April 19, 2019

Archives for October 28, 2014

Colorado Supreme Court: “Actual Notice” Means “Actual Knowledge” Under UMDDA

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. McKimmy on Monday, October 27, 2014.

Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act—Actual Notice.

The Supreme Court clarified the process for invoking one’s rights under the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA or Act), CRS §§ 16-14-101 to -108. Even when prisoners do not strictly comply with the UMDDA’s requirements, the Court previously determined that they invoke their rights under the Act if (1) their request substantially complies with the Act’s requirements, and (2) the prosecution receives “actual notice” of their request.

Here, the Court held that, for purposes of substantial compliance under the UMDDA, “actual notice” means “actual knowledge.” Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case with instructions to return the case to the trial court for further fact-finding. Specifically, the trial court should determine: (1) when the prosecution gained actual knowledge of defendant’s UMDDA requests in each of his cases, at which point defendant would have effectively invoked his rights under the Act; and (2) whether any UMDDA violations subsequently occurred.

Summary and full case available here, courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Deported Defendant’s Appeal Not Moot Where He is Not Barred from Reentry

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Calderon on Thursday, October 23, 2014.

Probation Revocation—Due Process.

In 2012, defendant pleaded guilty to attempted first-degree trespass of an automobile with the intent to commit a crime. He was sentenced to two years of intensive supervised probation, with ninety days in jail.

A few months later, defendant’s probation officer filed a probation revocation complaint. At the revocation hearing, the officer testified she had never met with defendant because he had been released to jail directly into the custody of Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE). The district court found that defendant had violated the terms of his probation and resentenced him to two years of intensive supervised probation. Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.

On appeal, defendant argued that his due process rights were violated when his probation was revoked based on a violation of a condition of probation. He claimed he did not receive either notice of the probation conditions when he was sentenced to probation, or written notice of those conditions in the revocation complaint. It was undisputed that defendant did not receive written notice of his probation conditions, and there was no evidence that defendant had actual notice of the probation conditions. Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the order revoking probation.

The Court further held that defendant was deprived of his due process right to written notice in the revocation complaint of the condition of probation he allegedly violated. Defendant had a due process right and a statutory right to such notice. The orders were reversed and the case was remanded to the district court to reinstate defendant’s original sentence to probation.

Summary and full case available here, courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Insufficient Findings on Batson Challenge Warranted Reversal

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Beauvais on Thursday, October 23, 2014.

Jury Selection—Peremptory Challenge—Batson Challenge.

A jury found Beauvais guilty of one count of stalking under CRS § 18-3-602(1)(c) after she repeatedly called, e-mailed, and sent text messages to a man she met on the Internet. On appeal, she contended that the trial court committed reversible error in the jury selection process, and that CRS § 18-3-602)(1)(c) is unconstitutional.

Beauvais first contended that the trial court clearly erred by failing to sustain her Batson challenge to the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges to excuse potential jurors on account of their gender [Batson v. Kentucky, 476, U.S. 79 (1986)]. The record refutes several of the prosecutor’s explanations for excusing potential jurors. The prosecutor did not attempt to excuse several males on the panel that had the same characteristics for which the prosecutor claimed he excused the female jurors. However, the prosecutor also claimed that each of the potential jurors he had excused was either young, sick, or a college student. These justifications are objectively verifiable and could potentially form the basis of a legitimate peremptory challenge. However, the trial court made no findings regarding the potential jurors’ ages or health, and there is nothing in the record to show whether the trial court believed that the prosecutor sought to excuse any of them because they were college students. Because the record was insufficient to determine whether the trial court’s ruling was clearly erroneous, the matter was remanded to the trial court for additional findings.

Beauvais next contended that, on its face, CRS § 18-3-602(1)(c) (the stalking statute)is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The Colorado Supreme Court and a division of the Court of Appeals have both concluded that a prior substantially identical version of this statute was neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad. Therefore, Beauvais’s facial challenge was rejected.

Summary and full case available here, courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Improper Jury Instruction Amounted to Directed Verdict for Prosecution

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Bertrand on Thursday, October 23, 2014.

Sexual Assault—Evidence—CRS §18-3-402(1)(b)—Asleep—Jury Instruction.

Defendant is the cousin of K.B., the alleged victim. K.B. suffered from developmental disabilities, and lived with her parents because she was unable to care for herself. On several occasions while defendant lived with K.B. and her family, defendant got into bed with K.B. and had sexual intercourse with her. K.B. later told her mother that defendant had had sex with her, but that she did not want to have sex with him. The family made a report to police, and a jury ultimately convicted defendant of two counts of sexual assault.

On appeal, defendant contended that there was insufficient evidence to show that K.B. was incapable of appraising the nature of her conduct as required by CRS § 18-3-402(1)(b). K.B. suffered from cognitive difficulties, and she took medication before bedtime that made her groggy and sleepy. The jury could have reasonably inferred from this evidence that she was incapable of appraising the nature of her conduct when defendant was having sex with her. The jury could also have reasonably concluded that defendant knew that K.B. was unable to appraise the nature of her conduct. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction under CRS § 18-3-402(1)(b).

Defendant also contended that one of the jury instructions improperly directed a verdict in favor of the prosecution. The jury instruction stated that “[a] person is incapable of appraising the nature of her conduct when she is asleep or partially asleep during an assault.” The instruction should have stated that a person “may be” incapable.Because the error was not harmless, the conviction was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial.

Summary and full case available here, courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Tenth Circuit: Unpublished Opinions, 10/27/2014

On Monday, October 27, 2014, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued no published opinion and one unpublished opinion.

Citizens United v. Gessler

Case summaries are not provided for unpublished opinions. However, published opinions are summarized and provided by Legal Connection.