May 20, 2013

Tenth Circuit: Securities Fraud Conviction and Sentence Affirmed; Forfeiture Orders Upheld

The Tenth Circuit published its opinion in United States v. Gordon on Friday, March 15, 2013.

Defendant-Appellant George David Gordon is a former securities attorney convicted of multiple criminal charges relating to his alleged participation in a “pump-and-dump” scheme where he, along with others, violated the federal securities laws by artificially inflating the value of various stocks, and then turning around and selling them for a substantial profit. He was sentenced to 188 months in prison and was ordered to pay $6,150,136 in restitution. The government also restrained some of his property before the indictment was handed down and ultimately obtained criminal forfeiture of that property.

Gordon raised numerous arguments on appeal. He argued that the he was deprived of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel because the government placed restraints on various property, including two of his law firm accounts, so he lacked the funds to pay for counsel of his choice. In deciding against Gordon on this issue, the Tenth Circuit refused to consider trial brief arguments he attempted to incorporate into his appellate brief by reference as that is disapproved. After reviewing his appellate arguments, the court agreed with the trial court that Gordon failed to show he was denied access to funds to pay for his defense in any substantial sense. He paid his defense counsel over $900,000 and “counsel remained fully and actively engaged in the case throughout the entire trial court proceedings.”

Next, Gordon challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. In connection with misleading promotional material sent or paid for by the conspirators, Gordon contended that under Rule 10b-5 he had no liability because he had no duty to disclose. Once a party elects to disclose material facts, however, the party has a duty to speak truthfully and correct misstatements. The Tenth Circuit found “substantial evidence that many aspects of the information disseminated in the promotional campaigns were false and misleading, and that misleading statements went uncorrected by numerous material omissions.” The court also found sufficient evidence that Gordon prepared or endorsed false opinion letters and that he violated 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) when he had a friend sign backdated documents to present to the government in an attempt to prevent the forfeiture of his home.

Gordon complained that the district court erred in permitting the government to insinuate guilt by introducing evidence that infringed upon his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. At trial, the government offered the testimony of Lindberg to establish that he and Gordon had discussed who should be permitted to testify in the proceedings before the SEC. Two additional witnesses testified that Gordon advised them to take the Fifth Amendment. The testimony was offered to corroborate Lindberg’s testimony that he and Gordon had essentially calculated a cover-up strategy. The Tenth Circuit rejected Gordon’s claim that this tactic tainted the invocation of his own Fifth Amendment right not to testify at trial because it did not refer to his right.

The court rejected Gordon’s argument that the district court erred by excusing a juror without adequate cause. The juror had informed court staff that her continued presence on the jury could affect the outcome of the case. The district court determined the juror had not contaminated the rest of the jury and dismissed her for potential bias. The court did not address whether the trial court abused its discretion because even if it had, the juror’s dismissal did not cause any prejudice to Gordon.

The court also rejected Gordon’s claim that the trial court violated the Speedy Trial Act. The trial court properly identified the complex nature of the case and the voluminous records that would take additional time for the parties to organize and analyze when it granted an ends-of-justice continuance. Gordon’s interlocutory appeal and pending trial court motions created additional periods of delay that were excludable from the Act.

Gordon’s challenges to his sentencing also failed. In fraud cases where loss cannot be accurately calculated, a sentence may be based on gain. The court found no error in the trial court’s calculations, but even if it had, the error would be harmless because of the court’s downward variance from the sentencing guidelines. The court also properly included Gordon’s co-conspirators gains in making sentencing calculations.

Finally, the district court did not err in making its forfeiture orders. The defendant’s conviction and sentence were affirmed.

Crowdfunding and the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act

On April 5, 2012, President Barack Obama signed the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) into law. The JOBS Act was intended to increase the ability of small businesses to raise capital.

The legislation makes several changes to existing laws for small businesses. It enlarges the time from two to five years for certain small companies to begin compliance with some regulations, including provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. It allows certain small businesses to have more shareholders before registering with the SEC and becoming a public company. It also creates a new exemption from public filings with the SEC, and gives wider latitude to “emerging growth companies.”

The JOBS Act makes direct mention of “crowdfunding.” Crowdfunding refers to the funding of a company by selling small amounts of equity to many investors. Title III of the JOBS Act amends Section 4 of the Securities Act to allow “crowdfunding” by exempting issuers from the requirements of Section 5 of the Securities Act when they offer and sell up to $1 million in securities, provided that individual investments do not exceed certain thresholds and the issuer satisfies other conditions in the JOBS Act. The SEC has been tasked with developing regulations for crowdfunding; these are being developed and implemented. Until the regulations are implemented, however, the SEC cautions that “any offers or sales of securities purporting to rely on the crowdfunding exemption would be unlawful under the federal securities laws.”

Chapter 26 of The Practitioner’s Guide to Colorado Business Organizations discusses the JOBS Act and other securities issues for small businesses.

CLE Book: The Practitioner’s Guide to Colorado Business Organizations

The 2012 Supplement to The Practitioner’s Guide to Colorado Business Organizations is now available. Click here to purchase the supplement online, or call (303) 860-0608.

Tenth Circuit: Petitioner Used Fifth Amendment Privilege to Manipulate Securities Fraud Litigation Process; Not Abuse of Discretion to Deny Leave to Withdraw Assertion

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in SEC v. Smart on Friday, April 27, 2012.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. In 2009, the SEC began investigating Petitioner, who was the sole owner of Smart Assets, for securities fraud. Petitioner appeared before the agency to provide testimony, but his counsel instructed him “to take the Fifth Amendment,” and the proceeding ended. The next day, the SEC sued Petitioner and Smart Assets, claiming Petitioner “had defrauded multiple investors because he had represented that investors’ money would be placed in low-risk financial instruments, but he then used their money to cover his and his wife’s personal expenses, pay prior investors, and engage in high-risk ventures, like hard-money lending. In the process, he commingled investor funds, fabricated account statements, refused investors’ inquiries about their money, misled investors about his affiliation with a financial-planning firm, gave promissory notes as collateral for investment funds, and gave investors bogus financial product-information sheets.” The SEC moved for summary judgment and asked the district court to draw an adverse inference against Petitioner in regard to his Fifth Amendment invocations. Petitioner sought a continuance. The district court granted summary judgment, citing Petitioner’s “failure to raise a genuine issue of fact, and it inferred from his Fifth Amendment invocation that ‘he knowingly and purposely defrauded investors.’”

On appeal, Petitioner contends that he should have been permitted to withdraw his assertion of the Fifth Amendment and have his declarations considered in opposing summary judgment. The Court disagreed, stating that the circuit has “not yet defined the parameters in a civil case for withdrawing an invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.” However, the “circumstances of [Petitioner]’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment reveal that he was using the privilege to manipulate the litigation process. . . . Further, [Petitioner] took the Fifth during the deposition of Smart Assets after conferring with the company’s counsel. . . . Given the circumstances of this case, [the Court concluded] that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying [Petitioner] leave to withdraw his assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and in striking his declarations.” Additionally, Petitioner failed to provide evidence to contradict the SEC’s evidence of his frauds.

Tenth Circuit: Perjury by Former ClearOne Communications Executive Affirmed by Sufficient Evidence and Materiality

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in United States v. Strohm on Tuesday, November 8, 2011.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conviction. Petitioner “is a former executive of ClearOne Communications, Inc. In 2003, the SEC sought a preliminary injunction against ClearOne based on suspicions of irregular accounting practices and securities law violations. During a hearing on the preliminary injunction, [Petitioner] was asked if she was involved in a particular sale by ClearOne that was the focus of the SEC’s case. She said she was not and approximated that she learned of the sale either before or after the end of ClearOne’s fiscal year.” Based on this testimony, Petitioner was later convicted of one count of perjury. “She argues her conviction should be reversed because (1) the questioning at issue was ambiguous, (2) her testimony was literally true, and (3) even if false, her testimony was not material to the court’s decision to grant the preliminary injunction.”

The Court rejected all three of Petitioner’s contentions. The Court found that “the questions were not ambiguous and there [was] sufficient evidence to demonstrate [Petitioner] knowingly made false statements. Also, [Petitioner]’s testimony was material to the preliminary injunction hearing because it related to a transaction the SEC believed demonstrated ClearOne’s accounting irregularities.”

J. Robert Brown, Jr.: Shareholder Protection Act of 2011 – Preemption, Prevention and Protection (The Consequences of the Legislation) – Part 5

We are discussing the Shareholder Protection Act of 2011. So if this Act passes in its present form, what will be the consequences?

In some respects, the consequences will be modest.  Certainly, they will require companies wanting to make campaign contributions to act proactively and submit the matter to shareholders for approval.  The increase in activism notwithstanding, shareholders still tend to approve what management asks.

On the other hand, there is reason to believe that the adoption of the provision will sharply reduce campaign contributions by public companies.  First, submitting the matter to shareholders will generate considerable publicity, much of it bad.  Companies will sometimes forgo contributions rather than submit to a public pillorying.

The likelihood of this occurring will be enhanced by language in the Act that provides a safe harbor for investment managers who decide to divest because of disagreement over political expenditures.  As the provision states:

(f) Safe Harbor for Certain Divestment Decisions- Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal or State law, if an institutional investment manager makes the disclosures required under subsection (e), no person may bring any civil, criminal, or administrative action against the institutional investment manager, or any employee, officer, or director thereof, based solely upon a decision of the investment manager to divest from, or not to invest in, securities of an issuer due to an expenditure for political activities made by the issuer.’

In other words, those unhappy with the campaign contributions can disinvest without risk.  Shareholders of mutual funds could, therefore, put pressure on the advisers to do exactly that.

Similarly, the SEC is instructed to conduct an “annual assessment of compliance” with these provisions and and submit a report to Congress.  At the same time, the GAO is instructed to “periodically evaluate and report to Congress on the effectiveness of the oversight by the Securities and Exchange Commission of the reporting and disclosure requirements”.  In other words, Congress will receive reports on the provision.  Boards may not want to see their company’s name on a report that suggests a clear political preference.

Second, companies will sometimes forgo seeking shareholder approval because of the risk of liability.  For listed companies, boards will have to approve specific expenditures of more than $50,000.  As a result, they will be “authorizing” the payments.  The Act provides that those improperly authorizing payments will be liable for treble damages.

Moreover, the payments themselves may be a violation of fiduciary obligations, irrespective of the treble damages provision.  The shareholder law suit against News Corp apparently alleges, among other things, that the company improperly made a “$1,250,000 contribution to the Republican Governor’s Association last year.”  Rather than confront these risks, it will be easier to avoid having the authority in the first instance.

To the extent that this Act is adopted, therefore, campaign contributions will likely fall, state law will be preempted yet again, and the role of the SEC in the governance process will be expanded.

For more than two decades, J. Robert Brown, Jr. has taught corporate and securities law, with a particular emphasis on corporate governance. He has authored numerous publications in the area and several of his articles have been cited by the U.S. Supreme Court. He is a professor at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law and blogs for The Race to the Bottom, where this post originally appeared on July 28, 2011.

J. Robert Brown, Jr.: Shareholder Protection Act of 2011 – Preemption, Prevention and Protection (Approval by the Board) – Part 3

The Shareholder Protection Act of 2011 seeks to regulate campaign contributions by public companies.  It would require shareholder approval of the amount available for these contributions.

The Act, however, goes well beyond the requirement of shareholder approval.  It also requires board approval of the contributions in certain cases. Proposed Section 16A of the Exchange Act (15 USC 78p-1) provides that listed companies must have in place a bylaw that “expressly provide[s] for a vote of the board” on any expenditure for political activities in excess of $50,000 (including amounts in excess of $50,000 in a “particular election”).  Moreover, the votes must be made public within 48 hours “including in a clear and conspicuous location on the Web site of the issuer.”

This provision promises to be far more intrusive than other federal efforts with respect to approval requirements imposed on the board.  While Congress has mandated other approval requirements, they have for the most part been limited to committees.  Thus, SOX required audit committee approval of the independent accounting firm.  This provision applies to the entire board, which presumably means it cannot be delegated to an officer or board committee.

The provision effectively preempts state law.  The board would effectively be required to approve expenditures that for large public companies are extraordinarily small in amount.  Moreover, by using a bylaw to accomplish this task, it suggests that shareholders can adopt bylaws that mandate board approval for other types of expenditures.  If so, this would substantially expand shareholder authority and give more teeth to proposals under Rule 14a-8.

This provision would only apply to listed companies.  As such, it is more narrow than the provision requiring shareholder approval of the total amount of campaign contributions.  Nonetheless, the provision may well affect the behavior of smaller public companies.  Many, particularly those anticipating an exchange listing, may well put the bylaw in place.  Moreover, because the shareholder approval process will be disclosed in the proxy statement, boards will have a hard time disclaiming knowledge of the campaign contributions.  To the extent shareholders bring actions over the contributions, the board may be at risk over the contributions even if not approved.

Finally, the obligation to disclose board results within 48 hours will create headaches.  Fro one thing, it will provide some directors with an incentive to dissent.  Those not wanting to be publicly associated with the recipients of the contributions may decided to vote against the expenditures.  In addition, companies may feel compelled (or Congress/SEC may eventually want to require) to provide an explanation for the vote.  It will entail some discussion of the inner workings of the board and, potentially, be the basis for an antifraud suit if inaccurate.

For more than two decades, J. Robert Brown, Jr. has taught corporate and securities law, with a particular emphasis on corporate governance. He has authored numerous publications in the area and several of his articles have been cited by the U.S. Supreme Court. He is a professor at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law and blogs for The Race to the Bottom, where this post originally appeared on July 27, 2011.

J. Robert Brown, Jr.: Shareholder Protection Act of 2011 – Preemption, Prevention and Protection (Approval by Shareholders) – Part 2

The Shareholder Protection Act of 2011 seeks to regulate political contributions by, among other things, imposing a requirement that shareholders approve the expenditures.

With respect to shareholder approval, a new Section 14C of the Exchange Act would require shareholders of public companies to approve “total amount of expenditures for political activities proposed to be made by the issuer for the forthcoming fiscal year”.  See Proposed Section 14C, 15 USC 78n-3.

There are several points to make about this putative requirement.  First, it preempts state law. State law does not require shareholder approval as a precondition for a corporate expenditure.  In effect, this provision would reduce the discretion of the board and provide a shareholder veto over the contributions.

Second, it continues the expansion of the SEC’s authority (and the involvement of the federal government) in the corporate governance area with respect to shareholder rights.  State law requires shareholder approval of mergers, sale of all/substantially all assets, and dissolutions.  Shareholders must also elect directors and approve amendments to the charter (excepting the creation of a new class of stock assuming the presence of a blank check stock provision).  That’s it.  When Congress mandated say on pay in Dodd-Frank, it for the first time required all public companies to extend voting rights to their shareholders and gave the SEC the authority to oversee the process.  See Rule 14a-21, 17 CFR 240.14a-21. Political contributions would represent the second time the federal government mandated that certain matters be submitted to the shareholders of all public companies and the second time that the SEC was assigned responsibility for overseeing the process.

Third, the provision goes well beyond say on pay.  It does not provide an “advisory vote” on the matter but instead gives shareholders substantive authority to approve or disapprove the activity.  While the board has the authority to ignore a shareholder vote on say on pay, it would not be able to do the same with the vote required in this provision.  But for shareholder approval, the expenditures could not be made.

For more than two decades, J. Robert Brown, Jr. has taught corporate and securities law, with a particular emphasis on corporate governance. He has authored numerous publications in the area and several of his articles have been cited by the U.S. Supreme Court. He is a professor at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law and blogs for The Race to the Bottom, where this post originally appeared on July 26, 2011.

J. Robert Brown, Jr.: Shareholder Protection Act of 2011 – Preemption, Prevention and Protection (What Citizens United May Have Wrought) – Part 1

The issue of corporate campaign contributions has returned.  Several sponsors have reintroduced the Shareholder Protection Act of 2011. The bill is designed to deal with some of the problems arising out of the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United.

In striking down restrictions on campaign contributions by corporations, the Court all but invited a governance response. As the opinion noted:

Shareholder objections raised through the procedures of corporate democracy . . .  can be more effective today because modern technology makes disclosures rapid and informative. A campaign finance system that pairs corporate independent expenditures with effective disclosure has not existed before today. . . . With the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their positions and supporters. Shareholders can determine whether their corporation’s political speech advances the corporation’s interest in making profits, and citizens can see whether elected officials are “‘in the pocket’ of  so-called moneyed  interests.” . . . The First Amendment protects political speech; and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way. This transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages.

As we have already discussed, the Court’s view reflects a serious misunderstanding of shareholder authority under state law. As a result, any effort by shareholders to influence the political expenditure process will require a legislative response.

In that regard, members of Congress have reintroduced Shareholder Protection Act of 2011 (a version was also submitted last year). The Act seeks to regulate the campaign contribution process through four forms of protection: the requirement for shareholder approval of the expenditures, the requirement of board authorization for the expenditures, the requirement that the expenditures be disclosed, and the imposition of treble damages on officers and directors who are responsible for any violation.

To the extent adopted, the provisions will, among other things, result in a sizable preemption of state (read Delaware) law. As a corollary, it will significantly expand the role of the SEC in the corporate governance area, a trend already well underway. We’ll look at some of these issues in the next few posts.

For more than two decades, J. Robert Brown, Jr. has taught corporate and securities law, with a particular emphasis on corporate governance. He has authored numerous publications in the area and several of his articles have been cited by the U.S. Supreme Court. He is a professor at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law and blogs for The Race to the Bottom, where this post originally appeared on July 26, 2011.

Tenth Circuit: Dividing Original Case into Three Separate Federal Actions Is Not a Permissible Way to Cure a Jurisdictional Defect in a Diversity Case

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Ravenswood Investment Co. v. Avalon Correctional Servs. on Friday, July 8, 2011.

The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s order. Respondent, a Nevada corporation with its principal place of business in Oklahoma, operates for-profit correctional facilities; Petitioners, shareholders of Respondent, are both New York limited partnerships. Petitioners allege that Respondent deregistered with the Securities and Exchange Commission and ceased filing financial reports with the agency; over a period of time from 2006 to 2008, the Chief Executive Officer, sole director, and controlling shareholder of Respondent, is alleged to have breached his fiduciary duty by engaging in considerable self-dealing to the detriment of non-controlling shareholders, including Petitioners. Petitioners brought suit in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. “After the district court entered interim orders dismissing many claims, entering summary judgment on another, and resolving various discovery disputes, the parties discovered complete diversity never existed and the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Rather than dismiss the case in its entirety for lack of jurisdiction, the district court severed some previously decided claims between diverse parties and made final their dispositions”; the court dismissed the remainder of the claims.

“Although dismissing a nondiverse party is an available procedure for curing a lack of complete diversity in some circumstances, the district court’s order here failed to create complete diversity.” The district court’s order ultimately failed to cure the jurisdictional defect in this case because it did not alter the composition of the parties; jurisdiction based on diversity does not contemplate diversity of claims, but rather diversity of parties. “Even if the district court had created three cases by dividing the original case, there is no authority for the proposition that creating multiple federal actions is a permissible way to cure a jurisdictional defect in a diversity case. The sole recognized exception to the time-of-filing rule is when a court completely dismisses from the case a nondiverse party pursuant to Rule 21.” On review, if the district court concludes one of the Petitioners is an indispensable party or one or more of the parties will be unfairly prejudiced by dismissing that Petitioner, the district court must dismiss the case in its entirety for lack of jurisdiction.

Protected

2013-05-20 05:02:35