May 24, 2018

Bills Signed Enacting Uniform Trust Code, Creating Civil Rape Shield Law, Helping Preserve Family Units with Parents with Disabilities, and More

On Wednesday, April 25, 2018, Governor Hickenlooper signed nine bills into law. On Thursday, April 26, 2018, he signed five bills into law. To date, he has signed 183 bills and sent one bill to the Secretary of State without a signature. The bills signed Wednesday and Thursday include a bill enacting the Colorado Uniform Trust Code, a bill enacting a civil rape shield statute, a bill amending family preservation safeguards for parents with disabilities, a bill requiring free-standing emergency rooms to post certain consumer notices, and more. The bills signed Wednesday and Thursday are summarized here.

  • SB 18-071 – “Concerning an Extension of the Repeal of the State Substance Abuse Trend and Response Task Force, and, in Connection Therewith, Making an Appropriation,” by Sens. Cheri Jahn & Larry Crowder and Rep. Daneya Esgar. The state substance abuse trend and response task force is scheduled to be repealed effective July 1, 2018. The bill extends the repeal for 10 years to September 1, 2028.
  • SB 18-146 – “Concerning a Requirement that a Freestanding Emergency Department Inform a Person who is Seeking Medical Treatment about the Health Care Options that are Available to the Person, and, in Connection Therewith, Making an Appropriation,” by Sens. John Kefalas & Jim Smallwood and Reps. Lang Sias & Jonathan Singer. The bill requires a freestanding emergency department (FSED), whether operated by a hospital at a separate, off-campus location or operating independently of a hospital system, to provide any individual that enters the FSED seeking treatment a written statement of patient information, which an FSED staff member or health care provider must explain orally.
  • SB 18-154 – “Concerning a Requirement for a Local Juvenile Services Planning Committee to Devise a Plan to Manage Dually Identified Crossover Youth,” by Sen. Rhonda Fields and Rep. Joseph Salazar. The bill requires local juvenile services planning committees to devise a plan to manage dually identified crossover youth. A dually identified crossover youth is a youth involved in both the juvenile justice system and the child welfare system. The plan must contain descriptions and processes.
  • SB 18-169 – “Concerning Offenses Against Witnesses in Noncriminal Proceedings,” by Sen. Bob Gardner and Rep. Terri Carver. The clarifies that the offenses of intimidating a witness or victim and retaliation against a witness or victim apply to witnesses in criminal, civil, and administrative proceedings.
  • SB 18-180 – “Concerning the Colorado Uniform Trust Code,” by Sen. Bob Gardner and Reps. Cole Wist & Matt Gray. The bill enacts the Colorado Uniform Trust Code and repeals many sections of the Colorado Probate Code.
  • SB 18-187 – “Concerning Transferring Marijuana Fibrous Waste for the Purpose of Producing Industrial Fiber Products,” by Sens. Vicki Marble & Jack Tate and Rep. Jeni James Arndt. The bill gives the state licensing authority rule-making authority to address conditions under which a medical or retail marijuana licensee is authorized to transfer marijuana fibrous waste to a person for the purpose of producing only industrial fiber products.
  • HB 18-1104 – “Concerning Family Preservation Safeguards for Parents with Disabilities,” by Rep. Jessie Danielson and Sens. Dominick Moreno & Kent Lambert. The bill establishes that family protection safeguards for a parent or prospective parent with a disability are critical to family preservation and the best interests of the children of Colorado. These safeguards include that a parent’s disability must not serve as a basis for denial or restriction of parenting time or parental responsibilities in a domestic law proceeding, that a parent’s disability must not serve as a basis for denial of participation in a public or private adoption, or for denial of foster care or guardianship, and that the benefits of providing supportive parenting services must be considered by a court when determining parental responsibilities, parenting time, adoption placements, foster care, and guardianship.
  • HB 18-1132 – “Concerning the Amount that the Department of Corrections is Required to Reimburse a County or City and County for the Confinement and Maintenance in a Local Jail of any Person who is Sentenced to a Term of Imprisonment in a Correctional Facility,” by Rep. Dafna Michaelson Jenet and Sen. Larry Crowder. Under current law, the General Assembly establishes in its annual general appropriations bill the amount that the Department of Corrections is required to reimburse any county or city and county for a portion of the expenses and costs incurred by that county or city and county for the confinement and maintenance in a local jail of any person who is sentenced to a term of imprisonment in a correctional facility. The bill states that, to assist the General Assembly in determining such rate of reimbursement, each county and each city and county shall report to the joint budget committee the average cost of confining and maintaining persons in a local jail for more than 72 hours after each such person has been sentenced to the custody of the department.
  • HB 18-1147 – “Concerning the Continuation of the Regulation of People who Modify the Weather, and, in Connection Therewith, Implementing the Sunset Review Recommendations of the Department of Regulatory Agencies,” by Reps. Joann Ginal & Kim Ransom and Sen. Don Coram. The bill continues the regulation of people who modify the weather.
  • HB 18-1211 – “Concerning Controlling Medicaid Fraud,” by Reps. Cole Wist & Mike Foote and Sens. Irene Aguilar & Jim Smallwood. The bill establishes the medicaid fraud control unit in the department of law. The unit is responsible for investigation and prosecution of medicaid fraud and waste, as well as patient abuse, neglect, and exploitation. Prior to initiating a criminal prosecution, the unit must consult with the district attorney of the judicial district where the prosecution would be initiated.
  • HB 18-1237 – “Concerning the Continuation of the Requirements Regarding the Preparation of a Cost-Benefit Analysis as Administered by the Department of Regulatory Agencies, and, in Connection Therewith, Implementing the Recommendations Contained in the 2017 Sunset Report by the Department of Regulatory Agencies,” by Reps. Tracy Kraft-Tharp & Kevin Van Winkle and Sen. Tim Neville. The bill implements the recommendations of the Department of Regulatory Agencies’ sunset review and report on requirements and procedures regarding the preparation of a cost-benefit analysis.
  • HB 18-1243 – “Concerning Enactment of a Civil Rape Shield Law,” by Reps. Mike Foote & Cole Wist and Sens. Don Coram & Rhonda Fields. Under Colorado criminal law there is a rape shield law that presumes that evidence of a victim’s sexual conduct is irrelevant and not admissible except for evidence of the victim’s prior or subsequent sexual conduct with the defendant or evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or origin of semen, pregnancy, disease, or any similar evidence of sexual intercourse offered for the purpose of showing that the act or acts were or were not committed by the defendant. The bill creates a similar presumption in a civil proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct. If a party wants to introduce sexual conduct evidence, it must file a confidential motion with the court at least 63 days prior to trial. Prior to ruling on the motion, the court shall conduct an in camera hearing and allow the parties and alleged victim to attend and be heard.
  • HB 18-1275 – “Concerning the Repeal of the Craig Hospital License Plate Donation Requirement,” by Rep. Jeff Bridges and Sen. Daniel Kagan. Current law requires an applicant to make a donation to Craig Hospital in order to be issued a special Craig Hospital license plate. The bill repeals the $20 donation requirement.
  • HB 18-1282 – “Concerning a Requirement that a Health Care Provider Include Certain Identifying Information on all Claims for Reimbursement for Health Care Services,” by Reps. Susan Lontine & Lang Sias and Sens. Jim Smallwood & John Kefalas. The bill requires an off-campus location of a hospital to apply for, obtain, and use on claims for reimbursement for health care services provided at the off-campus location a unique national provider identifier, commonly referred to as NPI. The off-campus location’s NPI must be used on all claims related to health care services provided at that location, regardless of whether the claim is filed through the hospital’s central billing or claims department or through a health care clearinghouse. It also requires all medicaid providers that are entities to obtain and use a unique NPI for each site at which they deliver services and for each provider type that the department of health care policy and financing has specified.

For a complete list of Governor Hickenlooper’s 2018 legislative decisions, click here.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Obvious Error in Trial Court’s Restitution Calculation Did Not Seriously Affect Fairness or Integrity of Judicial Proceeding

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Butcher on Thursday, April 19, 2018.

Restitution—Post-Judgment Interest—Crim. P. 52(b)—Plain Error.

A jury convicted Butcher of two counts of securities fraud and two counts of theft from at-risk adults, and he was ordered to pay restitution.

On appeal, Butcher argued that the trial court erred in its award of prejudgment and post-judgment interest in its amended restitution order. The court of appeals reviewed the appeal for plain error and found that the trial court erred by calculating post-judgment interest from the date of conviction rather than from the date of the operative restitution order. However, although this error was obvious, it did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

The court exercised its discretion under Crim. P. 52(b) and affirmed the order.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Police Officer’s Testimony Defining Street Slang for Drug Considered Expert Testimony

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Bryant on Thursday, April 19, 2018.

Assault—Expert Testimony—Jury Instructions—MirandaWarning—Voluntary Statements—Evidence.

While high on PCP, defendant assaulted two teenagers. After defendant’s arrest, police officers interviewed him and he admitted that he was under the influence of PCP, which he initially referred to as “sherm.” Defendant told officers that they could retrieve the substance from his sock, which they did. Before trial, defendant filed several motions to suppress. The court denied all of the motions, ruling that defendant’s statements were made voluntarily and that he had validly waived his Miranda rights. Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance and two counts of third degree assault.

On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred by ruling that his statements to the police were voluntary. He argued that the police exploited his intoxicated state during their interrogation. Here, by the time they reached the police station, defendant was calm, coherent, and cooperative. The interview lasted no more than 15 minutes; there was no evidence that defendant’s demeanor changed during the interview; and there was no evidence of psychological coercion. The trial court did not err by finding that defendant’s statements to police were voluntary.

Defendant also contended that his statements should have been suppressed because police failed to obtain a valid waiver of his Miranda rights. Defendant contended that he was so intoxicated and confused when he was advised of his Miranda rights that he did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights. The record supports the trial court’s finding that defendant was not intoxicated when he waived his Miranda rights. The trial court did not err by finding that defendant validly waived his Miranda rights.

Defendant also contended that the trial court reversibly erred by allowing Officer Fink to testify as a lay witness regarding the meaning of the term “sherm.” This testimony was not based on Officer Fink’s personal knowledge or investigation of defendant’s case, but was based on his training and experience as a police officer. Although the trial court erred by allowing Officer Fink to testify as a lay witness, the error was harmless because the testimony was cumulative of other evidence presented at trial that served to prove the “knowingly” element of the possession charge.

Defendant next contended that the trial court erred by improperly instructing the jury. First, the instruction that voluntary intoxication was not a valid defense to the charged crimes could not have confused the jury, particularly because it was a brief and correct statement of the law. Second, the pattern instruction on mens rea was legally correct and informed the jury to apply a subjective standard rather than on objective standard. There was no error in the manner in which the trial court instructed the jury.

The judgment was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Bills Signed Modifying Public Trustee Foreclosure Process, Lowering Mandatory Parole for Certain Felonies, and More

On Monday, April 23, 2018, Governor Hickenlooper signed 20 bills into law. To date, he has signed 169 bills and sent one to the Secretary of State without a signature. Some of the bills signed Monday include a bill modifying the Public Trustee Foreclosure process, a bill lowering mandatory parole for certain felonies, a bill allowing discretionary parole of special needs offenders, and more. The bills signed Monday are summarized here.

  • HB 18-1008 – “Concerning the Financing of the Division of Parks and Wildlife’s Aquatic Nuisance Species Program, and, in Connection Therewith, Creating an Aquatic Nuisance Species Stamp for the Operation of Motorboats and Sailboats in Waters of the State, Increasing Penalties Related to the Introduction of Aquatic Nuisance Species into the Waters of the State, and Combining Two Separate Funds Related to the Aquatic Nuisance Species Program into One Fund,” by Reps. Daneya Esgar & Jeni James Arndt and Sens. Kerry Donovan & Don Coram. The bill updates a legislative declaration concerning aquatic nuisance species to encourage the federal government to dedicate sufficient funding and resources to the detection, prevention, control, and eradication of aquatic nuisance species for federally owned or managed aquatic resources and water infrastructure in Colorado.
  • HB 18-1025 – “Concerning the Nonsubstantive Relocation of Laws Related to the Regulation of Alcohol Beverages from Title 12, Colorado Revised Statutes, to a New Title 44 as Part of the Organizational Recodification of Title 12, and, in Connection Therewith, Making an Appropriation,” by Rep. Leslie Herod and Sens. John Cooke & Bob Gardner. The bill creates Title 44 and relocates laws related to the regulation of alcohol beverages to the new Title 44.
  • HB 18-1029 – “Concerning Lowering the Period of Mandatory Parole from Five Years to Three Years for Certain Felony Offenses,” by Rep. Mike Weissman and Sen. Kevin Lundberg. Under current law, the length of a mandatory parole sentence for a class 2 and 3 felony is 5 years. The bill lowers the length of mandatory parole for a class 2 felony if the offense is not a crime of violence and a class 3 felony to 3 years.
  • HB 18-1047 – “Concerning Technical Modifications to the ‘Fair Campaign Practices Act’ to Facilitate its Administration,” by Rep. Susan Lontine and Sen. Bob Gardner. The bill makes technical modifications to the “Fair Campaign Practices Act” (FCPA) to facilitate its administration.
  • HB 18-1065 – “Concerning Discipline of a Department of Human Services Employee when the Employee is Found to have Mistreated a Vulnerable Person,” by Reps. Susan Beckman & Janet Buckner and Sens. Kent Lambert. Current law specifies when an employee of the Department of Human Services will be suspended or dismissed after being charged with specified criminal offenses. However, the Department has encountered difficulty in suspending, dismissing, or otherwise disciplining employees through the administrative process when the employee was involved in an egregious incident of mistreatment of a vulnerable person but was not convicted of a criminal offense. The bill specifies that in considering a disciplinary action against an employee for engaging in mistreatment, abuse, neglect, or exploitation, against a vulnerable person, the appointing authority shall give weight to the safety of vulnerable persons over the interests of any other person.
  • HB 18-1098 – “Concerning the Expanded Ability of the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission to Finance the Remediation of Oil and Gas Locations,” by Reps. Lori Saine & Matt Gray and Sen. Vicki Marble. Under current practice, expenditures by the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission to address the mitigation of adverse environmental impacts of oil and gas operations are paid from the environmental response account of the oil and gas conservation and environmental response fund, and the year-end balance of the account transfers into the fund. The bill specifies that the year-end balance of the account remains in the account.
  • HB 18-1109 – “Concerning Discretionary Parole of Special Needs Offenders,” by Rep. Mike Weissman and Sen. John Cooke. The bill makes several changes to the process of determining parole for special needs offenders.
  • HB 18-1191 – “Concerning a Local Authority’s Ability to Alter Speed Limits Within the Local Authority’s Jurisdiction,” by Rep. Faith Winter and Sens. Beth Martinez Humenik & John Kefalas. Current law requires county and municipal authorities (authorities) to conduct a traffic investigation or survey before increasing or decreasing the speed limits within the authority’s jurisdiction. The bill allows the authority to also consider certain other factors.
  • HB 18-1227 – “Concerning the Authority of the Real Estate Commission to Issue Licenses for an Initial Period of Less than Three Years,” by Reps. Leslie Herod & Cole Wist and Sen. John Cooke. The bill authorizes the Real Estate Commission to issue licenses that expire on December 31 of the year of issuance.
  • HB 18-1242 – “Concerning the Salary Categorization of Locally Elected Officers in Specified Counties,” by Reps. KC Becker & Donald Valdez and Sens. Larry Crowder & Randy Baumgardner. Current law categorizes each county for purposes of establishing the salaries of elected county officials in the county. The statutory salary amounts are adjusted every 2 years for inflation and take effect for terms commencing after any change is made. The bill modifies the categories of 4 counties with the accompanying percentage increase in salary.
  • HB 18-1254 – “Concerning the Modification of the Foreclosure Process on Property that is Encumbered by a Deed of Trust,” by Rep. Kevin Van Winkle and Sen. Jim Smallwood. The bill makes several modifications to the public trustee foreclosure process, including eliminating the authority of the holder’s attorney to specify a newspaper for publication, allowing an amended combined notice to be omitted in certain circumstances, modifying the amounts of deposits required for fees and costs of the public trustee, and more.
  • HB 18-1327 – “Concerning the All-Payer Health Claims Database, and, in Connection Therewith, Making an Appropriation,” by Rep. Dave Young and Sen. Dominick Moreno. The bill authorizes the General Assembly to appropriate general fund money to the Department of Health Care Policy and Financing to pay for expenses related to the all-payer health claims database.
  • HB 18-1330 – “Concerning a Supplemental State Payment Relating to Certain Office-Administered Oncology-Related Drugs for Qualified Providers under the Medical Assistance Program who Experienced a Reduction in Reimbursement Payments in the 2017-18 State Fiscal Year as a Result of the Implementation of the Federal Final Rules for Covered Outpatient Drugs, and, in Connection Therewith, Making an Appropriation,” by Rep. Dave Young and Sen. Dominick Moreno. The bill authorizes a supplemental payment of state-only money to providers under the medicaid program of certain office-administered drugs relating to oncology who experienced a decrease in aggregate reimbursements in the 2017-18 fiscal year as a result of the implementation of the federal department of health and human services final rule for covered outpatient drugs, 81 FR 5169, published in the federal register on February 1, 2016.
  • SB 18-014 – “Concerning Requiring the Department of Corrections to Disclose the Location of Inmates who are Relocated to Facilities Outside of the State,” by Sens. Rhonda Fields & John Cooke and Reps. Cole Wist & Leslie Herod. The bill states that if the Department of Corrections relocates an inmate for incarceration or contracts with another state for the incarceration of an inmate in a penal institution in another state, then not later than 48 hours after such relocation, the Department shall notify the prosecuting attorney and any registered victim of crimes for which the inmate is serving his or her sentence of the name and location of the penal institution where the inmate is to be housed, with certain exceptions.
  • SB 18-026 – “Concerning Measures to Make Sex Offender Registration More Effective,” by Sen. Daniel Kagan and Reps. Pete Lee, Leslie Herod, and Yeulin Willett. The bill makes several changes to the sex offender registration process.
  • SB 18-055 – “Concerning the Crimes Against Children Surcharge in Cases Involving Trafficking of Children,” by Sen. Tim Neville and Reps. Kevin Van Winkle & Edie Hooten. Current law requires each person who is convicted of a crime against a child to pay a surcharge to the clerk of the court for the judicial district in which the conviction occurs. The bill adds the crime of human trafficking of a minor for sexual servitude to the definition of crime against a child for purposes of the surcharge.
  • SB 18-149 – “Concerning Records of the Board of Directors of the Denver Health and Hospital Authority,” by Sen. Bob Gardner and Reps. Matt Gray & Leslie Herod. The bill specifies that certain reports, statements, agreements, bonds, guidelines, manuals, handbooks, and accounts of the authority are public records. The bill also specifies that the content of an electronic medical record system and individual medical records or medical information are not public records.
  • SB 18-151 – “Concerning Department of Education Research to Develop Bullying Prevention Policies,” by Sens. Rhonda Fields & Kevin Priola and Reps. Janet Buckner & James Wilson. The bill requires the Department of Education to research approaches, policies, and practices in other states related to bullying prevention and education, and to develop a model bullying prevention and education policy after considering its research.
  • SB 18-174 – “Concerning Liability of Entities that Provide Services to Persons with Developmental Disabilities in Residential Settings,” by Sen. Bob Gardner and Rep. Lang Sias. The bill defines ‘case management agency’ and adds a case management agency to the definition of ‘provider’ that provides services and supports to persons with developmental disabilities. The bill requires providers and service agencies to operate pursuant to department of health care policy and financing rules.
  • SB 18-188 – “Concerning Agricultural Commodities, and, in Connection Therewith, Adding Millet to the Definition of an Agricultural Commodity and Allowing the Commissioner of Agriculture to Determine Marketing Order Public Announcement Requirements,” by Sen. Jerry Sonnenberg and Reps. Jeni James Arndt & Jon Becker. The bill adds millet to the definition of an agricultural commodity in the “Colorado Agricultural Marketing Act of 1939.” The bill removes the requirement that marketing order issuance, suspension, amendment, or termination be posted in the office of the commissioner of agriculture and published in a newspaper.

For a complete list of Governor Hickenlooper’s 2018 legislative decisions, click here.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Witness’s Probationary Status Alone Does Not Implicate Defendant’s Right to Cross-Examine

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Margerum on Thursday, April 19, 2018.

Assault—Menacing—Sixth Amendment—Confrontation Clause—Cross-Examination—Probationary Status.

Defendant was alone in a friend’s apartment with the friend’s girlfriend, E.S. When E.S. rejected defendant’s sexual advances, defendant became angry and forced E.S. onto the bed, climbing on top of her and kissing and groping her. Then defendant tried to remove E.S.’s clothing. Eventually he stopped and let E.S. leave the apartment. Defendant then texted his sister, T.M., to come to the apartment. He told her he had a bag of clothes he wanted to give her. T.M. went to defendant’s apartment with her son. Without warning, defendant grabbed her around the neck and began choking her. Defendant then pinned T.M. underneath him and began groping her body. T.M. grabbed a glass candleholder and hit defendant on the back of the head, which allowed her to escape with her son. A jury convicted defendant of unlawful sexual contact without physical force as to E.S., and third-degree assault and menacing with a deadly weapon as to T.M.

On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause by not allowing him to cross-examine E.S. concerning her probationary status. A witness’s probationary status alone does not implicate a defendant’s constitutional right to cross-examine the witness on potential bias or motive. Rather, some logical connection between the probationary status and the witness’s motive for testifying is required. Here, at the time of defendant’s trial, E.S. was serving a one-year probation in another county for a forgery conviction. Defendant pointed to no other facts that would logically connect E.S.’s probationary status with her testimony at his trial. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s request to cross-examine E.S. regarding her probationary status because these facts do not show that E.S.’s testimony might have been influenced by a promise or expectation of leniency in exchange for favorable testimony.

Defendant next argued that there was insufficient evidence to support his menacing conviction. He contended that (1) the menacing statute requires that a defendant place the victim in fear before any actual injury, and (2) the conduct underlying his menacing conviction cannot be the same single act as the conduct underlying his assault conviction. The statute does not require that the victim be placed in fear before she in injured; it is thus irrelevant whether the victim is injured before, during, or after she is placed in fear of imminent bodily harm, if defendant’s actions place or attempt to place her in such fear. Defendant presented no basis to depart from established law that a person can commit two crimes with one act. The evidence supports defendant’s menacing conviction.

The judgment was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Defendant May Challenge Unrevoked Deferred Judgment under Crim. P. 32(d)

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Figueroa-Lemus on Thursday, April 19, 2018.

Deferred Judgment—Crim. P. 32(d)—Jurisdiction—Immigration Consequences—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel—Withdrawal of Plea.

As relevant to this appeal, defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a schedule II controlled substance. The parties stipulated to a two-year deferred judgment. The court accepted the deferred judgment and sentenced defendant to two years of probation. About five months later, defendant filed a Crim. P. 32(d) motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that his counsel failed to advise him of the clear immigration consequences of the plea and claiming that if he had been properly advised, he would have rejected the offer. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion.

On appeal, the People argued that the court of appeals did not have jurisdiction to review the trial court’s order because the motion challenged a non-final judgment. Although a deferred judgment may not be subjected to either Crim. P. 35 or direct review while it is still in effect, a defendant may challenge an unrevoked deferred judgment under Crim. P. 32(d). Further, the Court had jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea because that motion challenged a deferred judgment still in effect.

Defendant argued that his guilty plea was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently because his counsel never informed him of the clear immigration consequences of the plea. Here, the record supports the district court’s finding that defendant’s criminal attorney and immigration attorney both told defendant on multiple occasions that a guilty plea to a drug felony would result in deportation. Because counsel’s performance was not deficient, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the Crim. P. 32(d) motion.

Defendant also argued that counsel should have advised him that he would be held in custody during the removal proceeding. The court found no authority that would require counsel to give this advice, and defendant failed to explain how such an advisement would have affected his decision to accept the plea offer.

The order was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Compliance with Departmental Policy Insufficient to Bring Seizure of Vehicle Within Exception to Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Quick on Monday, April 16, 2018.

Inventory Search—Impoundment.

The People brought an interlocutory appeal, as authorized by C.R.S. § 14 16-12-102(2) and C.A.R. 4.1, from a district court order granting Quick’s motion to suppress a gun found during an inventory search of his car. The district court initially denied the motion, but in light of the court of appeals’ opinion in People v. Brown, 2016 COA 150, __ P.3d __, it found that where Quick was merely cited, and not actually arrested, for driving with a suspended license, and where the only justification offered for seizing his car was instead the likelihood that he would continue to drive and thereby endanger public safety, the initial seizure of his car did not fall within the community caretaking exception to the probable cause and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment.

The supreme court affirmed the district court’s order. Compliance with a departmental policy or procedure is insufficient in and of itself to bring the seizure of a vehicle within an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. Moreover, seizing a vehicle to prevent the driver from continuing to drive with a suspended license does not fall within the specific community caretaking exception.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Seizure of Vehicle Not Justified as Exercise of Police Caretaking Function

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Brown on Monday, April 16, 2018.

Inventory Search—Impoundment.

The People petitioned for review of the court of appeals’ judgment reversing Brown’s drug-related conviction on the ground that his motion to suppress should have been granted. See People v. Brown, 2016 COA 150, __ P.3d __. The district court found that the contraband in question was discovered during an inventory search of defendant’s vehicle, the conduct of which was within the officers’ discretion according to the policies and procedures of the Aurora Police Department, even though they had already decided to issue a summons rather than arrest defendant for driving with a suspended license. By contrast, the court of appeals found that in the absence of an arrest, seizing defendant’s vehicle to provoke an inventory of its contents could not be justified as an exercise of the police caretaking function, and in the absence of any other recognized exception to the probable cause and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment, violated its prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment. The record failed to demonstrate that seizure of defendant’s vehicle was justified as an exercise of the police caretaking function or was otherwise reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, regardless of local ordinances or police policies and procedures broad enough to grant the officers discretion to impound the vehicle of a driver merely summoned rather than arrested for driving with a suspended license.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Tenth Circuit: Petitioner Ineligible for Cancellation of Removal After Theft Convictions

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Issued its opinion in Lucio-Rayos v. Sessions on Tuesday, November 14, 2017.

The issue presented in this case was whether petitioner Lucio-Rayos’s municipal theft conviction qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). If so, it would make him ineligible for cancellation of removal. Lucio-Rayos is a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without authorization. Although he conceded that he was subject to removal, he sought discretionary relief in the form of cancellation of removal.

Lucio-Rayos first contended that the immigration judge erred in refusing to recuse from his case because the immigration judge’s spouse works with the Denver Immigration and Customs Enforcement office that initiated this removal proceeding. The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument.

In order to prevail on this argument, Lucio-Rayos had to establish that he was deprived of due process and that the deprivation prejudiced him. Lucio-Rayos presented extrajudicial-influence and inherent-bias arguments relying on law that requires a federal judge to recuse in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. However, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement office had a plan in place to ensure that the immigration judge’s spouse had no involvement in the case. Further, there is no evidence suggesting that the immigration judge’s spouse played any role in Lucio-Rayos’ removal proceedings. The immigration judge’s spouse was not a party, officer, director, or trustee of a party in this matter.

In addition, Lucio-Rayos has not shown that he was prejudiced by the immigration judge’s refusal to recuse; that is, Lucio-Rayos has not shown that his rights were violated in a manner so as potentially to affect the outcome of the proceedings.

Next, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Lucio-Rayos is ineligible for cancellation of removal. To be eligible for cancellation of removal, Lucio-Rayos had to meet four requirements. The only one at issue was whether Lucio-Rayos’s conviction for theft is a CIMT.

The Tenth Circuit applied the categorical approach by comparing the elements of Lucio-Rayos’s offense to the definition of CIMT, which refers to conduct which is inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the accepted rules of morality, and conduct that is inherently wrong, rather than conduct deemed wrong only because of a statutory proscription. The lower court found that a conviction like Lucio-Rayos’s qualifies as a CIMT only if one element of the offense is that the perpetrator intended to deprive the victim permanently of his property. The Tenth Circuit found, however, that not all convictions under the applicable theft provision require proof that the defendant intended to deprive the victim of his property permanently. The applicable code was found to be divisible.

The Tenth Circuit found that the undocumented alien bears the burden of proof to show that his conviction was not a CIMT. The Tenth Circuit held that, because it was unclear from Lucio-Rayos’s record whether he committed a CIMT, he did not prove eligibility for cancellation of removal.

Lastly, Lucio-Rayos contended that if his conviction was a CIMT, he nevertheless met an exception to ineligibility available for petty offenses. However, the Tenth Circuit held that in this situation, the petty offense exception did not prevent an immigrant’s CIMT conviction from disqualifying him from eligibility for discretionary cancellation of removal.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals DENIED Lucio-Rayos’s petition for review and found he was not eligible for cancellation of removal.

Rules of Civil Procedure, JDF 601, and Form 4 Amended in Rule Changes 2018(05) and 2018(06)

On Thursday, April 12, 2018, the Colorado Supreme Court issued two rule changes. Rule Change 2018(05) amends Form 4, “Petition for Postconviction Relief Pursuant to Crim. P. 35(c),” and Rule Change 2018(06) amends Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 16.1, “Simplified Procedure for Civil Actions,” and JDF 601, “District Court Civil Case Cover Sheet for Initial Pleading of Complaint, Counterclaim, Cross-Claim, or Third-Party Complaint and Jury Demand.”

The changes to C.R.C.P. 16.1 are extensive, and contain multiple changes to the first several subsections, including “Purpose of Simplified Procedure,” “Actions Subject to Simplified Procedure,” “Civil Cover Sheet,” “Motion for Exclusion from Simplified Procedure,” and more. There is also new Comment to the Rule that explains the reasoning for the changes.

For the full text of the 2018 rule changes, click here. For all of the court’s adopted and proposed rule changes, click here.

Tenth Circuit: Defendants Found Liable for ATV Protest Ride on Recapture Canyon in Utah

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in United States v. Wells on Monday, October 23, 2017.

In 2007, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) closed part of Recapture Canyon in Utah to all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) due to potential damage to the soil and archaeological sites. Although this was intended to be temporary, the order was still in place in 2014. Upset at the delay in reopening, County Commissioner Lyman organized a protest ride on ATVs into the closed portion of the Canyon. Wells, who ran a website that reported on local news, assisted and interviewed Lyman, while also encouraging others to the protest. Despite warnings from the BLM that criminal and civil penalties would be enforced against anyone riding ATVs in the closed portion of the Canyon, the ride took place in May of 2014. There is undisputed evidence that both Lyman and Wells rode ATVs in the protest.

At trial, Lyman and Wells were found guilty for riding ATVs on the closed lands and with conspiracy to do the same. On appeal, Defendants seek a new trial, arguing that a reasonable observer would have questioned the district judge’s impartiality. Although the judge did ultimately recuse before sentencing, Defendants contend he should have recused earlier. Further, they challenge the denial of their motions to dismiss the criminal information, the denial of a new trial, and their restitution order. Lyman separately argues that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel. The Tenth Circuit addressed each claim in turn.

The first argument was that the district court judge, Judge Shelby, should have recused earlier in the trial. Judge Shelby is close friends with the legal director for the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), an organization that was opposed to the protest ride. The ultimate recusal was based largely on a letter to the judge signed by SUWA and other conservative groups that expressed views adverse to Defendants, as well as evidence that showed SUWA had extensive pretrial involvement with the case in passing information to BLM officials and the United States Attorney’s Office.

Defendants argued for a new trial, contending that Judge Shelby ought to have recused from participation in the trial because a reasonable observer would have questioned his impartiality, as Judge Shelby should have been alerted to SUWA’s involvement by their legal director’s presence at trial and by a voir dire question asking potential jurors if close friends or family members were in SUWA.

The Tenth Circuit found that the argument for a new trial failed on the merits. The Circuit reviewed Judge Shelby’s decision not to recuse early in the trial for an abuse of discretion and found that the decision not to recuse could not be characterized as arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable. The Tenth Circuit concluded that recusal was not required where SUWA was not a party to the criminal prosecution, and, further, there was no evidence that Judge Shelby should have known about SUWA’s pretrial involvement. As Judge Shelby did not err in failing to recuse, Defendant were not entitled to a new trial.

The Defendants next challenged the denial of their motions to dismiss. Wells claimed that he could not be prosecuted for his activities because they consisted of protected speech under the First Amendment. To determine whether Wells’ conduct was protected, the Tenth Circuit inquired as to whether there was a realistic or reasonable likelihood of prosecutorial conduct that would not have occurred but for the hostility toward the defendant because he exercised his specific legal rights.

Wells argued that the prosecution’s hostility became evident when showings were made that SUWA had pushed for prosecution of the Canyon riders and that they regularly passed Wells’ social media posting on to prosecutors. However, the Tenth Circuit found that Wells did not present any evidence of prosecutorial hostility toward Wells’ exercise of his First Amendment rights. SUWA was simply interest in protecting the Canyon, not in limiting Wells’ First Amendment rights. The Circuit held that Wells failed to establish the requisite vindictiveness from the prosecution.

Lyman argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss when the government failed to allege interdependence, a required element of conspiracy. The Circuit applied a two-part test to determine the sufficiency of an indictment: First, the indictment must contain the elements of the offense and sufficiently apprise the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet; second, it must be such as to show to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction as a bar to further prosecution for the same cause. The Tenth Circuit found that Lyman’s argument implicated only the first prong of this test. Further, Lyman and Wells worked together for their mutual benefit in the context of their conspiracy to ride ATVs on the Canyon in protest. The Tenth Circuit found that Lyman’s motion to dismiss argument failed.

Next, Wells argued that the government failed to introduce sufficient evidence that he was acting as a co-conspirator rather than a journalist. The Tenth Circuit inquired whether the evidence would establish each element of the crime of conspiracy, to wit: (1) an agreement, (2) to break the law, (3) an overt act, (4) in furtherance of the conspiracy’s object, and (5) proof that the defendant willfully entered the conspiracy. The Circuit found that the evidence presented by the government was sufficient for a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Wells acted not merely as a journalist reporting on issues, but as a co-conspirator who agreed with Lyman to ride on the closed lands. More specifically, Wells reposted Lyman’s advertisements of the protest ride while adding flourishes of his own that suggest active support for, and agreement with, the planned ride.

Defendants next contested the district court’s denial of their motion for a new trial based on the post-trial discovery of a map which allegedly showed a right-of-way that the government failed to disclose before trial. Defendants argued that (1) the map would have permitted them to establish the existence of a right-of-way to negate the legality of the closure order on the Canyon, and (2) they should have been able to present the map as evidence relevant to their good-faith defense, since violation of the laws at hand require that the defendant act knowingly and willfully. The government argued that no violation occurred because the map in question was not material.

The Circuit found that the materiality of the map was at issue in this appeal. Materiality requires a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the evidence been disclosed. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the map could not have been material for purposes of the Defendants’ good-faith defense, and, as the district court pointed out, the map could not be relevant because the Defendants were unaware of the map at the time of the ATV ride. A mere suspicion that a right-of-way existed is not an honest belief that the road was not legally closed to ATV use. The Tenth Circuit found that the Defendants could not establish that the map would have been material to their good-faith defense. Further, the map failed to create a reasonable probability of a different outcome so as to cast doubt on Defendants’ convictions. The Circuit held that the district court properly denied Defendants’ motion for a new trial.

Wells next challenged the restitution order holding him jointly and severally responsible with Lyman for $48,000. Wells challenged that it included: (1) harms that were not recoverable as restitution because they were not caused by the conspiracy and its underlying conduct, and (2) amounts that were not legally cognizable as actual loss or supported by the evidence. Lyman made a similar argument. Under the Mandatory Victims Restitutions Act (MVRA), courts are required to order a defendant to pay restitution to a victim of the offense. No party disputed that the United States constituted a victim under the MVRA; however, the question was for which alleged harms could the United States properly recover restitution. The government was required to show both that the defendant’s conduct was the ‘but-for’ cause of the harm and that the defendant proximately caused the harm.

The government’s principal contention was that the conspiracy and its underlying conduct was the but-for cause of the motorized damage to archeological, riparian, and upland soil resources in the closed area. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the government presented ample evidence to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the government’s contention was correct. The district court did not err in ruling that Defendants were responsible for paying restitution to the United States for damages stemming directly and proximately from Defendants’ unlawful conspiracy to conduct a protest ride.

Next, Defendants challenged three aspects of the total amount of restitution ordered: (1) that the amount spent assessing the damage caused by the ATV ride was disallowed, speculative archeological expenses; (2) that the assessment costs were not incurred during participation in the investigation or prosecution of the offense; and (3) that at least some of the claimed amount was supported by estimates, not concrete figures. The Tenth Circuit first found that the government’s requested damages did not constitute speculative, archaeological damages. The archaeological value is an effort to go back in time before the violation occurred and estimate what it would have cost the United States to engage in a full-blown archaeological dig at the site, notwithstanding the fact that the United States had no plans to engage in any such effort. The Circuit held that the assessment that took place was detailed and anything but hypothetical.

Second, the MVRA provides that a victim must be reimbursed for expenses incurred during participation in the investigation or prosecution of the defense. The Tenth Circuit rejected Defendants’ assertion that the expenses were not incurred during the government’s participation in the investigation or prosecution of the offense, as the court has specifically recognized that the government’s investigatory costs can constitute actual losses subject to restitution.

Third, the Circuit concluded that the third argument was based on a mistaken view of the record. The government did not admit that its damages were not hard numbers. In context, the prosecutor was attempting to explain why restitution figures from an earlier case could not be considered as a basis for comparison in the present case. The Circuit found Defendants’ final argument misguided and spurious. The district court’s restitution award was upheld.

The last argument by Lyman was ineffective assistance of counsel. The Tenth Circuit found that ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be brought in collateral proceedings, not on direct appeal. Such claims brought on direct appeal are presumptively dismissible, and virtually all will be dismissed. As Lyman made no attempt to argue that his claim should be addressed on direct appeal, the Tenth Circuit saw no reason to reach its merits.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the district court’s judgment and restitution order.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Payments by Victim’s Compensation Board are Direct Result of Defendant’s Conduct and Properly Ordered as Restitution

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Henry on Thursday, April 5, 2018.

Restitution—Victim Compensation Board—Rebuttable Presumption—In Camera Review.

A jury convicted defendant of third degree assault. The trial court imposed a two-year jail term and ordered defendant to pay $900 in restitution. Defendant objected to the amount, requesting additional documentation to support the restitution request and a hearing. The court denied the request for additional documentation and granted the hearing request. After an evidentiary hearing, the court upheld its order regarding the restitution amount because defendant failed to offer any evidence rebutting the compensation board director’s testimony.

On appeal, defendant contended that the record did not contain sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s decision to order him to pay $230 in restitution to the compensation board for the victim’s lost wages. C.R.S. § 18-1.3-603(10)(a) creates a rebuttable presumption: once the compensation board has established that it paid a victim a set amount, the defendant has the burden of introducing evidence to show that the amount paid was not the direct result of his criminal conduct. Here, the prosecution proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the victim had lost $230 in wages and that the compensation board had paid that amount to her, and defendant did not rebut the presumption.

Defendant also asserted that the trial court should have conducted an in camera review of the compensation board’s records. Because defendant’s request for an in camera review was speculative and not based on an evidentiary hypothesis, the court did not err in denying defendant’s request for an in camera review.

The order was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.