December 16, 2018

Bills Signed Enacting Uniform Trust Code, Creating Civil Rape Shield Law, Helping Preserve Family Units with Parents with Disabilities, and More

On Wednesday, April 25, 2018, Governor Hickenlooper signed nine bills into law. On Thursday, April 26, 2018, he signed five bills into law. To date, he has signed 183 bills and sent one bill to the Secretary of State without a signature. The bills signed Wednesday and Thursday include a bill enacting the Colorado Uniform Trust Code, a bill enacting a civil rape shield statute, a bill amending family preservation safeguards for parents with disabilities, a bill requiring free-standing emergency rooms to post certain consumer notices, and more. The bills signed Wednesday and Thursday are summarized here.

  • SB 18-071 – “Concerning an Extension of the Repeal of the State Substance Abuse Trend and Response Task Force, and, in Connection Therewith, Making an Appropriation,” by Sens. Cheri Jahn & Larry Crowder and Rep. Daneya Esgar. The state substance abuse trend and response task force is scheduled to be repealed effective July 1, 2018. The bill extends the repeal for 10 years to September 1, 2028.
  • SB 18-146 – “Concerning a Requirement that a Freestanding Emergency Department Inform a Person who is Seeking Medical Treatment about the Health Care Options that are Available to the Person, and, in Connection Therewith, Making an Appropriation,” by Sens. John Kefalas & Jim Smallwood and Reps. Lang Sias & Jonathan Singer. The bill requires a freestanding emergency department (FSED), whether operated by a hospital at a separate, off-campus location or operating independently of a hospital system, to provide any individual that enters the FSED seeking treatment a written statement of patient information, which an FSED staff member or health care provider must explain orally.
  • SB 18-154 – “Concerning a Requirement for a Local Juvenile Services Planning Committee to Devise a Plan to Manage Dually Identified Crossover Youth,” by Sen. Rhonda Fields and Rep. Joseph Salazar. The bill requires local juvenile services planning committees to devise a plan to manage dually identified crossover youth. A dually identified crossover youth is a youth involved in both the juvenile justice system and the child welfare system. The plan must contain descriptions and processes.
  • SB 18-169 – “Concerning Offenses Against Witnesses in Noncriminal Proceedings,” by Sen. Bob Gardner and Rep. Terri Carver. The clarifies that the offenses of intimidating a witness or victim and retaliation against a witness or victim apply to witnesses in criminal, civil, and administrative proceedings.
  • SB 18-180 – “Concerning the Colorado Uniform Trust Code,” by Sen. Bob Gardner and Reps. Cole Wist & Matt Gray. The bill enacts the Colorado Uniform Trust Code and repeals many sections of the Colorado Probate Code.
  • SB 18-187 – “Concerning Transferring Marijuana Fibrous Waste for the Purpose of Producing Industrial Fiber Products,” by Sens. Vicki Marble & Jack Tate and Rep. Jeni James Arndt. The bill gives the state licensing authority rule-making authority to address conditions under which a medical or retail marijuana licensee is authorized to transfer marijuana fibrous waste to a person for the purpose of producing only industrial fiber products.
  • HB 18-1104 – “Concerning Family Preservation Safeguards for Parents with Disabilities,” by Rep. Jessie Danielson and Sens. Dominick Moreno & Kent Lambert. The bill establishes that family protection safeguards for a parent or prospective parent with a disability are critical to family preservation and the best interests of the children of Colorado. These safeguards include that a parent’s disability must not serve as a basis for denial or restriction of parenting time or parental responsibilities in a domestic law proceeding, that a parent’s disability must not serve as a basis for denial of participation in a public or private adoption, or for denial of foster care or guardianship, and that the benefits of providing supportive parenting services must be considered by a court when determining parental responsibilities, parenting time, adoption placements, foster care, and guardianship.
  • HB 18-1132 – “Concerning the Amount that the Department of Corrections is Required to Reimburse a County or City and County for the Confinement and Maintenance in a Local Jail of any Person who is Sentenced to a Term of Imprisonment in a Correctional Facility,” by Rep. Dafna Michaelson Jenet and Sen. Larry Crowder. Under current law, the General Assembly establishes in its annual general appropriations bill the amount that the Department of Corrections is required to reimburse any county or city and county for a portion of the expenses and costs incurred by that county or city and county for the confinement and maintenance in a local jail of any person who is sentenced to a term of imprisonment in a correctional facility. The bill states that, to assist the General Assembly in determining such rate of reimbursement, each county and each city and county shall report to the joint budget committee the average cost of confining and maintaining persons in a local jail for more than 72 hours after each such person has been sentenced to the custody of the department.
  • HB 18-1147 – “Concerning the Continuation of the Regulation of People who Modify the Weather, and, in Connection Therewith, Implementing the Sunset Review Recommendations of the Department of Regulatory Agencies,” by Reps. Joann Ginal & Kim Ransom and Sen. Don Coram. The bill continues the regulation of people who modify the weather.
  • HB 18-1211 – “Concerning Controlling Medicaid Fraud,” by Reps. Cole Wist & Mike Foote and Sens. Irene Aguilar & Jim Smallwood. The bill establishes the medicaid fraud control unit in the department of law. The unit is responsible for investigation and prosecution of medicaid fraud and waste, as well as patient abuse, neglect, and exploitation. Prior to initiating a criminal prosecution, the unit must consult with the district attorney of the judicial district where the prosecution would be initiated.
  • HB 18-1237 – “Concerning the Continuation of the Requirements Regarding the Preparation of a Cost-Benefit Analysis as Administered by the Department of Regulatory Agencies, and, in Connection Therewith, Implementing the Recommendations Contained in the 2017 Sunset Report by the Department of Regulatory Agencies,” by Reps. Tracy Kraft-Tharp & Kevin Van Winkle and Sen. Tim Neville. The bill implements the recommendations of the Department of Regulatory Agencies’ sunset review and report on requirements and procedures regarding the preparation of a cost-benefit analysis.
  • HB 18-1243 – “Concerning Enactment of a Civil Rape Shield Law,” by Reps. Mike Foote & Cole Wist and Sens. Don Coram & Rhonda Fields. Under Colorado criminal law there is a rape shield law that presumes that evidence of a victim’s sexual conduct is irrelevant and not admissible except for evidence of the victim’s prior or subsequent sexual conduct with the defendant or evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or origin of semen, pregnancy, disease, or any similar evidence of sexual intercourse offered for the purpose of showing that the act or acts were or were not committed by the defendant. The bill creates a similar presumption in a civil proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct. If a party wants to introduce sexual conduct evidence, it must file a confidential motion with the court at least 63 days prior to trial. Prior to ruling on the motion, the court shall conduct an in camera hearing and allow the parties and alleged victim to attend and be heard.
  • HB 18-1275 – “Concerning the Repeal of the Craig Hospital License Plate Donation Requirement,” by Rep. Jeff Bridges and Sen. Daniel Kagan. Current law requires an applicant to make a donation to Craig Hospital in order to be issued a special Craig Hospital license plate. The bill repeals the $20 donation requirement.
  • HB 18-1282 – “Concerning a Requirement that a Health Care Provider Include Certain Identifying Information on all Claims for Reimbursement for Health Care Services,” by Reps. Susan Lontine & Lang Sias and Sens. Jim Smallwood & John Kefalas. The bill requires an off-campus location of a hospital to apply for, obtain, and use on claims for reimbursement for health care services provided at the off-campus location a unique national provider identifier, commonly referred to as NPI. The off-campus location’s NPI must be used on all claims related to health care services provided at that location, regardless of whether the claim is filed through the hospital’s central billing or claims department or through a health care clearinghouse. It also requires all medicaid providers that are entities to obtain and use a unique NPI for each site at which they deliver services and for each provider type that the department of health care policy and financing has specified.

For a complete list of Governor Hickenlooper’s 2018 legislative decisions, click here.

Rules of Civil Procedure, JDF 601, and Form 4 Amended in Rule Changes 2018(05) and 2018(06)

On Thursday, April 12, 2018, the Colorado Supreme Court issued two rule changes. Rule Change 2018(05) amends Form 4, “Petition for Postconviction Relief Pursuant to Crim. P. 35(c),” and Rule Change 2018(06) amends Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 16.1, “Simplified Procedure for Civil Actions,” and JDF 601, “District Court Civil Case Cover Sheet for Initial Pleading of Complaint, Counterclaim, Cross-Claim, or Third-Party Complaint and Jury Demand.”

The changes to C.R.C.P. 16.1 are extensive, and contain multiple changes to the first several subsections, including “Purpose of Simplified Procedure,” “Actions Subject to Simplified Procedure,” “Civil Cover Sheet,” “Motion for Exclusion from Simplified Procedure,” and more. There is also new Comment to the Rule that explains the reasoning for the changes.

For the full text of the 2018 rule changes, click here. For all of the court’s adopted and proposed rule changes, click here.

Tenth Circuit: Defendants Found Liable for ATV Protest Ride on Recapture Canyon in Utah

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in United States v. Wells on Monday, October 23, 2017.

In 2007, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) closed part of Recapture Canyon in Utah to all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) due to potential damage to the soil and archaeological sites. Although this was intended to be temporary, the order was still in place in 2014. Upset at the delay in reopening, County Commissioner Lyman organized a protest ride on ATVs into the closed portion of the Canyon. Wells, who ran a website that reported on local news, assisted and interviewed Lyman, while also encouraging others to the protest. Despite warnings from the BLM that criminal and civil penalties would be enforced against anyone riding ATVs in the closed portion of the Canyon, the ride took place in May of 2014. There is undisputed evidence that both Lyman and Wells rode ATVs in the protest.

At trial, Lyman and Wells were found guilty for riding ATVs on the closed lands and with conspiracy to do the same. On appeal, Defendants seek a new trial, arguing that a reasonable observer would have questioned the district judge’s impartiality. Although the judge did ultimately recuse before sentencing, Defendants contend he should have recused earlier. Further, they challenge the denial of their motions to dismiss the criminal information, the denial of a new trial, and their restitution order. Lyman separately argues that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel. The Tenth Circuit addressed each claim in turn.

The first argument was that the district court judge, Judge Shelby, should have recused earlier in the trial. Judge Shelby is close friends with the legal director for the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), an organization that was opposed to the protest ride. The ultimate recusal was based largely on a letter to the judge signed by SUWA and other conservative groups that expressed views adverse to Defendants, as well as evidence that showed SUWA had extensive pretrial involvement with the case in passing information to BLM officials and the United States Attorney’s Office.

Defendants argued for a new trial, contending that Judge Shelby ought to have recused from participation in the trial because a reasonable observer would have questioned his impartiality, as Judge Shelby should have been alerted to SUWA’s involvement by their legal director’s presence at trial and by a voir dire question asking potential jurors if close friends or family members were in SUWA.

The Tenth Circuit found that the argument for a new trial failed on the merits. The Circuit reviewed Judge Shelby’s decision not to recuse early in the trial for an abuse of discretion and found that the decision not to recuse could not be characterized as arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable. The Tenth Circuit concluded that recusal was not required where SUWA was not a party to the criminal prosecution, and, further, there was no evidence that Judge Shelby should have known about SUWA’s pretrial involvement. As Judge Shelby did not err in failing to recuse, Defendant were not entitled to a new trial.

The Defendants next challenged the denial of their motions to dismiss. Wells claimed that he could not be prosecuted for his activities because they consisted of protected speech under the First Amendment. To determine whether Wells’ conduct was protected, the Tenth Circuit inquired as to whether there was a realistic or reasonable likelihood of prosecutorial conduct that would not have occurred but for the hostility toward the defendant because he exercised his specific legal rights.

Wells argued that the prosecution’s hostility became evident when showings were made that SUWA had pushed for prosecution of the Canyon riders and that they regularly passed Wells’ social media posting on to prosecutors. However, the Tenth Circuit found that Wells did not present any evidence of prosecutorial hostility toward Wells’ exercise of his First Amendment rights. SUWA was simply interest in protecting the Canyon, not in limiting Wells’ First Amendment rights. The Circuit held that Wells failed to establish the requisite vindictiveness from the prosecution.

Lyman argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss when the government failed to allege interdependence, a required element of conspiracy. The Circuit applied a two-part test to determine the sufficiency of an indictment: First, the indictment must contain the elements of the offense and sufficiently apprise the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet; second, it must be such as to show to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction as a bar to further prosecution for the same cause. The Tenth Circuit found that Lyman’s argument implicated only the first prong of this test. Further, Lyman and Wells worked together for their mutual benefit in the context of their conspiracy to ride ATVs on the Canyon in protest. The Tenth Circuit found that Lyman’s motion to dismiss argument failed.

Next, Wells argued that the government failed to introduce sufficient evidence that he was acting as a co-conspirator rather than a journalist. The Tenth Circuit inquired whether the evidence would establish each element of the crime of conspiracy, to wit: (1) an agreement, (2) to break the law, (3) an overt act, (4) in furtherance of the conspiracy’s object, and (5) proof that the defendant willfully entered the conspiracy. The Circuit found that the evidence presented by the government was sufficient for a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Wells acted not merely as a journalist reporting on issues, but as a co-conspirator who agreed with Lyman to ride on the closed lands. More specifically, Wells reposted Lyman’s advertisements of the protest ride while adding flourishes of his own that suggest active support for, and agreement with, the planned ride.

Defendants next contested the district court’s denial of their motion for a new trial based on the post-trial discovery of a map which allegedly showed a right-of-way that the government failed to disclose before trial. Defendants argued that (1) the map would have permitted them to establish the existence of a right-of-way to negate the legality of the closure order on the Canyon, and (2) they should have been able to present the map as evidence relevant to their good-faith defense, since violation of the laws at hand require that the defendant act knowingly and willfully. The government argued that no violation occurred because the map in question was not material.

The Circuit found that the materiality of the map was at issue in this appeal. Materiality requires a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the evidence been disclosed. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the map could not have been material for purposes of the Defendants’ good-faith defense, and, as the district court pointed out, the map could not be relevant because the Defendants were unaware of the map at the time of the ATV ride. A mere suspicion that a right-of-way existed is not an honest belief that the road was not legally closed to ATV use. The Tenth Circuit found that the Defendants could not establish that the map would have been material to their good-faith defense. Further, the map failed to create a reasonable probability of a different outcome so as to cast doubt on Defendants’ convictions. The Circuit held that the district court properly denied Defendants’ motion for a new trial.

Wells next challenged the restitution order holding him jointly and severally responsible with Lyman for $48,000. Wells challenged that it included: (1) harms that were not recoverable as restitution because they were not caused by the conspiracy and its underlying conduct, and (2) amounts that were not legally cognizable as actual loss or supported by the evidence. Lyman made a similar argument. Under the Mandatory Victims Restitutions Act (MVRA), courts are required to order a defendant to pay restitution to a victim of the offense. No party disputed that the United States constituted a victim under the MVRA; however, the question was for which alleged harms could the United States properly recover restitution. The government was required to show both that the defendant’s conduct was the ‘but-for’ cause of the harm and that the defendant proximately caused the harm.

The government’s principal contention was that the conspiracy and its underlying conduct was the but-for cause of the motorized damage to archeological, riparian, and upland soil resources in the closed area. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the government presented ample evidence to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the government’s contention was correct. The district court did not err in ruling that Defendants were responsible for paying restitution to the United States for damages stemming directly and proximately from Defendants’ unlawful conspiracy to conduct a protest ride.

Next, Defendants challenged three aspects of the total amount of restitution ordered: (1) that the amount spent assessing the damage caused by the ATV ride was disallowed, speculative archeological expenses; (2) that the assessment costs were not incurred during participation in the investigation or prosecution of the offense; and (3) that at least some of the claimed amount was supported by estimates, not concrete figures. The Tenth Circuit first found that the government’s requested damages did not constitute speculative, archaeological damages. The archaeological value is an effort to go back in time before the violation occurred and estimate what it would have cost the United States to engage in a full-blown archaeological dig at the site, notwithstanding the fact that the United States had no plans to engage in any such effort. The Circuit held that the assessment that took place was detailed and anything but hypothetical.

Second, the MVRA provides that a victim must be reimbursed for expenses incurred during participation in the investigation or prosecution of the defense. The Tenth Circuit rejected Defendants’ assertion that the expenses were not incurred during the government’s participation in the investigation or prosecution of the offense, as the court has specifically recognized that the government’s investigatory costs can constitute actual losses subject to restitution.

Third, the Circuit concluded that the third argument was based on a mistaken view of the record. The government did not admit that its damages were not hard numbers. In context, the prosecutor was attempting to explain why restitution figures from an earlier case could not be considered as a basis for comparison in the present case. The Circuit found Defendants’ final argument misguided and spurious. The district court’s restitution award was upheld.

The last argument by Lyman was ineffective assistance of counsel. The Tenth Circuit found that ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be brought in collateral proceedings, not on direct appeal. Such claims brought on direct appeal are presumptively dismissible, and virtually all will be dismissed. As Lyman made no attempt to argue that his claim should be addressed on direct appeal, the Tenth Circuit saw no reason to reach its merits.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the district court’s judgment and restitution order.

Several JDF and C.R.C.P. Forms and Instructions Amended in January

The Colorado State Judicial Branch amended 41 forms in January, including forms in the adoption, appellate, civil, criminal, domestic relations, and name change categories. Several bills were amended in February also; these will be discussed in a future post.

The forms amended in January are available here as PDF downloads, and are available as Word documents and templates from the State Judicial forms page. Additionally, the Filing Fees (JDF 1) were revised in November 2017, along with six other forms, all of which are available here.

ADOPTION

  • JDF 340 – “Oath or Affirmation of Confidentiality Regarding Motion to Open Adoption and Relinquishment Files” (Revised 1/18)
  • JDF 341 – “Motion and Affidavit to Open Adoption File by Adoptive Parent or Custodial Grandparent” (Revised 1/18)
  • JDF 342 – “Motion and Affidavit to Open Adoption File by Sibling of an Adoptee or Half-Sibling of an Adoptee” (Revised 1/18)
  • JDF 343 – “Motion and Affidavit to Open Adoption File by Adoptee” (Revised 1/18)
  • JDF 454 – “Verified Statement of Fees Charged” (Revised 1/18)
  • JDF 501 – “Petition for Adoption” (Revised 1/18)
  • JDF 502 – “Petition for Stepparent Adoption” (Revised 1/18)
  • JDF 503 – “Petition for Custodial Adoption” (Revised 1/18)
  • JDF 504 – “Petition for Second Parent Adoption” (Revised 1/18)
  • JDF 505 – “Petition for Kinship Adoption” (Revised 1/18)
  • JDF 508 – “Consent to Adoption – Sole Legal Parent” (Revised 1/18)
  • JDF 509 – “Consent to Adoption – Custodial Parent” (Revised 1/18)
  • JDF 510 – “Consent to Adoption – Non-Custodial Parent” (Revised 1/18)
  • JDF 511 – “Consent to Adoption – Child Over 12 Years of Age” (Revised 1/18)
  • JDF 517 – “Motion and Affidavit for Publication of Notice” (Revised 1/18)
  • JDF 527 – “Petition for Validation of Foreign Decree of Adoption” (Revised 1/18)
  • JDF 528 – “Petition for Adult Adoption” (Revised 1/18)

AGISTOR’S LIEN

  • JDF 131 – “Instructions for An Agistor’s Lien” (Revised 1/18)

APPELLATE

  • JDF 605 – “Instructions for Appealing Property Tax Assessments with the District Court” (Revised 1/18)
  • JDF 640 – “Notice of Limited Appearance by an Attorney with Consent of Pro Se Party Under C.A.R. 5 in an Appellate Matter” (Revised 1/18)
  • JDF 641 – “Consent to Limit Appearance by an Attorney Under C.A.R. 5 in an Appellate Matter” (Revised 1/18)

CIVIL

  • JDF 105 – “Pattern Interrogatories Under C.R.C.P. 369(g) – Individual” (Revised 1/18)
  • JDF 108 – “Pattern Interrogatories Under C.R.C.P. 369(g) – Business” (Revised 1/18)
  • JDF 253 – “Motion and Order to Set Aside Dismissal/Default Judgment” (Revised 1/18)
  • JDF 256 – “Notice of Representation by Attorney” (Revised 1/18)
  • JDF 622 – “Proposed Case Management Order” (Revised 1/18)

CRIMINAL

  • C.R.C.P. Form 4 – “Petition for Post-Conviction Relief Pursuant to Crim. P. 35(c)” (Revised 1/18)
  • JDF 221 – “Instructions for Filing a Municipal or County Court Criminal Appeal” (Revised 1/18)
  • JDF 301 – “Instructions to File an Expungement Juvenile “JV” or Municipal Case” (Revised 11/17)
  • JDF 302 – “Petition for Expungement of Records” (Revised 11/17)
  • JDF 304 – “Order of Expungement of Records” (Revised 11/17)
  • JDF 323(a) – “Instructions to File a Petition to Seal Records Related to Illegal Possession or Consumption of Alcohol or Marijuana by an Underage Person (MIP) or Possession of Marijuana Paraphernalia (Offenses Committed Prior to July 1, 2014)” (Revised 1/18)
  • JDF 323(b) – “Instructions to File a Petition to Seal Records Related to Illegal Possession or Consumption of Alcohol or Marijuana by an Underage Person (MIP) or Possession of Marijuana Paraphernalia (Offenses Committed After July 1, 2014)” (Revised 1/18)
  • JDF 324 – “Petition for Expungement of Records for a Law Enforcement Contact Not Resulting in Referral to Another Agency” (Revised 11/17)
  • JDF 326 – “Order of Expungement of Records for a Law Enforcement Contact Not Resulting in Referral to Another Agency” (Revised 11/17)
  • JDF 460I – “Instructions to Discontinue Sex Offender Registration for a Colorado and Non-Colorado Conviction” (Revised 1/18)
  • JDF 477 – “Motion to Seal Criminal Justice Records” (Revised 10/17)
  • JDF 611 – “Instructions to File a Petition to Seal Criminal Conviction Records Involving Controlled Substances and Petty Offenses and Municipal Violations” (Revised 1/18)

DOMESTIC RELATIONS

  • JDF 1111 – “Sworn Financial Statement” (Revised 1/18)
  • JDF 1801 – “Instructions for Completing an Income Assignment Based on Child Support and/or Maintenance Orders” (Revised 1/18)
  • JDF 1816 – “Motion and Affidavit for Citation for Contempt of Court” (Revised 1/18)
  • No JDF Number – “Income Withholding for Support Information” (Revised 1/18)

FILING FEES

  • JDF 1 – “Filing Fees, Surcharges, and Costs in Colorado Courts” (Revised 11/17)

GARNISHMENT/EVICTIONS

  • C.R.C.P. Form 26 – “Writ of Continuing Garnishment” (Revised 1/18)
  • C.R.C.P. Form 30 – “Claim of Exemption to Writ of Garnishment with Notice” (Revised 1/18)
  • JDF 100 – “Instructions for Forcible Entry and Detainer (FED)/Eviction” (Revised 1/18)

NAME CHANGE

  • JDF 420 – “Instructions for Filing a Change of Name (Minor)” (Revised 1/18)
  • JDF 427 – “Public Notice of Petition for Change of Name” (Revised 1/18)

PROTECTED PERSONS

  • JDF 396 – “Instructions for Protected Person Motion to Modify/Dismiss Protection Order” (Revised 1/18)

For all of State Judicial’s JDF forms, click here.

Income Eligibility Guidelines Updated; Several CJDs Affected

On Thursday, February 22, 2018, the Colorado State Judicial Branch released revisions to the Income Eligibility Guidelines. Several Chief Justice Directives were affected by these revisions:

  • CJD 98-01 – “Costs for Indigent Persons in Civil Matters”
  • CJD 04-04 – “Appointment of State-Funded Counsel in Criminal Cases and for Contempt of Court”
  • CJD 04-05 – “Appointment and Payment Procedures for Court-appointed Counsel, Guardians ad litem, Child and Family Investigators, and Court Visitors paid by the Judicial Department in proceedings under Titles 12, 13, 14, 15, 19 (special respondents in dependency and neglect only), 22, 25.5, and 27, C.R.S.”
  • CJD 04-06 – “Court Appointments Through the Office of the Child’s Representative”
  • CJD 14-01 – “Appointment of State-Funded Counsel in Juvenile Delinquency Cases”
  • CJD 16-02 – “Court Appointments Through the Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel”

All of the Colorado Supreme Court’s Chief Justice Directives can be accessed here.