December 12, 2017

Colorado Supreme Court: District Court May Collect Unpaid Restitution After Completion of Deferred Sentence

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Pineda-Liberato v. People on Monday, October 2, 2017.

Sentencing—Deferred Sentences—Restitution—Court Costs and Fees.

This case required the supreme court to determine whether the district court had the authority to continue to collect unpaid restitution, court costs, and fees ordered as conditions of petitioner’s deferred sentence after the completion of that deferred sentence. The court concluded that the district court may collect any unpaid restitution from petitioner after the completion of her deferred sentence, until the restitution has been paid in full. With respect to the unpaid fees and costs, however, the court concluded that the district court lacked the authority to collect such unpaid amounts after it terminated petitioner’s deferred sentence, withdrew her guilty plea, and dismissed her case with prejudice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s orders in part and reversed in part.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Completion of Deferred Judgment Withdraws Guilty Plea as Matter of Law

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Espino-Paez v. People on Monday, June 5, 2017.

Criminal Law—Withdrawal of Guilty Plea—Crim.P. 32(d)—Guilty Pleas—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel—Deferred Judgment.

Jose Espino-Paez pleaded guilty to the use of a schedule II controlled substance and received a deferred judgment. When he successfully completed the terms of the deferred judgment, his guilty plea was withdrawn and the charge was dismissed with prejudice. In 2012, Espino-Paez filed a motion to withdraw his plea pursuant to Crim. P. 32(d). The district court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the district court had no authority to withdraw the plea because it had already been withdrawn. For the reasons discussed in the lead companion case, People v. Corrales-Castro, 2017 CO 60, ___ P.3d ___, announced the same day, the supreme court held that the plain terms of Rule 32(d) require a plea to exist for it to be withdrawn. Therefore, Crim. P. 32(d) does not authorize withdrawal of Espino-Paez’s plea. Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea Properly Denied After Completion of Deferred Judgment

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Zafiro-Guillen v. People on Monday, June 5, 2017.

Criminal Law—Withdrawal of Guilty Plea—Crim.P. 32(d)—Guilty Pleas—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel—Deferred Judgment.

Edgar Zafiro-Guillen pleaded guilty to possession of one gram or less of a schedule II controlled substance in exchange for a two-year deferred judgment. In 2009, upon successful completion of the terms of the deferred judgment, the district court withdrew Zafiro-Guillen’s guilty plea and dismissed the case with prejudice. In 2013, Zafiro-Guillen filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Crim. P. 32(d). The district court denied the motion, holding it lacked jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed. For the reasons discussed in the lead companion case, People v. Corrales-Castro, 2017 CO 60, ___ P.3d ___, announced the same day, the supreme court held that the plain terms of Rule 32(d) require a plea to exist for it to be withdrawn. Therefore, Crim. P. 32(d) does not authorize withdrawal of Zafiro-Guillen’s plea. Accordingly, the court affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Guilty Plea Cannot be Withdrawn Once Deferred Judgment Completed

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Roman on Monday, June 5, 2017.

Criminal Law—Withdrawal of Guilty Plea—Crim.P. 32(d)—Guilty Pleas—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel—Deferred Judgment.

Eloisa Roman pleaded guilty to criminal impersonation and received a two-year deferred judgment. She successfully completed her deferred judgment, and her plea was withdrawn and the case was dismissed. In 2013, she filed a motion under Crim. P. 32(d) seeking to withdraw her plea. The trial court denied her motion, and the court of appeals reversed, holding that Rule 32(d) authorized the district court to withdraw Roman’s previously withdrawn plea. For the reasons discussed in the lead companion case, People v. Corrales-Castro, 2017 CO 60, ___ P.3d ___, announced the same day, the supreme court held that the plain terms of Rule 32(d) require a plea to exist for it to be withdrawn. Therefore, Crim. P. 32(d) does not authorize withdrawal of Roman’s plea. Accordingly, the court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Successful Completion of Terms of Deferred Judgment Automatically Withdraws Guilty Plea by Operation of Law

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Flores-Heredia v. People on Monday, June 5, 2017.

Criminal Law—Withdrawal of Guilty Plea—Crim. P. 32(d)—Guilty Pleas—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel—Deferred Judgment.

Jesus Flores-Heredia pleaded guilty to inducement and conspiracy to sell and possess with intent to sell a schedule II controlled substance, and he received a one-year deferred judgment in 1990. Although he successfully completed the deferred judgment in 1991, no court ever ordered his plea withdrawn or the action against him dismissed pursuant to C.R.S. § 18-1.3-102(2), which provides that, upon “full compliance with [the conditions of a deferred judgment]” the guilty plea previously entered “shall be withdrawn and the charge upon which the judgment and sentence of the court was deferred shall be dismissed with prejudice.” In 2014, Flores-Heredia filed a motion to withdraw his plea pursuant to Crim. P. 32(d). The district court concluded that because no order had been entered withdrawing Flores-Heredia’s plea and dismissing the charge under C.R.S. § 18-1.3-102(2), it would enter such an order. The court then denied the Rule 32(d) motion, concluding that it could not withdraw the plea because the plea had already been withdrawn.

The supreme court held that C.R.S. § 18-1.3-102(2) requires that a plea be deemed withdrawn and the charge dismissed once the deferred judgment is successfully completed, and when an order to this effect is not entered, it occurs by operation of law as mandated by C.R.S. § 18-1.3-102(2). Therefore, Flores-Heredia’s plea was withdrawn by operation of law when he successfully completed the deferred judgment in 1991. Further, for the reasons discussed in the lead companion case, People v. Corrales-Castro, 2017 CO 60, ___ P.3d ___, announced the same day, the supreme court held that the plain terms of Rule 32(d) require a plea to exist for it to be withdrawn. Therefore, Crim. P. 32(d) does not authorize withdrawal of Flores-Heredia’s plea. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s judgment.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Deferred Juvenile Adjudication Not Predicate Felony Offense for POWPO Purposes

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People in Interest of A.B. on Thursday, November 17, 2016.

A.B., a juvenile, was the rear driver’s side passenger in a parked car when police blocked the car due to a noise violation from the car’s loud stereo. All three of the vehicle’s occupants exited when the police arrived, and an officer saw A.B. pull a gun from his waistband and throw it into the car. He was charged with possession of a weapon by a previous offender (POWPO) based on a prior incident in which A.B. accepted a deferred adjudication on a charge of aggravated motor vehicle theft in the first degree, a felony.

Before trial, A.B. moved to suppress the weapon, arguing the search was unconstitutional because when police officers ordered him to get back in the car, they seized him but lacked reasonable suspicion to do so. The trial court denied the motion to suppress based on the officer’s testimony that he saw A.B. throw the gun into the car. The officer presented the same testimony at trial. When the prosecution rested, A.B. moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing the deferred adjudication did not constitute a prior adjudication for POWPO purposes. The court denied his motion, and A.B. was convicted and sentenced to two years in youth corrections.

On appeal, A.B. argued the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The court of appeals disagreed. The court declined to reach the constitutional issue of whether the encounter was a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, and instead found that the officers had reasonable suspicion that every person in the vehicle was violating the Denver Municipal Code’s noise ordinance. Therefore, the court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion to seize A.B. based on a violation of the noise ordinance.

A.B. next argued that his deferred adjudication was not a predicate felony for POWPO purposes. The court of appeals agreed. The court analyzed the POWPO statute applicable to juveniles, C.R.S. § 18-12-108(3), and found no reference to deferred adjudications. A.B. relied on the plain statutory language in arguing that because he accepted a deferred adjudication, he was not actually adjudicated at the time of the POWPO offense. The Attorney General analogized the juvenile statute to its adult counterpart, relying on cases interpreting “conviction” to include deferred judgments. The court of appeals analyzed the juvenile delinquency statutes and found that they distinguished deferred adjudications from adjudications of juvenile delinquency both as to definition and effect. The court found that the General Assembly expressly equated deferred adjudications to delinquency adjudications in several instances, evidencing an intent to separate the two definitions. The court found that A.B.’s deferred adjudication was not a predicate offense for POWPO purposes.

The court of appeals affirmed the denial of the suppression order, reversed the adjudication, vacated the sentence, and remanded for entry of judgment of acquittal.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Plea of Guilty Constitutes Conviction for Purposes of Revocation Proceedings

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Blackwell on Thursday, September 22, 2016.

Aaron Blackwell pleaded guilty to theft from an at-risk victim and received a deferred judgment with the condition that he could violate no federal, state, or local criminal law during the deferral period. He later pleaded guilty in an unrelated case to driving after revocation prohibited (DARP), a class 1 misdemeanor. The district court also deferred the judgment in the DARP case. The prosecution then filed a motion to revoke the deferred judgment in the theft case based on Blackwell’s guilty plea in the DARP case. The district court revoked the deferred judgment.

Blackwell appealed, contending his guilty plea in the DARP case was not sufficient to prove that he violated a state criminal law. The Colorado Court of Appeals evaluated whether a guilty plea constitutes a “conviction” for purposes of the revocation hearing statute. The court evaluated C.R.S. § 16-7-206(3), which provides that a court’s acceptance of a guilty plea acts as a conviction for the offense. The court of appeals concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Blackwell’s deferred judgment. Blackwell argued that the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in Kazadi v. People, 2012 CO 73, ruled that a guilty plea resulting in a deferred judgment is not a judgment of conviction, but the court of appeals disagreed, finding that the supreme court has distinguished between a “conviction” and a “judgment of conviction.”

The court of appeals affirmed the district court.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Deferred Judgment Is Not Final for Purposes of Appeal

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Sosa on Thursday, June 16, 2016.

Deferred Judgment—Crim. P. 35(c)—Withdrawal of Guilty Plea—Crim. P. 32(d)—Final Judgment—Appeal.

Defendant entered into a plea agreement to a deferred judgment. Later, he filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas under Crim. P. 32(d) and 35(c).

Regarding the appeal of the district court’s denial of defendant’s Crim. P. 32(d) motion, no final, appealable judgment exists because defendant’s deferred judgment has not yet been revoked and he has not been sentenced. Therefore, defendant’s appeal of his Crim. P. 32(d) motion was dismissed, without prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction.

Regarding his appeal of the denial of his Crim. P. 35(c) motion, defendant raised no argument on appeal. Therefore, this argument was not considered and the district court’s order denying defendant’s Crim. P. 35(c) motion was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Defendant Has Right to Withdraw Plea as Void Ab Initio Even When Deferred Judgment Completed

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Corrales-Castro on Thursday, March 26, 2015.

Deferred Judgment—Successful Completion of Sentence—Withdrawal of Guilty Plea—Jurisdiction—Immigration Consequences—Voluntary—Unconstitutional—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

In 2009, defendant pleaded guilty to criminal impersonation and DUI. The district court imposed a one-year deferred judgment and sentence on the criminal impersonation count, and one year of probation on the DUI count. In 2010, defendant successfully completed the conditions of the deferred judgment and probation. The district court withdrew the guilty plea on the criminal impersonation count, dismissed that count, and closed the case. In 2013, defendant filed a Crim.P. 32(d) motion to withdraw his guilty plea to criminal impersonation, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the motion, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

On appeal, defendant argued that the district court erred when it held it did not retain jurisdiction to consider his motion. When a guilty plea that is withdrawn after the successful completion of a deferred judgment may nevertheless result in the removal of a defendant from the United States (or the defendant’s inability to re-enter the country), Crim.P. 32(d) authorizes the defendant to challenge the constitutionality of the plea, regardless of its prior withdrawal. Here, defendant claimed that ineffective assistance of counsel rendered his guilty plea involuntary and thus unconstitutional because his defense counsel had failed to inform him that his guilty plea to criminal impersonation could have negative federal immigration consequences, even if he successfully completed the conditions of the deferred judgment. Furthermore, under the circumstances presented here, a Crim.P. 32(d) motion is not subject to the time limits of CRS § 16-5-402(1), and defendant’s motion is not time barred by that statute. Accordingly, the district court retained jurisdiction to decide defendant’s motion, the order denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea under Crim.P. 32(d) was reversed, and the case was remanded for a determination of defendant’s Crim.P. 32(d) motion.

Summary and full case available here, courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Period of Probation Under Deferred Judgment Does Not Count when Deferral Revoked

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Anderson on Thursday, February 12, 2015.

Probation Termination—CRS § 18-1.3-1008(2).

In 2002, Anderson pleaded guilty to one count of sexual assault on a child, a class 4 felony, and one count of unlawful sexual contact, a class 1 misdemeanor. As part of the plea agreement, Anderson entered into a stipulation for a deferred judgment and sentence on the felony count, which continued the case for four years.

Three years later, the probation department filed a revocation complaint claiming Anderson had been unsuccessfully terminated from his sex offender treatment program for violating his treatment contract and was in arrears on payments toward the costs of his supervision. Anderson admitted to the violations and the district court revoked his deferred judgment and probation.

At a March 2006 hearing, the court sentenced Anderson to probation for ten years to life on the felony count. In August 2013, Anderson moved to terminate his probation and for a review hearing under CRS § 18-1.3-1008(2). He argued that he had been on probation for eleven years. He acknowledged that his deferred judgment had been revoked but claimed he had maintained compliance with his probation. Although the probation department agreed he had successfully completed his treatment, it stated it could not recommend termination because he had not completed ten years of probation. The district court denied Anderson’s request without a hearing.

On appeal, Anderson argued that the period during which he was supervised in connection with his unsuccessful deferred judgment constituted probation within the meaning of CRS § 18-1.3-1008(2). The Court of Appeals was not persuaded. Under the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act of 1998 (SOLSA), a district court may sentence a sex offender to probation for at least ten years for a class 4 felony. After serving ten years of probation, the offender may petition the court to be discharged from the indeterminate probation sentence. There is no discretion to terminate probation before a sex offender has completed the minimum term of probation. The Court rejected Anderson’s argument that supervision under a deferred judgment is the same as probation under SOLSA. His argument contravenes the plain language of the statute.

The Court concluded that the district court correctly determined it did not have authority to consider Anderson’s request at the time it was made. Accordingly, the order was affirmed.

Summary and full case available here, courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Defendant’s Medical Use of Marijuana Violated Terms of His Deferred Judgment

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Wilburn on Thursday, September 26, 2013.

Deferred Judgment—Revocation—Medical Marijuana—Prescription—Affirmative Defense.

The People appealed the trial court’s order finding that defendant did not violate the conditions of his deferred judgment. The order was disapproved.

The probation department filed a complaint to revoke defendant’s deferred judgment, alleging in part that defendant had violated the condition that he not use or possess any narcotic, dangerous, or abusable substance without a prescription. The trial court found that defendant had not violated the conditions of his deferred judgment and dismissed the revocation complaint. The court essentially determined that defendant had established an affirmative defense to the revocation because he satisfied conditions of the Colorado Constitution pertaining to medical marijuana.

On appeal, the People contended that the trial court erred by concluding that defendant established an affirmative defense to revocation of the deferred judgment. Although the Colorado Constitution sets forth an affirmative defense to criminal prosecution based on the medical use of marijuana, it does not provide a defense to an administrative proceeding such as the revocation here. Because defendant violated his plea agreement by not possessing a prescription for medical marijuana, the People could seek revocation of his deferred judgment. Although the court erred in dismissing the revocation complaint, however, it does not follow that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to make its decision. Hence, its order was not a nullity, and the trial court’s ruling was disapproved.

Summary and full case available here.