September 24, 2017

Colorado Court of Appeals: Pattern of Abuse Convictions were Sentence Enhancers to Substantive Acts

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Wiseman on Thursday, April 20, 2017.

Sexual Assault on a ChildIllegal SentencingConsecutive Sentences—Concurrent Sentences—Sentence EnhancersColorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act of 1998—Double Jeopardy—Due Process—Laches—Speedy Sentencing—Cruel and Unusual Punishment.

A jury found Wiseman guilty of acts constituting sexual assault on a child under the age of 15 by one in a position of trust. Wiseman received four sentences, three of which were to run consecutively, and one to run concurrent to two others. While Wiseman was incarcerated in the Department of Corrections (DOC), the district court, at the DOC’s request, reviewed his sentence and determined that consecutive terms were mandated by law on all four of his sentences. The effect of the court’s order was to increase Wiseman’s sentence to 46 years imprisonment.

On appeal, Wiseman contended that he was subject to, at most, two convictions and sentences in this case, and that the district court erred in determining that consecutive sentences were statutorily required. Counts seven and eight did not encompass “additional” substantive crimes for which one or more separate sentences could be imposed; they acted as mere sentence enhancers for counts one and three. Consequently, in entering separate convictions and sentences for counts seven and eight, the district court erred. As to the types of sentences, concurrent sentencing is required when offenses are supported by identical evidence. Here, Wiseman’s convictions were not supported by identical evidence and arose out of different incidents. Under the circumstances, Wiseman was subject to concurrent or consecutive sentencing, in the court’s discretion. The district court, therefore, erred in concluding that it was statutorily required to impose consecutive sentences.

Wiseman requested that the case be remanded for reinstatement of the original judgment of conviction and sentences. But Wiseman’s crimes were punishable by indeterminate sentencing under the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act of 1998 (SOLSA). Thus, Wiseman’s original and revised sentences were both illegal, and a remand for the imposition of a “legal” indeterminate sentence under SOLSA is required: Wiseman must be sentenced for each conviction to an indeterminate sentence having a minimum term of a certain number of years and a maximum term of life imprisonment.

Wiseman objected to the imposition of another sentence that could expose him to the potential of serving life in prison. He asserted that imposing an indeterminate sentence at this point in time, over 15 years after he was initially sentenced, violated double jeopardy, due process, laches, speedy sentencing, and cruel and unusual punishment principles. Because Wiseman was put on notice by the statute that his offense would be subject to an indeterminate sentence, he lacked a legitimate expectation of finality in his original sentence. Thus, correcting the illegal sentence does not violate double jeopardy. There is no due process violation because Wiseman has no fundamental right to avoid serving a lawful sentence of which he should have been aware, and the State of Colorado has legitimate interests in the correct application of its laws and avoiding the precedential risk of irregular enforcement of its laws. The doctrine of laches is not applicable in the context of a Crim. P. 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence. The court of appeals found no basis on which Wiseman may assert that resentencing him would violate a constitutional right to speedy sentencing under Crim. P. 32(b). Lastly, the court disagreed that the imposition of a legal, indeterminate sentence would constitute cruel and unusual punishment because (1) Wiseman’s premise that he had an expectation that he would be immediately released on parole under his original sentence is wrong, and (2) such a claim cannot be predicated on the negligence of executive agencies or the courts in failing to impose or correct a sentence at a much earlier date.

The sentence was vacated and the case was remanded with instructions.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Court Procedure Met Joinder Statute’s Purpose of Preventing Successive Prosecutions

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Leverton on Thursday, March 23, 2017.

Theft by Receiving—Possession—Drug Paraphernalia—Mandatory Joinder—Double Jeopardy—Prior Statements—Impeachment—Evidence.

The victim started her car and left it running while she went inside her home to retrieve some belongings. When she returned to where the car had been parked, the car was gone. She immediately reported the theft to the police. A few days later, a police officer pulled over the stolen car. Leverton and two women were passengers. Leverton told the officer that the car belonged to the victim, whom he claimed was his girlfriend. Leverton was arrested and transported to the police station. After removing Leverton from the police vehicle, the officer discovered a pipe typically used to smoke methamphetamine. Leverton was initially charged with possession of drug paraphernalia. Shortly thereafter in a separate case he was charged with theft by receiving. The cases were later joined on the prosecution’s motion, over defendant’s objection. The women passengers testified at Leverton’s trial and were questioned by the prosecutor about oral statements they allegedly had made to police following their arrests. Leverton was convicted as charged.

On appeal, Leverton argued that the trial court erred when it rejected his guilty plea on the paraphernalia charge and then permitted the prosecution to add that charge to the theft complaint because the result was that he was effectively charged with the same offense in two separate cases. He claimed that this violated Colorado’s mandatory joinder statute and the Double Jeopardy Clauses of both the U.S. and Colorado Constitutions. The Court of Appeals noted that Leverton did not allege that he was reprosecuted for either offense after he was convicted or that he was sentenced or otherwise punished multiple times for those offenses. Here, the prosecution moved to join the two offenses prior to Leverton’s attempt to plead guilty to the paraphernalia charge. The court’s procedure met the purpose of the mandatory joinder statute, to prevent successive prosecutions, and Leverton raised no claim of unfair prejudice resulting from the procedure. Further, the court acted within its discretion when it rejected Leverton’s guilty plea to the petty offense. And because the court had not accepted Leverton’s guilty plea on the paraphernalia charge, double jeopardy had not attached and there was no due process violation.

Leverton next argued that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to examine the two women witnesses about their prior statements to the police, alleging this evidence was inadmissible and violated his confrontation rights. Both women testified that they did not remember what happened the night the stolen car was pulled over, nor did they remember any statements they made to the police. To impeach the witnesses, the prosecutor was entitled to confront them with the exact language of their prior inconsistent statements. Therefore, the court properly admitted the statements.

Leverton also argued that the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed theft or possessed drug paraphernalia. A few days after the car had been reported stolen, the police found Leverton sitting in the car’s front passenger seat. Though Leverton told the police that the car had been given to him by the victim, his statement was directly refuted by the victim’s testimony that she had never met him. This and other evidence was sufficient to support the theft by receiving conviction. There was also sufficient evidence concerning the pipe found in the police vehicle for the jury to convict Leverton of possession of drug paraphernalia.

Leverton also argued that his convictions were based on his associations with other persons. Having found that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence proving that Leverton and not some other person committed the crimes, the Court rejected this argument.

The judgment was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Double Jeopardy Claims May Be Raised for the First Time on Appeal

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Reyna-Abarca v. People on Monday, February 27, 2017.

Plain Error Review—Double Jeopardy—Lesser Included Offenses.

In these four cases, which raise the ultimate question of whether driving under the influence (DUI) is a lesser included offense of either vehicular assault-DUI or vehicular homicide-DUI, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed (1) whether a double jeopardy claim can be raised for the first time on direct appeal, and (2) what test courts should apply in evaluating whether one offense is a lesser included offense of another.

The court concluded that unpreserved double jeopardy claims can be raised for the first time on appeal and that appellate courts should ordinarily review such claims for plain error. In so holding, the court rejected the People’s contention that defendants waive their double jeopardy claims unless they raise them at trial through a Crim. P. 12(b)(2) challenge to defective charging documents.

The court further concluded that the applicable test for determining whether one offense is a lesser included offense of another is the strict elements test articulated in Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 716 (1989). Under this test, an offense is a lesser included offense of another offense if the elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the greater offense, such that the lesser offense contains only elements that are also included in the elements of the greater offense. Applying this test to the cases before it, the court concluded that DUI is a lesser included offense of both vehicular assault-DUI and vehicular homicide-DUI, and thus, defendants’ DUI convictions must merge into the greater offenses. The court further concluded that in not merging such offenses, the trial courts plainly erred and that reversal of the multiplicitous convictions is therefore required.

Accordingly, the court affirmed the divisions’ rulings in People v. Reyna-Abarca, No. 10CA637 (Colo.App. Aug. 1, 2013), and People v. Hill, No. 12CA168 (Colo.App. Aug. 8, 2013), that appellate courts review unpreserved double jeopardy claims for plain error, but reversed the portions of the judgments in those cases concluding that DUI is not a lesser included offense of vehicular assault-DUI, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Similarly, the Court reversed the portion of the judgment in People v. Medrano-Bustamante, 2013 COA 139, ___ P.3d ___, concluding that DUI is not a lesser included offense of vehicular assault-DUI and vehicular homicide-DUI, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court affirmed the judgments in those cases in all other respects, and affirmed in full the judgment in People v. Smoots, 2013 COA 152, ___ P.3d ___.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Courts Should Review Unpreserved Double Jeopardy Claims for Plain Error

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Scott v. People on Monday, February 27, 2017.

Plain Error Review—Double Jeopardy—Lesser Included Offenses.

In this case, the supreme court reviewed two issues: (1) whether a double jeopardy claim can be raised for the first time on appeal, and (2) whether defendant William Costello Scott’s convictions for both aggravated robbery-menaced with a deadly weapon (“aggravated robbery-menaced victim”) and menacing amounted to plain error. In light of the Colorado Supreme Court’s opinion in Reyna-Abarca v. People, 2017 CO 15, ___ P.3d ___, also decided on February 27, the court concluded here, contrary to the division majority below, People v. Scott, No. 08CA2327 (Colo. App. Nov. 8, 2012), that unpreserved double jeopardy claims can be raised for the first time on appeal and that courts should ordinarily review such claims for plain error. The court further concluded, however, that in the circumstances presented here, any error that might have occurred when the trial court entered judgment on Scott’s convictions for both aggravated robbery-menaced victim and menacing was not obvious, and thus did not amount to plain error.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Court of Appeals Correctly Evaluated Unpreserved Double Jeopardy Claim for Plain Error

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Zubiate v. People on Monday, February 27, 2017.

Plain Error Review—Double Jeopardy—Lesser Included Offenses.

In this case, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed (1) whether a defendant may raise his or her unpreserved double jeopardy claim for the first time on appeal and, if so, what standard of review applies, and (2) whether driving under revocation (DUR) is a lesser included offense of aggravated driving after revocation prohibited (aggravated DARP). In Reyna-Abarca v. People, 2017 CO 15, ¶¶ 2–3, ___ P.3d ___, also decided on February 27, the court (1) concluded that unpreserved double jeopardy claims can be raised for the first time on appeal and that appellate courts should ordinarily review such claims for plain error and (2) clarified the applicable test to be employed in determining whether one offense is a lesser included offense of another.

Applying those rulings here, the court concluded that the division in Zubiate v. People, 2013 COA 69, ___ P.3d ___, correctly (1) conducted plain error review of Zubiate’s unpreserved double jeopardy claim, and (2) determined that DUR is not a lesser included offense of aggravated DARP, although the court’s analysis differs somewhat from that of the division. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Plain Error Review Appropriate for Unpreserved Double Jeopardy Claims

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Zadra on Monday, February 27, 2017.

Plain Error Review—Double Jeopardy.

These two cases present the issues of whether double jeopardy claims can be raised for the first time on direct appeal and, if so, what standard of review applies. The Colorado Supreme Court addressed the same issues in four cases also decided on February 27 (consolidated as Reyna-Abarca v. People, 2017 CO 15, ___ P.3d ___). There, the court concluded that unpreserved double jeopardy claims can be raised for the first time on appeal and that appellate courts should ordinarily review such claims for plain error. Applying that ruling here, the court concluded that the divisions in People v. Zadra, 2013 COA 140, ___ P.3d ___, and People v. Adams, No. 12CA339 (Colo. App. Mar. 12, 2015), correctly conducted plain error review of defendants’ unpreserved double jeopardy claims and merged certain of defendants’ convictions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgments in both cases.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Retrial Following Hung Jury Does Not Violate Double Jeopardy Clause

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Beller on Thursday, December 30, 2016.

Peter Wilson Sund Beller arranged to buy two ounces of marijuana from a man named Justin Singleton. Singleton testified that Beller attempted to steal marijuana from him and his dad, and during the ensuing shooting Singleton’s dad was fatally shot and Beller was shot in the chest. Beller was charged with felony murder, two counts of aggravated robbery, and lesser non-included offenses of attempted aggravated robbery, robbery, and attempted robbery. The jury acquitted Beller of aggravated robbery but was hung on the felony murder count. He was retried for felony murder.

Before the second trial, Beller moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the Double Jeopardy clause precluded retrial on that count. During the second trial, the court identified robbery and attempted robbery as the predicate offenses for felony murder, but they were not charged separately. Beller was convicted of felony murder.

On appeal, Beller argued his second trial and conviction violated the Double Jeopardy clause, and the court’s admission of certain statements violated hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause. The court of appeals addressed his Double Jeopardy claims first.

Beller argued that the felony murder charge and all four robbery charges were the same offense for Double Jeopardy purposes. The court agreed. However, the court noted that the Double Jeopardy clause only applies where there has been an event, such as an acquittal, that terminates the original jeopardy, and noted that a hung jury is not such an event. Beller argued that the first jury’s not guilty verdicts on the robbery offenses precluded the second trial on the greater offense of felony murder. He also argued that the acquittals precluded the use of the robbery charges in the second trial as predicate offenses. The court of appeals disagreed with both arguments. The court found that the fact that Beller was charged in the same information in the same case was fatal to his arguments. After a detailed analysis of other Double Jeopardy cases, the court of appeals noted that Double Jeopardy only applied where the offenses were charged separately. The court concluded that jeopardy did not terminate on the felony murder charge after Beller’s first trial.

The court also disagreed with Beller that his acquittals on the aggravated robbery charges precluded the use of robbery as a predicate offense for the felony murder charge. The court noted that there were several possible reasons for the jury’s acquittal, such as finding that Beller did not actually steal anything of value from the Singleton residence, or that he repeatedly asserted he did not remember firing his weapon. The court noted that the acquittal on the aggravated robbery charge did not necessarily decide whether he committed the lesser offense of simple robbery. The court found that Beller’s retrial was not barred by Double Jeopardy or issue preclusion.

Beller also argued that the trial court erred in allowing hearsay statements from the girlfriend of his accomplice, Shaffer, and from his girlfriend. The statements in question were made by Shaffer to the two women regarding the crime and Beller’s admission to the hospital. The court of appeals found no error in their admission. The court found the statements admissible under the statement against interest exception to the hearsay rule, CRE 804(3). The key issue was whether the statements were independently trustworthy. The court concluded that they were, finding that because they were made shortly after the crime and at the home of his girlfriend and Beller’s girlfriend, they were sufficiently trustworthy.

The court of appeals affirmed Beller’s conviction.

Colorado Supreme Court: Charges Requiring Different Evidence Arising from Same Incident Do Not Violate Double Jeopardy

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Schneider v. People on Monday, October 17, 2016.

Sentencing—Constitutional Law.

Schneider sought review of the court of appeals’ judgment affirming his convictions and consecutive sentences for two counts of sexual assault. The jury returned guilty verdicts on one count of sexual assault of a physically helpless victim and another count of sexual assault by causing submission of a victim by means of sufficient consequence reasonably calculated to cause submission against the victim’s will, based on evidence of a single, continuous penetration of the same victim. The trial court imposed mandatory consecutive sentences for conviction of separate crimes of violence arising out of the same incident.

The court of appeals upheld the two sexual assault convictions against challenges of jeopardy and merger, on the grounds that defendant was convicted of violating two separate statutes. It also upheld the trial court’s order of consecutive sentences, on the grounds that consecutive sentences were mandated by statute unless both convictions were supported by identical evidence, which it reasoned could not be the case where the evidence required to prove each sexual assault charge was inconsistent with that required to prove the other.

The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, although on slightly different grounds. Although C.R.S. § 18-3-402 proscribes a single crime of “sexual assault,” which can be committed in either of the two ways charged in this case, the evidence at trial was sufficient to support a jury finding that defendant committed that single crime of “sexual assault” twice against the same victim.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Prosecutorial Misconduct Not Intended to Provoke Mistrial

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. August on Thursday, April 21, 2016.

Double Jeopardy—Prosecution Intentionally Seeking a Mistrial.

Defendant was tried twice on charges of kidnapping and sexual assault of his former wife. The first trial was declared a mistrial and the charges were dismissed on federal double jeopardy grounds based on a finding that the prosecution had willfully violated a court order. On appeal, a division of the court of appeals concluded that the reprosecution would only be barred if the prosecutor had acted with the intent to provoke a mistrial, and the case was remanded with directions to make findings on this issue. On remand, the trial court found that the prosecutor had not intended to provoke defendant into moving for a mistrial, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges, and held a second trial.

At the second trial the defense objected to the prosecution’s closing statement referencing a prior assault and remark that “history repeats itself” as an impermissible reference to propensity. The court agreed with the defense, declared a mistrial, and heard argument as to whether the charges should be dismissed under the double jeopardy provisions of the U.S. and Colorado constitutions. The trial court dismissed the charges on double jeopardy grounds, finding that the prosecutor had willfully goaded the defense into asking for a mistrial in order to try the case a third time and benefit from the experience of the second trial’s weaknesses.

On appeal, the People argued that the trial court erred. The court agreed, finding that the state and federal standard on this issue is the same: a retrial is barred only if prosecutorial misconduct giving rise to the mistrial was intended to provoke the defense into moving for a mistrial. Double jeopardy bars retrial in the mistrial context only where the prosecutor’s intent is to avoid a jury verdict. In evaluating the prosecutor’s conduct, the trial court used an improper legal standard and may not have considered the totality of the circumstances surrounding the prosecutor’s conduct.

The order of dismissal was vacated and the case was remanded to the trial court for reconsideration of its ruling and further findings of fact consistent with the court’s opinion.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Universal Malice Requires Potential Harm to More than One Person

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Anderson on Thursday, April 7, 2016.

Richard Anderson became depressed after his wife’s death and decided to commit suicide. After a night of drinking at a bar, he went to his car and pulled a gun on another of the bar’s patrons. He then left, and the other patron called the police. A police officer found him quickly and pulled him over in an isolated area with no other cars or people. Anderson shot at the officer multiple times, grazing his arm with one of the bullets, and the officer shot him, ending the conflict.

Anderson was charged with and convicted of attempted extreme indifference first degree murder; first degree assault, threatening a peace officer with a weapon; first degree assault, serious bodily injury with a deadly weapon; and first degree assault, extreme indifference. At trial, Anderson admitted shooting the officer but maintained that he did not mean to harm the officer but rather intended to have the officer shoot and kill him, and thus lacked the requisite mens rea for extreme indifference first degree murder. During trial, the jurors submitted five separate notes to the court, evidencing trouble reconciling the intent element of the extreme indifference charge. He was convicted and sentenced to a total of 108 years.

On appeal, Anderson contended the evidence was insufficient to support the extreme indifference conviction, the jury was improperly instructed on the mens rea element for both attempted extreme indifference murder and extreme indifference murder, his convictions for first degree assault violate double jeopardy, and his sentences are based on identical evidence and must run concurrently. The Colorado Court of Appeals agreed with his sufficiency challenge on the attempt conviction because his conduct only endangered one person. The court held that Anderson’s conduct was not the type that demonstrated the universal malice contemplated by the statute.

The court also agreed with Anderson that he should receive a single conviction for first degree assault because his three convictions violate double jeopardy. Since the three convictions were based on the same victim and the same act, they must be merged. The court did not address Anderson’s contentions about concurrent sentencing because of its double jeopardy finding.

The court of appeals vacated Anderson’s convictions for attempted extreme indifference murder, first degree assault (extreme indifference), and either first degree assault (peace officer) or (serious bodily injury), and remanded for correction of the mittimus.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Arrest in California Not Enough to Show Defendant Procured Prosecution There

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Giem on Thursday, December 19, 2015.

Double Jeopardy Clause—Out-of-State prosecution—Aggravated Motor Vehicle Theft.

Giem approaching the victim in a parking lot in Jefferson County, pointed a gun at him, demanded his car keys, and took his car. The car was equipped with an antitheft transmitter. The next day, law enforcement officials in California found Giem driving the victim’s car. In February 2012, Giem pleaded guilty to unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle and DUI in California. He was later prosecuted in Colorado for this same incident, and his motion to dismiss the charges based on the Double Jeopardy Clause and CRS § 18-1-303 were denied.

On appeal, Giem challenged only the court’s ruling on his motion to dismiss, arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause and CRS § 18-1-303 barred his prosecution in Colorado. CRS § 18-1-304(1)(b), however, creates an exception that allows a prosecution to proceed even if § 18-1-303 would otherwise bar it if the former prosecution “[w]as procured by the defendant without the knowledge of the appropriate prosecuting official and with the intent to avoid the sentence that otherwise might be imposed.” Here, the court’s factual findings do not support its legal conclusion that Giem procured his California prosecution. Merely being present in California with a stolen car stops short of procuring a prosecution there. Therefore, the trial court incorrectly determined that CRS § 18-1-304(1)(b) prevented Giem from taking advantage of § 18-1-303. Giem’s Colorado prosecutions for menacing, theft, and aggravated robbery, however, were not based on the same conduct that resulted in his conviction in California for unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle. Therefore, Giem’s prosecutions in Colorado for these crimes were not barred by his prior conviction in California for unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle. Conversely, Giem’s prosecution in Colorado for aggravated motor vehicle theft was based on the same conduct as the California conviction for unlawful taking of a vehicle, as both offenses were based on the taking and retention by Giem of the victim’s vehicle. Therefore, the People in Colorado were barred from prosecuting Giem for aggravated motor vehicle theft because it is not clear that the law of California and the law of Colorado for this crime were intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil. The judgment was affirmed as to all counts except the count of aggravated motor vehicle theft, which was reversed.

Summary and full case available here, courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Trial Court Erred by Amending Legal Sentence

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Evans on Thursday, November 5, 2015.

Department of Corrections—Attempt to Escape—Jurisdiction—Concurrent or Consecutive Sentence—Double Jeopardy.

Defendant was in the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC) serving a 16-year sentence when he left the Centennial Community Transition Center (CCTC) and reported to work as scheduled; however, he did not return to CCTC after completing his shift. Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of attempt to escape, and the trial court imposed a three-year prison sentence without stating whether it was to be served concurrently or consecutively. The trial court thereafter ordered the sentence to be served consecutively to his original 16-year sentence.

On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to change the sentence so that the sentence for attempt to escape would be served consecutively. The Court of Appeals held that the initial sentence—which was presumptively concurrent because the court did not order otherwise—was valid. Therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to later impose a consecutive sentence.

Defendant also argued, and the Court agreed, that his right to be free from double jeopardy was violated because his valid sentence was increased after he had begun serving it. The sentence was reversed, and the case was remanded with the direction that the trial court amend the mittimus to provide that defendant’s sentence for attempted escape be served concurrently with his underlying sentence.

Summary and full case available here, courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.