The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Krol v. CF&I Steel on Thursday, March 14, 2013.
Summary Judgment—Workers’ Compensation—CRS §§ 8-41-401 and -402—Statutory Employer—“On and To”—Summary Judgment Sua Sponte.
Plaintiff Stanislaw Krow appealed the trial court’s motion of summary judgment in favor of defendant CF&I Steel. The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded with directions.
CF&I owns a rail mill in Pueblo. It has several industrial cranes on the property, many of them inside buildings. In July 2002, CF&I and Alpine Crane entered into a contract obligating Alpine to maintain and inspect CF&I’s cranes. In January 2007, CF&I and SK’s Industrial Management, LLC (SKIM) entered into a contract obligating SKIM to train CF&I’s employees to maintain and inspect the cranes. That month, Krol, an employee of SKIM, went to the mill to provide inspection training. While he was standing on top of one of the cranes, training a CF&I employee how to inspect a crane, the crane moved and Krol was injured.
Krol received workers’ compensation benefits through SKIM’s workers’ compensation insurance. He sued CF&I, asserting several tort claims. CF&I moved for summary judgment pursuant to CRS § 8-41-402, contending that the undisputed facts established that Krol was on its property when he was injured. Therefore, CF&I argued, it was Krol’s “statutory employer” and he could not seek additional compensation from CF&I as a matter of law. Krol argued that CRS § 8-41-402 applies only when the injured person was doing work both “on and to” another’s property, and there was at least a genuine issue of fact as to whether he was doing work to CF&I’s property when he was injured.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CF&I, agreeing with its argument. It also found that summary judgment was appropriate under CRS § 8-41-401, because if CF&I did not contract out the training work, it would do the work itself, and because SKIM carried adequate workers’ compensation insurance.
CRS § 8-41-402 states that if a landowner is a statutory employer, and the contractor, subcontractor, or person hired to do the work carries workers’ compensation insurance covering the injured party’s injuries, the injured party is deemed an employee of that statutory employer, and the injured party may not seek damages from the statutory employer. The Court of Appeals found that, contrary to the district court’s finding and CF&I’s argument, an injured party does not only have to have been “on” the landowner’s property when performing work for the statute to apply, but the injured party also must have been doing work “to” the property for it to apply. This determination was based on the plain language of the statute. The Court further held that there was a factual question as to whether the work Krol was performing was to CF&I’s property. Therefore, the grant of summary judgment was in error.
The district court also erred in alternatively granting summary judgment under CRS § 8-41-401, which provides immunity when the work contracted out by the entity sought to be held liable is part of that entity’s regular business, as defined by its total business operation. The Court held that although summary judgment may be granted for a reason not raised by a moving party, the court should not do so without first giving the parties notice and reasonable opportunity to argue the issue and present evidence. Thus, it was error for the district court to grant summary judgment on grounds not raised by CF&I and of which Krol had no notice to argue.
Summary and full case available here.
