June 26, 2019

Colorado Court of Appeals: Defendant Has Right to Withdraw Plea as Void Ab Initio Even When Deferred Judgment Completed

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Corrales-Castro on Thursday, March 26, 2015.

Deferred Judgment—Successful Completion of Sentence—Withdrawal of Guilty Plea—Jurisdiction—Immigration Consequences—Voluntary—Unconstitutional—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

In 2009, defendant pleaded guilty to criminal impersonation and DUI. The district court imposed a one-year deferred judgment and sentence on the criminal impersonation count, and one year of probation on the DUI count. In 2010, defendant successfully completed the conditions of the deferred judgment and probation. The district court withdrew the guilty plea on the criminal impersonation count, dismissed that count, and closed the case. In 2013, defendant filed a Crim.P. 32(d) motion to withdraw his guilty plea to criminal impersonation, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the motion, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

On appeal, defendant argued that the district court erred when it held it did not retain jurisdiction to consider his motion. When a guilty plea that is withdrawn after the successful completion of a deferred judgment may nevertheless result in the removal of a defendant from the United States (or the defendant’s inability to re-enter the country), Crim.P. 32(d) authorizes the defendant to challenge the constitutionality of the plea, regardless of its prior withdrawal. Here, defendant claimed that ineffective assistance of counsel rendered his guilty plea involuntary and thus unconstitutional because his defense counsel had failed to inform him that his guilty plea to criminal impersonation could have negative federal immigration consequences, even if he successfully completed the conditions of the deferred judgment. Furthermore, under the circumstances presented here, a Crim.P. 32(d) motion is not subject to the time limits of CRS § 16-5-402(1), and defendant’s motion is not time barred by that statute. Accordingly, the district court retained jurisdiction to decide defendant’s motion, the order denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea under Crim.P. 32(d) was reversed, and the case was remanded for a determination of defendant’s Crim.P. 32(d) motion.

Summary and full case available here, courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

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