October 24, 2017

Colorado Court of Appeals: “Legal Disability” Means Inability to Bring Lawsuit Due to Some Policy of Law

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in T.D. v. Wiseman on Thursday, August 10, 2017.

“Legal Disability” for Tolling Statute of Limitations—C.R.S. § 13-80-103.7(3.5)(a).

T.D.’s complaint alleged she had endured 10 years of sexual and physical abuse from defendant, her former stepfather. She alleged that she was 7 years old when the abuse began and that it continued until about 1990, when she was in high school. She alleged that the abuse caused her to become dependent on drugs and alcohol, and she suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, psychological disorders, self-mutilation, eating disorders, depression, and a cycle of abusive relationships.

In August 2005, T.D. disclosed defendant’s alleged abuse to the doctors who had been treating her. She attempted suicide in 2012. Thereafter she was able to maintain sobriety. T.D. filed a lawsuit in 2015 asserting assault, battery, sexual assault and battery, extreme and outrageous conduct, and false imprisonment. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that T.D.’s claims had accrued in 2005 when she disclosed the alleged abuse to her doctors. Consequently, her claims were time-barred by the six-year statute of limitations in C.R.S. § 13-80-103.7(1). T.D. argued that the record contained genuine issues of material fact concerning whether she had been a “person under disability” until 2012 because of her addictions and psychiatric disorder, so the statute would have been tolled until her disability was lifted. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding no genuine issues of material fact in the record about when her claims accrued or whether the statute of limitations barred those claims.

The court of appeals determined that the issue of when the claim accrued was not properly before it, and assumed it accrued at the latest in 2005. The court then considered whether there was a factual dispute about whether the applicable statute of limitations was tolled because T.D. was a “person under disability.” Under C.R.S. 13-80-103.75(3.5)(a), a “person under disability” is a person who is (1) a minor under 18 (2) “declared mentally incompetent”; (3) “under other legal disability and who does not have a legal guardian”; or (4) “in a special relationship with the perpetrator of the assault” and “psychologically or emotionally unable to acknowledge the assault or offense and the resulting harm.” T.D. was 43 when the trial court granted the summary judgment motion, so she was not a minor from 2005 to 2011, when the statute of limitations was running. The record did not contain disputed facts about whether she was mentally incompetent during the years during which the statute of limitations ran. The court concluded that “legal disability” denotes an inability to bring a lawsuit based on a “policy of the law.” No facts in the record indicated that T.D. lacked the power to timely bring her suit. Lastly, while a familial relationship can constitute a “special relationship,” T.D. did not demonstrate that she was “psychologically or emotionally unable to acknowledge the assault or offense and the resulting harm.”

The judgment was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: District Court Properly Denied Attorney Fees to Non-prevailing Party

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Klein v. Tiburon Development, LLC on Thursday, August 10, 2017.

Attorney Fees—Fee-Shifting Provision—Contract—Violation of Public Policy—Substantial Justification.

Following remand, the district court denied the Kleins’ request for attorney fees and costs pursuant to a line of credit agreement (LOC) between them and Tiburon Development LLC (Tiburon). The district court granted Tiburon’s and Sell’s (a member of Tiburon) motions for attorney fees and costs.

On appeal, the Kleins contended that the district court erroneously denied their request for attorney fees pursuant to the fee-shifting provision of the LOC. However, enforcing  and awarding the Kleins their attorney fees and costs pursuant to the LOC would violate public policy because the Kleins lost the predominant and only contested part of the LOC claim, and they had only nominal success on the secondary and uncontested issue of entitlement to interest on the LOC. It would have been an abuse of discretion to conclude that the Kleins were the prevailing party on the LOC claim. Further, the Kleins were sanctioned for their conduct during the litigation and ordered to pay all of Tiburon’s attorney fees.

The Kleins next contended that the district court erred in awarding Sell the attorney fees he incurred in seeking an award of fees because Sell failed to carry his burden to prove that the Kleins’ defense to his fees motion lacked substantial justification, and the district court never found that the Kleins’ defense was frivolous. An award of fees incurred in seeking fees under C.R.S. § 13-17-102 must be supported by a determination in the record that the sanctioned party’s defense to the fees motion lacked substantial justification. Because the record in this case does not support that finding, the district court erred in including in its fee award the fees Sell incurred in pursuing his motion for fees.

The Kleins further contended that the district court’s award of fees to Sell unreasonably included fees Sell incurred to respond to the Kleins’ C.R.C.P. 59 motion, which they asserted was not relevant to their claims against Sell. It was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to award Sell the attorney fees he incurred to respond to the Kleins’ C.R.C.P. 59 motion, and the decision was supported by findings in the record.

The judgments denying an award of attorney fees and costs to the Kleins and awarding Sell the attorney fees he incurred to respond to the Kleins’ C.R.C.P. 59 motion were affirmed. The judgment was reversed insofar as the court awarded Sell the attorney fees he incurred in seeking fees against the Kleins, and the case was remanded for the district court to subtract the amount of such fees from the award.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Discovering Discovery: Building Your Case, Deposition Tips, Expert Witnesses, and More

“Reduced to its essence, discovery is the process of identifying, collecting, producing and/or receiving relevant, nonprivileged materials in connection with pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation. With the advent of notice pleading, civil discovery provides access to the relevant information that litigants and their counsel require to make informed decisions about the merits of their case and the potential for settlement.” -Magistrate Judge Craig B. Shaffer

Discovery is a crucial component of every litigation case. In the last 10 years, civil litigation has changed significantly. The proliferation of electronic data and new rules on both the state and federal level create increasingly difficult challenges for preserving, managing, and producing electronically stored information. Conducting discovery outside Colorado has become mainstream as civil litigation has become more national—even global.

This Friday, CBA-CLE will debut the newest title in our litigation library, Discovery in Colorado, at a full-day program, “Discovering Discovery.” Discovery in Colorado is a practical guide to discovery that brings to life the application of the Colorado and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing the discovery process. Discovery in Colorado was written by a variety of different practitioners, overseen by Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang and Natalie Hanlon Leh, Esq. Attorneys and judges with backgrounds in private, in-house, and government practice authored individual chapters.

Learn different approaches to discovery and hear distinct perspectives from some of the most experienced trial attorneys and judges in Colorado. Each class attendee receives Discovery in Colorado, 1st Edition, as course materials. Explore the ever-changing state of discovery through this valuable course and companion book. Register using the links below, or call (303) 860-0608.

 

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CLE Program: Discovering Discovery

This CLE presentation will occur on Friday, July 28, 2017, at the CLE Large Classroom (1900 Grant St., 3rd Floor) from 8:30 a.m. to 4:45 p.m. Register for the live program here and the webcast here. You may also call (303) 860-0608 to register.

Can’t make the live program? Order the homestudy here — Video OnDemandMP3 Audio

Tenth Circuit: Unofficial Head of Small Town Police Department Did Not Have Final Policymaking Authority for Department

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Patel v. Hall on March 1, 2017.

On April 20, 1011, Officers Bubla and Hall arrived at Mr. Austin’s auto-repair business pursuant to a call from Ms. Austin regarding suspicious activity by their landlord, Plaintiff Chetan Patel. The officers were informed that several cars that Plaintiff brought in were missing their Vehicle Identification Number (VIN). Additionally, Mr. Austin told the officers that he suspected the VINs had been switched on certain vehicles.

The officers contacted the County Attorney’s Office after speaking with the Austins and were informed that the officers could permit the Austins to remove their belongings from the premises and seal the building pending a search warrant. The officers also photographed the trucks with missing or replaced VIN plates which Mr. Austin had pointed out to them. The officers sealed the building. The next morning, Mr. and Ms. Austin and their son submitted written statements to the police and swore to their truthfulness in front of a notary. The statements included instances where the Plaintiff told Mr. Austin he needed to remove Plaintiff’s vehicles off the premises “because they were starting to draw the state’s attention.”

Officer Hall was unable to immediately obtain a search warrant, as none of the judges in Big Horn County were available. Officer Hall contacted the County Attorney’s Office to inquire whether there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff because Officer Hall believed Plaintiff might remove evidence from the premises. The County Attorney determined that there was probable cause to justify a warrantless arrest for felony VIN fraud. Plaintiff was arrested and the county court issued an arrest warrant the next day, along with a search warrant for the premises.

Pursuant to the search warrant, the officers discovered a syringe and white powder on a table in the premises. The officers left the building and obtained a new warrant to search for drugs as well as VIN plates inside the building. In total, the officers seized two loose VIN plates, a truck with switched VIN plates, a truck with a missing VIN plate, and an empty insurance envelope which was found laying on the floor with a claim number written on it. The officers also photographed several documents with VIN numbers written on them.

The charges against Plaintiff for felony VIN fraud were dismissed on October 4, 2011. In April 2014, Plaintiff filed the §1983 complaint. Defendants argued they were entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff supplied an affidavit purportedly signed by Mr. Austin. Plaintiff’s two attorneys also submitted affidavits stating they met with Plaintiff and Mr. Austin when Mr. Austin allegedly made statements that differed from his original sworn police witness statement.

The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants and refused to consider the purported Mr. Austin affidavit. The district court also disregarded Plaintiff’s attorneys’ affidavits holding that the affidavits would make the attorneys material witnesses to the case in violation of Rule 3.7 of the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct. The district court held that Plaintiff had not shown a constitutional violation relating to the search and seizure because (i) Mr. Austin consented to the initial search, (ii) the officers had probable cause to seize the shop while they obtained a search warrant, (iii) the subsequent search was conducted pursuant to a search warrant, and (iv) there was sufficient probable cause for Plaintiff’s arrest. The district court also rejected Plaintiff’s claim that the search was beyond the scope of the search warrant because Plaintiff had not shown the officer’s actions violated clearly established law. Finally, the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s state law claims with prejudice based on a procedural deficiency by Plaintiff and the state defense of qualified immunity.

The Tenth Circuit first addressed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Officer Hall on Plaintiff’s official-capacity claim. The claim requires evidence that the municipality “caused the harm through the execution of its own policy or customs or by those whose acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” The police department at the time had no chief of police, and Officer Hall was the senior officer. The Tenth Circuit laid out the test to decide whether a government employee is a final policymaker whose actions can give rise to municipal liability. First, the employee must be constrained by policies not of his own making. Second, his decisions must be final. Finally, the policy decisions and actions must fall within the realm of the employee’s grant of authority.

The Tenth Circuit held that there was no evidence to indicate whether or not Officer Hall was meaningfully constrained by policies not of his own making, whether or not his decisions were final, or whether his actions fell within the realm of his grant of authority. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit held that Plaintiff failed to satisfy the municipal liability test. Simply because Hall was “in charge” before the new chief took office was not enough. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims.

The Tenth Circuit next addressed the claims against Defendants in their individual capacities. The Tenth Circuit held that because Defendants asserted qualified immunity, the burden shifted to Plaintiff to establish that the Defendants violated a constitutional right and that the right was clearly established at the time of the violation.

Plaintiff’s first claim was against Officers Hall and Bubla for violation of his Fourth Amendment right when they initially searched the shop without a warrant. The Tenth Circuit held that the search was conducted pursuant to consent. The Austins had actual or apparent authority to consent as both worked at the auto-repair business. Ms. Austin contacted police and both she and Mr. Austin were present when the officers were shown around the shop. Mr. Austin did not protest, and the Tenth Circuit held that this was non-verbal consent.

Next, Plaintiff argued that Officers Hall and Bubla violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they sealed the premises without a warrant or probable cause. The Tenth Circuit held that there was probable cause and therefore Plaintiff’s rights were not violated. Probable cause existed because of what the officers found during their initial search with the Austins, Plaintiff’s suspected criminal conduct, and what Mr. Austin had told the officers about his conversations with Plaintiff. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit held that the officers were justified in sealing the building.

Third, Plaintiff argued that Hall violated his Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him without a warrant. The Tenth Circuit held that the arrest was valid because Hall had probable cause to believe Plaintiff was fraudulently altering VIN Plates. The Tenth Circuit held that the factors justifying the warrantless seizure of the building also supported Plaintiff’s arrest.

Fourth, Plaintiff argues that the warrants to search his shop and for his arrest were defective because they were “procured with reckless insufficient information.” The Tenth Circuit stated that there only needs to be a “substantial probability” that the suspect committed the crime before making an arrest. The Tenth Circuit held that Plaintiff’s evidence did not dispute that there was a substantial probability. Further because the prior search was lawful due to consent, the Tenth Circuit held that there was probable cause for a warrant to search the shop based on the initial findings.

Fifth, Plaintiff argued that the officers exceeded the scope of the search warrant. The Tenth Circuit held that the first two ways alleged by Plaintiff were not supported by evidence. The third allegation was that the officers exceeded the scope by seizing an envelope found on the ground of the shop. The Tenth Circuit held that Plaintiff met his burden of showing that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on that issue. The warrant clearly specified what items were to be seized, and by seizing additional items, the officers acted unreasonably for Fourth Amendment purposes.

The Tenth Circuit next addressed the district court’s decision to disregard the affidavit purportedly signed by Mr. Austin and its holding that the attorneys’ affidavits were inadmissible based on Wyoming’s professional conduct lawyer-as-witness rule. The Tenth Circuit held that is did not need to consider whether the district courts holding was accurate because even if the information from Mr. Austin’s purported affidavit was considered, it would not have created a material dispute of fact to defeat the Defendant’s assertion of qualified immunity. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit held that any error by the district court regarding Mr. Austin’s affidavit was harmless.

Finally, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s state law claims with prejudice. Because the district court did not explain why the defendants were entitled to the state qualified immunity, the Tenth Circuit remanded the issue for further consideration by the district court.

In sum, the Tenth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment as to the seizure of the envelope, remanded for further proceedings on the state qualified immunity issue, and affirmed the district courts grant of summary judgment in favor of all Defendants on the remaining claims.

Tenth Circuit: Discretionary Function Exemption Applies to All Activities of Prosecutors

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Estate of James D. Redd, M.D. v. United States on Tuesday, February 14, 2017.

The facts of the case stemmed from the case of Estate of James D. Redd, M.D. v. Love, in which the estate of Dr. Redd alleged that Mr. Love, a special agent with the Bureau of Land Management, violated Dr. Redd’s Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights when officers searched the Redds’ home as a part of an investigation that targeted persons in possession and trafficking in Native American artifacts that had been taken illegally from the Four Corners region of the United States. The day after agents searched the Redds’ property and arrested him, Dr. Redd committed suicide.

At the beginning of the trial of the lawsuit against Agent Love, the court dismissed all claims against Agent Love except one alleging excessive force. The court later dismissed the excessive force claim as well. In this appeal, the Tenth Circuit was evaluating one of the early claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) that had been dismissed by the district court in the first case: that the value of a “bird effigy pendant” was, as alleged by the estate, overstated in order to support a felony charge against Dr. Redd.

At the request of the parties to the case, the court decided the case on the briefs without oral argument. The court reviewed the claim de novo that the value of the pendant was inflated, and that prosecutors were aware of the inflation. The court stated, “determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” The court agreed with the district court’s finding that the allegation that a cooperating witness intentionally over-valued the pendant is implausible and not well pleaded. The court then noted that the district court was correct in stating that, “absent the implausible allegation of fraudulent valuation of the pendant, the discretionary function exception applies to all identified activities of the prosecutors barring the Estate’s FTCA claim.”

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all the Estate’s FTCA claims based on the discretionary-function exemption.

Tenth Circuit: Commerce Clause Authorizes Regulation of Take of Utah Prairie Dog

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in People for the Ethical Treatment of Property Owners v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service on Wednesday, March 29, 2017.

People for the Ethical Treatment of Property Owners (PETPO), representing over 200 property owners and entities, challenged a regulation promulgated by the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) pursuant to the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The challenged regulation restricts, but does not prohibit, the take of Utah prairie dogs, a listed threatened species, on non-federal land. The U.S. District Court of Utah granted PETPO’s request for summary judgment on the basis that neither the Commerce Clause nor the Necessary and Proper Clauses authorizes Congress to regulate the take. The FWS and Friends of Animals (FoA), as intervenors, appealed. Together they argue, that PETPO lacks standing and the challenged regulation is Constitutional. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court on the issue of standing, but concluded that the district court erred in its conclusion that the regulation was not authorized by the Commerce Clause. The court did not address whether the regulation was not authorized by Necessary and Proper Clause.

The Tenth Circuit first considered the issue of standing de novo. The parties disagreed whether the PETPO had sufficient standing for the summary judgment stage. The parties agreed that PETPO suffered an injury in fact that was traceable to the actions of defendant, but disagreed about whether PETPO’s injury would be redressable. PETPO claimed that the regulation was unduly burdensome and requested declaratory and injunctive relief, which “pertain to any federal prohibition on the take of Utah prairie dogs on nonfederal land.” The Tenth Circuit found that PETPO had standing, since the Necessary and Proper and Commerce clauses allow Congress to regulate the take.

The Tenth Circuit found that the district court erred in holding that the challenged regulation was not permissible under the Commerce Clause. The court held that “[R]egulation on nonfederal land of take of a purely intrastate species, like the Utah prairie dog, under the ESA is a constitutional exercise of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.” The court applied the framework established by the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Raich and found (1) the ESA to be a comprehensive regulatory scheme substantially affecting commerce; and (2) Congress had a rational basis to believe that the regulation at issue is an essential part of that scheme.

Here, the “[R]egulation of take of endangered and threatened species is directly related to—indeed, arguably inversely correlated with—economic development and commercial activity.” This is because Congress intended the ESA to conserve species, restrict commerce, and thereby promote long-term commerce. Further, the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate commerce, which includes “the power to prohibit commerce.”

Remaining was the question of whether regulation of a purely intrastate species, such as the Utah prairie dog, is authorized within the Raich framework. Here, the court reasoned that the majority of species protected by the ESA are intrastate. If this particular regulation is viewed in isolation as PETPO proposed, the “[p]iecemeal excision of purely intrastate species would severely undercut the ESA’s conservation purposes.” Further, this approach was foreclosed by Raich because it “[w]ould lead to just such a lingering death for the ESA—and likely for other regulatory schemes—insofar as every individual regulation passed within a larger regulatory scheme would be subject to a narrowly applied substantial effects test.” Therefore, “[C]ongress had a rational basis to conclude that providing for the protection of purely intrastate species is essential to the ESA’s comprehensive regulatory scheme.”

The court REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions to enter judgment in favor FWS and FoA.

Adoption Instruction Forms, Change of Name Instructions Amended in July

The Colorado State Judicial Branch released five JDF forms with a July 2017 revision date. The forms amended in July are four instruction forms in the adoption category and one instruction form for a change of name for a minor. These forms are available in PDF format here or in Word format on the State Judicial website. Additionally, one form was amended in June and several were amended in May. They are also available here.

ADOPTION

  • JDF 495 – “Instructions for Second Parent Adoption (Without Civil Union)” (Revised 7/17)
  • JDF 497 – “Instructions for Validation of Foreign Adoption” (Revised 5/17)
  • JDF 498 – “Instructions for Kinship Adoption” (Revised 7/17)
  • JDF 499 – “Instructions for Custodial Adoption” (Revised 7/17)
  • JDF 500 – “Instructions for Stepparent Adoption” (Revised 7/17)

DOMESTIC RELATIONS

  • JDF 1413I – “Instructions for Allocation of Parental Responsibilities” (Revised 6/17)

GENERAL/MISCELLANEOUS

  • JDF 76 – “General Motion” (Revised 5/17)
  • JDF 88 – “Notice of Change of Address or New Name” (Revised 5/17)
  • JDF 97 – “Notice to Quit” (Revised 5/17)

NAME CHANGE

  • JDF 420 – “Instructions for Filing for a Change of Name (Minor)” (Revised 7/17)
  • JDF 424 – “Request to Publish Notice to Non-custodial Parent of Change of Minor’s Name and Publication Order” (Revised 5/17)
  • JDF 425 – “Notice to Non-custodial Parent by Publication” (Revised 5/17)

For all of State Judicial’s JDF forms, click here.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Balancing Test Enunciated when One Party Calls Other Party’s “May Call” Witness

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Sovde v. Scott, D.O. on Thursday, June 29, 2017.

Medical MalpracticeMisdiagnosisExpert WitnessesTimely EndorsementHearsay.

Sovde, a child, sued doctors Scott and Sarka by and through his mother. The lawsuit claimed that defendants had negligently misdiagnosed lesions on the child’s head as something benign instead of manifestations of the herpes simplex virus, and if defendants had timely and properly diagnosed the lesions as products of less harmful skin, eyes, and mucous membrane disease, they could have treated the child with antibiotics, which could have prevented the onset of the more harmful central nervous system disease. The jury found in defendants’ favor.

On appeal, plaintiff argued that the trial court erred when it denied his requests to use the testimony of defendants’ previously endorsed expert witnesses whom defendants had withdrawn. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted defendants to withdraw Dr. Reiley and Dr. Molteni as expert witnesses and not make them available at trial because they had previously been listed as “may call,” not “will call,” witnesses. Further, because plaintiff did not timely endorse these witnesses or timely inform the court and defendants that he would use their depositions at trial, and the record supports the trial court’s implicit decision that the testimony and depositions would have been cumulative or would have had little probative value, the trial court did not err in denying his requests. For the same reasons, the trial court properly rejected plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.

Plaintiff also argued that the trial court erred in excluding father’s telephone conversation with a licensed medical assistant in a pediatrician’s office, contending that the testimony was admissible under CRE 803(4) as statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Although some of father’s statements fell within the ambit of CRE 803(4) because he provided them to the medical assistant to obtain a diagnosis of and treatment for the child’s condition, plaintiff failed to show that excluding this testimony substantially influenced the basic fairness of the trial. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied plaintiff’s motion for a new trial on these grounds.

The judgment was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Tenth Circuit: Brand Inspection Division is Entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Colby v. Herrick on March 1, 2017.

This case stemmed from a battle between Ms. Colby and her mother over the ownership of a horse. The mother complained to the Colorado Department of Agriculture, which sent someone from the Brand Inspection Division (Division) to investigate the situation. After investigating, the inspector seized the horse. Ms. Colby and her mother settled the ownership dispute in court and after three years, Ms. Colby prevailed and received the horse back. Ms. Colby and her husband then sued the Division and two of its officers. The district court dismissed the action.

The Tenth Circuit first addressed the Division as a defendant in the suit. It held that the Division was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as an arm of the state and therefore could not be sued in federal court. Further, the Tenth Circuit held that because the Division was an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Colbys could not sue the two officers in their official capacity.

The Tenth Circuit reviewed the Eleventh Amendment immunity issue de novo. The Eleventh Amendment extends to governmental entities that are considered arms of the state. When determining if the Division was an arm of the state, the Tenth Circuit laid out five factors that it considered: (1) how the Division is characterized under Colorado law; (2) how much guidance and control the state of Colorado exercises over the Division; (3) how much funding the Division receives from the State; (4) whether the Division enjoys the ability to issue bonds and levy taxes; and (5) whether the state of Colorado bears legal liability to pay judgments against the Division.

The Tenth Circuit held that the first factor weighed in favor of regarding the Division as an arm of the state. This was due to the fact that Colorado law treats the Division as part of the state government. Additionally, the Division participates in state government as a state agency and the agency’s inspectors are Colorado law enforcement officers with the power to make arrests for violations of state law.

The Tenth Circuit held that the second factor also weighed in favor of regarding the Division as an arm of the state. This was because the Division is considered part of the state Department of Agriculture and is therefore subject to control by state officials.

With regard to the third factor, the Division is entirely self-funded. Additionally, with regard to the fourth factor, the State Board of Stock Commissioners is entitled to issue bonds worth up to $10 million to pay the Division’s expenses. The Tenth Circuit held that these two factors by themselves would cut against Eleventh Amendment immunity. However, the Tenth Circuit held that because the Division is entitled to participate in the Colorado risk management fund, which obtains money from state appropriations, that use of state money supports consideration of the Division as an arm of the state.

The Tenth Circuit held that it was unclear whether the State bears legal liability to pay a judgment of the Division.

Therefore, because the first and second factors clearly support characterization as an arm of the state, and the third and fourth could go both ways, the Tenth Circuit held that the balancing of all of the factors led it to regard the Division as an arm of the state. Therefore, the Division was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not err in dismissing the claims against the division. However, it did hold that the dismissal with prejudice was a mistake. Because Eleventh Amendment immunity is jurisdictional, the Tenth Circuit held that the dismissal should have been without prejudice.

The Tenth Circuit next addressed the Eleventh Amendment immunity issue with regards to the Divisions’ two officers on the official-capacity claims for damages. The Tenth Circuit held that the officers were entitled to immunity in their official capacitates on behalf of the Division being an arm of the state. Therefore, The Tenth Circuit held that the officers were entitled to dismissal on the official-capacity claims for damages. However, just as with the Divisions Eleventh Amendment claim, because Eleventh Amendment immunity is jurisdictional, the district court should have dismissed the claim without prejudice.

The Tenth Circuit finally addressed the federal personal-capacity claims against the officers for damages. The district court had dismissed these claims based on timeliness. The Tenth Circuit stated that the Colbys claims had a two year statute of limitations. Further, the Tenth Circuit determined that the suffered damage accrued when the horse was seized on July 22, 2011. That action triggered the statute of limitations period. Because the Colbys did not sue until nearly three years later, the Tenth Circuit held that the claims were time-barred.

The Tenth Circuit addressed the Colbys’ argument that the statute of limitations should not have started until they were denied a timely post-deprivation hearing. The Tenth Circuit held that, even if this claim was accurate, that would only have moved the statute of limitations period six weeks in the future, which would still have resulted in the statute of limitations running out before the suit was filed.

Finally, the Tenth Circuit held that the continued violation doctrine did not apply to this case because the complaint does not base the claim on any acts taking place after July 22, 2011. Though the Colbys did not have their horse for three years, and therefore damages continued that entire period, the wrongful acts occurred only on July 22, 2011. Therefore, the Colbys’ claims against the officers in their individual capacity were time-barred.

In sum, the Tenth Circuit held that the Division and the officers in their official capacities were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. However, because the district court dismissed these claims with prejudice, the Tenth Circuit remanded them for the limited purpose of directing the district court to make the dismissals without prejudice. Additionally, the remaining federal claims against the officers were properly dismissed based on the expiration of the statute of limitations.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Plaintiff Need Only Demonstrate Prima Facie Showing of Personal Jurisdiction to Defeat Rule 12(b) Motion to Dismiss

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Rome v. Reyes on Thursday, June 15, 2017.

Ponzi Scheme—Investments—Insurance—Fraud—Personal Jurisdiction—Long Arm Statute—Colorado Securities Act—C.R.C.P. 12(b)(2)—C.R.C.P. 9(b).

This case arises out of a Ponzi scheme that defrauded at least 255 investors out of $15.25 million dollars. To implement the scheme, Schnorenberg formed KJS Marketing, Inc. in Colorado to obtain funds for investment in insurance and financial products sales companies. Schnorenberg hired Reyes, a California resident, and Kahler, a Wyoming resident, to solicit investor funds on behalf of KJS and its successor company, James Marketing. Rome, the Securities Commissioner for the State of Colorado, brought claims against Schnorenberg, Reyes, and Kahler for securities fraud, offer and sale of unregistered securities, and unlicensed sales representative activity. The Commissioner also sought a constructive trust or equitable lien against Schnorenberg’s mother (among others), who resides in Wyoming, as a “relief defendant,” based on allegations that she received some of the improperly invested funds. Reyes, Kahler, and Schnorenberg’s mother moved to dismiss all claims against them under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(2) for lack of jurisdiction. Reyes and Kahler also sought dismissal of the securities fraud claim on the ground that it failed to meet the C.R.C.P. 9(b) particularity requirements. (Neither Schnorenberg nor KJS is a party to this appeal.) The district court granted all of these motions without conducting an evidentiary hearing. In written orders, the court concluded that it lacked personal jurisdiction over each of the nonresident defendants, and that the Commissioner’s securities fraud claim failed to “link any particular factual allegations to actual false representations” made by Reyes or Kahler.

On appeal, the Commissioner contended that the district court erred in dismissing the claims against Reyes, Kahler, and Schnorenberg’s mother for lack of personal jurisdiction. Here, the Commissioner sufficiently alleged that Reyes and Kahler violated the Colorado Securities Act (CSA) because the transactions at issue pertained to securities that originated in Colorado. Taking the allegations together, the activities of Reyes and Kahler made it reasonably foreseeable that they could be haled into a Colorado court to answer the allegations. Further, the exercise of jurisdiction over them does not offend due process principles. Schnorenberg’s mother received funds from her son that had been transferred from Colorado accounts, and she knew or should have known that the money came from investors in her son’s “Colorado-based investment scheme.” The Commissioner’s action against Schnorenberg’s mother arises from her activities’ consequences in Colorado, and it is reasonable to exercise jurisdiction over her, despite the somewhat limited nature of her direct contacts with Colorado.

The Commissioner also argued that the district court erred in dismissing the claims against Reyes and Kahler under the CSA on the ground that the Commissioner failed to meet his pleading burden under Rule 9(b). The Commissioner’s complaint provided sufficient particularity to give Reyes and Kahler fair notice of the claim for securities fraud and the main facts or incidents upon which it is based.

The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Attorney Must Assume Financial and Ethical Responsibility in Order to Share Fees

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Scott R. Larson, P.C. v. Grinnan on Thursday, June 15, 2017.

Attorney Fee Dispute—Referral Fees—Division of Fees.

Grinnan is a general practitioner with limited experience in personal injury cases. Grinnan’s friend Kelley asked Grinnan to represent him in a personal injury case. Grinnan obtained Kelley’s approval to involve Scott Larson., P.C. in the case, and Larson entered into a contingency fee agreement with the Kelley family. As relevant here, the agreement identified Grinnan as “associated counsel,” stated that Grinnan would be paid a percentage of Larson’s fee “not to exceed 100%,” and provided that Larson was responsible for paying case expenses. Grinnan was not a signatory to the agreement.

Larson brought claims against various entities and settled with one early in the case. From Larson’s $333,333 fee on this settlement, he sent Grinnan a check for $50,000. After three years of litigation, the case settled. Based on the settlements, the contingent fee agreement entitled Larson to a fee of $3,216,666.67. Larson had incurred about $300,000 in costs.

Larson and Grinnan couldn’t agree on how to divide the contingent fee. Grinnan entered his appearance, and the court granted his request that all attorney fees paid to Larson be placed in a restricted interest bearing account. Following a hearing, the trial court entered a detailed written order allocating the attorney fees. The trial court declined to divide the fees in proportion to services and found that Grinnan had assumed joint responsibility for the litigation. The court divided the fees by awarding Grinnan 20% of the $333,333.34 from the first settlement and 12.5% of the $2,883,333.33 fee from the other two settlements. The court also awarded Grinnan prejudgment interest at the rate of 8% from the date the settlement checks were issued until final judgment entered on the fees allocated to him. It also awarded Larson interest on the fees placed in the restricted account less the fees awarded to Grinnan (as a wrongful withholding). The court declined to award costs, finding that neither lawyer was the prevailing party.

On appeal, Larson asserted that Grinnan never assumed joint responsibility because he did not assume responsibility for the representation as a whole. The court of appeals found that Grinnan had assumed one of the two components of joint responsibility—financial responsibility for the case—because of Grinnan’s exposure to liability for any malpractice of Larson. A remand was necessary to determine whether he also assumed ethical responsibility, the second component, on which the court had made no findings.

As guidance to the trial court on remand, the court analyzed the ethical responsibility issue. It concluded that a referring lawyer must: actively monitor the progress of the case; make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm of the lawyer to whom the case was referred has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct; and remain available to the client to discuss the case and provide independent judgment as to any concerns the client may have that the lawyer to whom the case was referred is acting in conformity with the Rules of Professional Conduct.

On remand, if the court finds that Grinnan assumed ethical responsibility, the court’s fee award will stand, subject to appeal by Larson. If the court finds that Grinnan did not assume ethical responsibility, he is only entitled to fees in proportion to the services he performed, with the referral fees to be reallocated to Larson, subject to appeal by Grinnan.

The court concluded that Grinnan failed to preserve issues he raised on cross-appeal.

Grinnan also contended that the trial court erred in finding a wrongful withholding.  The court found no error in the trial court’s award of prejudgment interest to Larson based on Grinnan’s wrongful withholding.

The court also noted that on remand the trial court could reconsider its decision not to award costs based on its findings on ethical responsibility.

The attorney fee award was vacated, the cross-appealed rulings were affirmed, and the case was remanded.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: District Court Correctly Characterized Water Storage Plan as Frustrated Plan in Condemnation Action

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Board of County Commissioners of County of Weld v. DPG Farms on Thursday, June 15, 2017.

Condemnation—Highest and Best Use—Lost Income—Costs.

The Board of County Commissioners of Weld County (the County) filed a petition in condemnation to extend a public road over 19 acres of DPG Farms, LLC’s 760-acre property (the property). When condemnation proceedings were initiated, the property was used primarily for agricultural and recreational purposes. The parties stipulated to the County’s immediate possession of the 19 acres and proceeded to a valuation trial. The dispute centered on the highest and best use of 280 acres that contained gravel deposits. DPG’s experts testified about the highest and best use of the property. The district court determined, as a matter of law, that the evidence was too speculative to support a finding that water storage was the highest and best use of the relevant area (Cell C); instead, it determined that the highest and best use of those acres was gravel mining, but not water storage as well. The jury awarded DPG $183,795 in damages for the condemned property and nothing for the residue. DPG then requested costs. The district court rejected a substantial portion of the costs on grounds that they were disproportionate to DPG’s success and that certain expert evidence had been excluded.

On appeal, DPG contended that the district court erred in rejecting water storage as the highest and best use of certain portions of the property. The Court of Appeals reviewed the evidence that the district court’s determination was based on and concluded that the district court did not err in determining, as a matter of law, that the evidence was too speculative to support a jury finding that water storage was the highest and best use of Cell C.

DPG also argued that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of lost income, arguing that it was admissible pursuant to an income capitalization approach to valuing the property. DPG’s evidence of a potential income stream was admissible not as the measure of its damages but rather as a factor that could inform the fair market value of the property. And both the appraiser and the mining expert testified that the potential income stream from mining informed their fair market valuations. Because the lost income evidence, on its own, did not reflect the proper measure of damages, the district court correctly excluded it.

Finally, because the income valuation evidence presented by DPG’s experts was properly excluded, the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting DPG’s award of costs on this basis.

The judgment and cost order were affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.