May 21, 2013

Colorado Court of Appeals: No Hearsay Exception Applied to Allow Introduction of Defendant’s Self-Serving Out-of-Court Statements

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued People v. Zubiate on Thursday, May 9, 2013.

Driving After Revocation Prohibited—Driving While Ability Impaired—Driving Under Restraint—Hearsay—Merger—Lesser Included Offense.

Defendant appealed her convictions entered following a jury trial for aggravated driving after revocation prohibited (aggravated DARP) and driving while ability impaired (DWAI). She also appealed her driving under restraint (DUR) conviction entered following her guilty plea to that offense, and the sentence imposed. The convictions were affirmed.

Defendant contended that the trial court erred in excluding an out-of-court statement concerning her fear of needles and, consequently, deprived her of her constitutional right to present evidence in her own defense. Specifically, defendant argued that the court erred in excluding her statement to Officer Rayside concerning her fear of needles because it was (1) offered for a non-hearsay purpose, (2) a statement against interest, and (3) a statement concerning her state of mind. Here, the statement was relevant only if it was offered for the truth of the matter asserted—namely, that defendant feared needles. Accordingly, it was hearsay. Because defendant’s statement was self-serving and the prosecution did not introduce evidence that defendant refused the test, none of the hearsay exceptions applied.

Defendant also contended that her DARP and DUR convictions should merge because DUR is a lesser included offense of DARP. The offenses do not merge, however, because proving the DARP elements does not necessarily establish DUR. DUR applies to offenses committed only on public ways. DARP, in contrast, does not require that the driver operate the vehicle on a highway. Accordingly, DARP is not limited to the highway and applies to private ways, as well. Because DUR requires proof of an additional fact that DARP does not—namely that a motor vehicle was driven on a highway—DUR is not a lesser included offense of DARP. Furthermore, because one could operate a vehicle without necessarily driving it, the offenses do not merge under the strict elements test. Therefore, DUR is not a lesser included offense of DARP. Accordingly, defendant’s convictions and sentences for both offenses do not merge.

Summary and full case available here.

Probate Omnibus Bill, Employee Privacy, HOA Bills Signed by Governor Hickenlooper

Although the Colorado General Assembly adjourned sine die on May 8, 2013, bills continue to be signed into law by Governor Hickenlooper. To date, the governor has signed 231 bills. Some of the most recently signed bills are summarized below.

On Thursday, May 7, Governor Hickenlooper signed one bill — HB 13-1117 Concerning Alignment of Child Development Programs, and, in Connection Therewith, Making and Reducing an Appropriation, by Rep. Millie Hamner and Sens. Mary Hodge and Andy Kerr. The bill consolidates several child development programs in the Department of Human Services and extends  the Early Childhood Leadership Council, which was set to sunset on July 1, 2013.

Governor Hickenlooper signed 18 bills into law on Friday, May 10, 2013. Six of them are summarized here.

On Saturday, May 11, 2013, the governor signed 19 bills into law. Five of them are summarized here.

Finally, on Monday, May 13, 2013, Governor Hickenlooper signed 11 bills into law. Four of them are summarized here.

For a complete list of Governor Hickenlooper’s 2013 legislative decisions, click here.

HB 13-1325: Establishing THC Blood Levels for Purposes of DUI Law

On May 2, 2013, Rep. Rhonda Fields introduced HB 13-1325 - Concerning Penalties for Persons who Drive While Under the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs, and, in Connection Therewith, Making an Appropriation. This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.

In any DUI prosecution, if at the time of driving or within a reasonable time thereafter, the driver’s blood contains five nanograms or more of delta 9-tetrahydrocannabinol per milliliter in whole blood, as shown by analysis of the defendant’s blood, such fact gives rise to a permissible inference that the defendant was under the influence of one or more drugs.

Under current law, in any prosecution for vehicular homicide or vehicular assault, if at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, or within a reasonable time thereafter, as shown by analysis of the defendant’s blood or breath, there was 0.08 or more grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, or if there was at such time 0.08 or more grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath, it is presumed that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol. The bill removes this presumption and states instead that such fact gives rise to a permissible inference that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol.

The bill removes instances of the term “habitual user” from the traffic code.

The bill was introduced on May 2 and approved, with amendments, by the Judiciary Committee on that same day. On May 3, the Appropriations Committee approved the bill and sent it to the full House for consideration on 2nd Reading. 2nd Reading is scheduled for Monday, May 6.

Since this summary, the bill made it through Second Reading unamended and passed Third Reading in the Senate.

HB 13-1240: Imposing Strict Penalties for “Persistent Drunk Drivers”

On February 25, 2013, Rep. Dave Young introduced HB 13-1240 - Concerning Penalties for Persistent Drunk Drivers. This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.

In current law, the definition of “persistent drunk driver” includes a person who drives a motor vehicle with a BAC of 0.17 or more. The bill lowers this threshold to 0.15 or more. The bill also amends the definition of “persistent drunk driver” to include a person who refuses to take or complete, or to cooperate in the completing of, a test of his or her blood, breath, saliva, or urine as required by law.

In current law, if a person is designated a persistent drunk driver, the state department of revenue (department) requires the person to complete a level II alcohol and drug education and treatment program.

Under the bill, the department shall also require the person to hold a restricted license requiring the use of an ignition interlock device upon the restoration of his or her driving privileges.

In current law, a person whose privilege to drive was revoked for one year or more because of a second or subsequent DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI conviction; for excess blood alcohol content (BAC); or for refusal may apply for an early reinstatement with an interlock-restricted license after the person’s privilege to drive has been revoked for one year. The bill reduces this one-year waiting period to one month for persons 21 years of age or older at the time of the offense; except that, for a person 21 years of age or older at the time of the offense whose privilege to drive was revoked because of a refusal, the waiting period is reduced to two months.

The bill amends the purposes of the first time drunk driving offender account in the highway users tax fund to include appropriations to the department to pay:

  • A portion of the costs for an ignition interlock device for a persistent drunk driver who is unable to pay the costs of the device and who installs the ignition interlock device on his or her vehicle on or after Jan. 1, 2014; and
  • The department’s costs associated with the implementation of the bill.

In current law, with certain exceptions, a license revocation must run consecutively and not concurrently with any other revocation. The bill provides that, for an offense committed on or after Jan. 1, 2014, with certain exceptions, a license revocation can run concurrently with any other revocation.

In current law, if a license is revoked for refusal, the revocation may not run concurrently, in whole or in part, with any previous or subsequent suspensions, revocations, or denials that may be provided for by law. The bill provides that, for a refusal committed on or after Jan. 1, 2014, with certain exceptions, a license revocation can run concurrently with any other revocation.

On March 27 the Transportation & Energy Committee amended the bill and sent it to the Appropriations Committee for consideration of the fiscal impact to the state.

 

HB 13-1214: Reclassifying Certain DUI Offenses as Felonies and Requiring Alcohol Monitoring and Use of Vehicle Interlock Devices

On February 1, 2013, Rep. Mark Waller introduced HB 13-1214 - Concerning the Classification of Certain Drunken Driving Offenses as Felonies, and, in Connection Therewith, Making an Appropriation. This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.

Under current law, a conviction for DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI is considered a misdemeanor offense. The bill states that such an offense is a class 5 felony if:

  • The violation occurred not more than seven years after the first of two prior convictions, upon charges separately brought and tried and arising out of separate and distinct criminal episodes, for DWAI, DUI, or DUI per se; vehicular homicide; or vehicular assault; or
  • The violation occurred after three prior convictions, upon charges separately brought and tried and arising out of separate and distinct criminal episodes, for DWAI, DUI, or DUI per se; vehicular homicide; vehicular assault; or any combination thereof.

Under current law, when a person is sentenced to a period of probation as part of a second or subsequent conviction for DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI, the court:

  • May require the person to use an approved ignition interlock device during the period of probation at the person’s own expense; and
  • May require the person to submit to continuous alcohol monitoring using such technology or devices as are available to the court for such purpose.

Under the bill, the court is required to impose these conditions on such offenders.

If a person is sentenced to a period of probation pursuant to a class 5 felony conviction of DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI, the court shall not grant early termination of probation before the person has successfully completed at least two years of probation.

The bill repeals provisions relating to the crime of aggravated driving with a revoked license when the offender also commits DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI as part of the same criminal episode. On Feb. 21, the Judiciary Committee amended the bill and sent it to the Appropriations Committee for consideration of the fiscal impact to the state.

Spark the Discussion: Colorado Marijuana Industry 2.0 (Beta Version)

By Shawn Coleman

Spark the Discussion” is a monthly Legal Connection column highlighting the hottest trends in the emerging field of marijuana law. This column is brought to you by Vicente Sederberg, LLC, the country’s first national medical marijuana law firm.

As our shortest month draws to a close, so does the Amendment 64 Task Force.  While earnest work has been accomplished by the Task Force, there is still more to do.

The Governors A64 Task Force

Overall, the Task Force has tackled some fascinating issues, with a lot more to come. The Task Force has already adopted recommendations to maximize localities’ control over adult use marijuana establishments, establish consumer protections, and encourage our Congressional delegation to address banking and tax treatment for marijuana-related businesses. The Task Force has also recommended that the regulatory model for medical marijuana should be adopted for adult use marijuana. More importantly though, the Task Force recommended that out-of-state residents be allowed to purchase marijuana in Colorado from our regulated market—but only in small quantities.

Despite previous consensus from the Criminal Law Work Group that marijuana DUID would be impractical to consider, the main Task Force rejected that recommendation, instead supporting the DUID legislation introduced in the state house, HB 13-1114. The bill, introduced by Representatives Waller and Fields, is a revised version of a proposal that has been previously rejected by the General Assembly. Previous versions created a per se standard; this year’s bill instead establishes a permissible inference for individuals whose blood tests positive for 5 nanograms or more of THC. The bill also removes the presumption for alcohol DUI in cases of vehicular assault or homicide. Apparently the bill sponsors are taking “regulate like alcohol” seriously. A first hearing on the legislation was postponed because of the Judiciary Committee’s, and the entire House’s, focus on pending gun control legislation.

Currently on deck are over 20 Task Force recommendations, including recommendations related to marketing, establishing the enforceability of marijuana-related business contracts, and setting the excise tax rate. We fully expect the Task Force to find resolution on these issues.

From Capitol Hill to Capitol Hill

At the State of the State Address, the Governor Hickenlooper proclaimed, “As we regulate this industry, and any industry, let’s be sure we are fair, rational and science based.” Of course, he was specifically referring to the oil and gas industry; however, “any industry” should include the second edition of Colorado’s medical marijuana industry, also known as the Colorado Marijuana Industry 2.0.

As we all revisit marijuana regulation, the discussion must be rationally informed by the existing regulatory framework and the businesses that have complied with it. A fair, rational, and science-based approach makes sense, and is most easily accomplished by assessing the strengths and weaknesses of our current marijuana industry—the ongoing, and relatively successful, experiment known as the Colorado Medical Marijuana Code, C.R.S. §§ 12-43.3-101, et seq.

The General Assembly is tasked with building the fledgling marijuana industry while keeping Colorado’s best interest in mind. While the specter of federal intervention remains present, recent events may give lawmakers confidence to find solutions that work for Colorado.

Congressman Jared Polis (D-CO) has introduced H.R. 499, the Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act, which would create the Bureau of Alcohol, Marijuana, Tobacco and Firearms to regulate marijuana federally while allowing states to continue marijuana prohibition within their borders. This bill has managed to get 11 co-sponsors of both parties representing every region of the nation. Meanwhile, medical or adult use marijuana legislation has been introduced in a growing number of states, in addition to the 18 states and Washington, D.C., where it is already legal. This evidences strength for the argument that civil matters, including marijuana, same-sex rights, and gun safety, will likely—as ought to—be resolved in state capitols.

Additionally, the president has spoken publicly of the need to harmonize state and federal laws, and the Department of Justice appears willing to wait and see. To that end, lawmakers here in Colorado must consider responsible regulations—possibly ones that even limit production—to guard against overproduction of marijuana. However, the only production within the state’s control is that which is produced by regulated businesses. Preventing unregulated large-scale production that could float across state lines is a challenge that is best addressed by moving deliberately on creating a consumer culture of acquiring marijuana through regulated stores, thus depriving the black market of a consumer base. Much like home brewing beer, the sooner marijuana for adults is available retail, the sooner home cultivation will be relegated to hobbyists and connoisseurs.

The passage of Amendment 64 by over 10 percentage points settles two important questions for the members of the 69th Colorado General Assembly:

  1. Marijuana reform is popular and politically safe.
  2. Marijuana as a regulated business is the intent of the voters.

During the legislative debate for the Colorado Medical Marijuana Code (originally HB 10-1284), a common reason to add heavy-handed regulations or vote against establishing the code was “the voters didn’t buy an industry with Amendment 20.” Now three years later, with the experience of marijuana storefronts, voters “bought” Amendment 64 with an industry as standard equipment. Interestingly, many of the counties with the most medical marijuana storefronts were greatly supportive of Amendment 64. November’s vote gave legislators a green light to enact sober and practical rules moving forward.

And it seems that members of the General Assembly have gotten the message.

The regulatory, excise tax, and criminal law bills to fully enact Amendment 64 may prove controversial yet; however, to date, the only thing more popular on the ballot than marijuana reform is marijuana legislation at the Capitol. The Colorado House has taken up two marijuana industry bills so far. The first, HB 13-1042 relating to state income tax (Rep. Kagan, Sen. Guzman), passed the Finance Committee unanimously. The second, HB 13-1061, the Responsible Vendor Bill, also passed unanimously in committee and has already passed the House on a vote of 55-9.

The Task Force is the beta test for Colorado Marijuana Industry 2.0. The legislature has the opportunity to experiment with this version and will hopefully be able to address any problems that arise. There is optimism that responsible marijuana laws may be the most sober conversation under the dome this year.

Shawn Coleman began working in cannabis policy as a Legislative Assistant for U.S. Representative Jared Polis in Washington D.C. He subsequently handled government affairs for Colorado Springs State Bank and served as Executive Director of the Cannabis Business Alliance. Shawn is currently a registered lobbyist with 36 Solutions and serves on the Board of Directors of the Colorado Youth Symphony and the U.S. Civil Rights Commissions Colorado Advisory Committee. 

The opinions and views expressed by Featured Bloggers on CBA-CLE Legal Connection do not necessarily represent the opinions and views of the Colorado Bar Association, the Denver Bar Association, or CBA-CLE, and should not be construed as such.

HB 13-1077: Allowing Drivers to Challenge Initial Contact When Charged with DUI, DUI Per Se, and DWAI

On January 14, 2013, Rep. Joe Salazar introduced HB 13-1077 - Concerning a Driver’s Right to Challenge the Lawfulness of a Law Enforcement Officer’s Initial Contact in an Administrative Proceeding for a Revocation of a Driver’s LicenseThis summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.

An administrative proceeding for a revocation of a driver’s license, a driver may challenge the validity of the law enforcement officer’s initial contact with the driver and the driver’s subsequent arrest for DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI. The hearing officer shall consider such issues when a driver raises them as defenses. On February 5 the Judiciary Committee amended the bill and sent it to the Appropriations Committee to consider the fiscal impact to the state.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Hotel Had No Duty to Detain Intoxicated Patron and Therefore Not Responsible for Subsequent Motor Vehicle Accident

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Groh v. Westin Operator LLC on Thursday, November 1, 2012.

Duty of Care—Innkeeper–Guest Relationship—Summary Judgment—Nonfeasance.

Plaintiff Jillian Groh appealed the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of defendant Westin Operator, LLC (Westin). The judgment was affirmed.

Groh and eleven of her friends spent an evening visiting bars in Denver and consuming alcohol. After the bars closed, the group gathered in a room of the Westin Hotel in downtown Denver, owned and operated by Westin. Groh had reserved the room in advance and was the only registered guest.

Around 2:45 a.m., a Westin security guard heard noises and investigated. He told Groh that she and the others needed to quiet down. Groh acquiesced, but the guard entered the room and told the others to be quiet, as well. Groh argued with him, claiming he wasn’t allowed to enter the room without her permission. The guard then re-entered the room and said everyone had to leave. Members of the group protested that the room had been rented so they could avoid having to drive after drinking.

Eventually, the manager was called. He determined that Groh could stay but that the others had to leave. Groh said that if her friends had to leave, she would leave too. For purposes of a summary judgment motion only, Westin conceded that Groh was evicted.

Several friends left and were not involved in the subsequent events. A little after 3:00 a.m., Groh and the remaining friends left the hotel. Groh called her brother and he advised her to take a taxi home. It was cold out, but the guard refused to let the party re-enter the Westin. Groh and the group then walked into a parking garage and, notwithstanding passing a taxi, one friend, Angela Reed, offered to drive. Groh gave her the keys to her PT Cruiser, which had five seatbelts. Seven people got it. Reed was the only one who used her seatbelt.

Around 4:00 a.m., on northbound I-225, Reed crashed into a slow-moving vehicle towing a vehicle with a flat tire. One passenger died; the others sustained injuries. Groh sustained severe injuries that left her in a persistent vegetative state. Reed’s blood alcohol content was estimated at between 0.170 and 0.222 at the time of the accident. She was charged with several felonies.

Groh, individually and by and through her guardians and conservators,brought negligence and breach of contract claims against the Westin. The district court granted summary judgment for the Westin. Groh appealed.

Groh argued that the Westin had a common law duty to protect her and prevent her from driving while intoxicated. Thus, the question was whether the Westin owed Groh a duty of care to take reasonable measures to protect her against the injury she sustained. Groh was injured as the result of riding as a passenger, without a seatbelt, in a vehicle driven by an intoxicated driver. In her fourth amended complaint, Groh contended the Westin had a duty to determine whether it was safe for her to drive home. The Court characterized this as a claim of nonfeasance on the part of the Westin.

The Colorado Supreme Court, in University of Denver v. Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54, 56 (Colo. 1987), analyzed the requirements of making out a claim of nonfeasance. Nonfeasance requires a special relationship, one of which is innkeeper to guest. However, once an individual ceases to be a guest of a hotel, the special relationship is terminated. Here, Groh was lawfully evicted because she breached her contract by having too many people stay in her room. Once evicted, the innkeeper–guest relationship terminated. Because there was no special relationship, there was no duty of care to take affirmative action to prevent the injury Groh sustained.

Groh also argued that the Westin was responsible under the assumed duty of care doctrine. Under this doctrine, “a party may assume duties of care by voluntarily undertaking to render service.” Here, the record did not contain evidence demonstrating that the scope of any such assumed duty would be so broad as to include preventing a former guest from being injured while riding as a passenger in a car driven by an intoxicated driver.

Finally, Groh argued it was error to rule that she breached her contract with the Westin, because the Westin waived any such claim when she was given three keys when she checked in. She cited no authority, and the Court found none, that would support such an argument. The summary judgment in favor of the Westin was affirmed.

Summary and full case available here.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule Does Not Apply to Driver’s License Revocation Hearings; No Right to Challenge Validity of Initial Police Contact

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its decision in Hanson v. Colorado Dep’t of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division on August 30, 2012.

Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol—Driver’s License Revocation—Express Consent Statute—Subpoena—Fourth Amendment—Exclusionary Rule.

Petitioner Andrew Hanson appealed the district court’s judgment affirming the administrative order entered by respondent, the Colorado Department of Revenue (Department), revoking Hanson’s driver’s license for one year. The judgment was affirmed.

After a citizen’s report of erratic driving, the police apprehended Hanson at his home and transported him to the hospital, where Hanson refused testing under the express consent statute. Despite the deputy’s failure to appear at the revocation hearing in response to a subpoena served on him, the hearing officer quashed the subpoena and sustained the revocation.

On appeal, Hanson contended that the revocation order should be reversed because the hearing officer erroneously denied him the opportunity to cross-examine the deputy about the circumstances surrounding his entry into the residence. The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to revocation hearings. Therefore, Hanson’s Fourth Amendment claim fails. Further, because Hanson had no right to challenge the validity of the initial police contact, the hearing officer did not err in concluding that the deputy’s proposed testimony was unnecessary. Thus, Hanson was not deprived of his statutory right to cross-examine the deputy.

Summary and full case available here.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Department of Medicaid Does Not as Victim for Purposes of Restitution Statute

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. McCarthy on August 16, 2012.

Restitution—“Victim”—Colorado Department of Health Care Policy and Financing.

Defendant appealed the trial court’s order concluding that the Colorado Department of Health Care Policy and Financing (Department) is a victim for purposes of the criminal restitution statute and granting restitution to the Department for costs incurred as a result of defendant’s vehicular assault. The order was reversed and the case was remanded.

Defendant, while driving under the influence, ran a red light and struck another car, causing seriously bodily injury to two passengers in the other car. The trial court ordered that defendant pay $417,750 to the Department for Medicaid disability benefits paid to a rehabilitation hospital on behalf of one of the victims.

Defendant argued that the Department does not qualify as a “victim” for purposes of the restitution statute. Under the vehicular assault statute, a victim is a human being. Because the Department has not been expressly identified by the legislature as a victim in the restitution statute, and the particular nature of the crime does not establish a right to restitution, the Department cannot qualify as a victim under the restitution statute. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the trial court with directions to modify the order so that it excludes the grant of $417,750 in restitution to the Department.

Summary and full case available here.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Cannot Refuse to Take Chemical Breath or Blood Test Merely Because Belief that Testing Equipment Is Unreliable; License Revocation Upheld

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Long v. Colorado Dep’t of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division on August 2, 2012.

Driver’s License—Revocation—Refusal—Express Consent—Advisement.

Plaintiff John Chris Long appealed the district court judgment affirming an administrative order entered by defendant, the Colorado Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division (Department). The judgment was affirmed.

The Department revoked plaintiff’s driver’s license for one year based on his refusal to submit to testing as required by Colorado’s express consent law. Plaintiff contended that the Department lacked statutory authority to proceed with the hearing, asserting that the Department failed to provide proof that it made an initial revocation determination as required by statute, and that there was insufficient information to support such a determination. Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, however, on receipt of the completed notice of revocation form, a copy of plaintiff’s driver’s license that was taken into possession, the officer’s affidavit, and other additional documents from the officer, the Department determined that plaintiff’s license should be revoked. It had sufficient information to make that initial revocation determination based on the documents submitted by the arresting officer, and it was not required to support its preliminary determination with formal findings. Thus, plaintiff failed to show that the Department lacked statutory authority or jurisdiction to proceed with a revocation hearing.

Plaintiff also contended that the hearing officer erred in determining that his conduct constituted a valid refusal to submit to testing. Plaintiff originally had elected to take a breath test. The breathalyzer initially indicated that it was not operating properly, but when the deputy restarted it, the breathalyzer printout indicated it was working properly. Plaintiff then refused to take the test because he did not believe that the machine was working properly. A licensee, however, cannot refuse to take a chemical test of breath or blood merely because he or she believes such testing equipment is unreliable or not working properly. Because the hearing officer’s factual finding that the breathalyzer was working properly after it had been restarted was based on unrebutted evidence and inferences on this issue, this finding is binding on judicial review.

Plaintiff contended that the hearing officer erred in determining that he was properly advised under the express consent statute. Because the breathalyzer was working properly, the deputy’s explanation was correct. The deputy had explained that plaintiff did not have to take the breath test, but because he had elected initially to take a breath test and because there were no extraordinary circumstances preventing completion of that test, if he did not take the test, it would constitute refusal.

Plaintiff further argued that there was no probable cause for the initial traffic stop. The testimony and written report of the arresting officer established that he observed plaintiff speeding and weaving in and out of his traffic lane. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support the hearing officer’s conclusions that there was reasonable suspicion to justify the initial traffic stop.

Summary and full case available here.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Complicitor Liability Does Not Apply to Strict Liability Crime of Vehicular Assault Because Crime Does Not Require Culpable Mental State

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Childress on July 19, 2012.

Child Abuse—Serious Bodily Injury—Vehicular Assault (DUI)—Complicitor Liability—Bill of Particulars—Unanimity Instruction—Sentencing—Crim.P. 25.

Defendant appealed his judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury, vehicular assault (driving under the influence (DUI)), driving while impaired by alcohol, reckless endangerment, reckless driving, and two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. He also appealed the sentence imposed. The judgment was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and reversed in part, and the case was remanded.

After consuming alcohol at a party, defendant drove his 3-year-old son, K.C., his 17-year-old son, B.L., and B.L.’s 19-year-old girlfriend, H.T., to defendant’s house in Aurora. They then decided to return to the party. B.L. drove, defendant did not restrain K.C., and they were involved in an accident where K.C. sustained severe injuries.

Defendant contended on appeal that his vehicular assault conviction must be vacated because there cannot be complicitor liability for vehicular assault (DUI). The Court of Appeals held, as a matter of first impression in Colorado, that complicitor liability does not apply to the strict liability crime of vehicular assault (DUI) because the crime does not require a culpable mental state. Therefore, defendant’s conviction for vehicular assault (DUI) was vacated.

Defendant also contended that his conviction for child abuse must be reversed because the trial court failed to require a bill of particulars and failed to require the prosecution to elect which act of child abuse supported his conviction, or, in the alternative, failed to give a unanimity instruction. The prosecution presented evidence that defendant took K.C. to a party where underage drinking and drug use was occurring, forced K.C. to drink alcohol, placed K.C. in a dryer and closed the door, took K.C. out in the cold without proper clothing, drove a vehicle while impaired with K.C. as an unrestrained passenger, and allowed B.L. to drive a vehicle while impaired with K.C. as an unrestrained passenger. Because the prosecution presented several acts that could form the basis of child abuse under CRS § 18-6-401(1)(a), the jury instructions given here did not ensure that the jury’s verdict was unanimous. Therefore, defendant’s conviction for child abuse was reversed.

Defendant further argued that his sentences must be vacated because the judge who conducted his trial was not the same judge who sentenced him. Because the record does not indicate the reason for the substitution, the case was remanded for an explanation pursuant to Crim.P. 25.

Summary and full case available here.

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