December 11, 2017

Colorado Court of Appeals: Trial Court Erred in Omitting Jury Instruction on Right Not to Testify, but Reversal Not Required

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Deleon on Thursday, November 16, 2017.

Sexual Assault—Child—Jury Instruction—Right Not to Testify—Hearsay.

Defendant was found guilty of two counts of sexual assault on a child.

On appeal, defendant contended that the district court erred by rejecting his tendered jury instruction on his right not to testify and by failing to instruct the jurors immediately before closing arguments of his constitutional right not to testify. The trial court did not err in choosing to give the jury the pattern jury instruction on defendant’s right not to testify because defendant’s proposed instruction went beyond the language of the pattern instruction. However, the trial court had an obligation to instruct jurors about defendant’s right not to testify before the attorneys made their closing arguments. Although the court violated Crim. P. 30 by not reading the instruction to the jury before closing argument, the court properly instructed jurors on defendant’s right not to testify during voir dire and reminded the sworn jurors of its earlier remarks. Reversal isn’t warranted because the error doesn’t cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction.

Defendant also argued that the district court erred by admitting into evidence the victim’s out-of-court statement to a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE nurse) that defendant had been “kicked out of the house.” Defendant argued that by saying he got kicked out of the house, the victim implied that her mother had kicked him out because of the victim’s allegations, which implied that the victim’s mother believed those allegations. Even assuming that the statement was inadmissible hearsay, any error in allowing it was harmless because any inferences defendant drew from the statement were speculative, and the victim’s mother testified that she did not believe the victim.

The judgment was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Tenth Circuit: Plaintiff’s Request for Immediate Release from Federal Custody Denied Under ACCA’s Enumerated Clause

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in United States v. Snyder on Thursday, September 21, 2017.

This case arose from Snyder’s request for immediate release from federal custody on the basis that he had already served more than the maximum sentence allowed by law. Snyder argues that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Johnson v. United States invalidates his sentence enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The district court denied Snyder’s motion, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial, concluding that Snyder was not sentenced based on the ACCA’s residual clause that was invalidated in Johnson.

In 2004, Snyder pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. A presentence report was prepared and concluded that Snyder was subject to an enhanced sentence as an armed career criminal because he had sustained two convictions for burglary of two residences, and had a conviction of a controlled substance offense. Snyder’s argument that his burglary convictions failed to constitute predicate offenses under the ACCA were rejected by the district court.

In 2015, the Supreme Court decided Johnson. Snyder subsequently filed a motion to vacate his sentence for immediate release, asserting that, following the Court’s decision in Johnson, his burglary convictions no longer qualify as predicate offenses under the ACCA, so he is not an armed career criminal, and his enhanced sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law.

The Circuit first determined whether the district court erred in concluding that Snyder’s motion was not timely.  By the plain language of the statute in question, the statute allows a motion to be filed within one year of the date on which the rights asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court. The Circuit concluded that to be timely, a motion need only to invoke the newly recognized right, regardless of whether the facts of record ultimately support the claim, and found that Snyder’s motion did just that.

The court then discussed whether Snyder had overcome the procedural-default rule, which is a general rule that claims not raised on direct appeal may not be raised on collateral review unless the petitioner can show cause and prejudice.

Cause is shown if a claim is so novel that its legal basis was not reasonably available to counsel at the time of the direct appeal. The Supreme Court has stated that if one of its decisions explicitly overrides prior precedent, then, prior to that decision, the new constitutional principle was not reasonably available to counsel, and defendant has cause for failing to raise the issue. The Johnson claim was not reasonably available to Snyder at the time of his direct appeal, and the Circuit found this sufficient to establish cause.

To establish actual prejudice, the Circuit held that Snyder must show that the error of which he complains is an error of constitutional dimensions and worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage. The Circuit found that Snyder has shown actual prejudice through his argument that the ACCA sentence enhancement is invalid after Johnson. The court concluded this by acknowledging that if Snyder is correct, he should have been sentenced to only ten years maximum, not eighteen as he had been sentenced. The sentence of eighteen years would then be unauthorized under law, creating an actual and substantial disadvantage of constitutional dimensions.

The Circuit next discusses the merits of Snyder’s claim. Snyder alleged that the sentence was imposed under an invalid legal theory and that he was, therefore, sentenced in violation of the Constitution. In order to make a determination, the relevant background of the legal environment at the time of sentencing must be evaluated. The Circuit held that the actual facts of record in this matter offered no basis whatsoever for the notion that the sentence Snyder received was based on the ACCA’s residual clause, rather than its enumerated offenses clause. The Circuit found no mention of the residual clause in the presentence report or any other pleading or transcript. Further, given the relevant background legal environment that existed at the time of Snyder’s sentencing, there would have been no need for reliance on the residual clause. The Circuit concluded that Snyder’s claim failed because the court’s ACCA’s determination at the time of sentencing rested on the enumerated crimes clause rather than the residual clause.

The decision of the district court denying Snyder’s motion is AFFIRMED by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Tenth Circuit: Social Worker Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity after Violating Defendant’s Constitutional Rights

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued is opinion in T.D. v. Patton on Monday, August 28, 2017.

Ms. Patton is a social worker for the Denver Department of Human Services (DDHS) and was responsible for removing T.D., a minor, from his mother’s home, and recommending T.D. remain in the temporary custody of his father, Duerson. T.D. was removed from Duerson’s home after DDHS made a determination that T.D. had suffered physical and sexual abuse at the hands of his father. This case concerns Ms. Patton’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that she is entitled to qualified immunity.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that Ms. Patton violated T.D.’s clearly established substantive due process constitutional right to be free of a state official’s creation of danger from a private actor under a danger-creation theory. The court found that Ms. Patton violated T.D.’s substantive due process right by knowingly placing T.D. in a position of danger by recommending that T.D. be placed in Duerson’s custody despite admitted concerns about T.D.’s safety, her knowledge of Duerson’s criminal history and conviction for attempted sexual assault against a minor, and failure to investigate whether Duerson was abusing T.D. despite her awareness of evidence of potential abuse. The court found that Ms. Patton acted recklessly and in conscious disregard of a known and substantial risk that T.D. would suffer serious, immediate, and proximate harm in his father’s home.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a person acting under color of state law who subjects any citizen of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution shall be liable to the injured party. However, a defendant in an action may raise a defense of qualified immunity, which shields public officials from damages unless their conduct was unreasonable in light of law. Once a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff has the burden to show that the defendant’s actions violated a federal constitutional or statutory right and that the right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s unlawful conduct.

The court first evaluated whether the facts satisfied T.D.’s claim of danger-creation. The court considered whether Ms. Patton created or increased the danger posed to T.D. The court concluded that Ms. Patton’s actions amounted to a failure to investigate evidence that Duerson was abusing T.D., satisfying the first element. The second element is whether T.D. was a member of a limited and specifically definable group. The court held that because the state removed T.D. from his natural parent and took him into state custody, T.D. fell within a limited and specifically definable group of children.

Third, Ms. Patton’s conduct put T.D. at substantial risk of serious, immediate, and proximate harm. This is evidenced by Ms. Patton withholding relevant information and recommending T.D. be placed with his father, by failing to investigate evidence of potential abuse, and by continuing to recommend T.D. remain with his father.

The court discussed the fourth and fifth elements simultaneously. Ms. Patton acted recklessly and in conscious disregard of a risk (element 4) that was obvious or known (element 5). Ms. Patton knew of Duerson’s criminal history, but deleted those concerns for fear of being fired. She further withheld concerns of T.D.’s safety and concerns, stemming from her professional judgment, that T.D. should be removed from the home. Her intentional exclusion of her knowledge and concerns from her hearing report showed she acted recklessly and in conscious disregard of an obvious or known risk that Duerson posed to T.D.

The last element is satisfied by Ms. Patton’s conscience-shocking conduct. Ms. Patton’s conduct was held to significantly exceed ordinary negligence or permitting unreasonable risk and rose to a degree of outrageousness and a magnitude of potential or actual harm that is truly conscience shocking.

In sum, Ms. Patton’s conduct violated T.D.’s substantive due process right by creating or increasing T.D.’s vulnerability to the danger of private violence by Duerson.

The court found that the law was clearly established at the time of Ms. Patton’s misconduct. The court held that a reasonable official in Ms. Patton’s shoes would have understood that she was violating T.D.’s constitutional right by creating or increasing T.D.’s vulnerability to the danger posed by Duerson.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the district court’s DENIAL of summary judgment.

Tenth Circuit: Collection of Resource Data Considered Protected Speech Under the First Amendment

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Western Watersheds Project v. Michael on Thursday, September 7, 2017.

The State of Wyoming has enacted a pair of statutes imposing civil and criminal liability on individuals who enter open land for the purpose of collecting resource data without permission from the owner. “Resource data” was defined as data relating to land or land use. And the term “collect” was defined as requiring two elements: (1) taking a sample of material or a photograph, or otherwise preserving information in any form that is (2) submitted or intended to be submitted to any agency of the state or federal government. Information obtained in violation of these provisions could not be used in any proceeding other than an action under the statutes themselves. The statutes also required government agencies to expunge data collected in violation of their provisions and forbade the agencies from considering such data in determining any agency action.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the statutes regulate protected speech under the First Amendment and that they are not shielded from constitutional scrutiny merely because they touch upon access to private property. The statutes at issue target the creation of speech by imposing heightened penalties on those who collect resource data.

Plaintiffs in this case are advocacy organizations, arguing that the statutes violated Free Speech and Petition Clauses of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and they were preempted by federal law. After the district court’s holding that Plaintiffs have stated claims for free speech, petition, and equal protection, Wyoming amended the two statutes, although the statutes continue to impose heightened criminal punishment and civil liability. The amendments penalize any individual who without authorization: (1) enters private land for the purpose of resource data; (2) enters private land and collects resource data; or (3) crosses private land to access adjacent or proximate land where he collects resource data. Under the current version of the statutes, there is no requirement that resource data be submitted to, or intended to be submitted, to a government agency. Instead, the term “collect” now means: (1) to take a sample of material or acquire, gather, photograph or otherwise preserve information in any form; and (2) to record a legal description or geographical coordinates of the location of the collection. The district court concluded that the revised version of the statutes did not implicate protected speech, Plaintiffs appealed to the Tenth Circuit.

The Tenth Circuit found that Wyoming already prohibits trespass, thus the effect of the challenged provisions is to increase a pre-existing penalty for trespassing if an individual collects resource data from public lands. To determine if such provisions are subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment, the question is not whether trespassing is protected conduct, but whether the act of collecting resource data on public lands qualifies as protected speech.

The Circuit concluded that the Plaintiffs’ collection of resource data constitutes the protected creation of speech, as the Supreme Court has explained that the creation and dissemination of information are speech within the meaning of the First Amendment; however, the court did not discuss the level of scrutiny to be applied, as the district court did not conduct an analysis on this matter and, as a general rule, the court will not consider an issue not passed upon below.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals REVERSED the district court’s conclusion that the statutes are not entitled to First Amendment protection and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Video Recording by Confidential Informant Need Not Be Suppressed per Fourth Amendment

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Mendez on Thursday, October 19, 2017.

Confidential Informant—Audio Recording—Video Recording—Fourth Amendment—Discovery Violation—Remedy—Evidence—Non-Testimonial—Jury Deliberations.

A confidential informant (CI) approached a police investigator with a potential target for a controlled drug buy. The investigator arranged for the CI to purchase methamphetamine from Mendez in a controlled drug buy with concealed audio and video. After the buy, the People charged Mendez with distribution of a schedule II controlled substance. Mendez moved to suppress evidence obtained during the CI’s entry into his apartment. The district court denied the motion.

On appeal, Mendez contended that his conviction must be reversed because the video recording of the controlled buy should have been suppressed as the result of an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. The Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that the use of video surveillance by a CI in this case did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Mendez invited the CI into his apartment to engage in a drug transaction. Because Mendez consented to the CI’s presence in his home, he gave up any reasonable expectation of privacy in what the CI could observe or visually record. The district court properly denied the motion to suppress the resulting video recording.

Mendez next asserted that the district court abused its discretion by failing to provide an adequate remedy for a discovery violation. He argued that the prosecution’s failure to disclose a conversation between the CI and a police investigator about the Department of Homeland Security constituted a violation of his constitutional rights and the district court’s chosen remedy deprived him of a fair trial. As a sanction for the discovery violation, the district court ordered the investigator to make himself available for an interview with defense counsel to determine the scope of his representations to the CI. The district court denied defense counsel’s request that the CI be subject to recall for cross-examination. The district court’s discovery sanction was inadequate because Mendez was given no opportunity to cross-examine the CI about whether he believed he would receive immigration support from Homeland Security for his willingness to participate in the controlled buy. That belief could have been relevant to the CI’s motive, regardless of the investigator’s memory of the conversation. And the district court’s remedy did not cure that potential prejudice. Nevertheless, the district court’s error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and did not warrant reversal given the overwhelming evidence against Mendez at trial, and the fact that Mendez was able to successfully call the CI’s credibility into doubt by the end of trial.

Finally, Mendez argued that the district court abused its discretion in failing to limit the jury’s access to the video recording and transcript during deliberations. A district court need not limit juror access to non-testimonial evidence. It was not an abuse of discretion for the court to allow the jury unfettered access to the video recording and transcript.

The judgment was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Defendant May Fire Retained Counsel for Any Reason but Must Face Consequences

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Ronquillo v. People on Monday, October 16, 2017.

Criminal Law—Counsel—Choice of Counsel—Continuance.

The Colorado Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice includes the right to fire retained counsel without having to show good cause, even when the defendant wants appointed counsel. But defendants who fire retained counsel will not necessarily be allowed to proceed as they wish. Accordingly, trial courts must ensure that defendants understand the consequences of firing retained counsel. The court outlined the analysis that trial courts should conduct before releasing retained counsel from a case. Because the Colorado Court of Appeals erred by requiring Ronquillo to show good cause for firing retained counsel, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Findings of Inventory Search of Vehicle Need Not Be Suppressed Because Search Was Lawful

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Camarigg on Thursday, September 7, 2017.

Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol—Impound—Vehicle—Inventory Search—Warrant—Prosecutorial Misconduct—Burden of Proof—Beyond a Reasonable Doubt—Evidence—Intent to Manufacture Methamphetamine.

After defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), officers impounded his vehicle because it was parked in front of a gas pump at a gas station. The officers conducted an inventory search of the vehicle and discovered a sealed box containing items commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Based on those items, they obtained a warrant to search the vehicle and found additional items used to manufacture methamphetamine. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search and warrant. The trial court denied the motion. A jury convicted defendant of DUI, careless driving, and possession of chemicals, supplies, or equipment with intent to manufacture methamphetamine.

On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court should have excluded evidence discovered in the inventory search of his vehicle and under the subsequently issued warrant. A vehicle is lawfully taken into custody if the seizure is authorized by law and department regulations and is reasonable. Inventory searches are an exception to the warrant requirement and are reasonable if (1) the vehicle was lawfully taken into custody; (2) the search was conducted according to “an established, standardized policy”; and (3) there is no showing that police acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation. Here, the decision to impound the vehicle was reasonable, and the inventory search was conducted according to standard policy and was constitutional. Because the inventory search was constitutional, evidence obtained under the subsequently issued warrant could not have been tainted.

Defendant next argued that the prosecutor improperly quantified the concept of reasonable doubt and lowered the burden of proof by using a puzzle analogy during closing argument. The prosecutor used a puzzle analogy to convey the difference between proof beyond a reasonable doubt and proof beyond all doubt, which other courts have found permissible. Further, the prosecutor used the analogy to rebut the defense argument that evidence of defendant’s guilt was speculative. The Court of Appeals concluded there was no reasonable possibility that the prosecutor’s analogy contributed to defendant’s conviction. Additionally, the jury was properly instructed on the reasonable doubt standard. Therefore, any impropriety in the prosecutor’s analogy was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Lastly, defendant contended there was insufficient evidence that he intended to manufacture methamphetamine. There was sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a rational jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intended to manufacture methamphetamine.

The judgment was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Tenth Circuit: Protective Sweep Not Permissible Absent Suspicion of Another Person Hiding in Home

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in United States v. Nelson on Thursday, August 17, 2017.

A warrant was issued for the arrest of Stephen M. Nelson after he violated terms of his probation. Although Nelson’s whereabouts were originally unknown, the United States Marshals Service were informed that Nelson often spent time at a home owned by Antonio Bradley. Bradley was instructed to inform the Deputy Marshal when Nelson arrived at his home, which Bradley ultimately did, giving consent for deputy marshals to “go inside and search for” Nelson.

Upon entry, the deputies searched three of the four levels of the home before one deputy saw movement on the first floor. One deputy began shouting for Nelson to come out and show himself. After Nelson complied with the orders, he was put into custody and brought to the second floor as one deputy searched the first floor. The deputy found two firearms under a pile of clothing on a bed. Because Nelson had two previous felony convictions, the government charged him with possession of a firearm by a felon.

Nelson moved to suppress the firearms charge, arguing that the deputies violated the Fourth Amendment by continuing to search the residence after arresting him. In response, the government made two arguments relevant on appeal: (1) Bradley, the owner of the residence, consented to the search; and (2) the deputy lawfully searched the first level under the protective-sweep doctrine. Under the first exception to the general rule that police must obtain a warrant to search a home, the police may, in conjunction with an arrest in a home, “as a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched.” Under the second exception, police may conduct a “protective sweep” beyond areas immediately adjoining the arrest if there are “articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.”

The district court concluded that the protective sweep was valid under the second prong. Nelson appeals, arguing that the district court erred in relying on the second prong because the deputy had no reason to believe that there was a third person hiding in the residence.

This court holds that under the second prong, the government is required to articulate specific facts giving rise to the inference of a dangerous third person’s presence. There could always be a dangerous person concealed within a structure, but that cannot justify a protective sweep. The government argues that the deputies were informed that there was another person in the home, which, this court finds, would be the sort of specific, articulable information that might have permitted the deputy to search the first level after arresting Nelson; however, for that information to be relevant, the deputy had to have it before he conducted the protective sweep, which he did not. The court found that the first-level search was not a valid protective sweep under the second prong.

Next, the government argues that the first prong validates the first-level search under two theories: (1) the deputies arrested Nelson on the first level, so the search of the bed on that level occurred immediately adjacent to the arrest; and (2) even if the deputies arrested Nelson on the second level, the first level nevertheless immediately adjoins the second level. This court declines to consider the arguments, as the government failed to make the specific arguments below, and courts do not generally address arguments presented for the first time on appeal.

The government then argues that Owens’ search “was close enough to the line of validity that an objectively reasonable officer would have acted” in the same way. The court declines to consider this argument because the Supreme Court has “limited [the good-faith] exception to circumstances where someone other than a police officer has made the mistaken determination that resulted in the Fourth Amendment violation.” The government neither suggests that the deputies relied on a third party’s mistake in deciding to search the first level, nor explains why this case might present the “very unusual circumstances” that would convince us to “extend th[e] good-faith exception beyond its pedigree.”

Finally, the government argues that Bradley consented to a search of his entire residence. Whether a search remains within the boundaries of the consent is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances by the trial court. Although the government raised this argument below, the district court declined to conduct the fact finding necessary for us to resolve this issue on appeal. We therefore remand for it to do so.

The Tenth Circuit VACATED the district court’s order denying Nelson’s motion to suppress and REMANDED for the district court to determine whether the deputies exceeded the scope of Bradley’s consent when they continued searching his residence after they arrested Nelson.

Discovering Discovery: Building Your Case, Deposition Tips, Expert Witnesses, and More

“Reduced to its essence, discovery is the process of identifying, collecting, producing and/or receiving relevant, nonprivileged materials in connection with pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation. With the advent of notice pleading, civil discovery provides access to the relevant information that litigants and their counsel require to make informed decisions about the merits of their case and the potential for settlement.” -Magistrate Judge Craig B. Shaffer

Discovery is a crucial component of every litigation case. In the last 10 years, civil litigation has changed significantly. The proliferation of electronic data and new rules on both the state and federal level create increasingly difficult challenges for preserving, managing, and producing electronically stored information. Conducting discovery outside Colorado has become mainstream as civil litigation has become more national—even global.

This Friday, CBA-CLE will debut the newest title in our litigation library, Discovery in Colorado, at a full-day program, “Discovering Discovery.” Discovery in Colorado is a practical guide to discovery that brings to life the application of the Colorado and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing the discovery process. Discovery in Colorado was written by a variety of different practitioners, overseen by Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang and Natalie Hanlon Leh, Esq. Attorneys and judges with backgrounds in private, in-house, and government practice authored individual chapters.

Learn different approaches to discovery and hear distinct perspectives from some of the most experienced trial attorneys and judges in Colorado. Each class attendee receives Discovery in Colorado, 1st Edition, as course materials. Explore the ever-changing state of discovery through this valuable course and companion book. Register using the links below, or call (303) 860-0608.

 

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CLE Program: Discovering Discovery

This CLE presentation will occur on Friday, July 28, 2017, at the CLE Large Classroom (1900 Grant St., 3rd Floor) from 8:30 a.m. to 4:45 p.m. Register for the live program here and the webcast here. You may also call (303) 860-0608 to register.

Can’t make the live program? Order the homestudy here — Video OnDemandMP3 Audio

Tenth Circuit: Officers Executing Warrant Acted in Objectively Reasonable Reliance

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in United States v. Russian on Tuesday, February 21, 2017.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had to determine if the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was properly applied in the case where police searched two cell phones belonging to the appellant after his arrest without first obtaining a valid search warrant. At trial, Mr. Russian moved to have evidence obtained from the phones suppressed for lack of particularity. The district court denied the motion, and sentenced Mr. Russian to 137 months’ incarceration. Mr. Russian appealed, claiming that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the phone evidence, and claiming that the 137-month sentence was above the maximum permitted by statute.

The case stems from an incident beginning in Missouri, where police received a 911 call concerning a man matching Mr. Russian’s description threatening two women with a machete and handgun. When police arrived, Russian fled, beginning a high-speed chase into Kansas. Upon Russian’s arrest, Deputy Wilson searched Russian, and found a red and black phone in his possession. Deputy Wilson then found a second phone in Russian’s vehicle, both of which he entered into evidence. Deputy Wilson later applied for a warrant to search Russian’s residence, as well as both the contents of both phones already in police possession, The state district court warrant authorized the search of cell phones that could be used to commit the crimes, and described the locations to be searched, but did not authorize the search of the phones already in police possession.

The Fourth Amendment provides that no citizen will be subjected to unreasonable search and seizure. However, the court added, that even these protections are subject to the harmless error rule, where a search may be upheld if the error is so unimportant and insignificant that they may be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction. The court stated that a search warrant must, in addition to probable cause, describe with particularity the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. In this case, the court said that there is little doubt that the search warrant was invalid for lack of particularity, as it did not identify the phones or the data on those phones to be searched.

Although the warrant was invalid, the court still upheld the denial of Mr. Russian’s motion to suppress under the good faith exception. The good faith exception applies to an otherwise invalid search warrant where the officer’s reliance on the warrant was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, and asks if a reasonably well-trained officer would have known the search was illegal despite the warrant’s authorization. However, the court noted that the government is not entitled to the exception when the warrant is “so facially deficient—i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized—that the executing officer cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.” In analyzing Deputy Wilson’s search, the court determined that because his affidavit specifically described the phones, the warrant referenced the affidavit, and the exclusion of the evidence would not serve the purpose of the exclusionary rule (to prevent police misconduct) the good faith exception applied.

As to Russian’s second claim, the court agreed that district court erred in relying on a guidelines range that improperly took into account a fifteen year old felony conviction that was too old to be included in the sentencing range. The court also agreed with Russian that the court erred in imposing a 76-month sentence, as it is above the 60-month maximum imposed by statute.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed Russian’s convictions, but remanded for resentencing for three of the counts based on the improperly calculated guidelines range.

Tenth Circuit: Contents of Vehicle Search Suppressed Where Search Illegal at Inception

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in United States v. Lopez on February 27, 2017.

On June 21, 2013, Angela Lopez was driving eastbound in Kansas. Kansas Highway Patrol Trooper Robert Krause pulled the vehicle over for going 79 miles per hour in a 65-mile-per-hour zone. Adrienne Lopez was in the passenger seat. Throughout the encounter, Adrienne, rather than Angela, did almost all of the talking, which Krause said could be a sign of nervousness. Krause asked Angela for her license, insurance, and car-rental paperwork. Krause then looked in the back seat of the car. Upon doing so, Adrienne said, “Don’t look back there, it’s a mess.” Krause asked about their travel plans. Adrienne told him that they were going form California and headed to “Kansas City or Nebraska” to rescue her sister “because she was getting beat up by her boyfriend.” Angela provided Krause a receipt from the California Department of Motor Vehicles that was issued to her when she reported losing her license, rather than her actual license.

Krause asked both occupants if they had drugs in the car, to which both replied no. Krause relayed Angela’s information to the dispatcher and learned that she had a valid driver’s license and no criminal history. Krause warned Angela for speeding and turned to walk away. He immediately turned back and asked Angela if she would answer a few more questions, which she consented to. Krause asked where they were heading. Adrienne answered that she did not know the exact city because her phone did not have reception.

Krause then asked the Defendants if he could search the vehicle. They refused. Krause then detained them until a drug dog could be brought to the vehicle, which took about twenty minutes. The dog alerted Krause to the front seat where Adrienne’s purse was located. Adrienne admitted having some marijuana in her purse, which Krause found and then searched the rest of the car. He found four packages in a cooler in the back seat of methamphetamine. The packages totaled 1,766 grams of methamphetamine.

The United States District Court for the District of Kansas denied Defendants’ motions to suppress the evidence of methamphetamine found in the car. The two were convicted of possessing more than 500 grams of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, and of conspiracy to do the same. The Defendants appealed.

The Tenth Circuit first established that a traffic stop must be justified at its inception and that the officer’s actions during the stop must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that initially justified it. A stop may be extended beyond that scope if the person stopped consents to the extension or if the police have a reasonable suspicion that other illegal activity has occurred or is occurring.

Here, the Defendants did not consent to the extension of the stop by Krause beyond its initial purpose. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit addressed whether Krause had reasonable suspicion that the Defendants were engaged in criminal activity, which the government bears the burden of proving.

The government put forth three suspicious factors that justified detention: (1) Adrienne was nervous; (2) Adrienne asked Krause not to look at the backseat because it was messy, even though it was not; and (3) Defendant’s travel plans were implausible.

The Tenth Circuit first addressed Adrienne’s nervousness. It stated that it consistently assigns that factor limited significance because innocent people can be nervous in wide varieties. In order to contribute to reasonable suspicion, the Tenth Circuit held that there must be extreme nervousness, which the district court did not find, and Krause did not so testify.

Next, the Tenth Circuit held that Adrienne’s comments about the backseat gave little support for reasonable suspicion. It stated that in hindsight, the comments seemed revealing. But at the time, there was nothing incriminating in view on the backseat. Further, nothing stopped Krause from taking a closer look through the back window.

Finally, the Tenth Circuit addressed the government’s argument that the Defendants’ travel plans were implausible. The government pointed to the fact that the two only rented the car for two days, which was not enough time to drive to their destination and return. The Tenth Circuit held that the travel plans might have been overly ambitions, but they could reasonably have been done. First, the Tenth Circuit pointed to the fact that they were driving through the night, which was why two drivers were necessary. Next, because they were rescuing Adrienne’s sister from an abusive boyfriend, it was reasonable to assume they would not stay at the destination very long. Finally, because it was understandable that the sister needed to move to protect herself from her abusive boyfriend, it was reasonable that the Defendants did not need a more precise location until they were closer to the destination. Further, the Tenth Circuit stated that it has generally been reluctant to give weight to the reasonable-suspicion analysis to unusual travel purposes, except in extreme cases.

The Tenth Circuit held that the circumstances did not suffice to justify the continued detention of the Defendants. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit held that the evidence seized from the car must be suppressed.

The Tenth Circuit then quickly dispatched with the governments two remaining arguments. First, the government argued that the evidence was admissible against Adrienne because the discovery of the drugs was not the fruit of her unlawful detention. The Tenth Circuit held that because Krause seized the marijuana from Adrienne’s purse, and the detention of Adrienne’s personal property led to the search of the car and discovery of the methamphetamine, Adrienne did have standing to challenge the admission into evidence of the drugs.

Second, the government argued that the detention was lawful as to Angela because there was probable cause to arrest her for driving while not in possession of her driver’s license. The Tenth Circuit held that there was no probable cause to arrest Angela. First, the documents Angela gave Krause would likely be a “driver’s license” under the Kansas statute. Further, even if not a “driver’s license,” Krause learned from the dispatcher that she had a valid driver’s license in California, and therefore had enough information to know that she could not be convicted for the offense under the statute. The Tenth Circuit held that an officer does not have probable cause to arrest a person for a crime he know she could not be convicted of.

In sum, the Tenth Circuit reversed the Defendants’ convictions and remanded to the district court for proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Tenth Circuit: Sexual Assault Victim’s Prior Mental Health History Not Even Marginally Relevant to Assault at Issue

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in United States v. John on February 27, 2017.

Defendant and the victim were related. At trial, the victim testified to the following facts: The victim was in the shower when Defendant showed up at her house. He started undressing in front of the shower door while the victim was still in the shower. Defendant moved towards the victim and the victim struggled to get away. Defendant pulled the towel away from the victim and pushed her head toward his “private parts.” The victim was able to get away from Defendant and grabbed a blanket before running outside. When outside, the victim called the police. Officers arrived after Defendant had left. The officers found the shower door tilted and the bathroom trashcan turned over. No forensic testing occurred. Defendant was convicted on one count of attempted aggravated sexual abuse in Indian country and one count of abusive sexual contact in Indian county after a jury trial.

At trial, Defendant wanted to cross-examine the victim about an incident that occurred in Phoenix. The district court did not allow the line of questioning and the Defendant challenged the courts ruling on appeal claiming it violated his Confrontation Clause rights under the Sixth Amendment and his right to present a complete defense under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.

The Tenth Circuit summarized the facts of the Phoenix incident that it obtained from police reports. The victim had visited her sister in Phoenix. She alleged that her sister pressured her to drink. After the two argued, the victim tried to cut her writs. She was then taken to the hospital where she was transferred to an inpatient behavioral-health unit after telling the staff that she had been having suicidal thoughts for two years. During intake, she denied using any illicit substances, even though she told emergency staff that she used marijuana. The intake staff determined she had a mood disorder, but she was discharged without any medication needed. The victim’s sister denied to police that she gave the victim alcohol or coerced her to drink. Because the police could not determine how the victim got the alcohol, they closed the case.

On appeal, the Defendant argued that the Phoenix incident showed that the victim would falsely accuse him of sexual assault given her poorly controlled behavior and drug use revealed by the incident. It also would show her propensity to lie and accuse family members. These facts could have led the jury to draw “vital inferences” in his favor.

The Tenth Circuit held that because the Defendant only argued at trial that the Phoenix incident would show that the victim had an impaired ability to perceive events, and not the reasons given on appeal, Defendant was precluded from arguing such reasons on appeal. In fact, the Tenth Circuit points to the fact that Defendant’s counsel rejected the possibility of using the Phoenix incident for the reasons stated on appeal, which the Tenth Circuit held was an “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.”

The Tenth Circuit held that Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was not violated because that right is not unlimited. The Supreme Court has held that trial judges retain wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns about harassment, prejudice, and confusion of the issues. The Tenth Circuit held that the Phoenix incident was not even marginally relevant to the victim’s ability to remember or relate the shower incident. It would not show that the victim was on drugs at the time of the shower incident. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit held that no lay person could draw those inferences.

Next, the Tenth Circuit addressed the Defendant’s challenges to three jury instructs concerning the assessment of evidence.

The first challenged instruction stated: “The testimony of the complaining witness need not be corroborated if the jury believes the complaining witness beyond a reasonable doubt.” Defendant argued that the instruction did no accurately reflect the government’s burden of proving each element of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by giving this instruction because it properly informed the jury that it could convict on the basis of the testimony of a single witness, only if they believed that witness. Further, another instruction told the jurors that they could not convict unless they found each element of each offense beyond reasonable doubt.

The second challenged instruction stated: “An attorney has the right to interview a witness for the purpose of learning what testimony the witness will give. The fact that a witness has talked to an attorney does not reflect adversely to the truth of such testimony.” Defendant argued that this instruction insulated from the jury’s scrutiny the cross-examination of the victim about being improperly influenced by the prosecutor. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by giving this instruction because it did not prevent defense counsel from making a commonsense suggestion that inappropriate coaching influenced the witness, which the counsel actually made.

The final challenged instruction stated: “You may infer, but you are certainly not required to infer, that a person intends the natural and probably consequences of acts knowingly done or knowingly omitted.” Defendant argues that this instruction was ambiguous, because it was not stated which element the instruction was meant to modify, and that it was confusing because it created uncertainty as to the requisite level of intent. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by issuing this instruction because the court made clear to the jury that the burden was on the government to prove the requisite intent beyond a reasonable doubt.

Finally, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not err in declining to instruct the jury that it could consider the lesser-included charge of simple assault, rather than just the charges of attempted aggravated sexual abuse and abusive sexual contact. The district court held that there was no evidence that the encounter was anything but sexual. The Tenth Circuit affirmed this decision holding that the jury could reasonably have found that the alleged incident did not occur, but that there was no reasonable grounds for believing that Defendant assaulted the victim but with no sexual intent.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.