June 19, 2013

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Colorado Supreme Court: Although Considering Adoption of Child, Foster Parents Had Not Initiated Adoption Process Therefore Due Process Rights Not Violated by Child’s Removal

June 12, 2013 by Leave a Comment

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in M.S. v. People in Interest of A.C. on Monday, June 10, 2013.

Dependency and Neglect—Foster Parents—Due Process Rights of Foster Parents.

In this dependency and neglect case, the Supreme Court reviewed the court of appeals’ finding that removal of A.C. from his pre-adoptive foster parents’ home without prior notice to the foster parents did not violate their due process rights. The foster parents, though identified by the juvenile court as prospective adoptive parents, had not yet initiated the adoption process. Because of this, the Court concluded that their rights with regard to A.C. are indistinguishable from those of typical foster care parents.  Therefore, they do not possess a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Because they do not possess a constitutionally protected liberty interest, the Court did not consider whether a due process violation occurred. The judgment was affirmed.

Summary and full case available here.

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Colorado Court of Appeals: Transfer to Tribal Court Denied Because Dependency and Neglect Proceedings At Advanced Stage

May 15, 2013 by Leave a Comment

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People in Interest of T.E.R. on Thursday, May 9, 2013.

Dependency and Neglect—Indian Child Welfare Act—Termination of Parent–Child Legal Relationship.

In this dependency and neglect proceeding, mother and father appealed from the order denying transfer of jurisdiction to a tribal court under 25 USC § 1911(b) of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Father also appealed the judgment terminating the parent–child legal relationship between him and his child, T.E.R. The order and judgment were affirmed.

In September 2011, the Department of Human Services of the City and County of Denver (Department) filed a petition in dependency and neglect based on mother’s substance abuse and mental health issues and father’s incarceration. In October 2011, the Department sent a notice to the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa (Tribe), pursuant to the ICWA, based on mother’s report that she was registered with the Tribe. The Tribe responded that it intended to intervene. Before it did so, the juvenile court adjudicated T.E.R. dependent and neglected and adopted treatment plans for mother and father.

In May 2012, the Tribe moved to intervene, alleging that T.E.R. was eligible for membership. The juvenile court granted the motion. The Department then moved to terminate mother’s and father’s parental rights.

In July 2012, mother moved to transfer jurisdiction to tribal court. The Department and guardian ad litem (GAL) opposed, arguing that good cause existed to deny the motion, because the case was at an advanced stage and could not be adequately presented in the tribal court without undue hardship to the parties or witnesses. In October 2012, after hearing arguments but not taking evidence, the court found good cause to deny the transfer. Following a two-day hearing, the juvenile court entered judgment terminating mother’s and father’s parental rights.

On appeal, mother and father contended it was error to find good cause to deny transfer of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals disagreed.

The state and the tribe have concurrent jurisdiction under the ICWA over Indian children who live off the reservation. The tribal court is the preferred jurisdiction and, in the absence of good cause, the state must transfer jurisdiction to the tribe. The Bureau of Indian Affairs has issued guidelines for determining whether good cause exists. As relevant, those guidelines provide that good cause exists if the proceeding was at an advanced stage when the petition to transfer was received, or if the evidence necessary to decide the case could not be adequately presented in the tribal court without undue hardship to the parties or witnesses. The determination is within the juvenile court’s discretion. The Court found that substantial evidence in the record supported the juvenile court’s finding of good cause to deny transfer for the reasons stated.

The Court declined to address father’s argument regarding the transfer of jurisdiction because he failed to raise it in the juvenile court; therefore, it was waived. The order and judgment were affirmed.

Summary and full case available here.

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SB 13-278: Creating a Definition of “Drug-endangered Child” Within the Context of Child Abuse and Neglect

April 29, 2013 by Leave a Comment

On Thursday, April 18, 2013, Sen. Andy Kerr introduced SB 13-278 – Concerning Creating a Definition of a “Drug-endangered Child” with Respect to Child Abuse or Neglect. This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.

The bill creates a definition of a “drug-endangered child” in the context of child abuse or neglect.

The bill was introduced on April 18 and assigned to the Health & Human Services Committee. The bill is scheduled for committee review on April 25 at 1:30 p.m.

On April 25, the Senate Committee on Health & Human Services heard witness testimony and had committee discussion only; no action was taken on the bill.

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HB 13-1259: Making Several Amendments to Procedures for Civil Actions Involving Parental Rights and Responsibilities in Cases Involving Abuse and Neglect

April 11, 2013 by Leave a Comment

On March 11, 2013, Rep. Beth McCann and Sen. Linda Newell introduced HB 13-1259 - Concerning Civil Actions, and, in Connection Therewith, Procedures for Allocating Parental Rights and Responsibilities in the Best Interests of the Child in Cases Involving Child Abuse and Neglect and Domestic Violence; Provisions Relating to Parenting Time Orders; Provisions Relating to Parenting Time Evaluations and Reports; and Amending and Relocating Provisions Relating to Civil Protection Orders. This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.

The bill makes amendments to various provisions of law relating to civil actions and orders.

The bill amends provisions of article 10 of title 14, Colorado Revised Statutes (C.R.S.), as follows:

  • Includes additional rights of children with respect to the determination of parenting time in section 14-10-123.4, C.R.S.;
  • In the determination of the best interests of a child with respect to the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities pursuant to section 14-10-124, C.R.S.:
    • Requires a court to follow certain procedures in actions where a claim of child abuse or neglect or domestic violence has been made to the court or when the court has reason to believe that a party has committed child abuse or neglect or domestic violence;
    • In contested hearings on final orders, requires the court to make findings on the record concerning the factors the court considered and the reasons for the allocation of rights and responsibilities;
    • Permits the court to allocate mutual decision-making for a child in a case that involves domestic violence, over objections, if the court makes certain findings;
    • Requires the court to consider the current statutory factors concerning the best interests of the child in light of any finding of child abuse or neglect or domestic violence;
    • Includes certain factors that the court may consider when formulating or approving a parenting plan in cases where one of the parties has committed child abuse or neglect or domestic violence;
    • Permits the court to order a domestic violence evaluation and subsequent evaluations and to require a party to participate in domestic violence treatment; and
    • Includes general procedures that may be included in parenting plans;
  • Provides that a court is not required to order a parenting time evaluation pursuant to section 14-10-127, C.R.S., and includes a list of factors that the court shall consider in determining whether to order an evaluation; and
  • In section 14-10-129, C.R.S., expands language relating to domestic violence and increases the time within which the court must hear and rule on an emergency motion to restrict parenting time from 7 days to 14 days.

The bill amends, repeals, and relocates the provisions of part 1 of article 14 of title 13 relating to civil protection orders, as follows:

  • Moves the legislative declaration currently contained in section 13-14-102 (1), C.R.S., to a new section and adds additional language to the legislative declaration;
  • Amends section 13-14-101, C.R.S., containing definitions for article 14 to include a new definition for “contact” and “sexual assault or abuse,” and amends existing definitions for “domestic abuse,” “protection order,” and “stalking”;
  • Repeals section 14-13-102, C.R.S., and relocates provisions of that section, with amendments, to other sections in article 14;
  • Adds additional behaviors to the list of behaviors for which a court may enter an emergency protection order;
  • Repeals section 13-14-104, C.R.S., relating to foreign protection orders and relocates those provisions, with amendments, to the new section 13-14-110, C.R.S.;
  • Creates a new section 13-14-104.5, C.R.S., that includes provisions relating to temporary civil protection orders that are relocated from 13-14-102, C.R.S., with amendments, that:
    • Adds to the list of behaviors for which a temporary civil protection order may be entered;
    • Clarifies that a petitioner is not required to show that: he or she has reported the act that is the subject of the complaint to law enforcement, that charges have been filed, or that he or she is participating in the prosecution of the criminal matter; and
    • An order awarding temporary care and control of the child may be extended for not more than one year;
  • Creates a new section 13-14-105, C.R.S., that contains provisions that are relocated from section 13-14-102, C.R.S., with amendments, and adding additional provisions that a court may include as part of a civil protection order;
  • Creates a new section 13-14-106, C.R.S., that contains provisions that are relocated from section 13-14-102, C.R.S., with amendments, relating to procedures for permanent civil protection orders and clarifies that the court need not find that the petitioner is in imminent danger in order to grant a permanent civil protection order; and that the court may continue a temporary civil protection order and the show cause hearing for one year for good cause;
  • Creates a new section 13-14-107, C.R.S., that contains provisions that are relocated from section 13-14-102, C.R.S., with amendments, relating to enforcement of protection orders and duties of peace officers;
  • Creates a new section 13-14-108, C.R.S., that contains provisions that are relocated from section 13-14-102, C.R.S., with amendments, relating to the modification and termination of civil protection orders that:
    • Allows a restrained party to file for modification or dismissal of a permanent civil protection order 2 years after the order was entered or after the disposition of a prior motion; and
    • Permits the court to consider whether the protection order has been successful in preventing harm to the protected person as grounds to deny the modification or dismissal of a permanent civil protection order;
  • Creates a new section 13-14-109, C.R.S., that contains provisions that are relocated from section 13-14-102, C.R.S., with amendments, relating to civil protection orders fees and costs; and
  • Creates a new section 13-14-110, C.R.S., that contains provisions that are relocated from section 13-14-104, C.R.S., with amendments, relating to foreign protection orders.

At the request of the Family Law Section, the CBA Legislative Policy has voted to oppose the bill in its current form. On April 4, the Public Health Care & Human Services Committee amended the bill and sent it to the Appropriations Committee for consideration of the fiscal impact.

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Colorado Judicial Ethics Advisory Board Opinions 2013-01 and 2013-02 Released

April 8, 2013 by Leave a Comment

The Colorado Judicial Ethics Advisory Board released two new opinions in late March 2013. The Colorado Judicial Ethics Advisory Board (C.J.E.A.B.) is a supreme court committee comprised of judges and non-judges who offer practical advice on ethical issues to members of the judiciary. There are seven members of the C.J.E.A.B. Four are judges, one is a non-lawyer citizen, one an attorney, and one a law professor with an interest in ethics.

C.J.E.A.B. Opinion 2013-01 addresses the issue of whether a judge can sit on the board of directors for the Colorado Organization for Victim Assistance. The decision confirms that the judge may sit on that board, provided he or she is able to ensure that the board activities do not impair his or her impartiality, and that doing so would not lead to frequent disqualification.

C.J.E.A.B. Opinion 2013-02 discusses whether, as part of their administrative duties, judges may ethically select attorneys who are eligible for appointment as counsel for respondent parents in dependency and neglect proceedings. They may select such attorneys, and may also monitor their performance, provided that they maintain impartiality in exercising those decisions and the decisions are based on merit.

For more information about the Colorado Judicial Ethics Advisory Board, and for all of the C.J.E.A.B. opinions, click here.

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Chief Justice Directive 04-06 Amended by Colorado Supreme Court

March 27, 2013 by Leave a Comment

In March 2013, the Colorado Supreme Court updated Chief Justice Directive (CJD) 04-06, concerning appointments by the Office of the Child’s Representative. The changes are in response to the Colorado Supreme Court opinion in L.A.N. et al. v. L.M.B.

The decision in L.A.N. held that the GAL holds the child’s psychotherapist-patient privilege when the child is too young to hold the privilege, the child’s interests are adverse to his or her parents’ interests, and the privilege is not abrogated by C.R.S. § 19-3-311.

The updates to the CJD are intended in part to provide counsel to children in dependency and neglect cases who have been determined of sufficient age and competent to hold their own patient-therapist privilege so that the counsel may advise the children of their privilege. The updates also clarify that appointments as counsel for children in D&N proceedings may be made from the Office of the Child’s Representative’s D&N appointment list. The CJD also clarifies payment procedures for these appointed attorneys.

Click here to view a PDF of updated CJD 04-06. For all of the Chief Justice Directives, click here.

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Colorado Supreme Court: Foster Parents Who Have Properly Intervened in Dependency & Neglect Action Under C.R.S. § 19-3-507(5)(a) Allowed to Fully Participate

February 26, 2013 by Leave a Comment

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in A.M. v. A.C. on Monday, February 25, 2013.

Dependency and Neglect—Termination of Parental Rights—Rights of Intervenors—Due Process Rights of Parents—Foster Parents.

The Supreme Court considered whether foster parents who intervene in a dependency and neglect action pursuant to CRS § 19-3-507(5)(a) possess only a limited right to participate in a hearing on a motion to terminate parental rights. The Court construed § 19-3-507(5)(a) and concluded that foster parents who have properly intervened are afforded the same degree of participation as all other parties at a termination hearing. In addition, the Court concluded that parents’ due process rights were not impacted by the full participation of foster parents in the termination hearing. Therefore, the Court held that foster parents who meet the required statutory criteria to intervene may participate fully in the termination hearing without limitation.

Summary and full case available here.

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Colorado Supreme Court: Guardian ad Litem Holds Child’s Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in Dependency & Neglect Proceeding if Three-Part Test Met

January 24, 2013 by Leave a Comment

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in L.A.N. v. L.M.B. on Tuesday, January 22, 2013.

Dependency and Neglect—Psychotherapist–Patient Privilege—Guardian ad Litem—Waiver.

The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ finding that the guardian ad litem (GAL) held the minor child’s psychotherapist–patient privilege in this dependency and neglect proceeding. A GAL holds a minor child’s psychotherapist–patient privilege in a dependency and neglect case when: (1) the child is too young or otherwise incompetent to hold the privilege; (2) the child’s interests are adverse to those of his or her parent(s); and (3) CRS §19-3-311 does not abrogate the privilege.

The Court also affirmed the court of appeals’ holding that the GAL partially waived the child’s psychotherapist–patient privilege when she disseminated a letter from the child’s therapist to the juvenile court and to all of the parties. However, the Court disagreed with the procedure the court of appeals described for determining the scope of the waiver. On remand, the juvenile court must determine the scope of the waiver consistent with the Court’s instructions.

Summary and full case available here.

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Tenth Circuit: Child Died While in Foster Care–Denial of County Employees’ Motion to Dismiss Based on Qualified Immunity Affirmed

December 21, 2012 by Leave a Comment

The Tenth Circuit published its opinion in Schwartz v. Booker on Wednesday, December 19, 2012.

After their son, Chandler Grafner, died while in the foster care of Jon Phillips and Sarah Berry, Chandler’s biological parents and Melissa R. Schwartz, personal representative and administrator of Chandler’s estate, filed suit against two human services departments and two Denver County Department of Human Services employees alleging, among other claims, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for violation of Chandler’s substantive due process rights. The two employees, Defendants-Appellants Margaret Booker and Mary Peagler, filed this interlocutory appeal from the district court’s order denying their Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects governmental officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. This doctrine balances the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably. To survive a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity, the plaintiffs must allege sufficient facts that show—when taken as true—the defendant plausibly violated his constitutional rights, which were clearly established at the time of violation.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”  U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Section 1983 provides a private cause of action for “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.”  42 U.S.C. § 1983. Generally, state actors are only liable for their own acts, not for acts of private violence. One exception to this principle is the special relationship doctrine, which applies when the state assumes control over an individual sufficient to trigger an affirmative duty to provide protection to that individual.

The Tenth Circuit has explicitly recognized that foster children have a substantive due process right to protection while in foster care. The special relationship triggers a continuing duty which is subsequently violated if a state official knew of the asserted danger to a foster child or failed to exercise professional judgment with respect thereto, and if an affirmative link to the injuries the child suffered can be shown.

Denver County Department of Human Services effectively exercised custody over Chandler. Defendants were aware of Chandler’s circumstances and were the custodial officials responsible for overseeing Chandler’s foster care case. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit was persuaded that plaintiffs sufficiently pled a custodial relationship between the State and Chandler to potentially hold Booker and Peagler individually liable under the special relationship doctrine. The district court correctly determined that plaintiffs sufficiently pled facts, when taken as true, show Booker and Peagler plausibly violated Chandler’s substantive due process right to be reasonably safe while in foster care, which right was clearly established at the time.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was AFFIRMED.

 

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Colorado Court of Appeals: Trial Court Erred in Deviating from ICWA Preference for Placement and Adoption in Dependency and Neglect Proceeding

November 13, 2012 by Leave a Comment

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People in Interest of A.R., and Concerning F.N. on Thursday, November 8, 2012.

Dependency and Neglect—Parental Rights—Termination—Indian Child Welfare Act—Active Efforts.

In this dependency and neglect proceeding, mother appealed from the judgment terminating her parent–child legal relationship with A.R. The Department of Human Services (Department) joined mother’s appeal of the termination and also challenged that part of the judgment addressing the Department’s guardianship. The judgment terminating mother’s parental rights was affirmed, the part of the judgment addressing guardianship was reversed, and the case was remanded.

Because A.R. is an “Indian child” as defined in 25 USC § 1903(4), these proceedings were subject to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 USC §§ 1901 to 1963. Mother contended that the court erred in terminating her parental rights. She asserted that the Department did not meet the ICWA’s “active efforts” requirement, and there were viable, less drastic alternatives to termination, including A.R.’s placement with A.W. and C.W. The ICWA’s “active efforts” standard requires more effort than the “reasonable effort” standard in non-ICWA cases. Here, despite the court’s use of the term “best efforts,” the record supports the court’s determination that the Department’s actions met the requisite “active efforts” standard under the ICWA with regard to mother, A.W. and C.W. The trial court found, with record support, that although mother substantially complied with her treatment plan, it was unsuccessful in rendering her a fit parent and that her conduct or condition was not likely to change within a reasonable time. It also found that A.R. needs lifelong care or intensive services for her special needs, and mother was unable to provide those services. Additionally, placement with A.W. and C.W. without terminating mother’s parental rights was not a less drastic alternative; A.R. needed permanency, so it was not in her best interests.

The Department contended that, even if the court’s termination of mother’s parental rights was proper, the court erroneously deviated from the ICWA’s placement preferences when, in granting the Department guardianship, it denied the Department permission to place A.R. with A.W. and C.W. for purposes of adoption. The ICWA presumes that the child’s best interests are served by placement with an extended family member who also has Indian heritage. Here, the record does not support the trial court’s finding that there was good cause to deviate from the ICWA’s placement preferences. Therefore, the court erred in deviating from the ICWA’s placement preferences. The trial court’s judgment was reversed in this regard and the case was remanded with directions for the court to allow the department to arrange a home visit with A.W. and C.W., and to consider an adoption or preadoptive placement of A.R. consistent with the ICWA placement preferences, including possible placement with A.W. and C.W. or her foster parents.

Summary and full case available here.

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Colorado Court of Appeals: Multiple Instances of Hearsay Permissible Under Constitution and Evidence Rules

October 29, 2012 by Leave a Comment

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Phillips on Thursday, October 25, 2012.

First-Degree Murder—Child Abuse Resulting in Death—Hearsay—Federal Confrontation Clause—State Confrontation Clause—Batson Challenge—Jury Selection—Consecutive Sentences—Evidence.

Defendant appealed his convictions for first-degree murder, child abuse resulting in death, and tampering with physical evidence. The convictions were affirmed, the sentences were reversed in part, and the case was remanded.

Defendant’s convictions stemmed from evidence that defendant starved his stepson, C.G., to death in a linen closet in his apartment. Defendant argued that the trial court violated his federal and state Confrontation Clause rights by permitting his 5-year-old son, D.P., to testify via closed circuit television (CCTV). D.P.’s therapist testified that D.P. would be traumatized psychologically if he were made to testify in front of defendant. Further, the court allowed defense counsel to cross-examine D.P. fully, and defendant had two-way communication with counsel during direct and cross-examination. Therefore, the court did not violate defendant’s federal and state Confrontation Clause rights by allowing D.P. to testify via CCTV.

Defendant also argued that the trial court violated his federal and state Confrontation Clause rights, and state hearsay rules, by admitting various out-of-court statements made by defendant’s girlfriend, Sarah Berry; C.G.; and D.P. Statements that Berry made in a voicemail left on defendant’s cell phone, which relayed what C.G. and D.P. said, did not violate state hearsay rules, because C.G.’s statement to D.P. was a command, offered as circumstantial evidence that C.G. was extremely thirsty and, therefore, not covered by the hearsay rule. D.P.’s statement, relaying C.G.’s statement to Berry, was admissible for the non-hearsay purpose of showing its effect on Berry as the listener. Finally, Berry’s statement to defendant, in which she relayed D.P.’s (and thus C.G.’s) statement, was admissible as a non-hearsay statement by a co-conspirator under CRE 801(d)(2)(E). Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the voicemail into evidence.

Before his death, C.G. made various statements to the public school employees, to the police officer during the welfare check, and to the caseworker. The questioning of C.G., however, was for the purpose of determining his health and welfare, and his statements related to his then existing physical condition, which fell within a hearsay exception and were admissible. Additionally, some of C.G.’s statements to the caseworker were for a non-hearsay purpose of showing that C.G. had been coached to change his story.

Defendant’s rights were not violated in admitting the statements that D.P. made to a mental health therapist during therapy sessions after C.G.’s death. D.P. testified via CCTV and defense counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine him on any statements he had made to the therapist.

Any statements erroneously admitted were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. There was no reasonable possibility that the admission of these statements affected the guilty verdict because the other properly admissible evidence was overwhelming that defendant knowingly starved C.G. to death in the closet.

Defendant also contended that the trial court erred in denying his Batson challenge to the prosecutor’s allegedly discriminatory use of peremptory challenges [Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986)]. Although defendant made out a prima facie case because no African American jurors remained on the panel after the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to dismiss them, the prosecution provided permissible race-neutral explanations for his challenges, and defendant was given an opportunity to reply. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s Batson challenge.

Defendant further argued that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences for first-degree murder and child abuse resulting in death. Because the evidence presented at trial supports no reasonable inference other than that defendant’s convictions of first-degree murder and of child abuse resulting in death were based on identical evidence, the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences for these convictions. Hence, the sentences were reversed in part and the case was remanded to correct the mittimus to reflect concurrent sentences on defendant’s convictions of first-degree murder and of child abuse resulting in death.

Summary and full case available here.

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Tenth Circuit: Insurance Company Had No Contractual Relationship with Foster Child

October 18, 2012 by Leave a Comment

The Tenth Circuit issued it’s opinion in Colony Insurance Company v. Burke on October 17, 2012.

In January 2002, the Oklahoma Department of Human Services (DHS) placed six-month-old Aurora and four-year-old Cassandra in the foster care of Deanza Jones. Less than one month later, Aurora was found dead due to an untreated respiratory illness. Aurora’s estate brought a state-court wrongful death action against Jones, DHS and two DHS employees.

Oklahoma purchases liability insurance for foster parents. Two companies provided insurance: United and Colony. Before trial, Colony and United made offers of settlement, culminating in a combined offer of $300,000. No settlement was reached, and the case proceeded to trial, which resulted in a total judgment for the estate and against Jones of over $24 million. Jones appealed.

On appeal, the court addressed: 1) whether a foster child in Oklahoma has a “contractual or statutory” relationship with the insurance company that provides foster care liability insurance to a foster child’s foster parent, such that the insurer owes the foster child either a contractual obligation or an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing; 2) whether a judgment creditor may garnish a judgment debtor’s insurance policy in excess of the insurer’s actual liability to the judgment debtor; and 3) whether a Defendant’s status as intervenor in a co-Defendant’s cross-claim against a plaintiff is relevant to mattered adjudicated solely between defendant and plaintiff.

The Tenth Circuit held that the answer to all three questions was no. Accordingly, the Court AFFIRMED the judgment of the district court.

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