May 23, 2017

Be an IP Superhero at the 15th Annual Rocky Mountain Intellectual Property & Technology Law Institute

Be an IP Superhero like Nate and Molly!

Evil trolls are coming to destroy our patents —

Ransomware and robots are taking over our computers —

Unfair competition is just, well, UNFAIR! —

Virtual reality has gone rogue —

 

But who can we call?

The IP Superheroes!

You can be an IP Superhero, too. Find out how by registering today for the 15th Annual Rocky Mountain Intellectual Property and Technology Law Institute. This year’s Institute features three plenary sessions:

  1. Mile High Sports Law with major team general counsels,
  2. Trends in IP law and litigation, presented by a panel of national federal court judges, and
  3. Ethics of Artificial Intelligence and Ethics and Disclosure Exposure.

Plus much more! The chief judges of the PTAB and TTAB will discuss new developments, and attorneys will present the Year in Review for the PTAB and TTAB. There will be sessions on Six Things You Can Do to Protect your Company and Clients • Cannabis and Marijuana Update • Hot Topics in Bio-Pharma Prosecution • Big Data, Data Breaches, Open Source, and More • Trademarking Pop Culture • Ransomware, Robots, and Raging Machines • Getting Indemnity Agreements Right • and Many More!

The 15th Annual Rocky Mountain Intellectual Property and Technology Law Update will take place on June 1-2 at the Westin Westminster, 10600 Westminster Blvd., Westminster, CO 80020. Click here to register today!

District of Colorado Local Rules Amended, Effective December 1, 2016

The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado has adopted changes to its local rules, effective December 1, 2016. The changes include a new Rule 2.1, “Forms of Action,” and an entire section on Local Patent Rules.

New Rule 2.1 clarifies that a proceeding not defined as a civil action under F.R.C.P. 2 should be filed as a civil miscellaneous (“mc”) or registered judgment (“rj”) action only if included in the List of Miscellaneous Cases. Rule 5.3 was amended by the addition of a subparagraph (c) dealing with written discovery requests or responses. The subparagraph specifies that other than in prisoner cases or as otherwise ordered, discovery requests shall be submitted by email or in other non-paper form. There were several other minor changes to various rules.

Section III on the Local Patent Rules is a comprehensive section dealing with the handling of patent claims in the U.S. District Court. The local rules are to be cited as D.C.Colo.LPtR _. The rules are to be known as the Local Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado – Patent Rules. The rules specify that the civil local rules apply except as inconsistent with the patent rules. Topics addressed in the local patent rules include scheduling conferences and orders, discovery and confidentiality, infringement, invalidity, declaratory judgment, reliance on counsel’s opinion, claim construction, final infringement and invalidity contentions, and word limits. The remaining sections were renumbered accordingly.

Comments about the local rules may be submitted to the Advisory Committee on the Local Rules via email. For more information about the local rule changes, click here. For a redline of the changes, click here.

The Internet of Things: A Disrupter? Precarious? The Jetsons?

IP_2016By John Ritsick, Esq.

Predictions about how much and how quickly technology will change the world can vary – we all can ask “where’s my flying car” now that the 2015 of “Back to the Future has come and gone and we still don’t have those flying cars. But the impact of The Internet of Things (IoT) will be significant, and the scope and scale can be mind-boggling. The IoT is the network of physical objects—devices, vehicles, buildings, and other items—embedded with electronics, software, sensors, and network connectivity that enables these objects to collect and exchange data. I work in the manufacturing industry and see the changes coming before they are close to the market, and I am constantly blown away by what we know is coming.

Nearly every industry and every type of tangible item is a potential participant in the IoT. The industries affected include automotive, transportation, city infrastructure, homes and household goods, retail stores—virtually all industries can potentially be incorporated into the IoT. Self-driving cars necessarily mean the car is connected to the Internet and is “smart” technology, but a self-driving car also means that other cars and vehicles are connected, that the roads the cars drive on and traffic systems are part of a larger environment, and that our emergency response services are connected as well.

I’ll be moderating a talk on the IoT at the 2016 Rocky Mountain IP & Technology conference in Denver in June. My colleague at Flex, Kenji Takeuchi, leads Products and Technology Management for the Flex’s Connected Living and IoT Software business. He’ll be talking about this subject and other thoughts on where technology is headed—it will be an insightful look into the future!

John Ritsick, Esq., is in-house counsel at Flex, a global leader In the categories of design, manufacturing, distribution, and aftermarket services. Find out more about the 2016 IP & Technology Institute at the links below.

 

CLE Program — 14th Annual Rocky Mountain Intellectual Property & Technology Institute

This CLE presentation will occur on June 2-3, 2016, at the Westin Westminster Hotel. Register online or call (303) 860-0608.

Can’t make the live program? Order the homestudy here: CDMP3

Top Ten Reasons to Attend the Rocky Mountain Intellectual Property Institute

Each year, Colorado Bar Association CLE hosts the Rocky Mountain Intellectual Property & Technology Institute, the “place to be for the best IP.” In case you haven’t yet registered for this year’s event, here are the Top Ten Reasons to Attend:

Top Ten Reasons to Attend the 2016 Intellectual Property & Technology Institute

10. Anyone who’s anyone will be there! And if you’re not there, anyone who’s anyone will know.
9. Patents … Trademarks …Copyrights … Licensing …Technology & Transactions!
8. Learn best practices and practical tips that you can apply immediately.
7. Special panels of USPTO patent judges and SPEs discussing developments at the USPTO.
6. Over 40 sessions presented by an all-star faculty of leading IP practitioners.
5. Grow your professional contacts through networking opportunities with IP attorneys from … well … from all over!
4. Receive the digital course materials AND the MP3 audio download for the ENTIRE Institute!
3. Some of the best from across the nation come together to share their knowledge & insights with you!
2. Annual case law updates of all branches of IP law.
1. This Institute has quickly become “the place to be for the best IP” in the western United States!

If that wasn’t enough to convince you, watch this video of Rocky Mountain Regional U.S. Patent & Trademark Office Director Molly Kocialski and Program Chair Nate Trelease explaining what you’ll learn at the Institute:

Don’t miss the 14th Annual Rocky Mountain Intellectual Property & Technology Institute! Register today.

CLE Program — 14th Annual Rocky Mountain Intellectual Property & Technology Institute

This CLE presentation will occur on June 2-3, 2016, at the Westin Westminster Hotel. Register online or call (303) 860-0608. Can’t make the live program? Order the homestudy here: CDMP3

Tenth Circuit: Collateral Estoppel Bars Relitigation of Claims Decided in Other Federal Courts

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Stan Lee Media Inc. v. Walt Disney Co. on Tuesday, December 23, 2014.

In October 1998, legendary comic book artist Stan Lee entered into an employment agreement (“1998 agreement”) with a Colorado company he formed to create new characters, Stan Lee Entertainment, Inc. (the predecessor to Stan Lee Media). At the time, Lee had worked for Marvel for approximately 60 years, and the agreement expressly recognized he would continue to work for Marvel. In November 1998, Lee entered into a similar agreement with Marvel, transferring to Marvel essentially the same rights he had transferred to Stan Lee Media through the 1998 agreement. In 2001, Stan Lee repudiated the 1998 agreement, contending Stan Lee Media committed material breach and reclaiming ownership of the intellectual property rights. Over five years later, Stan Lee Media recorded the 1998 agreement with the U.S. Copyright Office, asserting in a cover letter that the 1998 agreement transferred to Stan Lee Media ownership rights in many famous characters, including Spider-Man and Iron Man.

Meanwhile, Marvel exploited the comic book universe by selling and licensing the character rights to major production companies in order to create, sell, and distribute motion pictures. These included 2002’s Spider-Man movie, which has grossed over $800 million worldwide. Despite Marvel’s success, Stan Lee Media did not assert ownership interests over the characters until 2007, at which time it filed lawsuits across the country. Many courts have considered Abadin v. Marvel Entm’t, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 0715 (PAC), 2010 WL 1257519 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2010) (Abadin I) binding precedent, including the lower court in this action.

Stan Lee Media filed a claim against Disney in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging a single cause of action for federal copyright infringement. The district court granted Disney’s motion to dismiss, relying on Abadin I as precluding the Colorado litigation. Since the district court’s decision, the Ninth Circuit has issued a decision in a related suit. The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California dismissed Stan Lee Media’s claims on res judicata grounds, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed on different grounds, finding that Stan Lee Media failed to state a claim that is plausible on its face.

The Tenth Circuit reviewed the Ninth Circuit decision, the briefing in the Ninth Circuit and the Central District of California, and supplemental briefing submitted in the Tenth Circuit, and found that none of the elements of collateral estoppel can be reasonable debated, because each are present in the Tenth Circuit case.

The Tenth Circuit found that only the fourth element of collateral estoppel was seriously contested — Stan Lee Media alleges it did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the ownership issue. However, the Tenth Circuit rejected that argument. Stan Lee Media devoted five full pages in a response explaining how its claims met the Iqbal/Twombly and Rule 8 standards. Further, the Ninth Circuit’s decision was a dismissal with prejudice, so there is no point in allowing Stan Lee Media to amend its complaint. Finally, the Ninth Circuit’s singular and readily discernible rationale for dismissal — that Stan Lee Media’s claims are “simply implausible,” — clears all remaining obstacles to the application of collateral estoppel.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Stan Lee Media’s complaint for failure to state a claim.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Copyright Claims Carrying “Extra Element” Beyond Copyright Act Properly Tried in State Court

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Long v. Cordain on Wednesday, December 31, 2014.

Breach of Contract—Copyright Law—Breach of Fiduciary Duty—Civil Theft—Request for Accounting—Federal Law—Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

Cordain was a leading proponent of the Paleo Diet and had already published two books and several articles on the Paleo Diet before he met Long. Long and Cordain thereafter formed a company, Paleo Diet Enterprises, LLC (PDE), to commercially market the Paleo Diet. A few years later, Long and Cordain had a falling out. Cordain dissolved PDE and formed a new company, The Paleo Diet, LLC (TPD), without Long. Cordain filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the federal courts had jurisdiction to determine the copyright claims. While this matter was pending, Long filed similar actions in federal court.

Long argued that the district court erred in dismissing his claims against Cordain for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Generally, federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over any claim for relief arising under any act of Congress relating to copyrights. However, if the state claim requires an “extra element” beyond those required for relief under the Copyright Act, then it is not “equivalent to” a copyright action, and the state court may hear the claim. Here, Long’s complaint advanced four state-law causes of action: breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, civil theft, and a request for an accounting. Long’s breach of contract claim, which alleged that Cordain violated the LLC Agreement, required proof of acts different from those required to establish a copyright infringement action. Long’s breach of fiduciary duty claim, in which he would have to prove, among other things, that Cordain breached a fiduciary duty he owed to PDE, also satisfied the extra elements test. Additionally, the civil theft claim as a whole satisfied the extra element test because it required proof of “theft, robbery, or burglary” of tangible and intellectual property. Therefore, these claims contained an extra element that distinguished them from a claim arising under copyright law. Because these claims did not seek a remedy expressly granted by the Copyright Act, and did not require construction of the Act, they did not arise under federal copyright law, and the district court erred by dismissing them. Finally, Long’s request for accounting did not involve federal law at all, and the court erred by dismissing this claim, as well. The orders were vacated in part and dismissed in part, and the case was remanded with directions.

Summary and full case available here, courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Tenth Circuit: Special Master Must Employ Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison Test for Copyright Infringement

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Paycom Payroll, LLC v. Richison on Friday, July 11, 2014.

David Richison, with his niece and nephew, Shannon and Chad Richison,  formed a payroll processing company, Ernest Group, d/b/a Paycom Payroll, in Oklahoma in the 1990s. During his time with Ernest Group, David wrote two payroll processing software programs, BOSS and Independence. He transferred his authorship interest in BOSS to Ernest Group in the 1990s. When the relationship between David and Chad deteriorated in 2001, David moved to Maryland and formed his own company called Period Financial Corporation. At Period, he wrote a new software program based in part on Independence, which he called Period Indy. In May 2009, Ernest Group filed a copyright infringement lawsuit against David, asserting that Period Indy infringed on Ernest Group’s copyright in BOSS. Ernest Group subsequently filed for copyright on Independence, stating that it was a work for hire. By 2011, David had written another program, Cromwell.

In August 2011, the parties settled and agreed to the entry of a consent decree. All of Ernest Group’s claims were released except its claim for injunctive relief based on copyright infringement, and all rights to Independence were assigned to Ernest Group. The partied agreed that the district court should appoint a special master to write a report regarding whether the Cromwell program infringed on either BOSS or Independence, and the district court should decide the issue based on the special master’s report. The parties disagreed as to which version of Cromwell should be used for the analysis, but not which versions of BOSS and Independence. The special master opined in his report, marked “Attorney’s Eyes Only,” that Cromwell infringed upon both BOSS and Independence. The district court adopted the special master’s findings and ordered that all copies of Cromwell should be destroyed.

After the report was filed, David objected to the “Attorney’s Eyes Only” restriction, noting that as the author of all the software in question, he could assist his attorneys in reviewing the substance of the report. Ernest Group opposed the motion, and the district court denied it, stating that David advanced no grounds to support lifting the restriction. David’s attorneys filed objections to the special master’s report, arguing that the special master failed to conduct the abstraction-filtration-comparison test, or at least that he did not document his application of the test. Ernest Group’s attorneys agreed with the objections to some extent and requested that the report be resubmitted to the master for further findings. Before the district court could rule, Ernest Group’s attorneys mailed David’s “highly critical” objections directly to the special master. David’s attorneys called for a new special master, claiming that Ernest Group had irrevocably tainted the master’s neutrality. The district court, instead of resubmitting the report to the special master, called on Ernest Group’s attorneys to offer a more substantive response to David’s critique of the report, which they did. The district court adopted the special master’s report in its entirety, ruled that Cromwell infringed upon Ernest Group’s copyrights in both BOSS and Independence, and ordered all copies of Cromwell destroyed. This appeal followed.

David raised four issues on appeal: (1) the “Attorney’s Eyes Only” restriction should be lifted, (2) the special master erred by evaluating versions of BOSS and Independence that were never registered with the copyright office, (3) the special master’s report was inadequate and the versions were not substantially similar, and (4) a new special master should be appointed if remand is necessary. The Tenth Circuit evaluated these claims in turn. The Tenth Circuit declined to agree with David on the first claim, noting that he agreed to the restriction in a consent decree and allowing David to view the report was not so fundamental of a right as to be unwaivable, and commenting that such restrictions are common in trade secret litigation. For the second claim, the Tenth Circuit similarly rejected David’s arguments, since he impliedly consented to the versions in two documents submitted to the court and his argument was therefore waived.

As to the third claim, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s adoption of the special master’s report. The Tenth Circuit agreed that the special master should have documented his application of each step of the abstraction-filtration-comparison test, which he did not do. The report contained little evidence that the master performed the abstraction test, and in fact the report seemed to deem abstraction superfluous. Because the abstraction test was not performed, the special master’s findings regarding filtration were limited, and his entire analysis was flawed. The case was remanded for more complete reporting by the special master. In his fourth claim, David requested that a new special master be appointed, due to potential bias from the master receiving David’s critique. The Tenth Circuit disagreed, because the parties had agreed to this particular special master, and also noting that it only addressed David’s contentions in this appeal so if need arose for a different special master in the future that claim would not be barred.

The district court’s judgment was reversed and remanded for further reporting by the special master using the abstraction-filtration-comparison test.

Tenth Circuit: Court Rejects “Continuing Wrong” Doctrine in Copyright Infringement Claims

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in Diversey v. Schmidly on Monday, December 23, 2013.

Andrew Diversey sued several administrators and members of the Board of Regents of the University of New Mexico (UNM) for infringing his copyright to an unpublished dissertation. Diversey complained about alleged failings of his dissertation committee to departmental and university administrators, including Charles Fleddermann, UNM’s Dean of Graduate Studies. As Diversey continued to attempt to convince UNM officials to correct the deficiencies in the dissertation process, he provided a copy of the draft dissertation to Doug Weintraub, who volunteered to proofread it. Before Weintraub could do so, Fleddermann allegedly confiscated the draft.

On February 7, 2008, UNM Deputy Provost Richard Holder wrote Diversey to advise him the dissertation had been deposited in the Zimmerman Library at UNM. Diversey continued complaining to various UNM officials. On June 16, 2009, Diversey discovered two copies of his dissertation: one in UNM’s Zimmerman Library and another in the collection of the Zimmerman Library’s Center for Southwest Research. These copies were available to the general public. Diversey wrote each of the appellees, including the Dean of University Libraries, citing his copyright and requesting the return of all copies of his dissertation. On October 5, 2009, UNM’s counsel sent Diversey a letter refusing Diversey’s request.

On June 15, 2012, Diversey filed a complaint for copyright infringement. The district court dismissed Diversey’s complaint as untimely under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), concluding the claim accrued in February 2008, when Diversey was notified of his dissertation’s deposit in the Zimmerman Library. A claim for copyright infringement must be brought within three years after the claim accrues.

Diversey argued that under a “continuing wrong” exception to the statutory limitation, his claim was not time barred. The Tenth Circuit rejected as unnecessary the “continuing wrong” doctrine in the copyright infringement context. It adopted the majority view, which holds that a related act of infringement during the limitation period does not allow recovery for acts that occurred more than three years before a complaint was filed.

Diversey, however, argued two infringements, one of his exclusive right to make copies; the other of his right to distribute copies to the public. The court held that his claim regarding making copies was untimely as he had notice of infringement no later than February 20, 2008. The court affirmed the dismissal of this claim but reversed dismissal of his right to distribute claim. Depositing the work in the library was not a distribution of the work. That did not occur until it was entered into the library’s catalog information system, at which time the public could access it.

The court rejected the appellees’ fair use argument and remanded to the district court to address their individual liability for infringement.

Tenth Circuit: Copyright Co-ownership Claim Barred by Statute of Limitations

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in Cooper v. NCS Pearson, Inc. on Monday, August 19, 2013.

Julia Copeland Cooper (Copeland) appealed from a grant of summary judgment dismissing on statute of limitations grounds her Copyright Act claims against NCS Pearson, Inc. for co-ownership of a psychological test. Copeland co-created a psychological test instrument called the Battery for Health Improvement (BHI) with Mark Disorbio, her husband at the time, and Daniel Bruns. Copeland is a physical therapist and Dr. Disorbio and Dr. Bruns are both clinical psychologists. After creating the BHI,  Copeland, Bruns, and Disorbio formed a corporation called Battery for Health and Illness, Inc. (BHI, Inc.). Bruns and Disorbio were the corporation’s directors and Copeland was its president and registered agent. In 1993, Bruns and Disorbio assigned their intellectual property rights in the BHI to the corporation. Each assignment stated that Dr. Bruns and Dr. Disorbio were the joint authors and owners of the BHI and the “absolute proprietor[s] of the copyright and all attendant intellectual property rights of the Work.”

Also in 1993, Bruns, Disorbio, and BHI, Inc. granted defendant’s predecessor corporation “all right, title, and interest” in the BHI, granting the right to publish and market the test in exchange for royalties. The Publication Agreement with NCS defined the “authors” of the BHI as Bruns, Disorbio, and BHI, Inc., and warranted that they “exclusively own all Intellectual Property Rights” in the BHI “and that no other person has an option, claim, or right” to the test. The Publication Agreement did not identify Copeland as an author. It was signed by Copeland for BHI, Inc., Bruns, Disorbio, and a representative of NCS.

The statute of limitations for claims under the Copyright Act is three years. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that the 1993 Agreement placed Ms. Copeland on notice that her ostensible copyright co-ownership claim was in jeopardy and thereby started the statute of limitations running.

In 1996, NCS first published the BHI. The cover stated that it was “by” Dr. Bruns and Dr. Disorbio, “with contributions by” Ms. Copeland. She was also listed in the “About the Authors” section. NCS began to send royalty checks to BHI, Inc., to the attention of Copeland as president. She disbursed 50% of the money to Bruns and 50% to Disorbio.

Even if Copeland’s claims had not accrued in 1993, they accrued no later than 1996. Awareness that one is not being credited in the same manner as other authors starts the statute of limitations running for copyright co-ownership claims. Copeland was also aware in 1996 she was not receiving royalties but that Bruns and Disorbio were. Awareness that one is not receiving royalties also puts one on notice of the basis for a copyright co-ownership claim. Because Copeland did not bring her action until 2010, the court affirmed.

Tenth Circuit: Prima Facie Case of Copyright Infringement Shown

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in Enterprise Management Limited v. Warrick on Tuesday, May 21, 2013.

In 1987, Mary Lippitt created and registered a diagram aimed to encapsulate and communicate the results of her research on the failures of complex organizational change initiatives. Sometime around 1996, Lippitt revised the diagram, and updated it slightly. Warrick, who teaches in the organizational development field, admitted receiving Lippitt’s diagram from a student. He incorporated and used a similar diagram in his course materials and in his consulting business. Although Warrick did not initially know Lippitt was the diagram’s creator, he later discovered this fact and began to credit her work at the bottom of his diagram.

Lippit sued Warrick for copyright infringement.  Warrick moved for summary judgment. As pertinent to this appeal, Warrick argued: (1) Lippitt could not prove she held a valid copyright on the diagram because she could not produce the diagram from the materials accompanying her 1987 registration to show its similarity to Warrick’s diagram. (2) Lippitt’s diagram was not copyrightable; and (3) Warrick’s diagram did not infringe on any protected expression in Lippitt’s diagram. After hearing arguments, the court granted Warrick’s motion. Lippit appealed.

On appeal, Lippitt contended she demonstrated a prima facie case of copyright infringement. The Tenth Circuit agreed.

There are two elements to a copyright infringement claim; a plaintiff must show both ownership of a valid copyright, and copying of protectable constituent elements of the work. La Resolana Architects, PA v. Reno, Inc., 555 F.3d 1171, 1177-78 (10th Cir. 2009). In construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Lippitt, the Tenth Circuit found she demonstrated a prima facie case of both elements.

First, because there are many ways to express the ideas depicted in Lippitt’s diagram, the expression does not “merge” with the underlying ideas and were therefore eligible for copyright protection. Second, the Court saw protectable creative insight in Lippitt’s arrangement and choice of expression. Further, the parties’ arguments about the evidence of copying are perplexing because the parties seem to agree on the salient point: Warrick admitted he copied Lippitt’s diagram.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

Tenth Circuit: No Copyright Infringement Without Substantial Similarity

The Tenth Circuit published its opinion in Blehm v. Jacobs on Thursday, December 27, 2012.

Gary Blehm brought a copyright infringement action against Albert and John Jacobs and the Life is Good Company (collectively “Life is Good”). Blehm is the creator of copyrighted posters featuring cartoon characters called “Penmen.” He alleged that numerous Life is Good depictions of a cartoon character called “Jake” infringed on his copyrighted works. The district court granted Life is Good’s motion for summary judgment, holding that no infringement occurred because the accused works were not substantially similar to the legally protectable elements of the copyrighted Penmen works.

The Tenth Circuit first discussed the idea/expression distinction required by the § 102(b) of the Copyright Act. Because the Act protects expression, not ideas, the court looks at only the protected elements, the expression, to determine if there are substantial similarities to an accused work. The test is “whether the accused work is so similar to the plaintiff’s work that an ordinary reasonable person would conclude that the defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff’s . . . expression by taking material of substance and value.” After comparing the images, the court found them “so dissimilar as to protectable expression that the substantial similarity question need not go to a jury” and affirmed summary judgment for the defendants.

SB 11-261: Amending Statutes Addressing the Publication of the Colorado Revised Statutes

On April 25, 2011, Sen. Ellen Roberts, R-Durango, and Rep. Bob Gardner, R-Colorado Springs, introduced SB 11-261 – Concerning the publication of the Colorado Revised Statutes by persons other than the general assembly. This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.

Committee on Legal Services. The bill amends statutes addressing the publication of the Colorado Revised Statutes to more clearly and appropriately reflect federal copyright law. It repeals the requirement in current law that directs the committee on legal services to copyright the Colorado Revised Statutes, but permits the committee, or its designee, to register a copyright for and on behalf of the state of Colorado in any and all original publications and editorial work that are ancillary to the Colorado Revised Statutes.

Under the bill, other publishers of the Colorado Revised Statutes who use the official text from the statutory database may state that their publications are officially sanctioned. The bill repeals the statutory penalties for the unauthorized publication of copyrighted materials, which provisions have not been employed or enforced in the past. Assigned to the Judiciary Committee; the bill is scheduled for committee review on Monday, May 2 at 1:30 p.m.

Since this summary, the bill has passed its Second Reading the Senate.

Summaries of other featured bills can be found here.