September 25, 2018

Archives for September 12, 2018

Ryan L. Kamada Appointed to 19th Judicial District Court

On Tuesday, September 11, 2018, Governor Hickenlooper appointed Ryan L. Kamada to the 19th Judicial District Court. He will fill a vacancy created by the retirement of Hon. Elizabeth Strobel, effective January 8, 2019.

Kamada is currently a district court magistrate in the 19th Judicial District, where he oversees a docket consisting of domestic relations, dependency and neglect, paternity, and contempt matters. Prior to his work as a magistrate, he was a contract attorney with the Office of the Child’s Representative from 2011 to 2015. He has also been a partner at Grant, Hoffman & Kamada, PC and an associate at Grant-Dickson, LLC. He received his undergraduate degree from Colorado School of Mines and his law degree from the University of Denver Sturm College of Law.

For more information about the appointment, click here.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Noncustodial Escape Convictions Precluded from Use as Current Conviction for Habitual Offender Purposes

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Jompp on Thursday, September 6, 2018.

Criminal Law—Speedy Trial—Insufficient Evidence—Robbery—Assault—Noncustodial Escape—Jury Instructions—Lesser Nonincluded Offense—Resisting Arrest—Sixth Amendment—Habitual Criminal.

Jompp, the victim, and an acquaintance, B.B., were driving around one evening in a stolen car while high on methamphetamine. After they picked up C.P., they later pulled the vehicle over and a fight broke out between Jompp and the victim. Jompp, B.B., and C.P. left the victim unconscious on the ground, and the victim later died of his injuries. Days later, police found Jompp. After the police handcuffed Jompp, he took off running. After a short chase he was caught and taken to jail. A jury convicted Jompp of third degree assault, robbery, and escape. The trial court adjudicated Jompp a habitual criminal and sentenced him to 48 years in prison.

On appeal, Jompp contended that the court violated his speedy trial rights by continuing his jury trial, over his objection, beyond six months after he pleaded not guilty and 13 months after he was arrested. Here, the trial court acted within its discretion by relying on the prosecution’s offer of proof that they were diligently trying to find B.B. to secure her testimony at trial and by finding that there was a reasonable possibility that B.B. would be available to testify. Therefore, there was sufficient record evidence to support the court’s granting of the prosecution’s request for a continuance. Further, the trial court didn’t plainly err because Jompp’s constitutional right to a speedy trial wasn’t obviously violated.

Jompp also contended that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence that he committed robbery, as either a principal or accomplice. Here, after Jompp attacked the victim, B.B. said she then saw C.P. get out of the car, go over to the victim, and start digging through his pockets. C.P. admitted that she went through the victim’s pockets to get money at Jompp’s direction and she gave him the money she found. Further, the court of appeals rejected Jompp’s argument that the prosecution had to show that the force he used against the victim was calculated to take the victim’s money. The record contained sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that Jompp robbed the victim.

Jompp next contended that the court erred by failing to instruct the jury that it could convict him of the lesser nonincluded offense of resisting arrest. Here, the undisputed record evidence showed that Jompp was in custody. He had already submitted to the police officer’s instructions, was handcuffed, searched, and led by the arm to a patrol car for transport to jail before he ran from the officer. Therefore, the court didn’t abuse its discretion by declining to instruct the jury on the crime of resisting arrest.

Finally, Jompp contended that the court convicted him in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial when, at sentencing, it, not the jury, found that he had prior convictions and increased his sentence under the habitual criminal sentencing statute. Jompp failed to preserve this issue at trial, and the prior conviction exception remains well-settled law, so the trial court did not err.

Finally, Jompp contended that his sentence is illegal because his noncustodial escape conviction can’t be deemed a current offense under the habitual criminal statute. The court held that C.R.S. § 18-1.3-801(5) (2013) precluded a noncustodial escape conviction from being used as a current conviction for adjudicating a defendant a habitual criminal under subsection (2) of that section. Therefore, the trial court erred in adjudicating Jompp a habitual criminal on his noncustodial escape conviction.

The judgment of conviction was affirmed. The part of the sentence based on Jompp’s escape conviction was vacated and the case was remanded for resentencing on that conviction. The remainder of the sentence was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Criminal Mischief Included in First Degree Arson if Both Offenses Based on Same Conduct

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Welborne on Thursday, September 6, 2018.

Criminal Law—First Degree Arson—Criminal Mischief—Theft—Double Jeopardy—Merger—Lesser Included Offense.

Welborne and his mother were charged with setting fire to their rented house and then filing false insurance claims based on the fire damage. Welborne was convicted of first degree arson, criminal mischief, theft, and attempted theft. The court of appeals previously rejected his challenges to his convictions based on Reyna-Abarca v. People, 2017 CO 15. After this decision, the Colorado Supreme Court clarified Reyna-Abarca and vacated the court’s judgment here as to the included offense statute and remanded this case.

On appeal, Welborne contended that criminal mischief is an included offense of first degree arson and, therefore, those convictions must merge under both statutory and double jeopardy dictates. Criminal mischief is included in first degree arson where both offenses are based on the same conduct. Here, when Welborne knowingly burned the rented house without the owner’s consent, he committed both criminal mischief and first degree arson. The failure to merge the convictions was plain error.

The criminal mischief conviction and sentence were vacated. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. The case was remanded for the trial court to correct the mittimus.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.