March 31, 2015

Colorado Court of Appeals: Declaratory Judgment Appropriate and Statutory Definition of Firearm Encompasses Bow Hunting

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Moss v. Board of County Commissioners for Boulder County on Thursday, March 26, 2015.

Declaratory Judgment—Firearm—Definition—County Board—Geographic Area.

This case concerns a county resolution that prohibits firearm discharges in a designated area of Sugar Loaf Mountain in unincorporated Boulder County. Moss and Westby live and own property in this area. Colorado Advocates for Public Safety is a nonprofit corporation whose mission is to assist in protecting the public from safety hazards, such as those involving firearms. This dispute between plaintiffs and the Board of County Commissioners for Boulder County (County Board) centers around the definition and scope of this resolution.

On appeal, plaintiffs contended that the district court erred in dismissing their declaratory judgment claim, wherein plaintiffs sought a judicial determination that, as a matter of law, the word “firearm” in CRS §§ 30-15-301 to -302 and Resolution 80-52 includes bows and arrows. Because a declaratory judgment would terminate the controversy or uncertainty regarding the scope of the resolution, plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment claim was properly raised in the district court and the district court erred in declining to address it.

The statute that authorizes counties to prohibit firearm discharges expressly defines “firearm” or “firearms” as “any pistol, revolver, rifle, or other weapon of any description from which any shot, projectile, or bullet may be discharged.” A bow is a weapon and an arrow is a projectile. Therefore, a bow and arrow constitute a “firearm” under this statute, and plaintiffs were entitled to a declaratory judgment in their favor on this issue.

Plaintiffs also requested an expansion of the geographic area covered by the resolution in their claim for injunctive relief. CRS § 30-15-302 does not subject the County Board to any procedural requirements to address plaintiffs’ request, and Colorado’s Administrative Procedure Act does not apply to the County Board. Additionally, plaintiffs concede that they have not asserted and cannot assert a claim under CRCP 106(a)(4) because there has been no final agency action in this case. Finally, plaintiffs have failed to state a constitutional due process claim on which relief can be granted. Therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief on this issue.

Summary and full case available here, courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

e-Legislative Report: March 24, 2015

legislationCBA Legislative Policy Committee

For readers who are new to CBA legislative activity, the Legislative Policy Committee (LPC) is the CBA’s legislative policy-making arm during the legislative session. The LPC meets weekly during the legislative session to determine CBA positions on requests from the various sections and committees of the Bar Association.

The following bill was discussed as the only action item taken up at the meeting on Friday, March 20. Other bills of interest from that agenda are tracked and updated below.

HB 15-1272—Timely Filed Claims Not Barred By Laches
Sponsors: Rep. Daneya Esgar (D) & Sen. Chris Holbert (R)
The LPC voted to oppose this bill because Laches is an important equitable defense. Colorado has a long history with the Doctrine of Laches and this bill upsets that balance. We understand the specific nature of the concern addressed in the bill, but the approach to a solution was overbroad. Therefore we voted to oppose HB 1272.

SB 15-069—Repeal Job Protection Civil Rights Enforcement Act
Sponsors: Sen. Laura Woods (R) & Rep. Kevin Priola (R)
The Legislative Policy Committee voted to oppose this bill to maintain a consistent position with the CBA’s position on previous legislation (HB13-1136 which the CBA supported). SB 69 would have reversed the effect of that bill.

HB 15-1292—Resentence Juveniles Life Sentence No Parole
Sponsors: Rep. Daniel Kagan (D)
The LPC voted to support the Juvenile Law Section’s recommendation to support this bill. There was a great deal of discussion. The bill allows for Juveniles who were previously convicted to petition for resentencing. The bill takes into consideration many factors for both victims and offenders.

Bills that the LPC is monitoring, watching or working on can be found at this link on Priority Bill Track.

At the Capitol—Week of March 16

This past week was a slower week for Bar priority bills. A number of bills we are watching and working on have not been scheduled for hearings or debate. We are constantly watching to ensure we are represented and up to date on bills the LPC has taken action on, and expect that this section will be more full after the “Long bill” (the state budget) is passed over the next two weeks.

HB 15-1142—Public Trustee Conduct Electronic Foreclosure Sale
We successfully amended this bill per the Real Estate Sections requirements, working in conjunction with the Denver Public Trustee and Representative McCann.

SB 15-077—Parents Bill of Rights
This bill was Postponed Indefinitely by the House Committee on Public Health Care and Human Services.

New Bills of Interest

The pace of new bill introductions is now slowing down, but there are a few new bills introduced still introduced through the remainder of the session. We will highlight some of the bills we have identified for tracking or monitoring here:

SB 15-200—Private Student Loan Disclosure Requirements
Sponsors: Sen. Andrew Kerr (D) & Sen. Nancy Todd (D)

The bill prohibits a private educational lender, as defined in the bill, from offering gifts to a covered educational institution, as defined in the bill, including public and private institutions of higher education, in exchange for any advantage or consideration related to loan activities or from engaging in revenue sharing. Further, the bill prohibits persons employed at covered educational institutions from receiving anything of value from private educational lenders. The bill makes it unlawful for a private educational lender to impose a fee or penalty on a borrower for early repayment or prepayment of a private education loan and requires a lender to disclose any agreements made with a card issuer or creditor for purposes of marketing a credit card. The bill requires private educational lenders to disclose information to a potential borrower or borrower both at the time of application for a private education loan and at the time of consummation of the loan.

The required disclosures are described in the bill and include, among other disclosures, the interest rate for the loan and adjustments to the rate, potential finance charges and penalties, payment options, an estimate of the total amount for repayment at the interest rate, the possibility of qualifying for federal loans, the terms and conditions of the loan, and that the borrower may cancel the loan, without penalty, within three business days after the date on which the loan is consummated.

SB 15-210—Title Insurance Commission
Sponsors: Sen. Laura Woods (R) & Rep. Jennifer Arndt (D)

The bill creates the title insurance commission (commission). The bill establishes the powers, duties, and functions of the commission and provides for the appointment of the members of the commission. With the exception of rate regulation and licensing, which will continue to be done by the insurance commissioner, the commission participates in the regulation of the title insurance business in Colorado by concurring in rules of the insurance commissioner, proposing rules for approval by the insurance commissioner, and reviewing and concurring in disciplinary actions related to the regulation of the title insurance business. The commission is scheduled to sunset Sept. 1, 2025, subject to continuation after a sunset review as provided by law.

Colorado Supreme Court: Natural Condition of Unimproved Property Caused Injuries so CGIA Applies

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Burnett v. State of Colorado Department of Natural Resources on Monday, March 23, 2015.

Colorado Governmental Immunity Act—Statutory Interpretation.

In this appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether the government retained immunity when a tree branch fell on plaintiff in a designated campsite at a state park. The court of appeals held that under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, the fallen branch was a “natural condition of . . . unimproved property,” and thus the government was immune from suit. The Court agreed. Under CRS § 24-10-106(1)(e), a “natural condition of . . . unimproved property” includes native trees that originate on unimproved property. Because a branch from such a tree caused plaintiff’s injuries here, the natural condition provision immunized the government.

Summary and full case available here, courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Tenth Circuit: Use of Force Against Physically and Mentally Unstable Person Excessive so No Qualified Immunity

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Aldaba v. Pickens on Wednesday, February 4, 2015.

Johnny Leija went to a hospital in Oklahoma and was diagnosed with dehydration and severe pneumonia in both lungs, causing hypoxia (low oxygen levels, known to cause altered mental status). He was pleasant when he was admitted at 11 a.m., but by 6 p.m. his behavior had changed—he was complaining of extreme thirst and a nurse discovered he had disconnected his oxygen and cut his IV, and he was bleeding from the arms. The nurse reconnected the IV and the oxygen, but Leija seemed confused and anxious. Leija became increasingly aggressive and disoriented, the doctor was increasingly concerned for his health due to the behavioral and mental status changes, and eventually law enforcement was called “for help with a disturbed patient.”

Leija, who had willingly come to the hospital, exited his hospital room and was walking toward the exit when law enforcement arrived. The doctor expressed concern that Leija could die if he left the hospital, given the severity of his symptoms. The officers tried to persuade Leija to return to his room, but he was agitated and insisted the nurses were trying to kill him. The officers repeatedly tried to get Leija to his knees and warned him they would use a taser. Leija removed his IVs and shook his arms, stating “this is my blood.” A deputy fired the taser, striking Leija in the torso, but it appeared ineffectual and a struggle ensued. The officers shoved Leija face-first against the wall and tased him again, this time making direct contact with Leija’s skin, but again the taser appeared ineffectual. A deputy shoved his leg into the back of Leija’s knee, bringing all three officers and Leija down. The officers handcuffed Leija while the doctor administered calming medications, but at that point Leija became limp and the doctors began CPR. Leija died that evening. The medical examiner testified that the cause of death was pneumonia, but the taser shots “certainly could have increased Leija’s need for oxygen,” and the treating physician testified that the position Leija was forced into by the officers made it difficult for him to breathe.

Erma Aldaba, Leija’s mother and next of kin, brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the officers. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers, deciding that Leija was lawfully seized, since probable cause existed for taking him into protective custody due to his altered mental status. However, the district court denied qualified immunity on the excessive force claim, holding that several material disputes existed about the reasonableness of the force used against Mr. Leija. The officers filed an interlocutory appeal.

The Tenth Circuit first analyzed the constitutional violation regarding the officers’ use of excessive force against Leija. The Tenth Circuit first enumerated the Graham factors for determining whether force was excessive, then added factors relating to the reasonableness of using force against a person who is to be taken into protective custody for mental health reasons. The Tenth Circuit found that where, as here, the person has committed no crime and poses a threat only to himself, it is especially egregious to use force to take the person into protective custody. The Tenth Circuit also admonished against the use of force or positional restraints when a person has special characteristics making him especially susceptible to harm, such as known medical conditions. Weighing the factors, the Tenth Circuit found the first factor weighed for the use of some force in restraining Mr. Leija, since he was clearly mentally disturbed and could die if he left the hospital. However, the rest of the factors weighed against the use of force, and particularly against the use of a taser.

Mr. Leija’s altered mental status and compromised physical condition weigh against the use of any force in restraint. Perhaps more importantly, weighing against the use of force was the fact that Mr. Leija committed no crime and voluntarily arrived at the hospital for medical treatment. Finally, the Tenth Circuit found disputed material facts regarding the last Graham factor—whether the defendant resisted seizure. Here, testimony varied on whether Mr. Leija complied with the officers’ orders to get down on his knees. Surveillance video showed no struggle from Leija, who simply continued walking when the officers commanded him to kneel. The deputy made the initial showing of force by tasing Mr. Leija. The officers were not justified in using the level of force shown on the surveillance video. The Tenth Circuit found the officers were not entitled to summary judgment on the excessive force claim, and that the law was clearly established at the time of the violation.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment to the officers.

Rule of 7, Wind Energy Development, Government Audit, and More Bills Signed by Governor

On Friday, March 13, 2015, Governor Hickenlooper signed 25 bills into law. To date, the governor has signed 49 bills into law during this 2015 legislative session. Some of the bills signed Friday are summarized here.

  • HB 15-1021 – Concerning Statutorily Established Time Periods that are Multiples of Seven Days, by Rep. Yeulin Willett and Sen. Michael Merrifield. The bill continues amending the Colorado Revised Statutes to conform statutorily prescribed time periods to the Rule of 7.
  • HB 15-1023 – Concerning the Age Limitation for Persons Served in a Day Treatment Center, by Rep. Susan Lontine and Sen. Irene Aguilar. The bill changes the age limits for people served by day treatment behavioral health programs to 3 to 21 (previously, the age limits were 5 to 18).
  • HB 15-1039 – Concerning the Donation of Prescription Medications by Licensed Health Care Facilities, by Rep. Max Tyler and Sen. Tim Neville. The bill allows licensed facilities to donate unused medications to other licensed facilities and removes the requirement that the expiration date be more than six months after the donation date.
  • HB 15-1121 – Concerning Agreements Between Landowners and Wind Energy Developers, and, in Connection Therewith, Clarifying the Rights and Duties of Parties to those Agreements and the Effects of Recording an Agreement in County Land Records, by Rep. Jon Becker and Sen. Jerry Sonnenberg. The bill requires wind energy agreements to be recorded in order to be binding on the parties, defines the wind energy developer of record, and imposes time limits for performing wind energy development.
  • SB 15-010 – Concerning Augmentation Requirements for Wells Withdrawing Water from the Dawson Aquifer, by Sen. Mary Hodge and Rep. Diane Mitsch Bush. The bill repeals a requirement that would have been effective July 1, 2015 requiring calculations based on actual depletions and instead continues the current practice of replacing out-of-priority depletions.
  • SB 15-024 – Concerning Updates to the Local Government Audit Law to Maintain Consistency with Audit Standards, by Sens. Jerry Sonnenberg & Cheri Jahn and Rep. Su Ryden. The bill increases the annual fiscal audit exemption amount from $500,000 to $750,000 and updates certain terminology.
  • SB 15-025, -026, -027, and -028 – Establish statutory requirements for statewide Fire and Police Pension Association Plans.
  • SB 15-082 – Concerning the Authority of Counties to Establish a County Workforce Development Program, by Sens. Vicki Marble & Mary Hodge and Reps. Dominick Moreno & Polly Lawrence. The bill allows counties to establish workforce programs to provide grants to high school graduates who pursue higher education.

Several bills were also signed regarding supplemental appropriations and transfers from the General Fund to various programs. For a complete list of legislation signed by Governor Hickenlooper on March 13, 2015, click here. For a list of all of Governor Hickenlooper’s 2015 legislative decisions, click here.

Frederick Skillern: Real Estate Case Law — Property Taxation and Assessments

Editor’s note: This is Part 15 of a series of posts in which Denver-area real estate attorney Frederick Skillern provides summaries of case law pertinent to real estate practitioners (click here for previous posts). These updates originally appeared as materials for the 32nd Annual Real Estate Symposium in July 2014.

frederick-b-skillernBy Frederick B. Skillern

Roaring Fork Club, LLC v. Pitkin County Board of Equalization
Colorado Court of Appeals, December 5, 2013
2013 COA 167

Valuation of a private golf club property.

The Pitkin County assessor determined the value of the Roaring Fork Club property for tax year 2011, and The Pitkin County Board of Equalization and the Board of Assessment Appeals agrees with the valuation. On appeal, the club asserts that the assessor should not have included the value of sold club memberships in the assessment of the club’s property. The Court of Appeals agrees and reverses.

The club’s property is open only to its members. Membership rights are retained for life unless sold or relinquished or revoked by the club. The club uses membership deposits to improve the property and maintain the improvements. The deposits are treated as a liability for accounting purposes because all or a part of them are refunded if members maintain their membership for at least thirty years or if they resign earlier and replacement members fill their spots.

The club’s amenities were completed in 1999 and the club had sold about 82% of the memberships by 2011. The club argues that the value of the sold memberships should not be considered in determining the actual value of the club’s property for property tax purposes because they are not interests in the real property. The BOE contends that the membership deposits are akin to prepaid rent on leasehold interests and they would escape taxation if not included in the property value.

On appeal, the club and the BOE agree that the income approach is the proper method to value the club’s property. However, the county argues that the memberships are an interest in land, like a leasehold, and should be included in the value under the “unit assessment rule.” The club contends that memberships are licenses, and are not an interest in land. The court agrees, and holds: (1) the membership agreement is not a lease; (2) memberships are not life estates; (3) the membership agreement does not give members any other taxable interest in the club’s property; (4) the membership agreement establishes that memberships are revocable licenses; (5) the unit assessment rule does not apply to these memberships; and (6) the sold memberships are not usufructuary interests. Accordingly, the Board’s order is reversed and the case is remanded to hold a hearing to determine the actual value of the club’s property without taking into account the value of the sold memberships.

 

Village at Treehouse, Inc. v. Property Tax Administrator
Colorado Court of Appeals, January 16, 2014
2014 COA 6.

Property tax; unit assessment rule.

Village paid more than $1 million to purchase certain development rights from the Treehouse Condominium Association (HOA). This supposedly gave Village the right to construct up to nineteen condominium units in the complex. The development rights were created by an amendment to the Treehouse declaration in 2006. The rights were assigned to Village in 2008 in a document entitled “Warranty and Assignment of Supplemental Development Rights”. The question is whether this property right is a taxable interest in real property. The Board of Assessment Appeals found that the right to build new condominium units constituted a taxable interest in real property for ad valorem tax purposes.

On appeal, the court of appeals affirms the BAA, and holds that the assignment, in effect, severed the development rights from the common elements owned by the HOA, creating a new taxable property interest. Because the Village acquired an interest in land, taxation of the development rights was required under C.R.S. § 39-1-102(16) and (14)(a).

Because the Assignment evinced the intent to sever title to the development rights from the common elements, taxing the development rights separately from the common elements did not contravene §§39-1-103(10) or 38-33.3-105. This taxation does not violate the unit assessment rule.

The Assignment created separate interests in real estate as between the interests of the individual unit owners in the common elements and those of the developer. The order was affirmed.

 

Premises Liability, Trespass and Nuisance

S.W. v. Towers Boat Club, Inc.
Colorado Supreme Court, December 23, 2013
2013 CO 72

Attractive nuisance; premises liability statute.

The Supreme Court considers whether, in the context of our premises liability statute, the attractive nuisance doctrine applies to both (a) trespassing children and (b) children who are licensees or invitees. The Court held that the doctrine permits all children, regardless of their classification, to bring a claim for attractive nuisance. C.R.S. § 13-21-115. The court therefore reverses the judgment of the court of appeals, which had found that the doctrine only protects trespassing children.

 

Frederick B. Skillern, Esq., is a director and shareholder with Montgomery Little & Soran, P.C., practicing in real estate and related litigation and appeals. He serves as an expert witness in cases dealing with real estate, professional responsibility and attorney fees, and acts as a mediator and arbitrator in real estate cases. Before joining Montgomery Little in 2003, Fred was in private practice in Denver for 6 years with Carpenter & Klatskin and for 10 years with Isaacson Rosenbaum. He served as a district judge for Colorado’s Eighteenth Judicial District from 2000 through 2002. Fred is a graduate of Dartmouth College, and received his law degree at the University of Colorado in 1976, in another day and time in which the legal job market was simply awful.

Colorado Court of Appeals: State Court Retains Jurisdiction Where Removal Attempt Without Slightest Color of Merit

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in McDonald v. Zions First National Bank, N.A. on Thursday, March 12, 2015.

Construction Loan Agreement Dispute—Partial Summary Judgment—Jurisdiction—Motion for New Trial.

In 2007, plaintiff purchased a parcel of land to construct a building on it. He entered into a loan transaction with defendant Zions First National Bank and signed a construction loan agreement (Agreement).

Plaintiff submitted applications for disbursement of loan funds, some of which defendant paid and some which it rejected. Plaintiff alleged defendant’s refusal to disburse all the loan funds required him to pay certain vendors out of his own pocket. Eventually, plaintiff defaulted on the loan and defendant foreclosed on the property.

Plaintiff sued in 2009, alleging defendant breached the Agreement and an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. After discovery, defendant moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed an unverified response. The trial court partially granted defendant’s motion, dismissing plaintiff’s two substantive claims, but did not issue judgment on defendant’s counterclaims due to genuine issues of material fact. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss its counterclaims without prejudice. The court granted the motions and vacated the trial date. The court also granted defendant’s request for attorney fees pursuant to the Agreement and entered judgment in favor of defendant in the amount of $102,267.75.

Defendant tried to collect from plaintiff for almost three years, during which time defendant filed a notice of removal of the action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. There had not been an acceptance of that action or a remand from the federal court. On December 23, 2013, defendant requested the trial court certify its order granting partial summary judgment as final.

The Court of Appeals first analyzed whether the trial court had jurisdiction to certify its order as final under CRCP 54(b) and, if so, whether the Court had jurisdiction to review it. Following analysis of the attempt at removal to the federal court, the Court held in a matter of first impression that where a party’s notice of removal indicates, on its face and as a matter of law, that the attempt to remove the case is without the slightest color of right or merit, jurisdiction in the Colorado courts is not divested. Plaintiff had no ability to remove this case to federal court; therefore, jurisdiction was not divested by the filing of the notice of removal. The Court concluded that because only the grant of partial summary judgment was certified as a final order, only challenges to the propriety of that order were properly before it. This disposed of many of plaintiff’s challenges.

The Court then turned to the breach of contract claim and found that there was no genuine issue of material fact because defendant had submitted evidence showing it did not breach its contractual duties and plaintiff had failed to refute this evidence. Plaintiff’s second claim alleged breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Again, there was no genuine issue of material fact because plaintiff submitted no evidence showing such a breach and defendant’s evidence showed no such breach.

Plaintiff also filed three motions under CRCP 59, one of which was accompanied by an affidavit from his real estate agent. The affidavit was not timely filed. The motion did not attempt to demonstrate any evidence that was newly discovered or could not have previously been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence. The Court found no abuse of discretion in denying the motions. The summary judgment and order denying motions for a new trial were affirmed.

Tenth Circuit: Citizenship of Beneficiaries to Trust Necessary to Determine Diversity Jurisdiction

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in ConAgra Foods, Inc. v. Americold Logistics, LLC on Tuesday, January 27, 2015.

Multiple plaintiffs brought suit against Americold Logistics, LLC and Americold Realty Trust (collectively, Americold) in Kansas state court. Americold removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas, asserting complete diversity of the parties. No party challenged removal and the district court did not address the issue. The district court granted summary judgment to Americold and plaintiffs timely appealed on the merits. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit noticed a potential defect in the notice of removal and ordered Americold to file supplemental briefing to address whether Americold’s Notice of Removal was sufficient to establish diversity jurisdiction and, if not, what curative facts could correct the defect in the appeal?

In its supplemental briefing, Americold asserted the omission of the citizenship of the beneficiaries of the Americold Realty Trust was not a jurisdictional defect because the citizenship of a trust is determined solely by the citizenship of its trustees. The Tenth Circuit disagreed. After analyzing Supreme Court precedent in Navarro and Carden, the Tenth Circuit found the citizenship of a trust depends on not only the citizenship of the trustees but also that of its beneficiaries. The Tenth Circuit ruled that when a trustee is a party to litigation, it is the trustee’s citizenship that controls for diversity jurisdiction purposes, as long as the trustee satisfies Navarro‘s real-party-in-interest test. However, when a trust itself is party to the litigation, the citizenship of the trust is derived from all of the trust’s “members.” In this case, the Tenth Circuit found that at a minimum the trust’s “members” were its beneficiaries.

The Tenth Circuit found Americold failed to meet its burden to establish diversity jurisdiction because it failed to present evidence of the citizenship of its beneficiaries. The Tenth Circuit remanded to the district court to vacate its judgment on the merits and remand to state court.

e-Legislative Report: February 17, 2015

legislationCBA Legislative Policy Committee

For followers who are new to CBA legislative activity, the Legislative Policy Committee (“LPC”) is the CBA’s legislative policy making arm during the legislative session. The LPC meets weekly during the legislative session to determine CBA positions from requests from the various sections and committees of the Bar Association.

Meeting held Friday, February 13

SB 15-129 — Preserving Parent-child Relationships
Sponsor: Senator Kevin Lundberg (R)
The LPC voted to oppose this bill in part because of the fundamental way that it changed the presumption of parenting time away from the “best interest of the child” to a different standard more focused on the parents in divorce proceedings. The bill was heard in committee on Wednesday the 11th and was passed on a party line vote after substantial amendments. SB-129 was referred to the Appropriations Committee for consideration of the bill’s fiscal impact.

SB 15-174 — Uniform Substitute Decision Making Documents Act
Sponsor: Senator Patrick Steadman (D)
The LPC voted to oppose this bill. The committee felt that the bill conflicts with existing statute, was unnecessary in many respects and that it potentially created more gaps and questions with existing law than its adoption would solve.

HB 15-1091 — Policies On Juvenile Shackling In Court
Sponsors: Representative Susan Lontine (D), Senator Michael G. Merrifield (D)
The LPC was concerned that while this bill was very well intentioned, it raised significant potential problems with separation of power between the legislative and judicial branches.

At the Capitol: Week of February 9

SB 15-049 — Real Estate Title Vests In Entity Once Formed
Sponsors: Senator Beth Martinez Humenik (R), Representative Jon Keyser (R)
This bill, supported by the Bar, passed through the Senate this past week. It has been assigned to the House Business Affairs and Labor Committee and has not yet been calendared for a hearing.

HB 15-1121 — Wind Energy Generation
Sponsors: Representative Jon Becker (R), Senator Jerry Sonnenberg (R)
The bill, supported by the Bar, also passed through its first chamber (the House) last week. It will next be heard in the Senate, where it has been assigned to the Agriculture, Natural Resources & Energy Committee. It will be heard by that committee on February 19.

SB 15-077 — Parents’ Bill of Rights
Sponsors: Senator Tim Neville (R), Representative Patrick Neville (R)
The bill passed out of the Senate committee hearing on a party line vote, and was debated on the floor. The bill was passed with amendments, and now moves to the House for consideration. It has not been calendared for consideration.

SB 15-042 — Mandatory Reports Of Animal Abuse
Sponsors: Senator Jerry Sonnenberg (R), Representative Jon Becker (R)
This bill was Postponed Indefinitely (killed) in committee. It will not be considered again this year. The CBA was opposed to the legislation.

HB 15-1101 — Public Defender ADC Records Open Records
Sponsors: Representatives Rhonda Fields (D), Polly Lawrence (R)
This bill was Postponed Indefinitely (killed) in committee. It will not be considered again this year. The CBA was opposed to the legislation.

HB 15-1174 — Information Protections Domestic Violence Victims
Sponsors: Representative Terri Carver (R), Senator Laura Woods (R)
The CBA has not taken a position on this bill—though we are working with the sponsors to ensure that the program will work as intended and not harm the real estate transaction process as a result of its adoption or implementation. It is likely that the CBA and its sections will participate in stakeholder groups and work sessions this summer.

New Bills of Interest

Senate

SB 15-177 — HOA Construction Defect Lawsuit Approval Timelines
Sponsors: Brian DelGrosso (R), Mark Scheffel (R), Jonathan Singer (D), Jessie M. Ulibarri (D)
The bill states that when the governing documents of a common interest community require mediation or arbitration of a construction defect claim and the requirement is later amended or removed, mediation or arbitration is still required for a construction defect claim. These provisions are in section 2 of the bill.

Section 2 also specifies that the mediation or arbitration must take place in the judicial district in which the community is located and that the arbitrator must:

  • Be a neutral third party;
  • Make certain disclosures before being selected; and
  • Be selected as specified in the common interest community’s governing documents or, if not so specified, in accordance with the uniform arbitration act.

Section 1 adds definitions of key terms. Section 3 requires that before a construction defect claim is filed on behalf of the association:

  • The parties must submit the matter to mediation before a neutral third party; and The board must give advance notice to all unit owners, together with a disclosure of the projected costs, duration, and financial impact of the construction defect claim, and must obtain the written consent of the owners of units to which at least a majority of the votes in the association are allocated.

Section 4 adds to the disclosures required prior to the purchase and sale of property in a common interest community a notice that the community’s governing documents may require binding arbitration of certain disputes.

House

HB 15-1025 — Competency To Proceed Juvenile Justice System
Sponsors: Representative Paul Rosenthal (D), Senator Linda M. Newell (D)
The bill establishes a juvenile-specific definition of “incompetent to proceed” for juveniles involved in the juvenile justice system, as well as specific definitions for “developmental disability”, “intellectual disability”, “mental capacity”, and “mental disability” when used in this context. The bill clarifies the procedures for establishing incompetency, as well as for establishing the restoration of competency.

HB 15-1216 — Basis For Expert Opinion Testimony
Sponsors: Representative Kevin Priola (R), Senator John Cooke (R)
The bill prohibits a person from testifying concerning the person’s expert opinion unless certain conditions are met.

Tenth Circuit: FTCA Claims Subject to Jurisdictional Time Limitations

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Barnes v. United States on Wednesday, January 21, 2015.

Larry Barnes was indicted in Oklahoma federal court for two crimes related to possession and distribution of methamphetamine. He was convicted and sentenced to two concurrent 66-month sentences. Barnes appealed. While his appeal was pending, the government acquired evidence that testimony of an ATF agent, a Tulsa police officer, and a confidential informant had been fabricated, and asked the court to vacate Barnes’ conviction and immediately release him from prison. The court granted that motion on July 2, 2009.

Seeking redress, Barnes filed administrative tort claims with the BATF on May 20, 2010. Receiving no response from the BATF, Barnes filed a civil lawsuit in Oklahoma state court on May 13, 2011, which the government removed to federal court. On September 23, 2011, the BATF filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that since the FTCA vests exclusive jurisdiction over federal tort claims in the federal district court, and removal jurisdiction requires a colorable state court claim, and plaintiffs had no jurisdiction in state court, the federal court therefore lacked jurisdiction as well. On October 25, 2011, while its motion to dismiss was pending, the BATF notified Barnes via certified mail of its formal denial of the administrative claims. The letter specifically advised that any appeal must be filed within six months of the date of  mailing of the letter, or by April 25, 2011.

On March 23, 2012, the federal district court granted the BATF’s motion to dismiss, and dismissed the case without prejudice. On August 22, 2012, Barnes filed a second lawsuit in federal district court. The BATF again moved to dismiss, this time for lack of jurisdiction under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) due to the lawsuit being time-barred. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and Barnes appealed.

The Tenth Circuit analyzed the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b), and found the two sections acted like “book-ends” for the time limit to file an FTCA claim. Barnes argued that his second lawsuit was timely because he was filing under § 2675(a)’s “deemed denial” provision, but the Tenth Circuit found that the BATF’s October 25, 2011 letter explicitly triggered § 2401(b)’s six-month limitations period. The Tenth Circuit found that the court lacked jurisdiction due to the time-bar.

The Tenth Circuit also analyzed Supreme Court precedent in Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990), regarding jurisdictional bars and equitable estoppel. After a lengthy analysis, the Tenth Circuit concluded it was bound by previous circuit precedent to apply a jurisdictional bar to FTCA claims. Even analyzing Barnes’ claims under equitable estoppel principles, though, the Tenth Circuit still found no relief for Barnes, because he could not show “affirmative misconduct” by the BATF.

The Tenth Circuit found that the district court correctly dismissed the claims, but incorrectly did so with prejudice. Claims subject to a jurisdictional bar are properly dismissed without prejudice. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court but remanded for correction of the dismissal as without prejudice.

Colorado Supreme Court: Error for Trial Court to Take Judicial Notice of Defendant’s Absence in Court

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Doyle v. People on Tuesday, February 17, 2015.

Colorado Rules of Evidence—Judicial Notice.

Defendant petitioned for review of the court of appeals’ judgment affirming his conviction for violating a condition of his bail bond. At the request of the prosecution, the trial court took judicial notice of the fact that defendant failed to appear in court on a particular day, as mandated by the relevant condition of his bond. The court instructed the jury that although it need not accept this judicially noticed fact as true, a judicially noticed fact is one that the court has determined is not the subject of reasonable dispute and one that the court has accepted as true.

The Supreme Court reversed. The resolution of a factual matter at issue in a prior judicial proceeding does not become an indisputable fact within the contemplation of CRE 201 because it was reflected in a court record. Accordingly, the trial court erred in taking judicial notice that defendant failed to appear in court on a particular day. Because the jury was instructed that this judicially noticed fact was not subject to reasonable dispute and had already been accepted as true by the court, the error was not harmless.

Summary and full case available here, courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Excusing Noncompliance with Date Certain Coverage Period Would Fundamentally Alter Terms of Insurance Contract

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Craft v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. on Tuesday, February 17, 2015.

Claims-Made Insurance Policies—Notice Requirements in Insurance Policies—Notice-Prejudice Rule.

In this opinion, the Supreme Court answered a question of state law certified by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The question, as reframed by the Court, was whether Colorado’s notice-prejudice rule applies to a date-certain notice requirement in a claims-made insurance policy. The Court concluded that excusing noncompliance with such a requirement would alter a fundamental term of the insurance contract and would not serve the public policy interests that originally supported the adoption of the notice-prejudice rule. Accordingly, it answered the question in the negative and returned the case to the Tenth Circuit for further proceedings.

Summary and full case available here, courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.