August 24, 2019

Archives for February 28, 2014

Surveying Intellectual Property: Predictions for the Supreme Court’s Rulings in 10 IP Cases

HarrisDoughertyBy Ray K. Harris and Thomas Dougherty

There are now ten IP cases under review in the Supreme Court. Why so many? And what will the Court do?

Why So Many IP Cases?

The Supreme Court docket demonstrates the accelerating importance of intellectual property. In the decade of the 1990s the Supreme Court wrote seven patent opinions.[1] The prior two decades saw a similar volume of patent cases. In the same decade, copyright cases decided in the Supreme Court (six)[2] and trademark cases decided in the Supreme Court (three, including two trade dress cases)[3] were about equally rare.

In the decade from 2000 to 2009, the Supreme Court increased the volume to 10 patent related opinions.[4] Total copyright cases (three)[5] and trademark cases (five, including two trade dress cases)[6] decided in the Supreme Court remained about the same.

In 2010 to 2012 the Supreme Court increased the pace to issue four patent opinions in three years.[7] The pace of Supreme Court copyright decisions (two)[8] remained about the same as over the last 20 years. The increase in patent litigation appears not to be aberrational.

Last year the Supreme Court again more than doubled the volume of patent cases handled and issued four patent-related opinions in one year.[9] The Supreme Court also decided one copyright case[10] and one trademark case.[11]

This year the Supreme Court has again increased the volume of patent cases and already has accepted for review six patent cases – more than half the volume it handled in the entire first decade of the 21st Century. The Court has also accepted for review two copyright and two trademark cases.

Why has the Supreme Court accepted review in so many IP cases? Because IP rights have grown in economic importance and clarity is required to maintain that economic value. The Federal Circuit was given exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases to avoid conflicts in treatment among the different Circuit Courts, but clarity (for example, on treatment of software-related inventions) has not uniformly emerged. Also, abusive assertion of IP rights imposes a substantial cost on the economy. Guidance for the Federal Circuit requires either Supreme Court review or Congressional action.

What Will The Court Do?

Here summaries of the issues raised and our humble PREDICTIONS of how these 10 current IP cases may be decided.

Patent. Two patent cases focus on the scope of what a patent may claim.

Alice Corp. Pty Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 734 (2013) (the test for patentable subject-matter for software inventions). An equally divided court affirmed the District Court holding that the claims were not patent eligible. The Federal Circuit generated seven opinions and could not agree on the appropriate test. NEITHER CAN WE, BUT THE COURT CONTINUES TO DECIDE CASES DEFINING THE LINE BETWEEN INVENTION AND ABSTRACT IDEAS. The court will limit the scope of software patentability, but not eliminate it. SOFTWARE CAN BE PATENTED BUT NOT THESE CLAIMS. AFFIRMED. Watch for oral argument March 31.

Nautilus Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 715 F.3d 891 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 896 (2014) (determining when a claim term is indefinite — therefore invalidating the claim) There were multiple reasonable interpretations of the claim language “spaced relationship.” The Federal Circuit concluded the term was not insolubly ambiguous because “inherent parameters” would allow a person of ordinary skill to understand the term. Particular and distinct patent claiming is required by statute. 35 U.S.C. 112. REVERSED. THE COURT WILL REQUIRE TIGHTER CLAIM DRAFTING SO WHAT IS CLAIMED IS DISTINCT FROM WHAT IS NOT CLAIMED AND INFRINGEMENT LIABILITY IS MORE PREDICTABLE. Watch for oral argument April 28.

The remaining 4 patent cases focus on enforcement issues:

Medtronic Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 571 U.S. ___ (Jan. 22, 2014). In a declaratory relief suit by a patent licensee the licensor/patentee always has the burden to prove infringement. REVERSED. WE ARE CERTAIN WE GOT THIS “PREDICTION” CORRECT.

Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Management Systems, Inc., 687 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 48 (2013), and Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 Fed Appx. 57 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 49 (2013) (the standard for awarding attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party). The infringement defendant prevailed in both cases. The Federal Circuit found no deference is owed to a district court’s finding regarding whether allegations of infringement were objectively unreasonable and neither case was “exceptional” under 35 U.S.C. § 285. The prevailing defendants assert (1) the District Court is entitled to deference, and (2) a showing that the litigation is objectively baseless and brought in subjective bad faith sets too high a standard for prevailing defendants (accused infringers) and conflicts with the lower bar set for prevailing plaintiffs (patent owners) — a showing “that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.”). THE COURT WILL ELIMINATE THE SUBJECTIVE ELEMENT OF THE REASONABLENESS TEST AND OTHERWISE AFFIRM THE APPELLATE DECISIONS ON THE OBJECTIVE ELEMENT WITHOUT DEFERENCE TO THE TRIAL COURT. This case was argued Feb. 26.

Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 895 (2014) (inducing infringement where separate elements of the method claim were carried out by different persons, hence there is no one person who directly infringed). The Federal Circuit held there can be inducement liability with no single direct infringer or agency relationship. AFFIRMED. INDUCING MULTIPLE ACTORS TO INFRINGE COLLECTIVELY IS WRONG (ONCE THE ADVERSE PRECEDENT IS NOT CONTROLLING). Watch for oral argument April 30.

Copyright. Both cases deal with defenses to enforcement of copyright protection.

Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct 50 (2013) (laches as a defense to damages incurred for the three-year period before suit is filed). The Copyright Act has a three-year statute of limitations, 17 U.S.C. 507(b). The Ninth Circuit found claims based on the 1980 film “Raging Bull” barred by laches. The other circuits are less receptive to this defense. AFFIRMED. DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF ARE BOTH UNAVAILABLE FOR THE CONTINUING TORT ON THE FACTS PRESENTED. This case was argued Jan. 21.

American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2nd Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 896 (2014) (streaming a broadcasted video over the Internet so paid subscribers each subscriber receive transmission of a separate copy). The Second Circuit found no infringement of the public performance right. Both parties asked for review. Even the winner below wants to avoid the possibility of inconsistent decisions in other circuits. REVERSED. THE COURT WILL CONCLUDE CONGRESS DID NOT INTEND TO PERMIT THE “RUBE GOLDBERG” DESIGN ADOPTED TO AVOID INFRINGEMENT. STREAMING AND RECORDING ON DEMAND IS A PUBLIC PERFORMANCE. CONGRESS COULD AMEND THE STATUTE IF IT DISAGREES WITH THE COURT (WE ARE NOT ARROGANT ENOUGH TO TRY TO PREDICT CONGRESS — BE SERIOUS). Watch for oral argument April 22.

Trademark. Both cases involve false advertising under the Lanham Act.

POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 679 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 895 (2014) (false advertising claims involving the labeling requirements of the Food Drug and Cosmetics Act). The Ninth Circuit found preemption. AFFIRMED. Watch for oral argument April 21.

Lexmark Int’l Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 697 F.3d 387 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2766 (2013) (the test for standing to maintain a false advertising claim). The Ninth Circuit requires the plaintiff to be an actual competitor. Other circuits require antitrust standing. The Sixth Circuit and Second Circuit allow the plaintiff to sue if it has a “reasonable interest” in the case. AFFIRMED. THE COURT WILL ADOPT THE REASONABLE INTEREST STANDARD. This case was argued Dec. 3.

Only two of the nine remaining cases reversed. Not a smart bet? “Never tell me the odds.”[12]

Ray K. Harris practices in the area of commercial litigation, including trade secret, trademark, trade dress, computer software copyright, and other intellectual property protection matters. His representation of aerospace clients has included enforcement of patent and trade secret rights and licensing provisions related to IP. Reach Mr. Harris at

Thomas A. Dougherty is a registered patent attorney who practices in all areas of intellectual property, and federal appeals. His practice includes international and domestic patent and trademark prosecution; inter partes reexaminations; portfolio management; freedom to operate, medical devices, general counsel services, M&A, and counseling for various clients and technologies. Reach Mr. Dougherty at

The opinions and views expressed by Featured Bloggers on CBA-CLE Legal Connection do not necessarily represent the opinions and views of the Colorado Bar Association, the Denver Bar Association, or CBA-CLE, and should not be construed as such.


[1] Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990); Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton, 508 U.S. 150 (1993); Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179 (1995); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996); Warner-Jenkinson Co, Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997); Pfaff v. Wells Electronics Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998); and Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999). See also Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999) (administrative burden of proof).

[2] Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990), Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Feltner v. Columbia Pictures, 523 U.S. 340 (1998); and Quality King Distributors Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l Inc., 532 U.S. 135 (1998). See also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l Inc., 116 S. Ct 804 (1996) (aff’d by an equally divided court); Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993) (copyright claim was immune from antitrust liability).

[3] Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992); Qualitex v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) and College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666 (1999).

[4] JEM Ag. Supply Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001) (patent alternative to plant variety protection act); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kubushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722 (2002); Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005); Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (rule of reason antitrust analysis); eBay Inc. v. Merc-Exchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007); KSR v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp, Int’l Co., 550 U.S. 437 (2007); and Quanta Computer Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008).

[5] New York Times Co, Inc. v. Tasini, 533 U.S.483 (2001); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).

[6] Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc. Co., 529 U.S. 205 (2000); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001); Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003); Dastar Corp. v. 20th Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003); and KP Permanent Make-Up Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004).

[7] Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011); Bd of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2186 (2011); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership., 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011); and Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). See also Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 U.S. 1690 (2012) (admissible evidence in administrative proceedings).

[8] Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010), and Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). See also Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010) (aff’d by an equally divided court).

[9] Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013); Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013) (patent-related jurisdiction); Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); and FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (reverse payment patent license antitrust analysis).

[10] Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).

[11] Already LLC v. Nike Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721 (2013).

[12] Han Solo to C-3PO, Star Wars: The Empire Strikes Back (1980).

Colorado Court of Appeals: Announcement Sheet, 2/27/2014

On Thursday, February 27, 2014, the Colorado Court of Appeals issued six published opinions and 32 unpublished opinions.

People v. Shifrin

People v. Bassford

Shigo, LLC v. Hocker

Colorado Airport Parking,LLC v. Department of Aviation of the City & County of Denver

Foster v. Board of Governors of Colorado State University System

In re Marriage of Dorsey

Summaries for these cases are forthcoming, courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Neither State Judicial nor the Colorado Bar Association provides case summaries for unpublished appellate opinions. The case announcement sheet is available here.

Tenth Circuit: Unpublished Opinions, 2/26/2014

On Wednesday, February 26, 2014, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued no published opinions and three unpublished opinions.

Martinez v. Holder

United States v. Myers

United States v. Lake

Case summaries are not provided for unpublished opinions. However, published opinions are summarized and provided by Legal Connection.

HB 14-1162: Allowing Victims of Sexual Assault Who Conceive Children as a Result of the Assault to Terminate Perpetrator’s Parent-Child Legal Relationship

On January 17, 2014, Rep. Lois Landgraf introduced HB 14-1162 – Concerning Protection of the Victim of a Sexual Assault in Cases where a Child was Conceived as a Result of the Sexual Assault, and, in Connection Therewith, Making Legislative Changes in Response to the Study by and the Report of the Recommendations from the Task Force on Children Conceived Through RapeThis summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.

Last session, the general assembly passed a bill that allows the victim of a sexual assault in which a child was conceived and in which the person who committed the sexual assault was convicted to file for the termination of the parent-child legal relationship of the person who committed the sexual assault. In that same bill, the general assembly created a task force on children conceived by rape to study whether changes should be made to that statute and to study issues associated with parental rights in cases where a child was conceived as a result of the sexual assault but a conviction did not occur. This bill makes legislative changes in response to the study and report prepared by the task force.

The bill makes the following changes to provisions passed last year for cases involving convictions:

  • Adding more due process protections, such as specifying the notice to the respondent, setting a date for hearing the petition, and notifying the Indian tribe if the child is an Indian child in accordance with the federal “Indian Child Welfare Act,”
  • Adding more protections for the victim and the child, including protecting the identity of the victim and the child in the summons, ordering protective measures for the victim in the courtroom, and treating child support payments as confidential;
  • Providing legal counsel and waiving filing fees for indigent victims;
  • Providing for admission of parentage and for genetic testing to confirm paternity and allowing the court to order the parent against whom the petition has been filed to pay for genetic testing;
  • Stating that the court shall not presume that having only one remaining parent is contrary to the child’s best interests;
  • Creating a process for the parent whose parent-child legal relationship is terminated to provide medical and family information to be shared with the child and the victim in a way that protects the child from knowing the name of the person;
  • Clarifying what happens if the court denies the petition to terminate the parent-child legal relationship, including that the juvenile court has continuing jurisdiction of the matter and has the authority to enter an order allocating parental responsibilities between the parties, including an order to not allocate parental responsibilities to the parent against whom the petition was filed.

The bill repeals the statutes enacted last year that provided for a stay of a civil domestic relations proceeding or a paternity action while criminal charges of sexual assault brought against the alleged perpetrator are resolved.

The bill creates a process to allow the victim of a sexual assault in cases where a child was conceived and in which a conviction did not occur to file a petition in juvenile court to prevent future contact with and to terminate the parent-child legal relationship of the parent who allegedly committed the sexual assault. This process is similar to the process for petitions involving convictions but does not include a rebuttable presumption that it is in best interests of the child to terminate the parent-child legal relationship. If the court denies the petition to terminate the parent-child legal relationship, the juvenile court has continuing jurisdiction and the authority to enter orders on allocation of parental rights, including an order to not allocate parental rights to the other parent. The juvenile court may order the parent to submit to a sex offense-specific evaluation and parental risk assessment that may factor in the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities and parenting time. The court shall order the parent who is found to have committed the sexual assault to pay for the costs of the evaluation and the assessment. All of the changes made in this bill to the process for petitions involving convictions are also included in the process for petitions for nonconvictions.

Since some issues involving the child conceived by a sexual assault might start in the domestic relations arena instead of in a juvenile proceeding, the bill gives the domestic relations courts the authority to allocate parental rights and responsibilities, to address decision-making between the victim and the other parent in these cases, and to issue protective orders. The provisions are similar to the considerations that the court uses to address cases involving domestic violence. If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that one of the parties has committed sexual assault and the child was conceived as a result of the sexual assault, then it shall not be in the best interests of the child to allocate sole or split decision-making to the person who was found to have committed sexual assault or to allocate mutual decision-making with respect to any issue over the objection of the other party or the guardian ad litem. If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that one of the parties has committed sexual assault and the child was conceived as a result of the sexual assault, the court shall consider whether it is in the best interests of the child to prohibit or limit the parenting time of that party with the child. Prior to entering an order relating to parenting time or parental contact, the court may order that party to submit to a sex offense-specific evaluation and a parental risk assessment in Colorado. The court shall order the parent who is found to have committed the sexual assault to pay the costs of the evaluation and parental risk assessment.

In addition, in cases where the court has found that the child was conceived as a result of sexual assault, a domestic relations court may not modify a prior order regarding allocation of decision-making or modify a prior order regarding parenting time, unless it finds that the child’s present environment endangers the child’s physical health or significantly impairs the child’s emotional development.

Under existing law, when a parent voluntarily relinquishes a child so that the child may be adopted, there is a private action filed to terminate the parent-child legal relationship of the other parent. A victim of sexual assault might want to voluntarily relinquish the child conceived from the sexual assault for adoption and terminate the other parent’s rights. This bill amends the statute on termination in voluntary relinquishment cases so that the court may order the termination based on a finding that the other parent is unfit due to a history of violent behavior, which may include an incidence of sexual assault that resulted in the conception of the child.

The CBA LPC has voted to oppose the bill. The bill has been assigned to the Judiciary and Appropriations Committees.

HB 14-1165: Limiting the Amount of Payment Property Owners Can Withhold from Construction Professionals

On January 21, 2014, Rep. Randy Fischer and Sen. Lois Tochtrop introduced HB 14-1165 – Concerning a Limit on the Retainage Allowed under a Private Construction Contract. This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.

The bill requires property owners who contract for improvements to real property to:

  • Pay 95 percent of the amount due, which limits the amount retained to ensure the quality of work to 5 percent; and
  • Pay subcontractors the retainage after the work is finally accepted.

If a person fails to make required payments, the person must pay interest and is liable for attorney fees. These requirements are enforceable in court. Contractual provisions that do not comply with the requirements are unenforceable. A statute of limitations to enforce the bill is set for one year.

The bill is assigned to the Business, Labor, Economic, & Workforce Development Committee; the bill is scheduled for committee review on Thursday, Feb. 27 at 1:30 p.m.

HB 14-1183: Requiring Director of Registrations to Reinstate Expired Professional Licenses for Returning Service Members

On January 29, 2014, Rep. Rhonda Fields and Sen. Matt Jones introduced HB 14-1183 – Concerning the Reinstatement of the Authority for Active Military Personnel to Practice Professionally. This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.

The bill requires the director of the division of registrations in the department of regulatory agencies to reinstate the expired license, certificate, or registration of any active military personnel pursuant to specific requirements.

The bill was given final approval by the House on Feb. 17; the bill is assigned to the Senate Business, Labor, & Technology Committee.

HB 14-1159: Exempting Biogas Components from State Sales and Use Tax

On January 17, 2014, Rep. Dave Young and Sen. Gail Schwartz introduced HB 14-1159 – Concerning a State Sales and Use Tax Exemption for Components used in Biogas Production SystemsThis summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.

As introduced, the bill exempts from state sales and use tax components used in biogas production systems. Local governments that currently impose sales or use tax on such components may either continue to do so or may exempt them from their sales or use taxes. On Jan. 27, the Agriculture, Livestock, & Natural Resources Committee amended the bill and sent it the Finance Committee. On Feb. 13, the Finance Committee also amended the bill and sent it to the Appropriations for consideration of the Fiscal Impact.