August 25, 2019

Archives for April 16, 2012

Colorado Court of Appeals: Determination that Interpreter Was Not Needed Was Not in Error; No Probative Value in Evidence of Victim’s Gang Affiliation

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Chavez on April 12, 2012.

Right to be Present—Right to Confront Witnesses—Right to Testify—Effective Assistance of Counsel—Interpreter—Cross-Examination.

Defendant Daniel Chavez appealed the trial court’s judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of second-degree assault and felony menacing. The judgment was affirmed.

In November 2006, Chavez and his brother Mario were driving through a parking lot when they encountered J.R.V. and D.D., with whom they had a longstanding contentious relationship. After exchanging words, Chavez got out of the passenger side of the truck and walked around the back of it, carrying a gun. Chavez pointed the gun at J.R.V. and told him to “back off.” J.R.V. got back into his truck. As J.R.V. and D.D. drove away, they heard gunshots.After driving for a short time, J.R.V. realized that he had been shot in the leg.

Chavez contended that his rights to be present, to confront the witnesses against him, to testify, and to receive the effective assistance of counsel were violated because he did not have an interpreter at trial. Chavez did not request an interpreter and the trial court was not on notice that he needed one. Therefore, the trial court’s determination that an interpreter was not needed was not error.

Chavez also contended that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights by not allowing cross-examination regarding the victims’ gang affiliation. Chavez’s right to confrontation was not violated by the trial court’s limitation because the court did not excessively limit cross-examination. Although Chavez was not able to cross-examine the victims or any prosecution witnesses about the victims’ gang affiliation, he was able to elicit evidence about the animosity between Chavez and the victims, as well as other evidence showing the victims’ bias. Therefore, Chavez was able to present evidence to support his defense. Furthermore, the evidence was not relevant because there was no evidence that the incident was gang-related. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the probative value of the evidence of the victims’ gang affiliation was not substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence under C.R.E. 403.

Summary and full case available here.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Trial Court Properly Denied Dismissal of Charges and Had Jurisdiction to Accept Guilty Plea

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Adolf on April 12, 2012.

Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act—Actual Notice—Prosecution.

Defendant appealed the judgment of conviction entered after the district court denied his request to dismiss the charges against him under the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA). The judgment was affirmed.

On May 29, 2008, defendant was charged with several drug-related crimes. While awaiting his preliminary hearing, defendant mailed directly to the district court a preprinted form entitled “Motion for Final Disposition” requesting speedy disposition of the charges against him pursuant to the UMDDA. However, the prosecutor did not receive a copy. Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to an added count of possession of a controlled substance in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges.

Defendant contended that the district court erroneously failed to dismiss the charges against him for failure to bring him to trial within 180 days of his request for final disposition as required by the UMDDA. However, there is no evidence in the record that the prosecution received notice before July 13, 2009, when defense counsel notified the court. The 180 days began to run on July 13. Defendant pleaded guilty on November 16, 2009—127 days after the prosecution received notice. Therefore, the trial court properly denied dismissal of the charges against defendant and had jurisdiction over defendant to accept his guilty plea.

Summary and full case available here.

Colorado Court of Appeals: District Court Erred in Imposing Restitution for Arson; Amount Not Determined within Ninety Days Following Conviction

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Turecek, Jr. on April 12, 2012.

Restitution—Time Limit.

Defendant Robert Turecek, Jr. appealed the district court’s orders concluding that it had statutory authority to determine the question of restitution and imposing restitution on him after he pleaded guilty to fourth-degree arson. The orders were reversed.

Turecek was charged with first- and fourth-degree arson for setting fire to his house. He ultimately pleaded guilty to fourth-degree arson, and the parties stipulated in the plea agreement to a sentence of supervised probation and further agreed that restitution and costs of prosecution would be as ordered by the court. The prosecution filed a notice of restitution that contained, among other things, an estimate of losses sustained by the company that insured Turecek’s house (insurer). However, the court indicated that it would not act on the original notice of restitution because it did not contain accurate information. The court gave the prosecution ninety days to file an amended notice of restitution, noting that if additional time was required, the prosecution would need to seek an extension, and explain why an extension was required. Approximately nine months later, having filed nothing regarding restitution in the interim, the prosecution filed a motion asking the court to rule on the original notice of restitution. The court thereafter ordered Turecek to pay restitution.

Turecek contended that the district court erred in ordering restitution because the statutorily imposed ninety-day limit had passed, and the prosecution had failed to establish good cause for its belated effort to have the court set the amount of restitution. The statute is clear that if the court determines that the defendant is obligated to pay restitution, and if a specific amount was not set when restitution was ordered, then the specific amount of restitution must be determined within the ninety days immediately following the order of conviction, unless good cause is shown for extending the time period by which the restitution amount shall be determined. Here, the specific amount of restitution was not determined within the ninety days immediately following the order of conviction, and the People failed to establish (or even attempt to establish) good cause to extend that time period. Accordingly, the district court erred in imposing restitution.

Summary and full case available here.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Trial Court Erred in Awarding State Farm Costs and Fees as Prevailing Party Based on Purely Procedural Victory on Class Certification

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Reyher v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. on April 12, 2012.

Jurisdiction—Final Order—Class Action—Prevailing Party—Costs.

Plaintiffs Pauline Reyher and Dr. Wallace Brucker appealed the trial court’s order awarding costs and attorney fees to defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm), following the trial court’s dismissal of Reyher’s claims and denial of plaintiffs’ class certification motion. The order was reversed and the case was remanded with directions. During the briefing of this appeal, Reyher II was announced, reversing the dismissal of Reyher’s claims. At the time of this appeal, there were no class action claims pending in the trial court; however, the individual claims of Reyher and Dr. Brucker remained pending and unresolved.

State Farm argued that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over this appeal because the order awarding costs and fees was not a final, appealable order. The cost and fee order was related solely to the class certification claims and Reyher’s claims, which were both resolved by final orders pursuant to C.R.C.P. 54(b); the order was not based on any other claims pending in the trial court. Therefore, the cost and fee order was itself a final, appealable judgment.

Plaintiffs argued that the trial court prematurely determined that State Farm was the prevailing party under C.R.C.P. 54(d) based on its successful defense of class certification but before termination of the underlying litigation. The trial court erred to the extent that it awarded costs based on its misconception that it was required to do so and had no discretion in the matter. Additionally, whether a party has derived some of the benefits sought by the litigation requires an assessment in the context of the overall litigation. Therefore, because plaintiffs may yet obtain a judgment against State Farm on their individual claims, it was premature for the trial court to determine that State Farm was the prevailing party. Accordingly, the trial court erred in awarding State Farm its costs and fees as the prevailing party at this stage in the proceedings based on its purely procedural victory on the class certification. Plaintiffs also argued, State Farm conceded, and the Court of Appeals agreed that because the judgment dismissing Reyher’s claims was reversed in Reyher II, the costs and fees related to that dismissal also must be reversed.

Summary and full case available here.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Insufficient Evidence Supporting Conviction for Internet Luring and Sexual Exploitation of Child; Sufficient Evidence for Solicitation

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Douglas on April 12, 2012.

Attempted Sexual Assaulton a Child—Enticement and Solicitation—Internet Luring and Sexual Exploitation—Evidence—Intent and Motive—Expert or Lay Witness Testimony—Prosecutorial Misconduct—Consecutive Sentences.

Defendant appealed the judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of attempted sexual assault on a child, enticement of a child, Internet luring of a child, Internet sexual exploitation of a child, and solicitation to commit sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust. He also appealed his sentence. The judgment was affirmed in part and vacated in part, and the sentence was affirmed.

Defendant and “Marsha” (mother), who actually was an undercover officer, communicated over the Internet and telephone and via text message regarding defendant’s desire to come to Colorado to establish a sexual relationship with her and her 9-year-old daughter. Defendant arranged to travel to Colorado, and he was arrested when he arrived.

Defendant contended that the convictions for (1) Internet luring of a child; (2) Internet sexual exploitation of a child; (3) enticement of a child; and (4) solicitation must be vacated because the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to prove the elements of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt. There was insufficient evidence supporting defendant’s convictions for Internet luring of a child and Internet sexual exploitation of a child because there was no evidence that defendant himself committed the crimes or that he acted as an accomplice to a principal who committed the crimes. As to the solicitation charge, the prosecution was not required to prove that defendant communicated directly with the child; communication with mother as an adult intermediary was sufficient. Further, one may be guilty of enticement by inviting or persuading a child to enter a room within the child’s home with the proscribed intent. Finally, there was sufficient evidence to find defendant guilty of solicitation under the theory that he attempted to persuade mother to act as his accomplice in his commission of sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust.

Defendant also contended that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of other similar acts and alleged child pornography. This evidence, however, was properly admitted to show intent and motive.

Defendant also argued that the trial court erred in permitting the undercover officer to present expert testimony in the guise of lay witness testimony. The undercover officer’s interpretation of her conversations with defendant did not depend on her specialized skills and training as a police officer. Therefore, any error was harmless.

Defendant further contended that prosecutorial misconduct required reversal. The court instructed the jury not to consider the prosecution’s characterization of the photographs as “child pornography,” and the jury was permitted to see the actual photos to make this determination themselves. Additionally, the prosecutor’s use of the term “grooming” was not improper. Therefore, any error on these issues was harmless.

Defendant also contended that the court erred in imposing consecutive sentences on the enticement and solicitation counts. The court did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences in this matter. First, the evidence supporting each count was not identical. Second, the two crimes did not “arise out of the same incident,” because the communications between defendant and mother took place over a period of ten days. Finally, the attempted conviction is not a lesser-included offense of the solicitation conviction.

Summary and full case available here.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Sufficient Evidence to Prove Conviction for Solicitation and Conspiracy to Commit Assault

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Davis on April 12, 2012.

Colorado Organized Crime Control Act—Conspiracy—Assault—Solicitation—Evidence—Statute of Limitations—ExpertTestimony—Habitual Offender—Consecutive Sentence.

Defendant appealed his judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of violating the Colorado Organized Crime Control Act (COCCA), conspiracy to commit assault in the second degree, assault in the second degree, and two counts of solicitation of second-degree assault. He also appealed his conviction as a habitual criminal and his 108-year sentence. Defendant’s convictions were affirmed, the sentence was affirmed in part and vacated in part, and the case was remanded to the trial court.

Defendant contended there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions arising from the assault on C.H. and his conviction for soliciting T.M. Because the evidence, including testimony about defendant’s role as the leader of the 211 gang and defendant’s encoded note to T.M. ordering the assault on C.H., supported a finding that defendant ordered the assault on C.H., it was sufficient to establish that defendant intentionally persuaded his fellow gang members to assault C.H. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for solicitation. Additionally, there was sufficient evidence to prove that defendant conspired with other 211 Crew members to commit second-degree assault on C.H.

Defendant contended that a criminal act that can no longer form the basis of a criminal count because its statute of limitations has expired cannot be used as evidence to support a COCCA conviction. To establish a COCCA violation, the prosecution must show that two or more acts of racketeering activity occurred within a ten-year period. As long as one predicate act of racketeering activity falls within the relevant statute of limitations, other predicate acts occurring within the ten-year period before that act was committed may be used to establish a COCCA violation, even if the earlier acts would be time-barred if separately prosecuted. Here, the prosecution presented four predicate acts that also gave rise to separate counts (namely, the three acts involving the assault on C.H. and the solicitation of T.M). Because there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s convictions for these acts, there is sufficient evidence to support defendant’s COCCA conviction. Additionally, evidence of the nine predicate acts occurring outside the limitations period established elements of defendant’s COCCA violation and were properly admitted.

Defendant contended that the trial court erred by qualifying a Denver police detective as an expert. At trial, the prosecution designated the detective as an expert witness with specialized knowledge of 211 Crew hierarchy, communication methods, and ideology. At the pretrial hearing, the trial court found that the detective possessed specialized knowledge that was relevant and that would be helpful to the jury. Furthermore, any doubts about the accuracy of the detective’s interpretation of the code, or his lack of experience cracking coded messages, go to the weight of his testimony, not its admissibility. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by qualifying the detective as an expert on the 211 Crew.

Defendant also contended that his convictions should be reversed because his co-defendants’ testimony that they had pleaded guilty to COCCA violations was offered as substantive evidence of his guilt. It is proper, however, to use this type of evidence to impeach the credibility of a co-defendant. Therefore, there was no error.

Defendant contended that the trial court erred in determining that he was a habitual offender. Defendant argued that (1) the trial court accepted evidence of his prior convictions in the form of “pen packs” in violation of his right to confrontation; and (2) his right to a jury trial was violated because the trial court rather than a jury determined his guilt. Defendant, however, failed to object to either the admission of the pen packs or the lack of a jury trial. Therefore, the Court of Appeals reviewed only for plain error, and found none.

Defendant further contended and the People agreed that the trial court erred by concluding that it was required by law to order that defendant’s COCCA sentence be served consecutively to the sentences he already was serving. There was no requirement for consecutive sentencing under these circumstances. Therefore, defendant’s COCCA sentence was vacated and the case was remanded to the trial court to determine, in its discretion, whether that sentence should run consecutively to or concurrently with the sentences for the three crimes to which he pleaded guilty in 1995.

Summary and full case available here.

Spark the Discussion: When Life Gives You Lemons…

Colorado’s state-licensed medical marijuana businesses have recently come under attack by U.S. Attorney John Walsh for locating in areas he deems problematic—specifically being within 1,000 feet of universities and other schools. In the past three months, Walsh has issued 50 letters to targeted medical marijuana shops asking them to close or face federal criminal and civil sanctions. Not surprisingly, all of these state-licensed stores have chosen to move their locations or close their doors entirely.

Instead of lamenting this negative turn of events, Colorado’s various medical marijuana advocacy and industry groups—including the United Food and Commercial Worker’s Union—recently decided to publish a letter highlighting the positive things these businesses bring to communities in Colorado. This attempt to shift focus to the positive contributions of Colorado’s emerging medical marijuana community is re-printed in its entirety below.

A LETTER TO US ATTORNEY JOHN WALSH: “We Care about our Community, too”

Dear Mr. Walsh,

As parents, patients, business owners, and Colorado citizens, we are concerned by the recent letters sent by your office demanding certain state-approved medical marijuana businesses cease operations.

Since the dawn of this new health care field, we have worked closely with Colorado state and local governments to safely regulate medical marijuana sales and production, and have made great efforts – and gone to great expense — to establish a thorough and safe regulatory structure. Because of this collaboration between stakeholders and state and local officials, Colorado has emerged as the model among states that legally recognize the medicinal value of marijuana.

We stand in unison with patients and governing bodies across Colorado in our active commitment to continue the careful implementation of a secure and community-minded system of regulation. Here is a partial list of our contributions to the Colorado community:

  • We have provided vital medicine to 164,000+ sick and disabled Colorado citizens whose doctors have recommended medical marijuana to them.
  • We helped author and endorse SB 12-154– to establish a responsible vendor program similar to what many Colorado jurisdictions currently require for alcohol sales.
  • We are working with the Denver City Council to foster sensible regulations, including currently working on language to limit inappropriate advertisements, specifically public advertisements near schools and other sensitive areas.
  • We worked with local papers, like the Colorado Springs Gazette, to establish community-conscious advertising with a proper healthcare focus.
  • We employ over 5,000 Coloradans and provide them with a living wage so they can support their families. We also provide substantial support for ancillary businesses like electricians, carpenters, and engineers.
  • Our businesses produce tens of millions of dollars in tax revenue with the first $2 million earmarked annually for programs critical to helping Colorado fight addiction and accompanying mental health issues. The Circle Program at Pueblo’s Colorado Mental Health Institute was on its last legs before this new tax supported it.
  • We help create safer neighborhoods through the extensive use of security cameras and guards, by increased lighting in commercial areas, and by occupying otherwise vacant retail or warehouse space.

As committed members of the communities we live in, we believe in responsible regulation of this important, and growing, health care field. We also share your concern about teens accessing medical marijuana and have taken serious steps to reduce any redistribution. We welcome a thoughtful discussion about the potential areas for improvement in the current regulatory structure.


Association of Cannabis Trades for Colorado (ACT4CO)

Cannabis Business Alliance (CBA)

Coloradans 4 Cannabis Patients Rights (C4CPR)

Colorado Springs Medical Cannabis Council (CSMCC)

Green Faith Ministry

In Harmony Wellness Services

Medical Marijuana Assistance Program of America (MMAPA)

Medical Marijuana Business Alliance (MMBA)

Sensible Colorado

Women’s Marijuana Movement

United Food and Commercial Workers Union:  Local 7

Brian Vicente, Esq., is a founding member of Vicente Consulting, LLC, a law firm providing legal solutions for the medical marijuana community. He also serves as executive director of Sensible Colorado, the state’s leading non-profit working for medical marijuana patients and providers. Brian is the chair of the Denver Mayor’s Marijuana Policy Review Panel, serves on the Colorado Department of Revenue Medical Marijuana Oversight Panel, and coordinates the Colorado Bar Association’s Drug Policy Project.

The opinions and views expressed by Featured Bloggers on CBA-CLE Legal Connection do not necessarily represent the opinions and views of the Colorado Bar Association, the Denver Bar Association, or CBA-CLE, and should not be construed as such.

The Failure Chronicles: Learning to Live With Failure (Part 1)

Editor’s Note: This is the first in a three-part series of job search and career transition articles. Click here to read part two. Click here to read part three.

I recently watched a TED talk by Regina Dugan, the director of DARPA (the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency). She leads a group of people whose job, simply put, is to do the impossible. They work on things like creating airplanes that can fly at Mach 20, which would get you coast-to-coast in less than 12 minutes. Their longest flight to date has been about 3 minutes. After that, the thing keeps burning up.

She challenged us with that question we’ve all heard so many times we’ve become hardened to it:  ”What would you attempt to do if you knew you could not fail?” If we can get over our cynicism for a moment, we’ll find it’s a useful question, because it brings our fear of failure front and center where we can deal with it.

“Failure is part of creating,” Ms. Dugan said. “We cannot fear failure and create new and amazing things.” She quoted  Georges Clemenceau:  “Life gets interesting if you fail, because it means we’ve surpassed ourselves.”

“We’ve surpassed ourselves.” Yes. We haven’t overcome external obstacles – we’ve challenged the barriers inside of us, such as how we think and what we believe. To do the impossible, we have to believe that maybe it – whatever the “it” in question might be – isn’t impossible after all. Why is believing that so hard for us? Because we’re afraid to fail.

What if we refuse to think that way? What if instead we follow DARPA’s example? They can’t believe in failure, otherwise they’d never get anything done. No, check that, they’d never get anything started. They must accept failure as an essential part of their work. That’s the only way they can find out for themselves what truly is and isn’t “impossible.”

Which is why they can create things like a mechanical surveillance hummingbird that weighs less than a AA battery and is equipped with a camera. (“The world’s first hummingbird pilot” flew it onstage during Ms. Dugan’s talk.)

Walt Disney said, “It’s kind of fun to do the impossible.” He also said,  “You may not realize it when it happens, but a kick in the teeth may be the best thing in the world for you.” I guess he, too, knew something about dealing with failure.

[to be continued]

Five years ago, Kevin Rhodes left a successful 20+ years career in private practice to pursue a creative dream. He recently reopened his law practice, while continuing to write (screenplays and nonfiction) and lead workshops on change for a variety of audiences, including the CBA’s Job Search and Career Transitions Support Group. His latest workshop, Life in the Gap: Getting Over Your Inspiration Hangover and Translating Inspiration into Action, was held April 10, 2012. Watch for another program in the near future.

HB 12-1325: Changing Sales Limits for Meth Precursor Drugs; Requiring Stores to Submit Purchasers’ Information to National Online Log

On March 9, 2012, Rep. Ken Summers and Sen. Jeanne Nicholson introduced HB 12-1325 – Concerning Tracking Transactions Related to Methamphetamine Precursor Drugs. This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.

The bill changes the 24-hour period to a period of one calendar day during which any person may not knowingly deliver in or from a store to the same individual, and a person may not purchase from a store, more than 3.6 grams of a methamphetamine precursor drug, or a combination of two or more methamphetamine precursor drugs. The bill adds more than 9 grams of methamphetamine precursor drugs during a 30-day period to those prohibitions. A store is required to check a customer’s identification before selling the methamphetamine precursor drug and keep a log of each sale.

Beginning January 1, 2013, a store before completing a precursor sale must electronically submit the required information to the national precursor log exchange if the system is available without a charge to stores for access. If the sale would result in the store or purchaser violating the quantity limits, the system will generate a stop sale alert. The person shall not complete the sale if the system generates a stop sale alert; except that the person may make the sale if he or she has a reasonable fear of imminent bodily harm if the sale is not completed. If the electronic system is unavailable, the store must keep a log until the system becomes available. There is an exception for stores that make fewer than 10 transactions during a seven day period.

The Colorado Bureau of Investigation will receive weekly reports from the national precursor log exchange and can allow Colorado law enforcement agencies to access the exchange. The provisions preempt any local ordinances. On March 27, the Judiciary Committee amended the bill are referred it to the Appropriations Committee. The Appropriations Committee is scheduled to hear the bill on Thursday, April 12 at 1:30 pm.

Summaries of other featured bills can be found here.

HB 12-1323: Changing Residency Requirements for Associate Judge in Montrose County/Southwestern Water Conservation District

On March 9, 2012, Rep. Don Coram and Sen. Ellen Roberts introduced HB 12-1323 – Concerning the Associate Judge for Montrose County. This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.

Under current law, the associate county judge for Montrose County must have his or her official residence in the portion of Montrose County that is in the southwestern water conservation district. The bill repeals the requirement the associate county judge for Montrose County must have his or her official residence in the portion of Montrose County that is in the southwestern water conservation district and instead requires the associate county judge to have his or her residence within Montrose County and court chambers in the city of Nucla. The bill passed out of the legislature on April 3. The bill now moves through the enrolling process at the legislature then it is off to the Governor’s desk for signature.

Since this summary, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and awaits the Governor’s signature.

Summaries of other featured bills can be found here.

HB 12-1322: Requiring the United States to Sell Agricultural Public Lands by December 31, 2014

On March 9, 2012, Rep. Jerry Sonnenberg and Sen. Scott Renfroe introduced HB 12-1322 – Concerning the Disposition of Federal Agricultural Public Lands. This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.

The bill requires the United States to sell agricultural public lands on or before December 31, 2014, and provides that any agricultural public lands that the United States does not sell as of that date will no longer be exempt from property tax. The bill further requires the United States to pay the state 5% of the net proceeds of the sales of any agricultural public lands and specifies that these revenues be deposited into an internal improvements fund, a portion of which is dedicated to the state education fund. Assigned to the Education Committee; the bill is on the committee calendar for action on Monday, April 16 at 1:30 p.m.

Summaries of other featured bills can be found here.

HB 12-1320: Repeal of Governor’s Energy Office Program and Diversion of Funds to Low-Income Energy Assistance in DHS

On March 2, 2012, Rep. Cindy Acree introduced HB 12-1320 – Concerning Energy-Related Assistance to Low-Income Households. This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.

The bill repeals the governor’s energy office’s program for providing home energy efficiency improvements for low-income households. The bill also redirects money to the department of human services low-income energy assistance fund for the purpose of increasing available funding under the low-income energy assistance program from:

  • Money currently allocated to the governor’s energy office for the office’s home energy efficiency improvements program; and
  • Money currently allocated to the energy outreach Colorado low-income energy assistance fund used by energy outreach Colorado to provide direct bill payment assistance to low-income households when the department of human services is not accepting client applications for the low-income energy assistance program.

The bill has been assigned to the Agriculture, Livestock, & Natural Resources Committee.

Summaries of other featured bills can be found here.