May 20, 2019

Colorado Court of Appeals: Affirmative Self-Defense Instruction Available for All General Intent Crimes

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. DeGreat on Thursday, July 30, 2015.

Self-Defense—Robbery—Jury Instruction—Peremptory Challenge—BatsonChallenge.

DeGreat’s criminal charges arose from an altercation with a taxi cab driver over the fare, which culminated in DeGreat stabbing and wounding the driver. DeGreat defended on a theory of self-defense. The jury found DeGreat guilty of aggravated robbery and a related crime of violence count.

On appeal, DeGreat contended that, given the unique facts presented, he was entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense as an affirmative defense to aggravated robbery. A person may use physical force to defend himself from what “he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force” by another person. Here, evidence was presented that supported an affirmative self-defense instruction, and DeGreat successfully defended against attempted murder and first-degree assault charges on that basis. Because the robbery was intertwined with the assault, the jury could have concluded that DeGreat had the right to defend himself. The refusal to give the self-defense instruction for the charge of aggravated robbery lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof and was not harmless. Therefore, DeGreat’s aggravated robbery conviction was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial.

DeGreat also contended that the trial court erred in denying his Batson challenge to the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge to remove Juror M, an African American, from the panel [Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)]. In light of the prosecutor’s stated basis for the strike, which was Juror M’s reaction to self-defense questioning, the trial court did not err in finding the prosecution offered a good faith, race-neutral basis for its peremptory challenge.

DeGreat contended that the trial court plainly erred in failing to sua sponte strike testimony that DeGreat had been offered a plea bargain. DeGreat’s attorney did not make a contemporaneous objection to this testimony. Because no binding precedent clearly precludes evidence regarding plea offers, the trial court could not have been expected to sua sponte strike such unsolicited testimony.

DeGreat contended that the trial court erred in admitting recorded phone calls he placed from jail in which he attempted to solicit the victim not to appear for trial. There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in phone calls placed from jail. Furthermore, the wiretapping statute does not apply to inmate phone calls placed from jail. Thus, the trial court did not err in admitting the jailhouse phone calls.

Summary and full case available here, courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Print Friendly, PDF & Email

Speak Your Mind

*