May 22, 2013

Colorado Court of Appeals: Town’s Fees Regarding Oil and Gas Wells Clearly Prohibited by Statute

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Town of Milliken v. Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas LP on Thursday, May 9, 2013.

Oil and Gas Well Safety and Security Inspection Fees—CRS § 34-60-106(15).

The Town of Milliken (Town) appealed the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Onshore LP (Kerr-McGee). The judgment was affirmed.

In 1983, the Town enacted a series of ordinances that imposed fees on oil and gas wells within its boundaries. In 1996, the General Assembly amended existing state oil and gas law by enacting House Bill 96-1045. As relevant here, the new legislation, codified in part at CRS § 34-60-106(15), states:

No local government may charge a tax or fee to conduct inspections or monitoring of oil and gas operations with regard to matters that are subject to rule, regulation, order, or permit condition administered by the [Oil and Gas Conservation] [C]ommission. Nothing in this subsection (15) shall affect the ability of a local government to charge a reasonable and nondiscriminatory fee for inspection and monitoring for road damage and compliance with local fire codes, land use permit conditions, and local building codes.

In 2003, the Town enacted another ordinance concerning oil and gas wells that authorized the Town to inspect wells, equipment, and structures to determine compliance with the land use code, the Town fire code, the Town building code, and all other Town health or safety standards. The Town imposed an annual $400 inspection fee for each well within its boundaries that had not been plugged or abandoned. It was undisputed that the Town has never conducted the inspections described. In 2008, the Town enacted an ordinance imposing an annual $400 security inspection fee on each active oil and gas well within its boundaries. The fee was intended to offset the costs incurred by the Town’s police department for additional security checks that the well sites require. It was undisputed that the Town’s police conducted such checks on a regular basis before 2003. In 2010, the Town repealed and replaced the portion of the land use code containing both of the above provisions and replaced it with a provision authorizing inspections of wells and an annual $400 security fee on active oil and gas wells within the Town’s boundaries.

In 2010, the Town sued Kerr-McGee and others seeking to collect the security fees from 2003 onward. Kerr-McGee moved for summary judgment, which was granted in its favor. The district court held that the Town lacked the statutory authority to impose the fees. The Town appealed.

The Court or Appeals found it patently clear that oil and gas well safety and security are matters subject to rule, regulation, order, or permit condition administered by the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission. Thus, the Town’s fees under all of the ordinances above are clearly prohibited. The summary judgment was affirmed.

Summary and full case available here.

SB 13-282: Exempting Qualifying Customers with Specified Medical Conditions from Tiered Electricity Rates

On Thursday, April 18, 2013, Sen. Lucia Guzman introduced SB 13-282 – Concerning a Medical Exemption from Tiered Electricity Rates. This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.

The bill requires the public utilities commission to adopt rules by Nov. 1, 2013, to exempt customers with certain medical conditions from tiered electricity rates. Only customers who have an annual income of less than 60 percent of the median area income may qualify for this exemption. The bill establishes that fraudulent receipt of or application for this exemption constitutes theft.

If the commission fails to adopt rules by Nov. 1, 2013, the medical exemption from tiered electricity rates takes effect on that date.

The bill passed out of the Senate on 3rd Reading on April 26 and has been assigned to the Transportation & Energy Committee.

Since this summary, the bill was referred, amended, to the House Committee of the Whole.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Calculation of Tax Increment Financing for Suspended Portions of Urban Renewal Project Not Addressed by Statute

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Northglenn Urban Renewal Authority v. Reyes, Adams County Assessor on Thursday, February 28, 2013.

Summary Judgment—Tax Increment Financing—Urban Renewal Plan.

In this case involving the financing of an urban renewal plan, plaintiff Northglenn Urban Renewal Authority (NURA) appealed the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of defendants Gil Reyes, in his official capacity as Adams County Assessor (Assessor), and the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Adams (BOCC). The judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case was remanded with directions.

In 1992, Northglenn City Council (City Council) approved an urban renewal plan created by NURA for the redevelopment of blighted areas. The plan included tax increment financing (TIF). In 2004, the City Council by resolution substantially amended the urban renewal plan, adding several new tracts of property to the Northglenn Urban Renewal Area. No significant activity occurred on most of this new property from 2005 to 2009. In 2009, the City Council resolved to suspend the TIF for those properties within the renewal area without active urban renewal projects.

In 2009, the assessor calculated the TIF revenue by removing the suspended property from the total assessed value but including the suspended property in the base value. The assessor also concluded that the TIF period for all properties would expire in 2017, twenty-five years after the effective date of the original plan.

NURA disagreed with the method used to calculate the TIF following the TIF suspension. It sought mandamus relief and a declaratory judgment that the assessor improperly calculated the base value of the property in the urban renewal area, and improperly shortened the duration of the applicable TIF period for the additional properties. The trial court denied mandamus relief because the dispute involved the manner in which TIF revenues were calculated, not the assessor’s refusal to act. The Court of Appeals did not address this issue but turned only to the declaratory judgment claims.

The Court agreed with NURA that the assessor erred in the calculation of TIF following the suspension. The parties agreed that the statute does not address the TIF calculation of the renewal area when TIF is suspended for a portion of the property. Likewise, the assessor’s manuals and appraisal procedures have no provisions that address this. The Court therefore tried to interpret the statute in accordance with legislative intent and objectives (commending this issue to the legislature to address it at some future date).

Specifically, the Court agreed that the assessor should have removed the value of the suspended properties from the total assessed value and from the base value, not just from the total assessed value. The assessor’s method impeded the goals of addressing and financing renewal of blighted areas.

NURA then argued that the twenty-five-year period did not increase the TIF provision in the renewal plan for those properties added after the effective date of the plan. The Court disagreed. The Court found that the plain language of CRS § 31-25-107(9)(a)(I) creates a reference date based on the effective date of adoption of a TIF provision. Although the City Council could have altered the dates when it added the new properties, it included them in the original urban renewal area and subjected them to the original plan . Therefore, they were bound by the original twenty-five-year period. The part of the trial court’s summary judgment regarding the assessor’s calculation of TIF was reversed, and the part regarding the twenty-five year TIF expiration was affirmed.

Summary and full case available here.

SB 13-145: Reallocating Conservation Trust Funds to Certain Metropolitan Districts that Provide Parks and Recreation Services

On Tuesday, January 29, 2013, Sen. Angela Giron introduced SB 13-145 – Concerning the Reallocation of the Conservation Trust Fund to a Metropolitan District that Provides Parks and Recreation Services Within and Includes Territory Within the Unincorporated Area of a County Only. This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.

For a metropolitan district (district) that provides parks and recreation services and includes territory exclusively within the unincorporated area of a county that, as of January 1, 2013, has not pledged or otherwise used revenues from its share of conservation trust fund moneys to secure financing that has not yet been fully repaid for a specific project, the reallocation of conservation trust fund moneys is changed, over a 3-year phase-in period, from one-half of the percentage to the full percentage which the district’s population within the county is to the total population of the unincorporated area of the county if the district:

  • Has, as estimated in the July 1, 2012, special district total population estimate of the state demography office of the department of local affairs, 10,000 or more individuals residing within its territory;
  • Has only elected board members;
  • Provides only parks and recreation facilities that are open to the general public, including individuals who are not residents of the district; and
  • When providing its annual certification that it is an entity eligible to receive a conservation trust fund allocation to the division of local government in the department of local affairs (division), informs the division that it prefers to receive a full percentage share.

A county must notify the division when it has fully repaid any financing secured by conservation trust fund moneys. The division may accept gifts, grants, and donations for the purpose of implementing the bill.

The bill is assigned to the State, Veterans, & Military Affairs Committee.

HB 13-1064: Allowing Certain Legal Notices To Be Published Online

On January 9, 2013, Rep. Tim Dore introduced HB 13-1064 - Concerning the On-line Publication by a Local Government of Information that is Currently Required to be Published in a NewspaperThis summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.

Currently, a board of county commissioners is required to publish certain legal notices, advertisements, and fiscal information in specified newspapers. The bill allows these items to be published on a web site maintained by the county rather than publish them in a newspaper. Assigned to the Local Government Committee.

Since this summary, the bill was postponed indefinitely by the House Local Government Committee.

Colorado Supreme Court: Home Rule Municipality Cannot Promulgate Laws that Conflict with State Law on Matters of Statewide Concern

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Webb v. City of Black Hawk on Monday, February 4, 2013.

Legality of Banning Bicycles on City Streets—Home-Rule Municipality—Local Government Law—Traffic Regulations—CRS § 42-4-109(11)—Matter of State and Local Concern—Preemption.

In this appeal from the Gilpin County District Court, petitioners Jamie Webb, Jeffrey Hermanson, and Michaleen Jeronimus challenged the legality of the City of Black Hawk’s ordinance banning bicycles on certain city streets. Petitioners, a group of bicyclists, were cited and fined for riding their bikes on Gregory Street in Black Hawk, the only street providing access through town from the state highway to Central City. The bicyclists argued that Black Hawk, as a home-rule municipality, lacked the authority to prohibit bicycles on local streets absent a suitable alternative bicycle route as provided by state statute. Both the trial and district courts ruled in favor of Black Hawk, finding that the city had the authority to ban bicycles through both its home-rule and police powers.

The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Black Hawk’s ordinance banning bicycles is a matter of mixed state and local concern, and conflicts with and is preempted by state law. As a home-rule municipality, Black Hawk may enact traffic regulations that cover the same subject matter as the model traffic code, but it may not promulgate regulations that conflict with state statute. Black Hawk’s ordinance banning bicycles on city streets is in conflict with CRS § 42-4-109(11), which requires any municipal bike prohibition to have an available alternate path within 450 feet. Because Black Hawk’s ordinance conflicts with a specific statutory provision in a matter of mixed state and local concern, it is preempted.

Summary and full case available here.

Tenth Circuit: Award of Attorney Fees was Arbitrary; Remand to Determine What Work Warrants Reimbursement

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in Zinna v. Congrove on Tuesday, June 5, 2012.

The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision. Petitioner “appeals the district court’s attorneys’ fee award following a successful 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights suit against [Respondent], a county official. On its consideration of the jury verdict favoring [Petitioner], the district court determined the damage award was nominal and the victory merely technical. It proceeded to award [Petitioner] but $8,000 in attorneys’ fees under § 1988— $1,000 for each day of an eight-day trial. In light of [Tenth Circuit] jurisprudence applying Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 116-22 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring), [the Court concluded] that that the district court’s award was arbitrary, and therefore reversed and remanded to determine what work warrants reimbursement.

Colorado Supreme Court: Disgorgement of Commissions Is Not an Available Remedy Against Seller of Securities

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Capital Securities of America, Inc. v. Griffin, Treasurer of Jefferson County on May 29, 2012.

Purchase of Unlawful Securities—CRS § 24-75-601.1—Common Law Disgorgement as a Remedy.

In 2006, Jefferson County purchased securities through Capital Securities of America, Inc. The county later determined the purchase was unlawful under CRS § 24-75-601.1. The county sued Capital Securities and, among other things, sought to disgorge the commissions earned by Capital Securities under a theory of common law restitution. Both the trial court and the court of appeals concluded that restitution was appropriate and ordered Capital Securities to disgorge their commissions.

The Supreme Court held that disgorgement is not an available remedy against Capital Securities. Although the Colorado Legislature expressly provided a damages remedy (and specified how damages were to be calculated), an equitable remedy (repurchase), and a regulatory remedy (license revocation), it did not provide a disgorgement remedy under a theory of common law restitution. Under these circumstances, the Court concluded that the addition of disgorgement would impermissibly alter the extensive and detailed remedial scheme adopted by the legislature. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed.

Summary and full case available here.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Disconnection from Home Rule Municipality Inappropriate When Statutory Requirements for Disconnection Not Met

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Radcliff Properties Limited Partnership, LLLP v. City of Sheridan on May 10, 2012.

Real Property—Municipality—Petition for Disconnection—Procedural Elements—Findings of Fact—Evidence.

Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s order denying their petition for disconnection from the City of Sheridan. Sheridan and its City Council (defendants) cross-appealed certain aspects of the order. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order.

Plaintiffs own eight parcels of property located within Sheridan, a Colorado home rule municipality. The properties were annexed into Sheridan in 1977, and Radcliff Street (Radcliff) provides the only access to the properties. On July 6, 2010, plaintiffs filed a petition seeking to disconnect certain of their properties from Sheridan pursuant to CRS § 31-12-119, which permits qualifying landowners to disconnect their property from a municipality when the municipality has failed to provide certain essential services. Plaintiffs’ petition ultimately was denied.

Plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred by requiring a petition to disconnect filed under § 31-12-119 to contain all of the statutory elements required in a similar petition filed under § 31-12-601. The trial court did not err by requiring that plaintiffs’ petition contain all of the statutory elements required in a petition filed under § 31-12-601, because those procedural elements are incorporated by reference in § 31-12-119.

Defendants argued that plaintiffs’ petition was precluded by § 31-12-603(1). A petition filed under § 31-12-119 only has to follow the procedures “set forth in parts 6 and 7,” not the substantive provisions of parts 6 and 7. Therefore, plaintiffs’ petition to disconnect was not precluded by § 31-12-603(1).

Plaintiffs also argued that the trial court erred by denying their petition to disconnect for failure to meet the statutory requirements of § 31-12-119. The record supports the court’s denial of plaintiffs’ petition because plaintiffs failed to show that Sheridan “does not, upon demand, provide the same municipal services on the same general terms and conditions as the rest of the municipality receives.”

Plaintiffs’ contention that the district court erred by making certain findings of fact that were not supported by any competent evidence was not successful. Plaintiffs’ contention that the trial court erred by failing to admit more than 100 photographs into evidence also was not successful, because they were not relevant.

Summary and full case available here.

HB 12-1356: Imposing Punitive Sanctions on Local Governments That Interfere with Oil and Gas Production

On April 27, 2012, Rep. Jerry Sonnenberg and Sen. Greg Brophy introduced HB 12-1356 – Concerning a Prohibition on a Local Government that Impacts Oil and Gas Extraction from Receiving Any Moneys from the Local Government Severence Tax Fund. This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.

Currently, moneys in the local government severance tax fund are primarily used for 2 purposes:

  • For the executive director of the Department of Local Affairs to provide grants and loans to political subdivisions impacted by development, processing, or energy conversion of minerals and mineral fuels; and
  • For direct distributions to counties and municipalities based on factors related to oil and gas production.

The bill prohibits any local government that restricts or delays the ability of an oil and gas producer to exercise the producer’s property right as a lessee or owner to extract oil and gas from receiving any grants or direct distributions from the local government severance tax fund.

The bill is assigned to the Assigned to Agriculture, Livestock, & Natural Resources Committee. Committee review of the bill is scheduled for Monday, April 30 at 1:30 p.m.

Summaries of other featured bills can be found here.

Colorado Supreme Court: Concealed Weapons with Permit Permitted on College Campus

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Regents of the University of Colorado v. Students for Concealed Carry on Campus, LLC on March 5, 2012.

Regulating Concealed Handgun Possession on Campus—Concealed Carry Act—Right to Bear Arms.

The Students for Concealed Carry on Campus, LLC, along with Martha Altman, Eric Mote, and John Davis, (collectively, Students) filed a complaint against the University of Colorado’s Board of Regents (Board) and others, alleging that the Board’s Weapons Control Policy (Policy) violated the Colorado Concealed Carry Act (CCA) and the Colorado Constitution’s right to bear arms. The Board filed a motion to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), which the district court granted. The Students appealed, and the court of appeals reversed.

The Supreme Court held that the CCA’s comprehensive statewide purpose, broad language, and narrow exclusions show that the General Assembly intended to divest the Board of its authority to regulate concealed handgun possession on campus. Accordingly, the Court agreed with the court of appeals that, by alleging the Policy violates the CCA, the Students have stated a claim for relief. Because the Court affirmed on statutory grounds, it did not consider the Students’ constitutional claim.

Summary and full case available here.

Tenth Circuit: District Court Did Not Abuse Discretion by Fashioning Remedial Legislative Plan Solely Consisting of Single-Member Districts

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in Large v. Fremont County on Wednesday, February 22, 2012.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Court decided “what level of deference—if any—must be afforded to a local governmental entity’s proffered plan to remedy an adjudged violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 . . . when that proposed remedy unnecessarily conflicts with state law.” The Court concluded that “when such plans in effectuating their remedial purposes do not adhere as closely as possible to the contours of the governing state law, they are not eligible for the deference customarily afforded legislative plans. Consequently, in this case, [the Court affirmed] the district court’s order that rejected the Fremont County Board of Commissioners’ proposed remedial plan, and [held], under settled Supreme Court precedent that strongly favors single-member districts in court-ordered plans, that the district court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning a remedial plan solely consisting of single-member districts.”

Protected

2013-05-23 05:21:23