either provide them guidance or get them the help they need.

Know the Warning Signs

The warning signs for suicide range from seemingly subtle and common to open and obvious. It is important to know what they are. Here are many warning signs:

  • feeling hopeless
  • experiencing dramatic mood changes
  • feeling rage or uncontrolled anger or seeking revenge
  • acting reckless or engaging in risky activities—seemingly without thinking
  • feeling trapped—like there’s no way out
  • withdrawing from friends, family, and society
  • feeling anxious, agitated, or unable to sleep or sleeping all the time
  • increasing alcohol or drug use
  • seeing no reason for living or having no sense of purpose in life
  • threatening to hurt or kill oneself or talking about wanting to hurt or kill oneself
  • looking for ways to kill oneself by seeking access to firearms, available pills, or other means.

We should all be mindful of these warning signs, both in ourselves and in our colleagues.

Prevention

Prevention strategies do exist for suicide. The most effective strategy is to identify the warning signs of suicide and to take the signs seriously. Once these warning signs are identified, an individual struggling with depression and contemplating suicide should be encouraged to receive professional help. We also have to be willing to talk about suicide. We must increase professional and public awareness through dialogue and education to eliminate the stigma associated with suicide.

The National Suicide Prevention Helpline (www.suicidepreventionlifeline.org) recommends the following when someone is threatening suicide:

  • Be direct. Talk openly and matter-of-factly about suicide.
  • Be willing to listen. Allow expressions of feelings. Accept the feelings.
  • Be nonjudgmental. Don’t debate whether suicide is right or wrong, or whether feelings are good or bad. Don’t lecture on the value of life.
  • Get involved. Become available. Show interest and support.
  • Don’t dare the person to do it.
  • Don’t act shocked. This will put distance between you.
  • Don’t be sworn to secrecy. Seek support.
  • Offer hope that alternatives are available, but do not offer glib reassurance.
  • Take action. Remove means, such as guns or stockpiled pills.
  • Get help from individuals or agencies specializing in crisis intervention and suicide prevention.

Helpful Resources

If you believe a colleague may be at risk for suicide, encourage him or her to seek help. If you are facing these struggles yourself, it is important to know that you are not alone. There are people and resources available to help you during these difficult times.

A very good resource for lawyers is the Colorado Lawyer Assistance Program (COLAP). One of the most important aspects of COLAP is confidentiality. COLAP was established by Colorado Supreme Court Rule 254. Pursuant to Rule 254(6)(a), information and actions taken by COLAP are privileged and held in strictest confidence and will not be disclosed or required to be disclosed to any person or entity outside COLAP, unless disclosure is authorized by the member. COLAP will not release any information without a signed release. Therefore, when a person contacts COLAP (whether a person is calling for himself or herself or to express concern about a colleague), the interaction will remain confidential.

COLAP provides assistance for any career challenge that interferes with the ability to be a productive member of the legal community, including but not limited to: practice management, work/life integration, stress/anger management, anxiety, depression, substance use, and relationship issues. COLAP provides referrals for a variety of personal and professional issues, assistance with interventions, voluntary monitoring programs, supportive relationships with peer volunteers, and educational programs. More information on COLAP can be found at www.coloradolap.org.

Take a Minute to Help Others and Yourself

If you are an attorney reading this article and feel as though you need support regaining strength, I encourage you to reach out to a friend or to COLAP. If you are an attorney and begin to see the signs of someone facing or nearing this struggle, take the time to reach out to that person.

Take a minute to help yourself or someone else. Take a minute to ask for help. Take a minute to connect with an old friend. Take a minute to ask how others are doing. Take a minute to listen (and really care) about the response. It may take only a minute to save a life.

Loren M. Brown is a founding shareholder with Ciancio Ciancio Brown, P.C. His practice is focused 100% on litigation, providing representation along the Front Range, and throughout the State of Colorado. Loren focuses on Wrongful Death and Personal Injury, Criminal Defense (ranging from traffic violations to homicide), Liquor Licensing, and Commercial Litigation. Loren is also actively involved in the Colorado Bar Association. Currently, Loren serves as the President of the Colorado Bar Association focusing his term on young lawyer involvement in the bar association, access to justice, and improving the image of lawyers.

The opinions and views expressed by Featured Bloggers on CBA-CLE Legal Connection do not necessarily represent the opinions and views of the Colorado Bar Association, the Denver Bar Association, or CBA-CLE, and should not be construed as such.

New Pretrial Rules for Civil Cases—What Is Changed (Part 2 of 2)

Editor’s Note: This article originally appeared in the July 2015 issue of The Colorado Lawyer. This is the second half of the article; click here for the first half. Reprinted with permission.

DickHolmeBy Richard P. Holme

Rule 16.1—Simplified Procedure

Rule 16.1(f) and (h)—Case Management Orders and Certification of Compliance. The amendments to Rule 16.1 regarding simplified procedure are minimal, but provide another incentive to use that method of dealing with lawsuits under $100,000.[1] Sections 16.1(f) and (h) incorporate by reference some provisions from Rule 16. Because some of the incorporated provisions of Rule 16 have been renumbered, the corresponding provisions in Rule 16.1 have been renumbered to remain consistent. The significant change in Rule 16.1 is that the parties under Simplified Procedure do not have to prepare or file a proposed order or attend a case management conference unless they wish to. This exception was designed to maintain the simplified procedure with minimal paperwork for these smaller, less complicated cases.

Rule 26—General Provisions Governing
Discovery and Duty of Disclosure

The amendments to Rule 26 relating to discovery and disclosures are the most significant of all the new amendments. As described in “Part I: A New Paradigm,” these amendments are central to a nationwide effort to change the litigation culture from “discover all you want” to “discover only what you need.” They are intended to enforce the urgent need to make cases just, speedy, and inexpensive; to reopen genuine access to the judicial system for many parties that have been priced or delayed out of their ability to use or interest in using the courts to resolve disputes; and to reinvigorate confidence and trust in the courts and judges. As stated in the 2015 Comment to Rule 26, these amendments “allow discovery of what a party/lawyer needs to prove its case, but not what a party /lawyer wants to know about the subject of a case—the amendments “emphasize the application of the concept of proportionality to disclosure and discovery, with robust disclosure followed by limited discovery.” (Emphasis in original.)

These changes should persuade parties and counsel to sharpen their focus; to relinquish the idea that they must discover every conceivable fact that may have some remote relevance to their general dispute; to recognize that justice delayed is justice denied; and to acknowledge that unchecked expense is more frequently used as an unjust sword than a shield against injustice. The cultural change is not expected to be immediately popular with some trial lawyers, or clients with unlimited litigation budgets, but the change may help lawyers to become better trial lawyers when they learn they must focus their cases and use thoughtful cross-examination in place of discovery paper blizzards.

As detailed below, the amendments call for more precise early disclosures—of both the favorable and the harmful information. They redefine discoverable information to limit it to that which relates to the claims and defenses of the specific case and, more significant, require that discovery be proportional to the needs of the case at issue. At this initial disclosure stage, the information to be disclosed is that which is “then known and reasonably available to the party.” In complex cases with many possible witnesses and multitudes of documents, the limitation to those things “then known and readily available” should be reasonably applied, while recalling that this initial disclosure does not terminate the continuing requirement of disclosure. Disclosures must be supplemented under Rule 26(e) “when a party learns that the information is incomplete or incorrect,” unless complete and correct information has already been provided in discovery responses. However, nothing permits information subject to mandatory disclosure to be withheld while waiting to see whether the opposing party will request it in discovery.

Although subject to change by the court, considering proportionality, the amendments limit the numbers of expert witnesses, call for more comprehensive written expert disclosures, limit discovery of communications between counsel and their experts, and limit expert testimony to that which has been previously disclosed. The amendments reduce the normal deposition times from seven hours to six hours.

Rule 26(a)(1)—Disclosures

The Good, the Bad and the Ugly

The first visible change in this subsection is to make clear what should have been the standard for years. The opening sentence requires parties to make initial disclosures, without awaiting a discovery request, of four categories of information: identification of possible witnesses; production of certain documents; description of categories of damages, in addition to computations of economic damages; and production of potential insurance agreements. The clarification in this initial amendment is that the information is to be disclosed “whether or not supportive of the disclosing party’s claims or defenses.”

In 2000, the Federal Rules were amended to limit disclosure to information “a disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses.”[2] Colorado declined to adopt that limitation, thus requiring disclosure of all of the information listed in Rule 26(a)(1). One of the reasons for declining to adopt the federal limitation was the belief of the Civil Rules Committee that failure to produce adverse information would only cause delay while waiting for the opposing party to request such adverse information in its initial set of interrogatories and document requests. Thus, for example, in an employment discharge case, the employer must produce not only memos, notes, and e-mails criticizing the plaintiff–employee’s behavior, but also the memos, notes, and e-mails praising the employee’s performance.

Some lawyers complain that this clarification is contrary to their ethical obligation to represent their clients. However, lawyers must also recall that they act as “an officer of the legal system,”[3] and in that light, among other things, have professional responsibilities to bring or maintain meritorious claims,[4] to expedite litigation,[5] to be candid with the tribunal,[6] to be fair to opposing parties and counsel,[7] and to be truthful in statements to others.[8] The fact that any of these obligations may impinge on a client’s interests or desires does not weaken their application to the lawyer.

Subsections 26(a)(1)(A) (identity of individuals) and (B) (documents) have both been revised to require disclosures not just of names and documents concerning “disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings,” but to disclose names and documents relevant to the “claims and defenses of any party.” Therefore, in an automobile collision negligence case with a statute of limitations defense, both the plaintiff and defendant must provide names of individuals “likely to have discoverable information” about both the collision and the statute of limitations.

Subsection (A) (list of individuals) has also been amended to require more than the name, address, and “subjects of information.” Too often parties may provide a list (frequently as many names as the party can think of) with a description of the subject of their knowledge such as “these individuals may have information about the claims in this case.” This, of course, is useless and often is intentionally designed to make it difficult for the opposing party to have any real idea of who it might want to depose or interview. The revised subsection (A) now requires, in addition to the names, addresses, and phone numbers of disclosed individuals, a “brief description of the specific information” the individual in “known or believed to possess.” (Emphasis added.) The wording of this provision is not designed to require binding disclosures used to limit the scope of possible trial testimony, such as is required from testifying experts. Rather, it is designed, for example, to reveal who was responsible for deciding to discharge the plaintiff/employee; who directly participated in negotiating the key contractual provision; and who hired the allegedly negligent company truck driver. For essentially the same reasons, subsection (B) (list of documents) now requires that a listing of the subject matter of documents be provided in addition to the category of documents.

Challenging Inadequate Disclosures

An important change is found in the last sentence of the second paragraph of Rule 26(a)(1), which was imported from the experience gained from CAPP. Motions challenging the adequacy of another party’s disclosures may no longer be filed prior to the initial case management conference. There are several reasons for this limitation. First, the parties are to note concerns relating to the other party’s disclosures in the proposed order (Rule 16(b)(9)) so that these issues can be addressed at the case management conference. The process of listing the asserted shortcomings will, itself, create the need for counsel to confer about these issues and perhaps resolve some of them. The identification of asserted failures to disclose should be much shorter than a motion to compel. Further, one of the court’s significant tasks at the case management conference is to determine the appropriate level of proportionality for disclosure and discovery purposes. The court’s ruling on this issue may indicate that some of the alleged shortcomings in disclosures are not proportional to the case and need not be disclosed for that reason alone. Additionally, the court can probably resolve the issues and concerns while conducting the case management conference without any need for briefing of a motion to compel.

Rule 26(a)(2)—Disclosure of Expert Testimony

The disclosure rules for witnesses providing opinion testimony continue to provide different requirements for disclosures of two classes of persons allowed to render opinion testimony. Persons retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony are referred to in Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(I) as “retained experts.” Persons who are not specially retained or employed to give expert testimony in the case but who are expected to present testimony concerning their personal knowledge of relevant facts, along with their opinion testimony relating to those facts, are referred to in Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(II) as “other experts.”

The major differences in the amended rule are that summaries of expert testimony are no longer allowed, and experts will be allowed to testify on direct examination only about matters “disclosed in detail,” in conformity with the rule. This limitation was included in CAPP and judges enforced it rather strictly. These witnesses are not required to anticipate issues or areas of inquiry that may be brought up in cross-examination, and may testify about such areas without prior disclosure. Indeed, the knowledge that witnesses may testify only as to opinions disclosed in their reports should allow opposing parties to plan much more focused, precise, and concise cross-examinations.

Experience with summaries of expert testimony has revealed that there can be so much background that is omitted that either the opposing party is blind to what testimony to expect or, as is usually the case, needs to take an extensive deposition to try to flesh out the expert’s testimony. These more extensive depositions add significant cost to the party taking the deposition, both in the hours preparing for and the time actually spent deposing the expert. Furthermore, once a deposition is taken, many courts will not limit testimony to the summary if the subject was or could have been covered in the deposition itself. The fundamental objectives here are to require parties using retained experts to fully disclose their opinions and bases for those opinions so that the parties can more accurately evaluate the strength of their cases and to reduce or eliminate the need to take the expert’s depositions in the first place.

Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(I)—Retained Experts

The revised rule now requires full written reports of the expert’s expected testimony. There is no requirement that the expert must personally prepare the report because frequently lawyers work closely with the experts to tailor and limit the testimony to what is most necessary for the case. Determining who is responsible for selecting each word of the report is not deemed significant. What is significant is that the expert witness must sign the report and thereby accept responsibility for both what the report says and includes and what it omits.

Much of the remainder of the changes in this portion of the rule is a clarification of certain required portions of expert reports that have been in existence for years. The most critical part of the report will be the complete statement of all opinions and the basis and reasons for those opinions. The word “complete” here supports the requirement that experts be limited in their direct testimony to what is disclosed in the report. This does not require a proposed transcript of the witness’s direct examination. However, before the report is complete, lawyers should plan that direct examination in detail to make sure nothing crucial is omitted. Lawyers should not rely on the assumption that the opposing party will depose the expert and open the door for further “supplementation” of the witness’s opinions.

Other amendments clarify that the data and other information considered by the witness in forming opinions is listed but need not be included. The information considered, however, should be both that which is relied on and that which was rejected in forming the opinions. Likewise, literature to be used during the expert’s testimony needs to be identified and referenced in the report, but need not be provided. On the other hand, copies of exhibits to be used must be provided with the report, along with the expert’s qualifications, a list of publications authored by the witness within the prior ten years, and a list of deposition or trial testimony given by the expert within the preceding four years.

The amended rule now mandates more information about the compensation to be paid the retained expert. Experts have been known to testify that they are to be paid $___ per hour, but they are not sure how many hours have been spent yet, or they have only been paid a small portion of their fee because most of their billings have not been rendered or paid yet. Now, reports must include the expert’s fee agreement or schedule for the study, preparation, and testimony, and an itemization of the fees incurred, whether or not actually billed or paid. The time spent must be included in the report and must be supplemented fourteen days before trial. In short, jurors are entitled to know what the expert’s true, total compensation is, not just what may have been paid to the expert as of the day of the expert’s initial report.

Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(II)—Other Experts

These witnesses are frequently investigating police officers at accident or crime scenes; treating physicians; and employees such as business owners, accounting personnel, supervisors, mechanics, and construction personnel with specialized, relevant background and experience, as well as personal knowledge of the events in suit. Especially for those who are not employees of a party, it is often difficult to arrange for the necessary time for them to prepare extensive reports of their planned testimony. Testimony from non-specially retained or employed witnesses who will give opinions must be disclosed either by written reports signed by the witness, or by statements prepared and signed by counsel or by any unrepresented party. The allowance of statements prepared and signed by counsel recognizes that frequently, witnesses such as police officers or treating doctors cannot or will not make time available to review or sign a written disclosure statement. In either event, the witness will be limited to testifying on direct about matters disclosed in detail in the report or statement. Again, the report or statement must include all opinions to be expressed, together with the bases and reasons therefor. Thus, a statement that the treating physician “will testify about the patient’s medical records and their impact on the physician’s treatment of the patient” will not meet this test. Additionally, the report or statement must list any qualifications of the witness needed to support allowing the witness to have and express admissible opinions, and must include copies of any exhibits to be used to support the opinions.

A feature of “other [non-retained] experts” is that they are not called to testify in the case because they have been specially retained as independent experts to offer opinions. They are called as fact witnesses with personal information relating to the case, and through training or experience are qualified to offer opinions useful to the jury based on facts they observed. In short, as noted in the Supreme Court’s 2015 Comments, non-retained experts are people whose opinions are formed or reasonably derived from or based on their occupational duties with respect to the matter at issue in the case. Even though their opinions and supporting factual bases and reasons must be disclosed in detail in their report or statement, they are not required or expected to prepare and sign a full report containing the other information only required from retained experts. For example, in addition to the opinions and diagnoses reflected in the plaintiff’s medical records, a treating physician may have reached an opinion as to the cause of those injuries gained while treating the patient. Those opinions may not have been noted in the medical records but, if appropriately disclosed, may be offered at trial without the witness having first prepared a full, retained expert report.

Rule 26(a)(2)(B)—Limitations of Trial Testimony

Both of the revised subsections of Rule 26(a)(2)(B) relating to retained experts and other experts contain the same last sentence: “The witness’s direct testimony shall be limited to matters disclosed in detail in the report [or statement].” This is a new provision based in part on the experience from CAPP and on the desire to continue holding down the cost of trial preparation. One of the justifications for the perceived necessity to take expert depositions is that trial courts frequently do not limit experts to their reports at trial so that the deposition is necessary to uncover unreported opinions (or belatedly conceived opinions), which the trial judges might allow in evidence.

With the revised rule, trial courts are instructed to limit direct testimony. This does not preclude opinions for which the opposing party opens the door by cross-examining on opinions held by the witness beyond those disclosed in the report or statement. Not only does this provide a rule-based requirement that the trial courts limit testimony, but it also enforces the requirements that reports or statements in fact be complete. This limitation is also bolstered by the supplementation requirements of Rule 26(e) in those situations where depositions are taken.[9]

Rule 26(b)—Discovery Scope and Limits

Before discussing the significant change in subsection 26(b)(1), it is important not to overlook the opening phrase of section 26(b): “Unless otherwise modified by order of the court . . .”; In other words, the court is not bound to treat discovery in all cases the same. Some cases may actually have more stringent limitations placed on their discovery than the presumptive limitations in subsection 26(b)(2). Conversely, larger and complex cases may need and can be given significantly more discovery than that which is set out as the presumptive discovery limitations, as appropriate.

Rule 26(b)(1)—In General

The amended portion of Rule 26(b)(1) is taken verbatim from the new Federal Rule. It makes one fundamental change and two significant but lesser revisions to the prior Colorado Rule 26(b)(1).

Proportionality. Previously, there were four factors in Rule 26(b)(2)(F) for courts to consider when determining whether good cause existed to justify modifying the presumptive limits on discovery. The third of those factors was whether the expense of discovery outweighed its likely benefit, “taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.”[10] Very few reported cases ever discussed this obscurely located provision.

In 2009, the ACTL/IAALS Final Report lit the wildfire. It stated “Proportionality should be the most important principle applied to all discovery.”[11] Thereafter, proportionality of discovery became a key issue at the Duke Conference.[12] Then, the Federal Rules Advisory Committee joined in, concluding that “What is needed can be described in two words—cooperation and proportionality—and one phrase.”[13] CAPP, along with many other pilot projects, also incorporated the concept of proportionality.[14] When the Federal Rules Advisory Committee proposed its revisions to Rule 26(b)(1), it lifted the list of factors to establish good cause from Federal Rule 26(b)(2).[15] It then specifically referred to this language as involving proportionality, and placed it directly into the very definition of what is discoverable. Thus, it is not enough any longer to contend that information is discoverable simply because it is relevant to a claim or defense. Such information must also be “proportional to the needs of the case.”

In evaluating the “needs of the case,” the Advisory Committee also adjusted the order of some of the factors to be considered when determining proportionality. It switched the order of “the amount in controversy” and “the importance of the issues at stake in the action” so that the amount of money was listed after the importance of the issues. This change was made to place less emphasis on the amount of money at stake as the leading factor (even though all of the factors must be considered if significant). The Advisory Committee also moved the issue of whether the burden or expense outweighed the likely benefit of the additional discovery from being a main issue in considering good cause (as phrased in Federal Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) and Colorado Rule 26(b)(2)(F)(iii)) to being simply another factor to be considered. Thus, as revised, the federal and Colorado provisions regarding the scope of discovery are virtually identical and state:

Subject to the limitations and considerations contained in subsection (b)(2) of this Rule, parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. (Emphasis added)

This new rule is patently designed to limit “full discovery” in all but the larger, more important and more complex cases. This is an important brick in the new paradigm of giving parties only what they need rather than whatever they want.

The Supreme Court’s 2015 Comments to Rule 26 emphasize the case-by-case considerations that may impact proportionality. All the listed factors should be thought about, but individual factors may carry very different weights depending on the case and claims. The amount in controversy may not be as much of a factor as the desired enforcement of fundamental civil or constitutional rights. The public interest may demand resolution of issues in the case. In employment and professional liability cases and for the amount of damages, for example, the parties’ relative access to key information may prove to justify more discovery for one party than to the other on selected issues.

Other limitations on the scope of discovery. In addition to the requirement that discovery be proportional to the needs of the case, a second change in both the Federal and Colorado Rules was to delete the authority of a court to “order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action,” as allowed in the previous version of Rule 26(b)(1). This, too, strikes a blow at potentially vast discovery of material even less directly relevant to the specific claims and defenses of the lawsuit. Discovery as the fishing expedition to find out whether a party can uncover new causes of action should no longer be available.

The third change in Rule 26(b)(1) is a clarification relating to information that is not admissible at trial. The last sentence of this section still allows discovery of information that may not be admissible, but only if the information sought is “within the scope of discovery.” Thus, such inadmissible information must still be relevant to the parties’ claims and defenses, not just to the “subject matter involved in the action,” and must still be proportional to the needs of the case.

Rule 26(b)(2)—Limitations [on Discovery]

This Rule retains Colorado’s previous basic limitations on the use of the various discovery devices. It retains the ability to expand or contract the uses of those devices “for good cause shown,” but also imports the proportionality factors of subsection (b)(1).

The only change is in subsection (b)(2)(F)(iii)—the subsection describing the factors to be considered in determining “good cause,” and the subsection from which the proportionality factors were removed for relocation into subsection (b)(1). This new consideration in reworded (b)(2)(F)(iii), taken verbatim from the proposed Federal Rule amendment, is whether the proposed additional discovery is “outside the scope permitted by C.R.C.P. 26(b)(1).” However, subsection (b)(2) specifically allows exceptions to its limits on use of discovery methods for good cause. Thus, this factor in (b)(2)(F)(iii) does not mean that good cause cannot be shown in situations if discovery is sought beyond subsection (b)(1)’s scope of discovery. If the broader discovery is sought, however, the other considerations in (b)(2)(F)(i), (ii), and (iv) will need to be quite persuasive.

Rule 26(b)(4)—Trial Preparation: Experts

Depositions of Experts. The subject of expert depositions has, from the beginning of CAPP, been a hotly debated topic. Opponents of expert depositions have argued that with requirements for disclosures of full expert reports and limiting their testimony to what is disclosed in detail, depositions of experts are unnecessary, expensive, and counterproductive. They argue that the main result of deposing experts is to “educate and make them smarter” and better able to prepare for and to withstand cross-examination at trial. Proponents of expert depositions counter that depositions allow lawyers to get a feel for the quality of the expert as a person, prospective witness, and expert in the designated field. They contend that the added cost of the deposition is not great in the overall expense of expert study and preparation, and that expert depositions enhance settlement once the lawyers have seen how well the expert can withstand intense examination. Finally, as noted above, a number of lawyers claimed that depositions were necessary because they could not rely on the judges to limit the expert’s testimony to the report or summary.

Although the Civil Rules Committee ultimately recommended that depositions for retained experts should be limited to three hours, the Supreme Court decided to apply the standard of six hours to all experts, as well as to all other deponents. Because of the varying importance of expert testimony in cases, this rule specifically authorizes trial courts to expand or limit deposition time in accordance with proportionality.

Disclosures and Discovery About the Preparation of Expert Opinions and Reports. In 2010, Federal Rules 26(b)(4)(B) and (C) were added to preclude discovery of drafts of expert reports or disclosures made pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2) and to provide work-product protection to communications between a party’s attorneys and the party’s retained experts and the expert’s assistants. The discovery bar does not extend to other information gathered by the expert or to questions about alternative analyses or approaches to the issue on which the expert is testifying.[16] Discovery may extend to communications relating to the expert’s compensation for study or testimony; facts and data provided by the attorney that the expert considered in forming the opinions expressed; or assumptions that the attorney provided and the expert relied on.[17] Among other things, these rules were adopted to prevent game playing with experts, such as counsel telling them to never make notes of what they discuss, to not prepare and send drafts, and to always make revisions to the original version of the report while deleting all portions that had been changed.

After this amendment was adopted in the Federal Rules in 2010, the Colorado Civil Rules Committee was prepared to recommend a similar change. However, it decided that such a change might adversely impact the information that was to be gained from the study of how CAPP worked and, therefore, the amendment was not further considered until the study of CAPP was concluded. Although there are slight variances in language between new subsection 26(b)(4)(D) of the Colorado Rules and subsections 26(b)(4)(B) and (C) of the Federal Rules, the substance of the changes is identical.

Rule 26(c)—Protective Orders

This Rule allows courts to issue a variety of protective orders to protect against annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. The new amendment to Colorado Rule 26(c)(2), taken verbatim from the amendment to Federal Rule 26(c)(1)(B), now also gives courts the authority to allocate the expenses of discovery among the requesting and delivering parties (or non-parties) where appropriate. This amendment does not mandate any allocation, but simply adds this tool to the court’s tool box of alternatives. Indeed, the Committee Note relating to the Federal Rule change provides that “recognizing the authority to shift the costs of discovery does not mean that cost-shifting should become a common practice,” and that “[c]ourts and parties should continue to assume that a responding party ordinarily bears the costs of responding.”[18]

Rule 26(e)—Supplementation of Disclosures,
Responses, and Expert Reports and Statements

A provision has been added to the requirement to supplement expert reports or statements where a party intends to have the expert testify on direct examination about matters disclosed for the first time during the expert’s deposition, but that are not in the expert’s report or statement. The supplementation must be a specific description of the deposition testimony to be offered and relied on. This additional supplementation is intended to allow the court to determine from the expert’s Rule 26(a)(2) report and its supplementation whether the direct testimony offered at trial has or has not been properly disclosed. These provisions are designed to avoid the court’s need to read scattered portions of the deposition before ruling on admissibility of the new testimony. It also avoids the opponent arguing surprise because it did not understand what deposition testimony was going to be offered as additional and admissible expert testimony.

When the expert report is properly supplemented with this subsequent deposition opinion testimony, Rule 26(e) instructs the trial courts that those supplemented opinions must be permitted, unless the court finds that the opposing party has been unfairly prejudiced by the failure to have made disclosure in the original expert report.

Rule 30—Depositions Upon Oral Examination

The only changes of note in Rule 30 are contained in subsection 30(d)(2). They shorten the standard deposition for all witnesses from one day of seven hours to one day of six hours (unless otherwise ordered by the court). With the usual practice now being to clock deposition times to the minute (not counting breaks for consultation or bathroom breaks), seven hours has frequently devolved into about ten hours of actual time spent at the deposition. Furthermore, many felt that six hours of solid time, leaving out boilerplate questions, was still normally sufficient to get the genuinely necessary evidence. If more is likely to be needed, the parties should determine that before the deposition and request the court’s permission for more time.

Rule 33—Interrogatories

After the Civil Rules Committee agreed on the changes to Rule 34 for the reasons described below, those changes seemed to be equally applicable to responses to interrogatories. Thus, Rule 33(b) was amended to add the requirements that objections to interrogatories specify the grounds for objection and to state whether responsive information is being withheld on the basis of the objection. Such objection also stays the need to answer those objectionable portions pending a ruling by the trial court and without filing a motion for a protective order.

Rule 34—Production of Documents

Over time, litigants have developed the habit of making a string of boilerplate objections to requests for production of documents. The objections are then incorporated verbatim, or by reference, at the beginning of the response to each document request. (To be fair, these responses are often invited by equally boilerplate definitions and instructions in the opposition’s request.) Thus, the requesting party has no real information about which of the objections are intended to apply or why they are being made. This confusion can then be aggravated by the boilerplate comment to the effect that “notwithstanding these objections, and without waiving them, [defendant] is producing the following documents.” With this response, the requesting party has no idea whether the responder is providing all the documents it has or whether it really is withholding some of them and, if so, how many are being withheld and the basis on which the responder is refusing to produce them.

Colorado Rule 34(b) and Federal Rule 34(b)(2) are being amended with virtually identical language. First, the amended rules provide that the response to each request must “state with specificity the grounds for objecting to the request.” The objections must then be specific, not generic, and relevant to the precise request to which objection is being made. Second, the amended rules require that an objection state whether any responsive materials are actually being withheld on the basis of that objection.

Separately, the rules are also being amended to allow production of materials instead of offering inspection of the materials. Essentially, this simply recognizes what has for many years been the practice in most cases, at least where the produced documents are not especially numerous or burdensome.

Finally, Colorado Rule 34(b) adds a new provision to clarify the effect of a fairly common practice. When a party objects to production of certain documents, it has been unclear whether the objecting party also must request a protective order under Rule 26(c) or whether the requesting party must file a motion to compel production. The newly amended Colorado Rule now specifies that an objection to production stays the obligation to produce these documents until the court resolves the objection and that no motion for protective order is necessary. Frequently, when the requesting party receives an objection, especially if some responsive documents are produced, the requesting party will decide that it is unnecessary to fight for more documents or the parties can reach an acceptable compromise as to what documents will be produced. Thus, it seems appropriate to await the requesting party’s determination that it really is worth the effort to obtain the withheld documents rather than requiring the objecting party to move for protection and involve the court on matters that the requesting party may no longer need.

Rule 37—Failure to Make Disclosure
or Cooperate in Discovery: Sanctions

Rule 37(a)(4)(A) and (B) have allowed courts to award reasonable expenses, including awarding attorney fees in favor of prevailing parties and against opposing parties and their attorneys, unless the court finds certain factors that ameliorate against such an award, including “other circumstances that make an award of expenses unjust.” Experience has shown that courts, which historically have been unwilling to award monetary sanctions, have used this latter escape valve to justify the lack of monetary sanctions.

The CAPP rules, however, required that courts grant sanctions “unless the court makes a specific determination that failure to disclose in a timely and complete manner was justified under the circumstances or [was] harmless.”[19] Judges handling CAPP cases found this extra pressure to impose sanctions helpful in some instances, although they still felt that encouraging compliance and emphasizing that attorneys cooperate with each other was ultimately more desirable.

After struggling with this dichotomy at some length, the subcommittee of the Civil Rules Committee, the full Committee, and ultimately the Supreme Court chose the path of encouraging courts to be more aggressive with the imposition of sanctions, but not to go as far as CAPP went. Thus, rather than making the mere determination that other circumstances made monetary sanctions unjust—a low standard for avoiding monetary sanctions—Rule 37(a)(4)(A) and (B) were amended to allow that reprieve from imposing sanctions only where it would be manifestly unjust to award monetary sanctions to the prevailing party.

Under these rules, however, courts may still decline to impose sanctions where the movant did not make a good-faith effort to obtain compliance before seeking court action or where the accused party was substantially justified for the nondisclosure, response, or objection. Indeed, those findings might trigger a sanction against the complaining party or its counsel. This counter-provision significantly increases the pressure on parties seeking these sanctions to meet, confer in person, and diligently endeavor to reach a reasonable resolution.

Conversely, Rule 37(c)(1) has authorized preclusion at trial or for summary judgment of nondisclosed information required to be disclosed by Rules 26(a) or (e), unless such failure is harmless. Because it is so easy to articulate some kind of harm, this rule has caused preclusion of evidence that failed to cause significant harm or where the harm caused by the nondisclosure would be substantially outweighed by the harm resulting from preclusion. The amended subsection 37(c)(1) prohibits preclusion as a sanction simply upon allegations of some harm. Thus, preclusion for nondisclosure may not be imposed where the failure has not and will not cause significant harm or where the preclusion is disproportionate to the alleged harm.

Rules 54 and 121 § 1-22—Costs

Although only tangentially related to the issue of amending pretrial procedures to increase access to the judicial system by advancing the concept that cases should be just, speedy, and inexpensive, the Civil Rules Committee also submitted two amendments relating to controlling costs awarded to prevailing parties. First, in Rule 54(d), as approved by the Supreme Court, awarded costs must be reasonable considering any relevant factors that may include the needs and complexity of the case and the amount in controversy. Second, Rule 121 § 1-22 is amended to allow hearings on bills of costs where the requesting party has identified the issues to be heard and where the court has concluded that a hearing would be of material benefit to the court in ruling on the bill of costs.

Conclusion

With the revisions and amendments to the foregoing Rules, Colorado has moved to address the increasingly severe problem of a litigation culture that appears to be driven by and has thrived on frequently excessive demands for information. These demands can add substantial unnecessary expense and foreclose the societal benefits of efficient judicial systems for the peaceful resolution of disputes and wrongdoing. By encouraging and expediting a new culture focused on the genuine and limited needs of clients and not their (or their lawyers’) desires—a culture trained in and dedicated to the prompt and efficient handling of disputes—it is hoped that civil litigation can indeed incorporate a new paradigm.

Richard P. Holme is senior of counsel in the Trial Group at Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP. He is a member of the Colorado Supreme Court Standing Committee on Civil Rules and was chair of its Improving Access to Justice Subcommittee, which drafted the proposed changes—(303) 892-7340, richard.holme@dgslaw.com. He has also been a member of the ACTL Joint Task Force since 2010, and was involved in the latter stages of the Joint Project of the ACTL and the IAALS. This article expresses the author’s views and does not endeavor to represent all the views of the Civil Rules Committee or the Supreme Court.

The opinions and views expressed by Featured Bloggers on CBA-CLE Legal Connection do not necessarily represent the opinions and views of the Colorado Bar Association, the Denver Bar Association, or CBA-CLE, and should not be construed as such.

[1] See Holme, “Back to the Future—New Rule 16.1: Simplified Procedure for Civil Cases Up to $100,000,” 33 The Colorado Lawyer 11 (May 2004), www.cobar.org/tcl/tcl_articles.cfm?articleid=3427.

[2] FRCP 26(a)(1)(A)(i) and (ii). See Advisory Committee Notes re 2000 Amendment.

[3] Colo. RPC, Preamble and Scope at [1].

[4] Colo. RPC 3.1.

[5] Colo. RPC 3.2.

[6] Colo. RPC 3.3.

[7] Colo. RPC 3.4.

[8] Colo. RPC 4.1.

[9] See discussion of Rule 26(e), infra.

[10] CRCP 26(b)(2)(F)(iii).

[11] ACTL/IAALS, supra note 24 at 7. See “Part I: A New Paradigm,” supra note 2 at 46.

[12] See Holme, supra note 3 at 46 and notes 35 to 37 and accompanying text.

[13] Advisory Comm. Memo at B2 to B3. See Holme, supra note 3 at 46.

[14] PPR 9.1. See Holme, supra note 3 at 47.

[15] FRCP 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).

[16] See Advisory Comm. Notes re: 2010 Amendments to FRCP 26(b)(4).

[17] Id.; FRCP 26(b)(4)(C)(i) to (iii).

[18] See 2014 Rules Report, supra note 26 at 26.

[19] PPR 3.7.