August 26, 2019

Archives for January 6, 2015

Frederick Skillern: Real Estate Case Law — Contracts, Purchase and Sale, Transactions (2)

Editor’s note: This is Part 5 of a series of posts in which Denver-area real estate attorney Frederick Skillern provides summaries of case law pertinent to real estate practitioners (click here for previous posts). These updates originally appeared as materials for the 32nd Annual Real Estate Symposium in July 2014.


By Frederick Skillern

Van Rees, Sr. v. Unleaded Software, Inc.
Colorado Court of Appeals, December 5, 2013
2013 COA 164

Economic loss rule; contract for design of website; no tort claim because no independent duty.

Although this is not a real estate case, I note it simply as an example of how the economic loss rule is spreading to preclude a wide array of fraud claims arising out of contractual relations. In this case, the court deals with the scope and applicability of Colorado’s economic loss rule in the context of an agreement for the design and maintenance of a website. Under the economic loss rule, no independent duty exists for tort claims of fraud, fraudulent concealment, constructive fraud, or negligent misrepresentation when the alleged misrepresentations and false statements are about the ability to perform contractual duties. The court affirms the trial court’s dismissal of the fraud, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, Colorado Consumer Protection Act, and civil theft claims. The breach of contract claim has it all.


Hickerson v. Vessels
Colorado Supreme Court, January 13, 2014
2014 CO 2.

Collections; statute of limitations; C.R.S. § 13-80-103.5 (1) (a) (six-year statute); partial payment doctrine; laches.

This case takes up the collection efforts of the holder of a $386,000 promissory note given in 1989 to the Vessels Oil Company. The note was due in ten years. Shortly after 1999, the maker started making payments on the note, and that continued for a couple of years. After payments stopped, Vessels sued to collect the entire balance. Under existing common law, which the court refers to as the partial payment doctrine, the running of the six-year statute of limitations begins anew whenever payments are made voluntarily, as the debt is recognized and acknowledged. The trial court held that the debtor should be protected under the circumstances of this case by the equitable defense of laches. The court of appeals reversed, but the Supreme Court reinstates the trial court’s ruling.

Four statutes refer to the partial payment scenario. See C.R.S. §§ 13-80-113 to 116. The court refers to these as examples of the common-law rule, and not a replacement of the rule.

In a fairly bold stroke in support of the exercise of equitable powers, the court holds that the separation of powers doctrine does not bar application of the equitable defense of laches to a debt collection action filed within the original or restarted six-year statute of limitations period. Laches does not conflict with the plain meaning of the relevant statute of limitations, nor does it conflict with the partial payment doctrine, which is a creature of Colorado common law. Since early statehood, Colorado case law has recognized the application of equitable remedies to legal claims. Accordingly, the Court reverses the judgment of the court of appeals and remands the case for consideration of issues it did not reach, to wit – does the record support a defense of laches. Maybe not.

“The essential element of laches is unconscionable delay in enforcing a right under the circumstances, usually involving a prejudice to the one against whom the claim is asserted.” The elements of laches are: (1) full knowledge of the facts; (2) unreasonable delay in the assertion of available remedy; and (3) intervening reliance by and prejudice to another. Laches requires “such unreasonable delay in the assertion of and attempted securing of equitable rights as to constitute in equity and good conscience a bar to recovery.”

The court remands the case to the court of appeals for review of whether the elements of laches are satisfied by evidence in the record. And father time marches on.

Frederick B. Skillern, Esq., is a director and shareholder with Montgomery Little & Soran, P.C., practicing in real estate and related litigation and appeals. He serves as an expert witness in cases dealing with real estate, professional responsibility and attorney fees, and acts as a mediator and arbitrator in real estate cases. Before joining Montgomery Little in 2003, Fred was in private practice in Denver for 6 years with Carpenter & Klatskin and for 10 years with Isaacson Rosenbaum. He served as a district judge for Colorado’s Eighteenth Judicial District from 2000 through 2002. Fred is a graduate of Dartmouth College, and received his law degree at the University of Colorado in 1976, in another day and time in which the legal job market was simply awful.

Appointments to Several Judicial Nominating Commissions and Supreme Court Nominating Commission Announced

On Wednesday, December 31, 2014, Governor Hickenlooper’s office announced appointments of several people to judicial nominating commissions throughout the state, and to the Supreme Court Nominating Commission.

The judicial nominating commissions are responsible for evaluating and recommending candidates for judicial vacancies in their respective judicial districts. They are comprised of seven members and one non-voting supreme court justice (the ex officio chair), of which no more than four members can be of the same political party and no more than three can be admitted to practice law in Colorado. The Supreme Court Nominating Commission evaluates and recommends candidates for vacancies on the Colorado Court of Appeals and the Colorado Supreme Court. The Supreme Court Nominating Commission is comprised of two people from each of Colorado’s seven congressional districts, one of whom may be admitted to practice law in Colorado and one of whom may not.

The following individuals were appointed to the judicial and Supreme Court nominating commissions:

Supreme Court Nominating Commission: 

  • Shannon Stevenson of Louisville, to serve as an unaffiliated attorney from the Second Congressional District.

Eleventh Judicial District Nominating Commission:

  • Larry McGee of Canon City, to serve as a non-attorney Democrat from Fremont County.
  • Herbert Phillips of Alma, to serve as a Republican attorney from Park County.
  • Margaret Walker of Nathrop, to serve as a Democratic attorney from Chaffee County.

Fourteenth Judicial District Nominating Commission:

  • James Stimson of Steamboat Springs, to serve as a non-attorney Democrat from Routt County.

Fifteenth Judicial District Nominating Commission:

  • Chris Rundell of Lamar, to serve as an unaffiliated non-attorney from Prowers County.

Twentieth Judicial District Nominating Commission:

  • Josh Marks of Louisville, to serve as an unaffiliated attorney from Boulder County.
  • Jodi Martin of Louisville, to serve as an unaffiliated attorney from Boulder County.

Twenty-Second Judicial District Nominating Commission:

  • Sharon Ann Lyons Hanson of Cortez, to serve as a Democratic attorney from Montezuma County.
  • Daniel Porter of Cortez, to serve as a Democratic non-attorney from Montezuma County.

All of the appointments are effective January 1, 2015, to serve six-year terms expiring December 31, 2020. For more information about the appointments, click here, and for more information about judicial nominating commissions, click here.