March 23, 2018

Tenth Circuit: Nursing Home Liable for Abuse to Resident

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Racher v. Westlake Nursing Home Limited Partnership on Thursday, September 28, 2017.

Mrs. Mayberry was abused by two certified nursing assistants while in Quail Creek Nursing Home, which is owned by Westlake. This case was filed against Westlake under Oklahoma law for negligence, negligence per se, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. At trial, the jury found for plaintiffs, Westlake appeals.

The two nursing assistants involved, Kaseke and Gakunga, worked at Quail Creek and were Mayberry’s caretakers. Both assistants had numerous write-ups in their personnel files for infractions and refusal to complete assigned duties, including sleeping on the job, which was grounds for immediate termination; however, neither were terminated for that infraction.

One of Mayberry’s daughters testified that the family began to notice bruising on Mayberry’s hands and arms soon after moving Mayberry to Quail Creek. These concerns went unexplained by Quail Creek. Although it was difficult for Mayberry to communicate due to dementia, Mayberry began to cry out to the family for help and that someone was hurting her mouth. To monitor Mayberry, the family placed a hidden camera in her room. The videos show Gakunga slapping Mayberry, forcibly stuffing Mayberry’s mouth with wadded up gloves, and performing compressions on Mayberry’s chest to force her to empty her bladder. Kaseke is seen watching this take place. Both assistants are seen roughly lifting Mayberry from her wheelchair and pushing her to lay down. Mayberry’s family brought the videos to Quail Creek’s attention. Both assistants were arrested. Mayberry died three months after the abuse was discovered.

Plaintiffs brought suit against Quail Creek due to the abuse that occurred and was perpetrated by Quail Creek employees, and on the grounds that Quail Creek is directly negligent in failing to investigate and report the incidents of abuse. At trial, the jury found that Westlake, the owner of Quail Creek, was liable on theories of negligence and negligence per se, that Westlake acted with reckless disregard for the rights of others, and that plaintiffs were entitled to compensatory damages in the sum of $1.2 million.

Westlake raised four issues on appeal: (1) whether the district court erred by failing to reduce compensatory damages to the statutory cap of $350,000; (2) whether the district court erred by failing to reduce the allegedly excessive compensatory damage award of $1.2 million or, in the alternative, to grant a new trial; (3) whether the district court erred by allowing allegedly improper closing argument regarding punitive damages during the first phase of the trial; and (4) whether the district court erred by admitting evidence of an unrelated incident subject to a limiting instruction.

As for the first issue, Oklahoma law caps noneconomic damages at $350,000 unless special findings are made. The district court concluded that the requirements for lifting the cap were satisfied in this case. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court decision. Because Westlake failed to raise the statutory damage cap at any point before the trial was completed, the Tenth Circuit held that Westlake waived the defense.

Next, Westlake argued that the compensatory damages awarded by the jury were excessive and that the district court erred by declining to either reduce the award or grant a new trial. The district court denied this motion because it concluded that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the jury’s award. Oklahoma recognizes a broad jury discretion in determining the amount of damages to award. The Tenth Circuit considered the entire trial record and viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs in concluding that the damages awarded were not excessive. The Circuit found that the jury could have reasonably concluded that Mayberry was abused on a daily basis and that the abuse caused emotional distress that was significant enough to have contributed to her death.

Westlake then argued that the district court erred by allowing counsel for plaintiffs to make arguments that invited an award based on consideration of deterrent and punitive rather than compensatory factors. Although the Tenth Circuit agreed that portions of the argument were improper at the time they were presented, Westlake failed to show that the argument led the jury to return a verdict based on passion or prejudice rather than the evidence presented at trial. The Tenth Circuit noted that not all errors require reversal. In this case, the Circuit found that the jury was not prejudiced by the poorly timed statements regarding the award of punitive damages. The jury was clearly instructed as to the correct procedure and the size of the awards, when considered in the context of the evidence presented at trial. The Tenth Circuit declined to warrant a new trial based on these circumstances.

Lastly, Westlake argued that the district court erred by admitting evidence of another incident subject to a limiting instruction. Prior to trial, Westlake had filed to exclude any evidence that Kaseke caused any physical or mental harm to any residents at Quail Creek on April 4th. This evidence at issue included two more instances of abuse, where two nursing students testified that Gakunga struck Mayberry on the forehead and put her into a cold shower, and Kaseke sprayed an unnamed resident in the face with cold water so violently that the resident’s dentures fell out. The district court denied Westlake’s motion because the evidence would be relevant, not unfairly prejudicial, and admissible if the abuse in Mayberrry’s case occurred after April 4th. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court because there was a limiting instruction given to the jury that properly allowed the jury to consider the incidents only if they took place before the alleged abuse of Mayberry.

The Tenth Circuit AFFIRMED the district court’s judgment.

Colorado Supreme Court: Complaint Against Planned Parenthood Failed to State a Claim

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Norton v. Rocky Mountain Planned Parenthood, Inc. on Monday, January 22, 2018.

Constitutional Law—Colo. Const. Art. V, § 50—Motion to Dismiss.

In this case, the Colorado Supreme Court considered whether petitioner’s complaint alleged a violation of article V, section 50 of the Colorado Constitution sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss. The court held that to state a claim for relief under section 50, a complaint must allege that the state made a payment to a person or entity—whether directly to that person or entity, or indirectly through an intermediary—for the purpose of compensating them for performing an abortion and that such an abortion was actually performed. Because petitioner’s complaint did not allege that the state made such a payment, the complaint failed to state a claim for relief under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

CJD 05-03 Amended Regarding Management Plan for Court Reporting and Recording

On Friday, January 19, 2018, the Colorado Supreme Court amended Chief Justice Directive 05-03, “Management Plan for Court Reporting and Recording Services.” This CJD was amended to reflect recent changes to C.A.R. 10 and 11, effective for appeals filed on or after January 1, 2018. The full text of the CJD is available here. For all of the Colorado Supreme Court’s Chief Justice Directives, click here.

CJD 85-22 Amended, Modifying Rate of Interest on Judgments that are Appealed

On Thursday, January 18, 2018, the Colorado Supreme Court issued modifications to Chief Justice Directive 85-22, “Rate of Interest on Judgments Which are Appealed.” The changes to the CJD reflect the Secretary of State’s certification that interest on monetary judgments that are appealed is 4 percent. The changes are in accordance with C.R.S. § 5-12-106(2)(a) and 13-21-101(3). For all of the Colorado Supreme Court’s Chief Justice Directives, click here.

Colorado Court of Appeals: CGIA Bars Father’s Claims that City Breached a Duty of Care to Prevent Son’s Death

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in L.J. v. Carracito on Thursday, January 11, 2018.

Wrongful Death—Child Protection Act of 1987—Colorado Governmental Immunity Act—Police Officer—Failure to Report Child Abuse—Public Entity—Vicarious Liability—Tort—Willful and Wanton—Exemplary Damages.

D.J.M., age 2, died after suffering a beating by his mother’s boyfriend. D.J.M.’s father brought an action against the City of Colorado Springs (City) and Officer Carricato, individually and in his capacity as an officer with the City of Colorado Springs Police Department, for failing to report child abuse that father complained about to them multiple times. The complaint alleged violation of the Child Protection Act of 1987 (CPA); negligence (wrongful death) by the City and Officer Carricato; negligence per se by the City and Officer Carricato; violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by the City and Officer Carricato; vicarious liability against the City; and an entitlement to exemplary damages under C.R.S. § 24-10-118(1)(c) against Officer Carricato. The district court determined that while the negligence claims for wrongful death and negligence per se were barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), the claim for violation of the CPA was not barred because it was not a claim based in tort. The district court allowed the claim for vicarious liability to stand insofar as it related to the violation of the CPA and found, without conducting a hearing under Trinity Broadcasting of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster, that the complaint alleged a sufficient factual basis to support a claim of willful and wanton behavior.

On appeal, the City and Officer Carricato argued that the district court erred because the CGIA bars the claim for violation of the CPA and father’s complaint does not allege specific facts sufficient to support a finding that Officer Carricato’s conduct was willful and wanton. The City is undisputedly a “public entity.” The exceptions to sovereign immunity are not applicable here because (1) the enumerated statutory exceptions are not at issue; (2) the CPA does not fit within any of the statutory exceptions; and (3) father is not requesting equitable, remedial, or non-compensatory remedies. Here, the essence of father’s claim is that the City breached a duty of care owed to D.J.M., which caused his death. Because father’s claim lies or could lie in tort, the CGIA bars the claim against the City for alleged violation of the CPA. Thus, the district court improperly denied that part of the motion to dismiss. Similarly, the vicarious liability claims are claims that lie in tort or could lie in tort and are thus barred by the CGIA.

Furthermore, public employees are immune from liability for tort claims unless their act or omission was willful and wanton. The district court must determine whether the conduct was in fact willful or wanton. Here, the district court failed to hold a Trinity hearing on this issue.

Finally, Officer Carricato argued that the claim for exemplary damages cannot stand because it was improperly pleaded and that exemplary damages cannot be awarded against a police officer. The CGIA allows a claim for exemplary damages against public employees only if their conduct was willful and wanton. The claim for exemplary damages against the police officer was prematurely pled.

The portions of the judgment on the claims against the City, the vicarious liability claim, and the exemplary damages claim were reversed. The portion of the judgment relating to the claims against Officer Carricato was remanded.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Tenth Circuit: Case Properly Remanded to State Court Under the Class Action Fairness Act

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Speed v. JMA Energy Company, LLC on Monday, October 2, 2017.

Plaintiff Speed filed a petition in the District Court of Hughes County, Oklahoma, asserting a class action against JMA Energy Company, alleging that JMA had willfully violated an Oklahoma statute that requires interest payments of revenue from oil and gas production. Speed further asserted that JMA fraudulently concealed from mineral-interest owners that JMA owed interest to the owners, intending to pay only those who requested the interest.

JMA removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, asserting that the district court had jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Speed then filed an amended motion to remand the case to state court. The district court granted this motion, relying on an exception to CAFA that permits a district court to decline to exercise jurisdiction over a class action meeting certain prerequisites based on consideration of certain factors.

JMA appealed, challenging the district court’s remand order. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found the district court properly considered the statutory factors and did not abuse its discretion by remanding to state court.

CAFA permits a class action to be brought in or removed to federal court if: (1) the proposed class includes at least 100 persons with claims; (2) the aggregate amount in controversy on all claims exceeds $5 million; (3) at least one proposed plaintiff and one defendant have diverse citizenship; and (4) the primary defendants are not governmental entities or officials against whom a federal court cannot order relief.

CAFA also recognizes three statutory exceptions. The exception at issue in this case is the discretionary exception. This exception allows a federal court to decline to exercise jurisdiction over a class action that is otherwise covered by CAFA based on six enumerated factors. The Tenth Circuit considered each factor in turn to determine if there was a legal error or other abuse of discretion by the district court.

The first factor is whether the claims asserted involve a matter of national or interstate interest. The Tenth Circuit found that JMA failed to explain how there could be a significant national interest in the mere allocation of interest between producers and royalty owners. The only thing national or interstate about this case is that some of the owners of Oklahoma property, who are basing their claims on alleged violations of an Oklahoma statute, happen to live in other states and receive their royalty checks there. The Tenth Circuit determined that was not enough to reverse the district court’s finding.

The second factor was whether the claims asserted would be governed by Oklahoma law or the laws of other states. The district court found JMA’s argument that a fraud claim against Oklahoma may be governed by the law of a different state unpersuasive and concluded that this factor weighed in favor of Speed’s motion to remand. The Tenth Circuit concluded that Oklahoma law controlled.

The third factor was whether the class action had been pleaded in order to avoid federal jurisdiction. JMA asserted that Speed attempted to avoid federal jurisdiction by excluding from the class any publicly traded companies and affiliated entities that produced, gathered, processed, or marketed oil and gas. The district court found this argument unpersuasive, reasoning that Speed had proposed a class that encompassed all the people and claims that one would expect to include in a class action. The Tenth Circuit agreed.

The fourth factor was whether the action was brought in a forum with a distinct nexus with the class members, the alleged harm, or the defendants. The Tenth Circuit found no abuse of discretion by the district court, as the factors of this case demonstrated the required nexus between Oklahoma and the class members, the alleged harms, and the defendant, including that the action was related to real-property interests in Oklahoma, the class members owned royalty interests in Oklahoma property, JMA is a citizen of Oklahoma, and the underlying alleged actions that gave rise to this suit took place in Oklahoma.

The fifth factor was whether the number of citizens of the state in which the action was originally filed is substantially larger than the number of citizens from any other state for plaintiffs in the class, and whether the citizenship of the other members of the proposed class was dispersed among a substantial number of states. The Tenth Circuit found the district court correctly determined that this factor weighed in favor of remand, as the number of Oklahoma citizens was about 2.5 times the number of citizens from any other state.

The sixth, and last, factor was whether, during the three-year period preceding the filing of the class action, one or more other class actions asserting the same or similar claims on behalf of the same or other persons had been filed. No other actions have been filed; therefore, this factor favors remand.

The Tenth Circuit determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that each factor supported remand.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the decision remanding the case to state court.

Enhance Your Brief With Visual Aids

Have you ever tried to describe a fence in a brief? How about a photo lineup, a property line, a crime scene, a trademark, a scientific process, a patent, a timeline, a trail of money, a web of subsidiaries, or a comparison under a multi-factor test? You have options. A picture is worth a thousand words. So use a picture and lower your word count.

Rarely used yet always appreciated are visual aids like charts, maps, diagrams, and pictures.[1] Some concepts are easier to understand pictorially.

Simple visual aids are best. Remember, visual aids are substitutes for less effective main text. They should be simple and self-explanatory. If they need explaining, they are not working. For example, do not describe a scene and then include a map that matches the description. Just use the map.[2]

If you are new to visual aids, do not fear. You do not need to be an artist or computer wizard. Although you must use care when designing the aid, it need not be elaborate or artistic. As you will see below, many are basic and occasionally even hand drawn.

Finally, even if the visual aid is part of the record, include it in the brief rather than just citing to the record. Keep the brief a cohesive unit with all the information a court needs to decide a case.

Here are some opinions that use visual aids effectively. They show courts using them for three reasons: (i) to orient a reader or visualize the scene, (ii) to make a comparison, and (iii) to summarize facts. Each example includes the paragraph introducing the visual aid.

Using Visual Aids to Orient a Reader/Visualize the Scene

Example 1: [3]

Busch also concluded that the trajectory of the bullet holes caused by the initial shots to both Baldwin and Turley were consistent with a shooter being located by the barstools and that the shots could not have been made by someone coming out of the men’s restroom. First, the bullet that caused Turley’s wound was found in the tavern’s east door. Had the bullet been fired by someone by the men’s restroom or walking along the south wall (as Ogryzek testified), the bullet would have had to change its course almost 90 degrees after striking Turley to end up in the east door. The diagram below reflects the tavern’s layout and locations of Marcia Woolley, Turley, and Baldwin at the time of the shootings.

Example 2: [4]

The following diagram shows the approximate relative relationship of the properties that we have described above. This diagram is for illustrative purposes only, and it is not drawn to scale.

Example 3: [5]

The court ordered that a deed transferring a right-of-way for a road from Digor to the county be reformed and that the defendants among others be permanently restrained and enjoined from interfering with the county’s or the public’s use and possession of the property described in the reformed deed. We affirm.

On December 1, 1953, defendant Digor filed a plat signed by him in which a proposed road across his land, represented by the segments A, B, C, and D in the diagram below, was designated ‘Digor Drive.’

Example 4: [6]

This writ of error presents a rather knotty problem and arises from the fact that a house was so constructed as to encroach about 2 feet on an adjoining lot. To aid in an understanding of the entire matter, there is set forth below a diagram, not to scale, which when considered in connection with the balance of this opinion will hopefully bring the dispute into focus.


Using Visual Aids to Compare

Example 1: [7]

¶ 42 And even if (1) defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of the crime had been at issue; or (2) modus operandi evidence were admissible in cases other than sexual assault or domestic violence cases to prove the crime’s actus reus, we would nonetheless conclude that evidence of the February drug deal was not admissible to prove defendant’s modus operandi. When we compare the February drug deal with the May drug deal in the chart below, we see that, although the two drug deals were similar in some respects, they lacked the striking similarities and distinctive methodology that the law requires to show that both drug deals were the handiwork of one perpetrator. . . .

Example 2: [8]

Figure 2 compares the Hawg sealed bearing pack (Figure 2a) and the Newsco sealed bearing pack (Figure 2b).

. . .

Fifth, a defense expert compared the Hawg design to designs that had been publicly available at that time. One of these was illustrated by U.S. Patent Application Pub. No. 2003/0015352 fig. 1 (filed July 17, 2001), which we compare to the Hawg design in Figure 3.

Example 3: [9]

When Baig saw a billboard advertisement for Diet Sprite Zero in September 2004, he contacted Coca-Cola to threaten litigation over its purported infringement of his mark. Below are pictures of “Diet Sprite Zero” and “Naturally Zero.”


Summarizing Facts With Timelines, Charts, or Flow Charts[10]

Example 1: [11]

The facts of the petitioner’s brutal sexual assault and murder of 25-year-old LaTausha Curry on January 21, 1999 have been set forth in detail in our earlier opinion and the opinion of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. We will not repeat them here. Some of the relevant dates have been set forth above. We repeat these dates and others in the timeline set forth below:

November 19, 1999: Johnson sentenced to death.
October 22, 2001: Johnson files state petition for writ of habeas.
January 30, 2002: Tex. Court of Criminal Appeals (“TCCA”) affirms Johnson’s conviction on direct appeal.
June 20, 2002: U.S. Supreme Court issues Atkins.
October 8, 2003: TCCA denies habeas relief.
February 11, 2004: TCCA modifies the “two-forum rule,” which required dismissal of a state writ or successive writ if a federal proceeding was pending, even if that proceeding was stayed. Ex parte Soffar, 143 S.W.3d 804, 804 (Tex.Crim.App.2004).
May 17, 2004: Johnson files first federal writ.
September 18, 2007: Federal writ denied by district court.
December 2, 2007: District court denies motion for new trial.
April 7, 2008: Johnson seeks COA from Fifth Circuit.
October 2, 2008: Fifth Circuit denies COA.
January 16, 2009: Execution date set for April 30, 2009.
March 9, 2009: U.S. Supreme Court denies cert to Johnson’s challenging the Fifth Circuit’s denying his COA.
April 28, 2009: Johnson attempts to file successive writ with TCCA based on Atkins claims.
April 29, 2009: TCCA denies subsequent writ because Johnson failed to make a prima facie case of mental retardation. Johnson files the current motion.

Example 2: [12]

On cross-examination, witness Nee frequently asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege. The chart below outlines the context in which these assertions were made:

Example 3: [13]

The ownership genealogy of the ‘236 and ‘578 patents is documented in the chart below.

Example 4: [14]

JWR operates four coal mines west of Birmingham, Alabama. The parties refer to the mines as Mines 3, 4, 5, and 7. Mine 3 is located in Jefferson County, Alabama, near Adger, Alabama. Mines 4, 5, and 7 are located in Tuscaloosa County, Alabama. The number of layoffs at each mine and the percentage of workers affected are reflected in the chart below:


How to Create Visual Aids

Here are helpful resources on creating visual aids.

Designing charts and graphs

  • Gene Zelazny, Say It With Charts: The Executive’s Guide to Visual Communication (4th ed. 2001).

Creating flowcharts, charts, and graphs in Microsoft Word

  • Add A Drawing To A Document, (last visited August 23, 2017).
  • Saikat Basu, How to Create Stunning Flowcharts With Microsoft Word, (last visited August 23, 2017).
  • Insert A Chart From an Excel Spreadsheet Into Microsoft Word, (last visited August 23, 2017).
  • How to Add A Graph to Microsoft Word, (last visited August 23, 2017).

[1] “Wherever possible, use pictures, maps, diagrams, and other visual aids in your briefs. Some lawyers seem to think a word is worth a thousand pictures. The reverse, of course, is true. Seeing a case makes it come alive to judges.” Hon. Richard Posner, Effective Appellate Brief Writing, A.B.A. Litigation News (Spring 2010), See also Ross Guberman, Point Made: How to Write like the Nation’s Top Advocates 293-94 (2d ed. 2014).

[2] Unlike brief writing, during a trial you might decide such repetition is useful to the jury.

[3] Woolley v. Rednour, 702 F.3d 411, 418 (7th Cir. 2012).

[4] Graham v. Jules Inv., Inc., 2014 COA 136, ¶ 13 (Colo. App. 2014).

[5] Bd. of Comm’rs of Grand Cty. v. Baumberger, 513 P.2d 1075, 1075–76 (Colo. App. 1973).

[6] Emery v. Medal Bldg. Corp., 436 P.2d 661, 662–63 (Colo. 1968).

[7] People v. Williams, 2016 COA 48, ¶ 42-43 (Colo. App. 2016).

[8] Hawg Tools, LLC v. Newsco Int’l Energy Servs., Inc., 2016 COA 176M, ¶¶ 27, 33 (Colo. App. 2016).

[9] Baig v. Coca-Cola Co., 607 Fed. Appx. 557, 558–59 (7th Cir. 2015).

[10] See also Stephen Armstrong & Timothy Terrell, Thinking Like a Writer: A Lawyer’s Guide to Effective Writing and Editing 127-30 (Practicing Law Institute 3d ed. 2008) (discussing use of lists and bullet points); Ross Guberman, Point Made: How to Write like the Nation’s Top Advocates 295-300 (2d ed. 2014) (same); Ross Guberman, Point Taken: How to Write Like the World’s Best Judges 73-77 (2015) (discussing same in an opinion’s Statement of Facts).

[11] In re Johnson, 325 Fed. Appx. 337, 339 (5th Cir. 2009).

[12] United States v. Newman, 490 F.2d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1974).

[13] Rembrandt Data Techs., LP v. AOL, LLC, 641 F.3d 1331, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

[14] Int’l Union, United Mine Workers v. Jim Walter Res., Inc., 6 F.3d 722, 724 (11th Cir. 1993).


Michael Blasie graduated from the New York University School of Law. He began his career as a commercial litigator and criminal defense attorney in the New York City office of Cooley LLP where he practiced in state and federal trial and appellate courts. After five years he moved to Denver where he worked as a law clerk to the Honorable David J. Richman of the Colorado Court of Appeals before becoming Staff Counsel at Wheeler Trigg O’Donnell, LLP. Michael also serves as a volunteer firefighter for the City of Golden.

Use Quotations to Make a Point

Many lawyers fill briefs with quotations; too many quotations. A parade of quotations rarely helps readers. Here are some tips on when to use quotations and how to use them effectively.

Use Quotations Sparingly

Many briefs quote too often.[1] If you are analyzing the words in the quotation, use it. If the quotation has unique phrasing that pops, use it. But if you can say it better in your own words, don’t quote. Most of the time you can say it better and shorter by paraphrasing.[2]



“Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009), quoting F.R.C.P. 8(a)(2). Complaints must contain a short and plain statement explaining why a claim succeeds. F.R.C.P. 8(a)(2).
“As the Court held in Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929, the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although complaints do not require detailed factual allegations, they require more than bare accusations of harm. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
“A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Complaints must state more than labels, conclusions, or a claim’s elements. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Weave Quotations Into Your Argument

Here are some stereotypical introductions to quotations:

  • As the Supreme Court held in Smith v. Jones, “. . .
  • According to Smith v. Jones, “. . .
  • The statute reads: “ . . .
  • As one case held, “ . . .

Cut these. They add nothing except words. After you cut them, the meaning of the sentence is unchanged.

Then do even more. Legal writing specialist Ross Guberman provides several ways to enhance your argument with quotations. Rather than letting a quotation stand alone, each method ties the quotes to your case.[3]

Method 1: Introduce Quotations By Explaining How They Support Your Argument[4]

Introduce a quote by telling readers what you want them to take away from it.

Regardless of the policy’s merits, courts defer to codified legislative policies: “It is not for the courts to enunciate the public policy of the state if, as here, the General Assembly has spoken on the issue.” Grossman v. Columbine Med. Group, 12 P.3d 269, 271 (Colo. App. 1999).

  • During trial the victim emphasized repeatedly his confidence in the defendant’s identity: [quotes with record citations]

Method 2: Link a Party in Your Case With a Party in the Quotation[5]

Often briefs summarize a case and then compare the cited case to the case at issue. Combine these steps.

  • Where, as here, the interpreter did not testify, the agents present did not speak Spanish, and no one could testify whether the “interpreter indeed read the Defendant each of his Miranda rights off of the card” or “what the Defendant said in response to each of these warnings,” then the government has failed to meet its burden and
    the court must suppress the post-arrest statements. United States v. Sanchez-Manzanarez, 2012 WL 315870, *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2012).

The prosecutor’s use of the term “lie” in closing argument is the exact conduct prohibited in Wend, where after reviewing the repeated use of “lie” in opening and closing arguments the Supreme Court held “a prosecutor acts improperly when using any form of the word ‘lie’ in reference to a witness’s or defendant’s
veracity.” Wend v. People, 235 P.3d 1089, 1096 (Colo. 2010).

Method 3: Link Your Case’s Facts with a Quoted Legal Standard[6]

You can use quotations to merge a statement of law with the facts of your case.

  • The late disclosure of Brady material shortly before closing arguments “meaningfully alter[ed]” the defendant’s strategy on critical issues like “how to apportion time and resources to various theories when investigating the case, [and] whether the defendant should testify,” which is precisely why “the belated disclosure of impeachment or exculpatory information favorable to the accused violates due process.” United States v. Burke, 571 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2009).
  • Plaintiff’s claim that the defendant gave him a dirty look falls well short of the “high standard” for intentional infliction of emotional distress by outrageous conduct, because the conduct is not “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency.” Coors Brewing
    Co. v. Floyd
    , 978 P.2d 663, 665-66 (Colo. 1999).


[1] “A remarkably large number of lawyers seem to believe that their briefs are improved if each thought is expressed in the words of a governing case. The contrary is true.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Making Your Case: The Art of Persuading Judges 127-28 (2008). See also Ross Guberman, Point Taken: How to Write Like the World’s Best Judges 140-47 (2015) (discussing use of quotations in opinions).

[2] “After you have established your major premise, it will be your reasoning that interests the court, and this is almost always more clearly and forcefully expressed in your
own words than in the stringing together of quotations from various cases. Such a cut-and-paste approach also produces an air of artificiality, even of lack of self-assurance. You want the court to develop confidence in your reasoning—not in your ability to gopher up supporting quotations” Scalia & Garner, supra n. 1 at 128. “Whether you’re a judge, advocate, or journalist, stringing together quotations is not ‘writing.’ A surgical strike with lean quoted language will often beat bulky block quotation bursting all over the page. And yet sometimes, when binding precedent is worded just right, even an economical judge will want to preserve the language in the original court’s own words.” Ross Guberman, Point Taken, supra n. 1 at 140.

[3] See also Bryan A. Garner, Legal Writing In Plain English 101-04 (2d ed. 2013) (discussing how to weave quotes into a narrative); Ross Guberman, Point Taken, supra n. 1 at 121-126 (discussing how opinions draw analogies to cited authority).

[4] Ross Guberman, Point Made: How to Write Like the Nation’s Top Advocates 175-79 (2d ed. 2014) (applying strategy to block quotations); Ross Guberman, Point Taken, supra n. 1 at 140-41 (“For starters, don’t just dump the quote and run. Introduce a long quote the way you would introduce a stranger to a friend—by telling the friend about what they have in common, and why this new person might be interesting to get to know.”).

[5] See Ross Guberman, Point Made: How to Write Like the Nation’s Top Advocates 131-32 (2d ed. 2014).

[6] See id. at 133-34 (2d ed. 2014).


Michael Blasie graduated from the New York University School of Law. He began his career as a commercial litigator and criminal defense attorney in the New York City office of Cooley LLP where he practiced in state and federal trial and appellate courts. After five years he moved to Denver where he worked as a law clerk to the Honorable David J. Richman of the Colorado Court of Appeals before becoming Staff Counsel at Wheeler Trigg O’Donnell, LLP. Michael also serves as a volunteer firefighter for the City of Golden.

Rule Change 2017(12) Issued, Amending Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure

On Thursday, December 7, 2017, the Colorado Supreme Court issued Rule Change 2017(12), amending the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 16 was amended to reference new forms available to use when offering records of regularly conducted activity pursuant to CRE 902(11) and (12). The new forms, Form 37 and Form 38, were introduced, and Forms 10 and 11 were amended. These changes are effective immediately.

Rule 53, “Masters,” was introduced, effective January 1, 2018. The rule provides guidelines for the appointment of masters. Rule 121, § 1-15 was also amended effective January 1, 2018, to delete specific page requirements of briefs and instead refer to Rule 10(d), and also to add information about self-represented parties.

Finally, Rule 120, “Orders Authorizing Foreclosure Sale Under Power in a Deed of Trust to the Public Trustee,” was significantly amended. These changes are effective March 1, 2018.

A redline and clean copy of the rule change is available here. For all of the Colorado Supreme Court’s adopted and proposed rule changes, click here.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Jury Award of Zero Noneconomic Damages Appropriate Where Injuries were De Minimis

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Miller v. Hancock on Thursday, November 16, 2017.

Non-economic Damages—Jury Award—De Minimis—Pre-Offer Costs—Pretrial Offer of Settlement.

Plaintiff Miller was involved in an automobile accident with defendants, Aragon and Hancock. Miller sued Aragon and Hancock to recover economic and noneconomic damages that he suffered as a result of that accident. Before trial, both Aragon and Hancock made statutory offers of settlement to Miller pursuant to C.R.S. § 13-17-202. The jury awarded Miller only economic damages. Miller filed a motion for new trial on damages, which the trial court denied. Each of the parties also moved to recover their costs, Miller as the prevailing party, and Aragon and Hancock pursuant to C.R.S. § 13-17-202, arguing that the final judgment Miller recovered did not exceed their respective pretrial settlement offers. The court did not award Miller costs against Hancock, but awarded Hancock the entire amount of her claimed costs that accrued after her first offer. The court awarded costs in favor of Miller and against Aragon and denied Aragon’s request for costs.

On appeal, Miller contended that the trial court erred by denying his motion for new trial on damages. He argued that a jury’s failure to award noneconomic damages is impermissible as a matter of law when the jury returns a verdict awarding economic damages. Miller contended that it was undisputed that his injuries were more than de minimis; however, his characterizations of the relevant facts and evidence lack record support. The jury could have reasonably concluded that Miller’s injuries from the accident were de minimis. Thus, the record here was sufficient to support the jury’s award of zero noneconomic damages.

Miller also argued that the trial court should have included his pre-offer costs when determining whether Hancock’s pretrial offers of settlement exceeded the amount Miller recovered from Hancock at trial. Whether a statutory offer includes pre-offer costs depends on the language of the offer. Hancock’s offers unambiguously included costs, so Miller was entitled to have his pre-offer costs included in his final judgment for the purpose of determining whether either of Hancock’s offers entitled her to recover her post-offer costs pursuant to C.R.S. § 13-17-202. Thus, the trial court erred by interpreting Hancock’s offers to exclude costs.

Miller next argued that the trial court erroneously reduced the costs he was entitled to recover, yet awarded Hancock the entire amount of her claimed costs without subjecting her costs to similar scrutiny. Here, the trial court abused its discretion when it reduced the amount of Miller’s recoverable costs without making adequate findings as to whether those costs were reasonable and necessary.

The order denying Miller’s motion for a new trial on damages was affirmed. The awards of costs to Hancock and Miller were reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings to determine Miller’s costs and whether, after determining Miller’s costs, Hancock made a settlement offer pursuant to C.R.S. § 13-17-202 that exceeds the amount of Miller’s final judgment, inclusive of pre-offer costs and interest.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Plaintiff Established Sufficient Contacts Under Stream of Commerce Doctrine to Withstand Motion to Dismiss

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Align Corp. Ltd. v. Boustred on Monday, November 13, 2017.

Stream of Commerce Doctrine—Personal Jurisdiction

In this case, the supreme court considers the stream of commerce doctrine to determine the prerequisites for a state to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. The court concludes that World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), sets out the controlling stream of commerce doctrine. That doctrine establishes that a forum state may assert jurisdiction where a plaintiff shows that a defendant placed goods into the stream of commerce with the expectation that the goods will be purchased in the forum state. Applying that doctrine to this case, the court then concludes that the plaintiff made a sufficient showing under that doctrine to withstand a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the supreme court affirms the judgment of the court of appeals.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Show Me The Way: Using Headers More Effectively

Headers are helpful. Use them.[1]

Use Headers in a Statement of Facts

Think of all the good reasons you use headers in your argument section. Those same reasons apply to the Statement of Facts section. So use headers there too.[2]

When you do come across the rare Statement of Facts that uses headers, it often contains ones like these:

  1.  The December 22, 2010 Common Interest Agreement.
  2.  Defendant’s Negligence.

These are useless. The date and title of the document are probably irrelevant.[3] The header does not engage the reader because none of us want to read about common interest agreements. Neither header provides a fact essential to a court’s ruling. In fact, the second header is a legal conclusion (not a factual one). They are neither memorable nor relevant. In short, they say nothing about your case.

But it does not have to be this way. Ross Guberman provides a helpful example.[4] Watch how the government used headers in a Statement of Facts section to defend convictions in the Martha Stewart case.

  1.  The Government’s Case
    1.  “Get Martha on the Phone”
    2.  “Peter Bacanovic thinks ImClone is Going to Start Trading Downward”
    3.  Stewart Sells Her ImClone Stock
    4.  “Something is Going On With ImClone And Martha Stewart Wants To Know What”
    5.  Stewart’s Conversation With Mariana Pasternak
    6.  The Investigations Begin
    7.  The Tax Loss Selling Cover Story
    8.  January 3, 2002: Faneuil Lies to Investigators
    9.  Bacanovic Changes The Cover Story
    10.  January 7, 2002: Bacanovic Lies to Investigators
    11.  Stewart Alters Bacanovic’s Telephone Message
    12.  February 4, 2002: Stewart Lies to Investigators
    13.  February 13, 2002: Bacanovic Lies in Sworn Testimony
    14.  March 7, 2002: Faneuil Lies to Investigators Again
    15.  April 10, 2002: Stewart Lies to Investigators Again
    16.  Stewart’s False Public Statements
    17.  Faneuil Reveals The Truth[5]

When you read these headers, a story emerges. Not just any story, a story helpful to the prosecution.[6]

Let’s consider a simpler example. When you glance at a Table of Contents you see the following:

  1.  Farm Inc. Agreed to Deliver One Hundred Eggs to Pie Corp. Every Sunday.
  2.  One Sunday, Without Notice, Farm Inc. Delivered No Eggs.
  3.  Without Eggs Pie Corp. Could Not Bake or Sell Any Pies That Week.
  4.  That Week Pie Corp. Lost $1,000.

From these headers you can predict this lawsuit probably contains a breach of contract claim. The headers track the elements without using any legal terms, like “breach” or “causation.” More importantly, these four headers match the four factual findings needed to succeed on the claim.  If the court remembers nothing else except these four factual conclusions, the plaintiff’s statement of facts has done its job.

Phrase Argument Section Headers Persuasively

Frequently headers state a legal conclusion without any reasoning. For example,

  1.  The Complaint Fails to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted.
  2.  The Existence of a Disputed Material Fact Precludes Summary Judgment.
  3.  Defendant’s Negligence Caused Damages.

These headers could appear in any brief for any case involving these types of motions or claims. They are weak and add little. Remember, when your reader gets to these headers, the reader already knows what you want. The caption page and opening said what you want and why. So the reader knows you think the complaint does not state a claim when the reader gets to the header saying the complaint does not state a claim. Add something new and helpful.

Make your headers stronger by stating why you win:[7]

  1.  Because the Complaint Does Not Allege the Third and Fourth Elements of Negligence, It Fails to State A Claim for Negligence.
  2.  Conflicting Expert Testimony About Whether The Landfill Continues to Cause or Threaten Environmental Damage Creates a Disputed Material Fact.
  3.  When the Driver Became Distracted While Texting on Her Phone, She Crashed Into the Car.

The Integrated Header: Visual Cues For The Reader

Usually we think of headers as an indented sentence prefaced with an outline-symbol like a roman numeral. So headers are abrupt and obvious. Not quite.

Some briefs integrate headers into the main text. They use portions of headers to start paragraphs. These integrated headers are not in the Table of Contents. Weaker but also less disruptive than traditional headers, they function as helpful visual cues and transitions.[8] These headers are neither better nor worse than traditional headers. They are an option. Use them when you deem appropriate.

Former United States Solicitor General Seth Waxman has a knack for these. Take a look.

Example 1:

Summary of Argument

I.  Implied dedication requires two elements: (1) the property owner’s unequivocal intent to dedicate land for a particular public use; and (2) and acceptance of that land for that use by the public. Only the first element, the landowner’s intent, is at issue here. . . .

[several paragraphs]

II. Appellants have not come close to establishing that the City intended—much less unequivocally intended—to irrevocably dedicate the four parcels at issue as parkland. . . .[9]

The roman numerals are not part of a traditional header. They introduce full main text paragraphs. In doing so, they visually break up points for the reader. They function as transitions without a transition word or phrase.

Example 2:

3. Appellants’ rule is singularly inappropriate in this case where the
landowner is the City and the property at issue is a street.

Finally, Appellants’ bid to jettison owner intent in favor of public use as the north star of the implied dedication analysis . . .

a. By elevating long continued public use to the ‘main determinant’ of dedication, Appellants’ rule would eviscerate the distinction between prescriptive rights—those acquired through . . .

[another paragraph]

b. Appellants acknowledge that their vision of implied dedication rests not on the City’s actual intent regarding the status of the DOT Strips, but instead on . . . [10]

Here Waxman uses letters to achieve the same function as the roman numerals above. Rather than including a full sub-header, he uses each letter to start a new point and a new series of paragraphs.

Example 3:

8. Social Science Does Not Support Any Of The Putative Rationales For Proposition 8.

Proponents of laws like Proposition 8 have advanced certain social-science arguments that they contend support the exclusion of same-sex couples from civil marriage. The proponents’ main arguments are (1) deinstitutionalization: that allowing same-sex couples to marry will harm the institution of marriage by severing it from child-rearing; (2) biology: that marriage is necessary only for opposite-sex couples because they can procreate accidentally; and (3) child welfare: that children are better off when raised by two parents of the opposite sex. Each of these arguments reflects a speculative assumption rather than a fact, is unsupported in the trial record in this case, and has in fact been refuted by evidence.

Deinstitutionalization. No credible evidence supports the deinstitutionalization theory on which petitioners heavily rely. . . .

[multiple paragraphs]

Biology. There is also no biological justification for denying civil marriage to same-sex couples. . . .

[multiple paragraphs]

Child Welfare. If there were persuasive evidence that same sex marriage was detrimental to children, amici would give that evidence great weight. But there is none. . . .[11]

The introduction establishes three counterarguments in a numbered list. The brief assigns each counterargument a title using an italicized word. Those italicized titles later serve as visual transitions.

[1] For more information on using headers effectively see Stephen Armstrong & Timothy Terrell, Thinking Like a Writer: A Lawyer’s Guide to Effective Writing and Editing 121-25 (Practicing Law Institute 3d ed. 2008); Bryan A. Garner, Legal Writing In Plain English 20-22 (2d ed. 2013); Ross Guberman, Point Made, How to Write Like the Nation’s Top Advocates 73-80 (2d ed. 2014); Ross Guberman, Point Taken: How to Write Like the World’s Best Judges 108-11 (2015) (discussing use of headers and sub-headers in opinions).

[2] See Ross Guberman, Point Made, supra n. 1 at 73-76 (discussing use of headers in Statement of Facts section).

[3] “Lawyers love narrative – and they adore dates and places. . . . And when, pages later, [the date] turns out to be wholly irrelevant, the judge will feel duped – a feeling that often leads to irritability and impatience. I would consider that a less-than-desirable start for one’s case.” Judge William Eich, Writing The Persuasive Brief, Wisconsin Lawyer (Feb. 2003), available at; Ross Guberman, Point Made, supra n. 1 at 69-71 (discussing alternatives to dates in a Statement of Facts).; Ross Guberman, Point Taken: How to Write Like the World’s Best Judges 44-56 (2015) (discussing cutting irrelevant facts from court opinions).

[4] Ross Guberman, Free Martha? Not with these Headings!, Legal Writing Pro, (last visited August 3, 2017).

[5] Brief For the United States of America at 6-17, United States v. Martha Stewart and Peter Bacanovic, 433 F.3d 273 (2d Cir. 2006).

[6] Query whether the dates in these headers are needed. They might suggest several significant events in a short period.

[7] “The old test is still the best. Could a judge skim your headings and subheadings and know why you win?” Ross Guberman, Point Made, supra n. 1 at 93. For more advice on using headers in your argument section see id. at 93-106. See also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Making Your Case: The Art of Persuading Judges 89 (2008) (describing Table of Contents as “primarily a finding tool” but also noting “many judges look at it first to get a quick overview of the argument. That’s one reason you should make your section headings and subheadings full, informative sentence.”)

[8] Ross Guberman, Point Made, supra n. 1 at 73 (giving examples of integrated headers in Statement of Facts).

[9] Brief for Necessary Third-Party Appellant-Respondent New York University at 38-40, Deborah Glick, et al. v. Harvey, et al., 25 N.Y.3d 1175 (N.Y. 2015).

[10] Id. at 59-60.

[11] Brief of Amici Curiae Kenneth B. Mehlman et al. Supporting Respondents at 10-12, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).


Michael Blasie graduated from the New York University School of Law. He began his career as a commercial litigator and criminal defense attorney in the New York City office of Cooley LLP where he practiced in state and federal trial and appellate courts. After five years he moved to Denver where he worked as a law clerk to the Honorable David J. Richman of the Colorado Court of Appeals before becoming Staff Counsel at Wheeler Trigg O’Donnell, LLP. Michael also serves as a volunteer firefighter for the City of Golden.