The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People in Interest of E.G. on Thursday, February 26, 2015.
Sexual Assault of a Child—Juvenile Offender—Access to Crime Scene—Privacy Interests—Cross-Examination—Sentence.
E.G. was charged with two counts of sexual assault of a child and two pattern of abuse sentence enhancers for sexually assaulting his younger cousins over a two-year period in the home of their mutual grandmother. Because E.G. was a juvenile, his case originated in juvenile court. E.G. was later charged as an aggravated juvenile offender and his case was transferred to district court.
On appeal, E.G. argued that the trial court erred when it denied, based on lack of authority, his motion requesting court-ordered access to the crime scene in the basement of his grandmother’s home. A trial court has the authority to allow discovery of a crime scene to the defense, even if the discovery implicates constitutionally protected privacy rights of a nonparty, provided that the defendant’s justification for the information, which derives from his constitutional rights to due process and to present a defense, outweighs the privacy interests. Because E.G. previously lived at the home and was provided photographs of the crime scene before trial, he failed to meet this standard. The trial court, therefore, properly denied E.G.’s motion.
E.G. next contended that the trial court reversibly erred in limiting E.G.’s cross-examination of the forensic interviewer. Because the forensic interview tapes were already in evidence and counsel had already impeached the victims during prior cross-examination of them, it was needless to question the forensic interviewer on her recollection of those same interviews or what the forensic interviewer did and did not ask. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence as cumulative. It was also not an abuse of discretion to exclude cross-examination that did not show actual bias of the forensic interviewer.
E.G. also contended that the trial court reversibly erred when it sentenced him directly to Department of Corrections (DOC) custody absent statutory authority to do so. A trial court must sentence an aggravated juvenile offender according to CRS § 19-2-601. Here, however, because E.G. was 22 years old at the time of sentencing, he had already aged out of Department of Human Services (DHS) custody and DHS could not exercise jurisdiction over him. Therefore, certain portions of § 19-2-601(8), which do not require the participation of DHS, may apply to defendants who fall within the statute’s gap. Because the record does not include the court’s consideration of all requirements under § 19-2-601(8), the case was remanded for additional findings concerning the missing factors to determine whether the court’s decision to sentence E.G. directly to DOC custody was proper.