June 17, 2019

Archives for April 15, 2015

The Future of Law (Part 14): The New Legal Experts (2)

rhodes[In the spirit of the developments we’ve been considering in this series, check out these technological innovations changing trial practice.]

The world of commoditized law dispenses legal advice not by lawyers in individual consultations with clients, but instead through IT distribution channels, to a wider market of similarly situated consumers. Legal content is subsumed into the greater context in which the advice is pertinent, so that the consumer (no longer a “client”) gets comprehensive, multidisciplinary advice in one stop shopping, without the need to separately consult a lawyer and other relevant professionals.

The creators of these products must be able to see the entire context in which the legal advice is needed, and then break down the legal aspects into separately implementable steps. In his book Tomorrow’s Lawyers, law futurist Richard Susskind calls this process “decomposing” the law, and provides examples of decomposing litigation and business transactions. The idea is to unbundle the law into its separately applicable components, combine the ones that have similar dynamics, and put them back together into steps that can be taken to completion after collecting pertinent data.

Expert lawyers do this already, dispensing advice in the context of one-to-one client relationships. The legal experts of the future will do this on a wider scale, creating more broadly applicable IT products embedded with legal advice.

  • The creators of this new kind of legal advice will be much in demand in the new world of law.
  • The means of entry into the professional will be altered to admit them into practice.
  • As we saw last time, they will follow a career development path not encumbered by the former “training” model which in truth was driven by law firm economics.
  • To help them serve the burgeoning legal commodities market and move more quickly to expert status, legal training in law school and law practice will increasingly promote systems thinking.

As for the law itself:

  • These new experts will have a more direct and substantial impact on shaping the law.
  • They will shape it around from the end-user’s perspective.
  • As a result, the law will be reorganized into practicable modules, replacing historical knowledge/content areas such tort, contracts, real property, etc.

As the future’s expert lawyers conduct their decomposing, embedding, and reorganizing, they will need to deal with an unprecedented challenge: the sheer bulk of the law. Technology’s speed and storage capacity have resulted in a massive proliferation in the volume and complexity of the law. Although lawyers have access to sophisticated digital repositories of all this law, they typically use analog means to assimilate it.

  • The analog processing of legal developments — i.e., by their assimilation into individual lawyer’s brains via CLE and similar means — is a holdover from the law’s analog past that will end in the future.
  • What will replace it? Law by Algorithm. We’ll look at that next time.

Do these developments signal the end of legal solutions expertly-tailored to individual client needs? The surprising answer is, not at all. In fact, just the opposite: the law of the future will be more personally-tailored than it is now.

Further, when we agree with Larry Sanger that the world will still need experts for the foreseeable future, we may actually mean something beyond experts and expertise: we may be talking instead about a new kind of legal mastery.

  • The future world of law will feature both experts and masters, and we’ll need them both.

We’ll be looking at these issues as well. Stay tuned!

A collection of Kevin Rhodes’ Legal Connection blog posts for the past three years is now available in print from Amazon. Also available from Amazon as a Kindle, and as an ebook from Barnes & Noble, iTunes, Smashwords, and Scribd.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Open Meetings Law Prohibits Use of Secret Ballots

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Weisfield v. City of Arvada on Thursday, April 9, 2015.

Lack of Standing—Secret Ballots and Open Meetings Law.

This case concerned the use of secret ballots by Arvada’s mayor and city council members to fill a vacancy on the council for Arvada District 1. Plaintiff is a resident of that district. Defendants Mayor Williams and council members Dyer, Fifer, Allard, Marriot, and McGoff participated in the vote, and defendant Marks was selected to fill the vacancy.

After proper notice, a special meeting was held by city council on January 10, 2014 to select among five candidates for the vacancy. The meeting was recorded and televised. The council conducted four rounds of secret ballot voting in which candidates were eliminated if they didn’t receive a sufficient number of votes. Total votes were reported after each round, but it was not reported who voted for which candidates. At the end of the process, Marks was the only remaining candidate. The council then held an open vote in which they unanimously elected Marks.

Plaintiff sued, alleging that the use of secret ballots violated Colorado’s Open Meetings Law. Defendants moved to dismiss. The trial court granted the motion, holding that plaintiff lacked standing because he failed to allege an injury in fact to a legally protected interest.

The Court of Appeals reversed. The Open Meetings Law explicitly prohibits the use of secret ballots and provides that “any citizen of this state” may enforce the Open Meetings Law in Colorado courts. Plaintiff had a legally protected interest in having the city council fill its vacancy in an open manner in compliance with the Open Meetings Law. He also sufficiently alleged an injury in fact to this legally protected interest. He is a citizen of Colorado and a resident of Arvada District 1. As a direct result of the alleged violation, plaintiff did not know how each council member voted during the process of selecting the new council member who now represents him. The case was remanded for further proceedings, including the district court’s consideration of the alleged grounds for dismissal asserted in defendants’ motion to dismiss under CRCP 12(b)(5).

Summary and full case available here, courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Trial Court Appropriately Declined Jurisdiction Under UCCJEA

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.C.B., a Child on Thursday, April 9, 2015.

Jurisdiction Under the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.

Mother and father, who were not married, are the parents of B.C.B., born in Idaho in December 2012. The couple moved to Colorado with B.C.B. in July 2013. In August 2013, mother and B.C.B. traveled to Massachusetts, where mother’s extended family lived. Mother testified at the hearing to determine Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) jurisdiction that she had intended to return to Colorado; however, while in Massachusetts, she decided her relationship with father would not work and therefore did not return.

In September 2013, father petitioned the Colorado district court for an allocation of parental responsibilities. Mother contested jurisdiction and filed a custody action in Massachusetts. The Massachusetts court entered temporary orders granting custody to mother in October 2013.

Following conferral between the Colorado and Massachusetts courts, the Colorado court asserted temporary emergency jurisdiction over B.C.B., ordered mother to return to Colorado with B.C.B., and set a hearing to determine jurisdiction. The Massachusetts court vacated its temporary order and stayed its proceedings pending the Colorado decision on jurisdiction.

The Colorado court determined that (1) Idaho was B.C.B.’s home state under the UCCJEA; (2) neither party wanted Idaho to take jurisdiction; and (3) either Colorado or Massachusetts could exercise jurisdiction, but neither was required to do so. The court then declined its jurisdiction on the basis that Colorado was not the most appropriate forum. Father appealed.

The Court of Appeals applied an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the trial court’s decision to decline to exercise jurisdiction. The Court held that the child had no home state because neither the parents nor the child lived in Idaho when father filed his petition and the child had not lived in either Colorado or Massachusetts long enough to establish home state jurisdiction. Despite this error by the trial court, it properly proceeded under CRS § 14-13-201(1)(b) to consider whether B.C.B. and his parents had a significant connection with Colorado and whether substantial evidence concerning B.C.B. was located in Colorado. Because the court’s factual findings as to the lack of significant connection with Colorado or of substantial evidence in Colorado were supported by the record, the Court will not disturb them. The judgment was affirmed.

Summary and full case available here, courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Trial Court Need Not Make Specific Findings to Revoke Probation

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Roletto on Thursday, April 9, 2015.

Probation Revocation—Failure to Pay Restitution.

Defendant pleaded guilty to defrauding a secured creditor and to second-degree perjury. He was sentenced to a five-year probation period, with a condition that he pay restitution on a monthly basis.

About midway through his sentence, the probation department filed a probation revocation complaint, asserting defendant had failed to pay restitution. At the hearing, defendant argued that he was financially unable to pay restitution. He testified that he could not work because he suffered from chronic pancreatitis and his criminal record would deter him from obtaining work. The trial court found no evidence to support defendant’s assertions. It revoked his probation and resentenced him to another probationary term.

On appeal, defendant argued that the court applied an incorrect legal standard in determining whether he was able to pay restitution. Specifically, he argued that the court was required to find: (1) a job was available for him; (2) the job would produce an income adequate to meet his obligations; and (3) he justifiably refused to take the job.

The Court of Appeals concluded that these express findings were not necessary to revoke probation. A defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is unable to pay restitution. The defendant’s burden is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court, and the court may consider numerous factors in making that determination. Here, the court’s finding that defendant was able to pay was based on copious evidence in the record.

Defendant also argued that the court improperly relied on information it read in the newspaper to find he was unable to pay. While making its finding and ruling, the court stated: “In the newspaper, this morning, I read that there were jobs available.” Defendant argued that this statement demonstrated the court improperly relied on “hearsay evidence” to find that he had violated the restitution condition. However, the record does not suggest the court used the information as evidence against defendant; rather, the statement was a casual observation. Moreover, the parties’ dispute did not center on whether jobs were generally available. Instead, defendant argued that his medical condition rendered him unable to work. As such, the availability of jobs was not dispositive. The judgment was affirmed.

Summary and full case available here, courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Tenth Circuit: Unpublished Opinions, 4/15/2015

On Wednesday, April 15, 2015, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued one published opinion and six unpublished opinions.

United States v. Juarez

United States v. Moreno

United States v. Aguilar

Templeton v. Anderson

United States v. Willis

Villareal v. Patton

Case summaries are not provided for unpublished opinions. However, published opinions are summarized and provided by Legal Connection.