May 21, 2013

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Tenth Circuit: In Tax Evasion Case, Evidence Was Properly Admitted Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) Because It Was Probative of Intent

December 19, 2012 by Leave a Comment

The Tenth Circuit issued its opinion in United States v. Farr on Monday, December 17, 2012.

A jury convicted Skoshi Farr of willfully failing to pay a trust fund recovery penalty that the IRS assessed against her after she failed to pay quarterly employment taxes. Farr appealed.

Farr first contended that she was denied her Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by the district court’s rulings that admitted Rule 404(b) evidence. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is inadmissible to prove the character of the accused, but may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. The Tenth Circuit imposes four requirements for evidence to be admitted under Rule 404(b), among them that the evidence must be relevant. Farr objected on relevancy grounds. The Tenth Circuit found no abuse of discretion by the district court in admitting the evidence because it was probative of Farr’s intent, knowledge of the penalties, and willful failure to pay the penalty.

Second, Farr contended the district court erred in denying her motion for judgment of acquittal. She argued the government’s evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. Reviewing the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the government, it was clear to the Tenth Circuit that a rational trier of fact could have found that Farr willfully evaded the trust fund recovery penalty and took affirmative steps to do so.

Third, Farr asserted that the district court erred by denying her pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment for failure to charge the offense under the appropriate statute. The government proceeded under 26 U.S.C. § 7201, and Farr asserted the appropriate statute was § 7202. It is well established that charging decisions are primarily a matter of discretion for the prosecution. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court properly denied Farr’s motion to dismiss the indictment.

Finally, Farr contended her prosecution was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause as a result of the government’s prior unsuccessful prosecution. The law of the case doctrine bars this claim. The law of the case doctrine posits that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case. Because the Tenth Circuit previously considered and rejected the same double jeopardy argument, the Tenth Circuit was precluded from reconsidering the issue.

AFFIRMED.

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Tenth Circuit: Obstruction of Justice Conviction Affirmed

November 19, 2012 by Leave a Comment

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in United States v. Ahrensfield on Wednesday, November 14, 2012.

The defendant, Brad Ahrensfield, was a former Albuquerque police officer who was convicted of obstructing justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). Ahrensfield’s teenage son worked for Car Shop, a business owned by Shawn Bryan. Car Shop and Bryan were the targets of an investigation by the FBI and Albuquerque police, following information from a confidential informant that Car Shop employees purchased stolen merchandise and sold drugs and that Bryan was the leader. An officer who was friends with Ahrensfield told him about the investigation because he was concerned about the son’s safety. Ahrensfield then told Bryan his shop was the target of an investigation and he was the suspected ringleader. Bryan then contacted the Albuquerque sheriff and police department commander to ask why he was under investigation and told them the defendant had told him about it. The investigation was dropped at that point.

The defendant was charged with obstruction of justice and making false statements to the FBI. During his first trial, he was acquitted of making false statements but the jury did not reach a verdict on obstruction of justice. Before the second trial, Ahrensfield argued the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded the government from introducing any evidence regarding the false statements because he had been acquitted of that charge by the jury in the first trial. The district court denied his motion. The Tenth Circuit upheld the admission of testimony regarding his false statements because the evidence was admitted as proof of his guilty knowledge, not because it was a required element of the offense of obstruction of justice. “Where the government is not required to prove the offered evidence relating to the prior acquittal beyond a reasonable doubt, ‘the collateral-estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause is inapposite.’”

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss during his second trial based on alleged Brady violations. During that trial, the government impeached Bryan through transcripts of an interview he gave the FBI after the first trial. Defense counsel said he had not been given the transcript or a copy of the recording and did not know Bryan had been interviewed after the first trial. The court gave him time to review the transcript and he extensively cross-examined Bryan. The next day, the government produced a transcript of a call between Bryan and the FBI. The district court denied his renewed motion to dismiss and instead allowed him to recall the FBI agent for further cross-examination as part of the government’s case. He did so and effectively cross-examined the FBI agent using the transcript. After the jury convicted the defendant, the defense discovered it had not received a laboratory report of analysis of the drugs purchased by the confidential informant from a Car Shop mechanic.

The Tenth Circuit found that while the transcripts were suppressed by the government and were favorable to the defendant, they were not material. The lab report was neither favorable nor material, so the court found no Brady violation.

The court affirmed the conviction as there was a nexus between the defendant’s conduct and interference with the official proceeding.

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Colorado Court of Appeals: Evidence Sufficient to Sustain Convictions for Leaving Scene of Accident but Double Jeopardy Violated

June 25, 2012 by Leave a Comment

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its decision in People v. Arzabala on June 21, 2012.

Vehicular Assault—Leaving the Scene of an Accident—Evidence—Double Jeopardy—Unit of Prosecution—Jury Instructions—Prosecutorial Misconduct—Testimony.

Defendant appealed the judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of two counts of vehicular assault (reckless); two counts of leaving the scene of an accident; two counts of providing alcohol to a minor; and one count of aggravated driving after revocation prohibited (ADARP)—leaving the scene of an accident. The judgment was affirmed, the sentence was vacated, and the case was remanded.

Defendant was driving with two female passengers, K.E. and O.C., both of whom were 18 years old at the time. All three were drinking alcohol, which defendant had bought earlier that night. Defendant struck a car driven by K.P., who had been parked on the right side of the road and was attempting to make a U-turn at the time of the collision. K.P. and her passenger, E.P., were seriously injured. K.E. also hit her head and suffered minor injuries, but neither defendant nor O.C. was injured.

On appeal, defendant contended that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for leaving the scene of an accident and for ADARP—leaving the scene of an accident. Although there was conflicting testimony at trial, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence that defendant left the scene after failing to provide his driver’s license and registration to the officers at the scene.

Defendant also contended that his two convictions for leaving the scene of an accident violated constitutional protections against double jeopardy. Here, defendant was charged with two counts of leaving the scene of an accident with serious bodily injury. One count corresponded to defendant’s leaving the scene of the accident resulting in serious bodily injury to K.P.; the other count corresponded to his leaving the scene of the same accident resulting in serious bodily injury to E.P. Thereafter, the trial court imposed two sentences of three years each corresponding to defendant’s two convictions for leaving the scene of an accident, to be served concurrently and concurrently with defendant’s five-year sentence for vehicular assault (reckless) against K.P. The unit of prosecution for the offense of leaving the scene of an accident, however, is the number of accident scenes, not the number of victims involved in any one accident. Therefore, defendant’s two convictions for leaving the scene of an accident violated his right to be free from double jeopardy. The case was remanded to the trial court with directions to merge defendant’s two convictions for leaving the scene of an accident into one; to vacate the sentence imposed as to one of the convictions; and to correct the mittimus accordingly.

Defendant also contended that the trial court reversibly erred by giving the jury two instructions that allegedly lessened the prosecution’s burden of proof and misled the jury in violation of his constitutional rights. The Court of Appeals disagreed. The jury instructions correctly instructed the jury on the elements of vehicular assault (reckless) and vehicular assault (DUI) and the proper culpable mental state necessary for a conviction for these charges.

Defendant contended that the prosecution twice committed misconduct during closing and rebuttal closing argument by misstating the law and the evidence. The prosecutor’s arguments, however, did not misstate the law and any references to incorrect facts were harmless.

The Court also rejected defendant’s contention that the trial court erred by admitting the testimony of K.P.’s mother. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony to show K.P.’s lack of injuries before the accident.

Defendant also argued that the trial court committed plain error by admitting his unredacted driving record into evidence. The driving record was relevant to show defendant had knowledge of his license revocation as a habitual offender under ADARP. Therefore, the trial court did not err by admitting the driving record.

Defendant further argued that the court erred by permitting the prosecution to elicit testimony from K.E. that she, defendant, and O.C. were en route to smoke marijuana at the time of the accident. K.E.’s testimony was relevant and admissible as res gestae evidence because it provided the fact finder with a fuller and more complete understanding of the surrounding events and context on the night of the accident. Therefore, there was no error in the admission of K.E.’s testimony.

Summary and full case available here.

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2013-05-21 10:47:32