May 18, 2012

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SB 12-184: Allowing Owners of Special Mobile Machinery Fleets to Register Their Vehicles Once a Year and Have Special Tags

May 14, 2012 By Leave a Comment

On May 4, 2012, Sen. Bill Cadman introduced SB 12-184 – Concerning the Registration of Special Mobile Machinery Fleets, and, In Connection Therewith, Making an Appropriation. This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.

The bill allows an owner of more than 10 pieces of special mobile machinery to register all new special mobile machinery quarterly with the county and to obtain and use special mobile machinery plates, stickers, or certificates to designate that the registration for the machinery is pending. This allows the owner to renew the registrations for all of the machinery on the same date each year. If the machinery is not intended for highway use, its plate is not required to have an annual validating tab or sticker. Fees are set to implement the bill.

The bill is assigned to the Transportation Committee and is scheduled for committee review today at a time and place to be determined.

Since this summary, the  bill passed out of the Senate, and was assigned to the House Finance Committee. It was unamended in Finance and referred to Appropriations, then referred unamended to the House Committee of the Whole.

Summaries of other featured bills can be found here.

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HB 12-1357: Providing for Use of Unspent Funds for Capital Construction Projects at State Sponsored Institutes of Higher Education

May 11, 2012 By Leave a Comment

On April 30, 2012, Rep. J. Paul Brown and Sen. Scott Renfroe introduced HB 12-1357 – Concerning the Use of Unspent Moneys After Completion of Capital Construction Projects at State-Supported Institutions of Higher Education Authorized by a 2008 Federal Mineral Lease Revenues Lease-Purchase Agreement. This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.

Capital Development Committee bill.

The bill specifies that the state treasurer shall ensure that each state-supported institution of higher education submits a certificate of completion no later than August 1, 2012, for each project funded by the lease-purchase agreement entered into by the state treasurer in 2008. The bill specifies that after such certificates of completion are received by the state treasurer, the state treasurer and the state controller shall calculate the unspent proceeds raised through the 2008 lease-purchase agreement. The bill requires the state treasurer and state controller to provide that calculation to the capital development committee in writing by a specified date and requires the capital development committee to hold a public meeting during the interim to decide what the unspent proceeds should be used to fund, limited to capital construction projects at state-supported institutions of higher education or, so long as such projects are identified as eligible by bond counsel, controlled maintenance projects at state-supported institutions of higher education.

The bill requires the capital development committee’s decision to be communicated to the state treasurer in writing and requires the state treasurer to ensure that the approved project or projects are funded from the unspent proceeds raised through the 2008 lease-purchase agreement as soon as possible.

The bill also makes transfers necessary to provide state-supported institutions of higher education a proportionate refund of their cash contributions toward the cost of the project.

On May 2, the Finance Committee referred the unamended bill to the full Senate for consideration it to the Committee on Appropriations. On May 4, the Senate approved the bill on 2nd Reading.

Since this summary, the bill passed a 3rd Reading in the Senate and is headed to the Governor’s desk.

Summaries of other featured bills can be found here.

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SB 12-179: Requires All Schools to Comply with Building and Fire Code Regulations; Bars Individuals With Financial Interest from Serving on PSCCA Board

May 4, 2012 By Leave a Comment

On April 26, 2012, Sen. Gail Schwartz and Rep. Tom Massey introduced SB 12-179 – Concerning Governmental Oversight of Public School Capital Construction Projects. This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.

On and after July 1, 2012, the bill prohibits an individual who has any financial interest in a potential or funded “Building Excellent Schools Today Act” (BEST) project from serving as a member of the public school capital construction assistance board. The bill requires the BEST board to include information regarding assistance fund revenues and the assistance fund balance in the annual report that it presents to specified committees of the general assembly and to make the report available electronically on the web site of the department of education.

Under current law, the state division of fire safety generally adopts building standards for public school capital construction, conducts plan reviews, permitting, and inspections for public school buildings and structures, and issues certificates of occupancy for the buildings and structures. The division may, however, qualify a local building department to conduct those activities within the department’s jurisdiction, and a school board, a charter school, or the state charter school institute may go to a prequalified appropriate building department rather than the division for required plan reviews, permitting, inspections, and certificate of occupancy issuance. An appeals board considers appeals of the division’s administrative decisions. The bill:

  • Encourages the division to prequalify appropriate building departments whenever feasible and requires a school board that has buildings or structures only within the territory of one municipality or only within the unincorporated territory of one county, a charter school, or the state charter school institute to go to a prequalified appropriate building department, if one is available, in lieu of the division for required plan reviews, permitting, inspections, and certificate of occupancy issuance;
  • Adds the director of the division of public school capital construction assistance in the department of education to the appeals board and clarifies the scope of the board’s powers;
  • Requires the BEST division to conduct supplemental plan reviews for any BEST-funded public school capital construction project for which a prequalified appropriate building department, rather than the division, is conducting necessary plan reviews, issuing building permits, conducting inspections, and issuing a certificate of occupancy; and
  • Requires the BEST division to ensure that the owner’s representative for any BEST–funded project to be constructed pursuant to a design-build contract is wholly independent of the contractor.

The bill is assigned to the Education Committee; committee review is scheduled for Wednesday, May 2 Upon Adjournment.

Since this summary, the bill was amended in the Senate Education Committee and referred to Appropriations, but was recalled for reconsideration by the Education Committee.

Summaries of other featured bills can be found here.

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Colorado Court of Appeals: Insurance Company Had No Duty to Provide Coverage to Third Party Under Lapsed Commercial General Liability Policy

April 17, 2012 By Leave a Comment

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its decision in TCD, Inc. v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. on April 12, 2012.

Summary Judgment—Duty to Defend.

Plaintiff TCD, Inc. appealed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of defendant American Family Mutual Insurance Company (American Family), on the ground that the insurance company had no duty to defend TCD under a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy. The judgment was affirmed.

The developer, Frisco Gateway Center, LLC (Gateway), entered into a contract with TCD, the general contractor, to construct a building. TCD subcontracted with Petra Roofing and Remodeling Company (Petra) to install the roof. The subcontract required Petra to “indemnify, hold harmless, and defend” TCD against claims arising out of or resulting from the performance of Petra’s work on the project. Petra also was to name TCD as an additional insured on its CGL policy. American Family issued a CGL policy to Petra, with TCD as an additional insured. The policy was cancelled on June 10, 2007 for nonpayment of the premium.

TCD sued Gateway, seeking payment on the project. Gateway counterclaimed for breach of contract, negligence, and violation of the Consumer Protection Act. This action proceeded to arbitration and resulted in a binding award. As an additional insured under the CGL policy, TCD demanded that American Family defend and indemnify it in the underlying action, but American Family denied coverage.

TCD sued Petra and American Family, asserting claims for declaratory judgment, breach of insurance contract, breach of contract, and negligence. The district court entered a default judgment against Petra and granted summary judgment in favor of American Family.

On appeal, TCD argued that Gateway’s counterclaims were sufficient to raise a genuine issue as to whether American Family had a duty to defend it against those counterclaims. Alternatively, TCD argued it was entitled to have the Court of Appeals consider evidence not contained in the counterclaims that purportedly shows the insurance company had a duty to defend. Finally, TCD argued that CRS § 13-20-808, enacted three years after the CGL policy was cancelled, requires reversal. The Court rejected all three arguments.

TCD argued that Gateway’s claims constituted “property damage” covered by the CGL policy. The Court stated that defense and liability coverage in CGL policies issued to subcontractors generally is limited to property damage caused by an “occurrence.” In this policy, an “occurrence” is “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” In analyzing the counterclaims made by Gateway, the Court found no alleged “accident,” but found that Petra improperly installed the roof, resulting in defects that caused TCD to breach its contract with Gateway.

TCD argued that it should be allowed to go outside the “four corners” of the counterclaims and offer other evidence. The Court found the argument unpersuasive.

In May 2010, the legislature enacted HB 10-1394, codified as CRS § 13-20-808. The Court held that the statute was not retroactive, and therefore was inapplicable. The judgment was affirmed.

Summary and full case available here.

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SB 12-038: Protecting Consumers by Preventing Fraud by Roofing Contractors

February 10, 2012 By Leave a Comment

On January 11, 2012, Sen. Lois Tochtrop and Rep. Glenn Vaad introduced SB 12-038 – Concerning Measures to Protect Consumers Who Engage a Roofing Contractor to Perform Roofing Services on Residential Property. This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.

The bill requires residential roofing contractors to sign a written contract with customers that details the following:

  • The scope of roofing services and materials to be provided;
  • The approximate dates of service;
  • The costs of the services;
  • The roofing contractor’s contact information;
  • Identification of the roofing contractor’s surety and liability coverage insurer and their contact information, if applicable;
  • The roofing contractor’s policy regarding cancellation of the contract and refund of any deposit, including a rescission clause allowing the client to rescind the contract and obtain a full refund of any deposit within 72 hours after entering the contract; and
  • A written statement that if the client plans to use the proceeds of a property or casualty insurance policy to pay for the roofing work, the roofing contractor cannot pay, waive, rebate, or promise to pay, waive, or rebate all or part of any deductible applicable to the claim for payment for roofing work on the covered residential property.

A person who enters into a contract with a roofing contractor to perform roofing work on his or her residential property and who submits a claim to his or her property and casualty insurer for payment for the roofing work may rescind the contract for the roofing work if the insurer denies the claim in whole or in part, as long as the person notifies the roofing contractor within 72 hours after the claim is denied. The roofing contractor must refund any moneys paid by the customer within 10 days after receipt of the cancellation notice.

When residential roofing work will be paid from the proceeds of a property and casualty insurance policy covering the residential property, the roofing contractor is prohibited from paying, waiving, rebating, or offering or promising to pay, waive, or rebate all or part of any deductible that applies to the claim.

Assigned to the Business, Labor and Technology Committee.

Summaries of other featured bills can be found here.

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Colorado Court of Appeals: Interlocutory Appeal — Claims Barred by Statute of Repose; Dispute Regarding “Substantial Completion” to Be Resolved as Question of Law

February 8, 2012 By Leave a Comment

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Shaw Construction, LLC v. United Builder Services, Inc. on February 2, 2012.

Interlocutory Appeal—Construction Defect Action Reform Act—Tolling—Substantial Completion—Summary Judgment—Statute of Repose

In this interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary judgments for third-party defendants United Builder Services, Inc. and MB Roofing, Inc. (collectively, subcontractors), and against third-party plaintiff Shaw Construction, LLC (Shaw). The Court held that Shaw’s claims were barred by the statute of repose.

Plaintiff Roslyn Court at Stapleton Homeowners Association (HOA), not a party to this appeal, alleged construction defects in the Roslyn Court condominium complex, for which Shaw had been the general contractor. The project was built in three phases and included eighty residential units in thirty-three buildings, fifteen garage structures, and additional elements such as sidewalks, alleys, benches, courtyards, and landscaping.

Shaw hired subcontractors to hang drywall and install roofs, gutters, and downspouts. The City and County of Denver issued certificates of occupancy (COs) for each residential building (between September 24, 2003 and October 28, 2003 for Phase I; October 31, 2003 and January 29, 2004 for Phase II; and January 22, 2004 and March 10, 2004 for Phase III). The project’s architect did not certify completion of all known architectural items until June 8, 2004.

On May 15, 2007, Shaw received a notice of claim letter from the HOA under the Construction Defect Action Reform Act (CDARA). On January 21, 2009, the HOA filed this action against the developers of the property but did not add Shaw as a defendant until January 28, 2010. On March 29, 2010, Shaw filed its answer and third-party complaint, naming subcontractors, among others, as third-party defendants. Shaw sent its only notice of claim to subcontractors the following day.

Subcontractors moved for summary judgment on the basis that the six-year statute of repose had run. They argued that substantial completion had occurred not later than the date the final CO was issued, March 10, 2004. Shaw argued that substantial completion was June 8, 2004, when the architect certified completion. Shaw did not include any evidence that subcontractors’ work continued after the date of the CO on the last building. Alternatively, Shaw argued that under § 805, the HOA’s notice of claim had tolled all claims associated with the project, including those against subcontractors, even though they had not received actual notice of the claim.

The trial court granted subcontractors’ motions, finding that the last CO indicated substantial completion. The trial court also held that the plain language of the statute required actual notice to a party to toll a claim as to that party. The Court accepted an interlocutory appeal due to the unresolved questions regarding tolling and substantial completion under Colorado law.

The Court first addressed whether the determination of when substantial completion under CDARA occurs is a question of fact or a question of law. The Court agreed with the trial court that it is a question of law. CDARA does not contain a definition of “substantial completion.” The interpretation of when a claim accrues under a statute of limitations is an issue of law.

The Court then considered and rejected Shaw’s contention that its claims against subcontractors were tolled by the HOA’s notice of claim to Shaw under § 805. The statute does not say whether claims against participants in a project without notice of a claim are tolled, so the Court looked to the legislative intent behind CDARA and concluded that such an interpretation would not further that intent.

The Court also rejected Shaw’s argument that its claims were timely, because substantial completion did not occur until the architect’s certificate was issued. Shaw argued, without authority, that in a multi-stage project, improvement means the entire project. Subcontractors responded that the statute of repose is triggered “when the subcontractor completed its own work and not when the entire project was completed.” The Court concluded that an improvement may be a discrete component of an entire project, such as the last of multiple residential buildings. Accordingly, the summary judgments were affirmed.

This summary is published here courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer. Other summaries for the Colorado Court of Appeals on February 2, 2012, can be found here.

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Colorado Court of Appeals: Piercing the Corporate Veil of Single-Member LLC; Three-Prong Test

February 8, 2012 By Leave a Comment

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Martin v. Freeman on February 2, 2012.

Limited Liability Company—Veil Piercing

In this limited liability company (LLC) veil-piercing case, defendants Dean C.B. Freeman and Tradewinds Group, LLC appealed the trial court’s judgment in favor of plaintiff Robert C. Martin. The judgment was affirmed.

Freeman managed Tradewinds Group, LLC as a single-member LLC. Tradewinds contracted to have Martin construct an airplane hangar. In 2006, Tradewinds sued Martin for breaching the construction agreement. In 2007, while the litigation was pending, Tradewinds sold its only meaningful asset, an airplane, for $300,000 and the proceeds were diverted to Freeman, who paid Tradewinds’ litigation expenses. In 2008, a judgment was entered in favor of Tradewinds. Martin appealed. Another division of the Court of Appeals found that Tradewinds’ damages were speculative, and remanded the case with directions to enter judgment in Martin’s favor. On remand, Martin was awarded $36,645.60 in costs. The LLC had no assets and Martin instituted this action to pierce the LLC veil. Following a bench trial in 2010, the court pierced the veil and found Freeman personally liable for the cost award against Tradewinds. Tradewinds appealed, arguing it was error to pierce the LLC veil. The Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the judgment.

To pierce the LLC veil, the court must conclude (1) the corporate entity is an alter ego or mere instrumentality; (2) the corporate form was used to perpetrate a fraud or defeat a rightful claim; and (3) an equitable result would be achieved by disregarding the corporate form. Tradewinds challenged whether the first and second prongs were met.

As to the alter ego prong, the trial court found that: assets were commingled; negligible corporate records were kept; the records concerning substantive transactions were inadequate; there was a single-member/manager-facilitated misuse; the entity was thinly capitalized; undocumented infusions of cash were required to pay all operating expenses; Tradewinds was never operated as an active business; corporate formalities were disregarded; Freeman paid its debts without characterizing the transactions; assets were used for non-entity purposes; and Tradewinds was operated as a mere assetless shell. The Court held that these findings fully supported a conclusion that Tradewinds was Freeman’s alter ego.

Tradewinds argued that the second prong was not met because the trial court did not find wrongful intent or bad faith. The Court found no case, and defendant cited none, requiring a showing of wrongful intent. Therefore, it concluded that a showing that the corporate form was used to defeat a creditor’s rightful claim is sufficient. Here, Tradewinds sold its only asset and diverted the proceeds to Martin during the litigation. Transferring all of the assets to defeat a rightful creditor’s potential claim is sufficient to support piercing the corporate veil.

Tradewinds also argued that Martin waived the ability to collect litigation costs by not contesting the amount of the cost bond filed. The Court disagreed, concluding that Martin’s failure to contest the cost bond did not constitute an unequivocal act manifesting intent to relinquish the right to collect costs. The judgment was affirmed.

This summary is published here courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer. Other summaries for the Colorado Court of Appeals on February 2, 2012, can be found here.

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Colorado Court of Appeals: Court Erred in Finding that Mechanic’s Lien Had Priority Senior to Lien Claimants

December 27, 2011 By Leave a Comment

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Ferguson Enterprises, Inc. v. Keybuild Solutions, Inc. on December 22, 2011.

Mechanics Lien—Foreclosure—Priority—Deed of Trust—Construction.

In this mechanics’ lien foreclosure action involving the priority of liens relative to a deed of trust, defendant Colorado Community Bank (CCB) appealed the summary judgment in favor of the following lien claimants: plaintiff Ferguson Enterprises, Inc. and defendants Keybuild Solutions, Inc., Carpenters Service Inc., Autumn Landscaping, Inc., Premier Glass Solutions, Inc., SC Design, Inc., Systems Plumbing, LLC, and Colorado Counter-Tops, Inc. (collectively, lien claimants). The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded.

Zion Development, LLC (Zion) borrowed money from FlatIron Bank (FlatIron) to become the owner of the real property involved in this action. Zion hired architects to prepare a master plan, and later defaulted on the FlatIron loan and lost the property through a foreclosure action. Thereafter, FlatIron conveyed the property to Water Tower Builders, LLC (Water Tower), which financed the purchase of the property and construction activities through two loans obtained from CCB. Water Tower hired subcontractors to perform work on the property and later defaulted on the loan to CCB and lost the property to a foreclosure sale. The court granted the lien claimants’ motion, which claimed that its mechanics’ lien had priority over CCB’s deed of trust because it was entitled to relate its lien back to the date when work performed by the architects for Zion was filed as a master plan.

CCB contended that the trial court erred in determining that the mechanics’ liens involved here had a priority senior to its deed of trust. Mechanics’ liens are not entitled to priority under CRS § 38-22-103(2) over a pre-existing deed of trust expressly intended to secure a loan for construction if (1) the deed is recorded before attachment of the mechanics’ liens; and (2) the loan proceeds are used for construction purposes. Here, CCB’s recorded deed of trust was expressly intended to secure a loan for construction, and the lien claimants had notice of such deed of trust. Further, CCB presented evidence that it disbursed loan proceeds of $1.6 million for construction purposes. Thus, CCB’s pre-existing deed of trust was entitled to priority over that of the lien claimants.

Lien claimants contended that their liens “attached” as of October 23, 2007, because their work relates back to work performed by the architects for Zion. If the architects did not actually file a lien or if any architects’ lien were junior to FlatIron’s lien on any structure or improvements, the foreclosure would have extinguished it, and the lien claimants could not relate their work back to the master plan filing. Because the record does not provide the facts necessary to determine this issue for summary judgment purposes, the case was remanded to determine whether the relation-back doctrine applies in this case.

This summary is published here courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer. Other summaries for the Colorado Court of Appeals on December 22, 2011, can be found here.

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Colorado Court of Appeals: Constitutional Claims Sufficiently Substantial to Warrant Award of Attorney Fees

December 12, 2011 By Leave a Comment

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Beaver Creek Property Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Bachelor Gulch Metro. Dist. on December 8, 2011.

42 U.S.C. § 1988—Attorney Fees—State Law Claims—Relation Back Doctrine.

Defendant Bachelor Gulch Metropolitan District (Bachelor Gulch) appealed the district court’s orders awarding attorney fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to two groups of plaintiffs, namely, Beaver Creek Property Owners Association, Inc. (Beaver Creek) and Strawberry Park at Beaver Creek Property Owners Association, Inc. and certain of its owners (collectively, Strawberry Park). The order was affirmed in part and reversed in part.

When Vail/Arrowhead, Inc. (Vail) began developing the Strawberry Park subdivision, it agreed not to route any of its construction traffic through the Beaver Creek subdivision. Instead, Vail sent all of its construction traffic over a road in the neighboring community of Bachelor Gulch. In April 2006, Bachelor Gulch enacted a road regulation that effectively banned Strawberry Park subdivision construction traffic from its roads.

On appeal, Bachelor Gulch argued that the district court erred in awarding Strawberry Park its attorney fees, because Strawberry Park’s constitutional claims were not sufficiently “substantial.” When a party joins state law and constitutional claims but prevails only on the state law claims without deciding the constitutional claims, a court still may award attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 if the constitutional claim was substantial and the state law claim arose from a common nucleus of operative facts. Here, Strawberry Park was required to establish that the traffic regulation at issue and the classification that it allegedly established lacked a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. There was a substantial evidentiary record in which both sides presented evidence tending to support their respective positions. In light of this record, and fully recognizing that a plaintiff seeking to invalidate a regulation on rational basis grounds faces an uphill battle, it is not apparent that Strawberry Park’s constitutional claims were “obviously without merit,” as Bachelor Gulch contended. Accordingly, Strawberry Park’s constitutional claims were sufficiently substantial to warrant an award of attorney fees under § 1988.

Bachelor Gulch also contended that the district court erred in awarding attorney fees to Beaver Creek because Beaver Creek did not add its § 1983 claims until after the district court had granted partial summary judgment for plaintiffs. The relation back doctrine may not be used to create a post hoc basis for an award of attorney fees under § 1988. Therefore, Beaver Creek improperly relied on the relation back doctrine to establish, after the fact, a basis for seeking attorney fees. Accordingly, the district court erred in awarding Beaver Creek attorney fees in connection with constitutional claims that were filed after the court granted partial summary judgment for plaintiffs. This judgment was reversed.

This summary is published here courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer. Other summaries for the Colorado Court of Appeals on December 8, 2011, can be found here.

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Tenth Circuit: No Contest Plea Does Not Foreclose Due Process Challenge to the Knowing Use of Perjured Affidavit to Defeat Defense of Selective Prosecution

November 16, 2011 By Leave a Comment

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Klen v. City of Loveland on Tuesday, November 15, 2011.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s decision. Petitioners brought this civil rights action against Respondent City of Loveland, Colorado (City) and various City employees, alleging many constitutional violations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent on the federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Petitioners appeal from the district court’s award of summary judgment to Respondent.

The Court determined that the district court only considered the first element of the test for Petitioners’ First Amendment retaliation claim, “that the plaintiff was engaged in constitutionally protected activity;” because the analysis of that element was insufficient, the issue was remanded. In Petitioners’ substantive due process claim, they allege that Respondent “engaged in a continuous campaign of harassment, deceit, and delay . . .  intended to injure . . .  in a way unjustifiable by any government interest.” The Court found that an arbitrary deprivation of a property right may violate the substantive component of the Due Process Clause if the arbitrariness is extreme, but that extremity was not present here.

Additionally, the Court found that Petitioners have produced sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment regarding an alleged Fourth Amendment violation by ordering an unauthorized “special inspection” of the premises. Lastly, Petitioner’s “no contest plea does not foreclose his due process challenge to the knowing use of a perjured affidavit to defeat his defense of selective prosecution.”

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Team CBA-CLE Scores a “Hat Trick” with Three International Awards, Including One for Legal Connection

September 26, 2011 By Leave a Comment

The staff of Colorado Bar Association Continuing Legal Education (CBA-CLE) has so many enthusiastic hockey fans (including recreational players, coaches, referees, and those who just watch) that we thought it appropriate to have a hockey theme to celebrate when we won three awards in 2011. The “Hat Trick” from the international organization, the Association for Continuing Legal Education (ACLEA), included awards in the categories of Publications, Technology (for this blog!), and Public Interest.

Dawn McKnight, Assistant Executive Director of CBA-CLE says, “Our staff does an incredible job and we could not have won the awards without the help of the hundreds of attorneys and legal professionals in Colorado who contribute their time and resources to the projects.  There are too many people to name that volunteer countless hours for us, but we are extremely grateful and lucky to work with such talented and dedicated people. It’s very rewarding to be recognized by this international organization for the work we do and especially to win three in one year!  We’ll continue to work hard to achieve our ‘goals’ of providing quality legal education programs and publications for our legal community.”

2011 ACLEA AWARDS

  • Public Service Category:   Senior Law Day Project
  • Senior Law Day is an annual event for the public, held in several different locations each year around the state and offers workshops taught by attorneys and other professionals on critical topics  to seniors including Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, Estate Planning and many other issues.
  • Publications Category:   Residential Construction Law in Colorado, Third Edition
  • Written by noted attorneys Ronald M. Sandgrund, Scott F. Sullan, and Leslie A. Tuft, this timely and well-written book reviews critical issues with homeowners’ legal rights and remedies arising from the design, construction, marketing, and sale of single-family homes and multi-family communities.
  • Technology Category:   CBA-CLE Legal Connection Blog – www.cbaclelegalconnection.com
  • A free resource for the Colorado legal community to get the latest Colorado legal news easier and faster from one centralized, searchable resource.

DEFINITION OF A HAT TRICK: Three goals scored by one player in a single game.

ABOUT ACLEA: Established in 1964, ACLEA is an international association providing educational opportunities and professional interaction for its members.  The organization includes members in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Africa, and Mexico. Administrators, trainers, managers, educators, publishers, programmers and meeting professionals are all members of ACLEA.

ABOUT CBA-CLE:  Colorado Bar Association CLE [CBA-CLE] is the nonprofit education arm of the Colorado Bar Association and the Denver Bar Association. We produce high-quality continuing legal education programs and legal publications for attorneys and legal professionals in Colorado and the Rocky Mountain Region.

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James Gilbert: Industrial Art’s Impact on Scenic Colorado Prompts Citizens’ Lawsuit

September 7, 2011 By Leave a Comment

Artist Christo Vladimirov Javacheff, “Christo”, famous for suspending huge curtains of orange fabric over bridges, buildings and other public spaces throughout the world, has embarked on yet another art project. Christo and his wife Jeanne-Claude have targeted Colorado for a second time (the first time being in 1972) with plans to hang silvery, translucent fabric over the Arkansas River for two weeks in August 2014 for their “Over the River” project. Their original plan entailed a 42-mile stretch of river, however the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) agreed to an approximately 6 mile area.

Unfortunately for Christo, his vision has been met with opposition as the citizens group “Rags Over the Arkansas River” (ROAR) and two fly-fishing businesses, The Arkansas River Fly Shop and ArkAnglers, filed a lawsuit July 22, 2011 in Denver District Court. They are opposing the artist’s project pointing out the possible adverse impact on park values and requirement of a state permit.

The feared environmental harms would potentially impact wildlife including the bighorn sheep population, birds and elk, not to mention an unfavorable impact to fishing, rafting and other popular activities along this scenic river.

ROAR claims that in order to support the cables and fabric, Over the River would have to use heavy industrial equipment to drive thousands of industrial rock bolts into the canyon walls all the while damaging public lands and resources, not to mention creating noise, dust and causing hundreds of highway closures.

In June, an agreement with park officials was approved pending the Bureau of Land Management granting a federal permit. In exchange, Christo’s team would pay $550,000 in fees and expenses. The Colorado Wildlife Commission initially opposed the project before legislation married the two agencies.

While the BLM was analyzing the project over the last several years, it received thousands of public comments prompting an $11million dollar study paid for by Christo out of his approximately $50 million dollar budget. The BLM’s final Environmental Impact Statement addresses the various wildlife and traffic concerns over the narrow 2-lane canyon highway during the five year project’s construction and demolition.

Opponents state that they will continue to fight the project because of the devastation they foresee occurring to this area.

To read the BLM’s Environmental Impact Statement go to: http://www.blm.gov/co/st/en/fo/rgfo/planning/otr/otr_final_eis/otr_final_eis_documents.html

Jim Gilbert is founding and senior partner at The Gilbert Law Group. He has over thirty years of experience litigating complex cases against major auto manufacturers and other large corporations. He writes for his firm’s Colorado Business Litigation Lawyer Blog, where this post originally appeared on August 31, 2011.
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