August 13, 2018

Colorado Court of Appeals: Indefinite Stay of Appeal Denied where Defendant Found Legally Incompetent After Notice of Appeal Filed

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Liggett on Thursday, June 12, 2018.

Competency to Proceed—Stay of Appellate Proceedings—Jurisdiction—Restoration Proceedings—Right to Counsel—Waiver.

This is a direct appeal of two cases, first degree murder after deliberation and revocation of probation (based on the murder conviction). Based on Liggett’s incompetence, his counsel requested an indefinite stay of the appellate proceedings, a stay of the ruling on Liggett’s request to terminate counsel’s representation and to dismiss the appeal, and a remand of the cases to the district court for competency restoration proceedings.

On appeal, Liggett’s counsel contended that the direct appeal should be stayed indefinitely because proceeding while Liggett is incompetent will violate his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process of law. An incompetent defendant’s direct appeal should proceed, despite incompetence, if the defendant is provided a postconviction remedy to raise issues not raised in the direct appeal due to his incompetence. The court of appeals held that Liggett must be permitted to raise in a postconviction motion any matter not raised in the direct appeal due to his incompetence.

The People contended that the direct appeal divested the district court of jurisdiction and that the appeal and restoration proceedings cannot occur simultaneously. They also argued that the district court has no authority to order the Department of Corrections (DOC), in whose custody Liggett resides, to restore him to competency. The People agreed that Liggett is incompetent and that an incompetent defendant cannot waive the right to counsel on direct appeal. Thus, Liggett’s incompetence precludes the court from ruling on his pending requests to terminate counsel and dismiss the appeal, and a limited remand to restore Liggett’s competence is necessary.

A stay of the ruling on Liggett’s requests to terminate counsel and dismiss the appeal was granted. The request for indefinite stay of the appellate proceedings was denied. The request for limited remand to restore Liggett to competence was granted and the case was remanded to the district court for that limited purpose.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Jury Instruction that Effectively Told Jury Not to Consider Burden of Proof Erroneous, but Error Not Plain

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Sabell on Thursday, June 14, 2018.

Jury Instructions—Involuntary Intoxication—Other Acts Evidence—Merger—Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act.

Sabell and his girlfriend, the victim, got into an argument one night. When the victim returned to the couple’s home that evening after running errands, Sabell accused her of cheating on him and physically assaulted her. The victim then began audio recording the altercation on her cell phone. Sabell then forced the victim to perform oral sex on him and later broke down her bedroom door after she had locked herself inside. A jury found Sabell guilty of sexual assault, unlawful sexual contact, third degree assault, and criminal mischief.

On appeal, Sabell contended that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on his affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication and that this lessened the prosecution’s burden of proof. Before trial, the victim admitted that she had put Seroquel, a drug she had been prescribed, in Sabell’s wine after the sexual assault in an attempt to sedate him. Sabell testified that the victim had put the Seroquel in his drink before the recording began and that he had no memory of any of the recorded events. Although the involuntary intoxication instruction was erroneous because it effectively told the jury not to consider the People’s burden of proof until after it first decided whether Sabell’s intoxication was self-induced, it was not plain error.

Sabell also contended that the trial court gave an erroneous instruction limiting the jury’s consideration of other acts evidence. At trial, the victim, along with the victim’s friend and police officers, testified about four other incidents in which Sabell had been violent toward her or had forced her to have sex. The other acts evidence was relevant as to whether Sabell acted knowingly and voluntarily, and the court properly gave limiting instructions to the jury. There was no error.

Sabell’s contention that the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him was without merit.

Sabell further argued, and the People conceded, that his unlawful sexual contact conviction should have merged with the sexual assault conviction at sentencing because they were based on the same conduct. The trial court plainly erred in entering both the sexual assault and unlawful sexual contact convictions.

Sabell also argued, and the People conceded, that the trial court erred in imposing a crime against a child surcharge of $500. The victim here was not a child, and the trial court plainly erred.

The unlawful sexual contact conviction and the crime against a child surcharge were vacated. The case was remanded for the trial court to correct the mittimus. The judgment and sentence were affirmed in all other respects.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Sex Offender Registration Act Requires Registry for Individuals with More than One Conviction for Unlawful Sexual Behavior

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. McCulley on Thursday, June 28, 2018.

Sexual Assault—Deferred Judgment—Plea Agreement—Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act—Petition for Removal from Registry.

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of second degree sexual assault and one count of third degree sexual assault and entered into a plea agreement. Among other things, the plea agreement provided that the trial court would dismiss the felony charge once defendant complied with his deferred judgment. A condition of the deferred judgment was that defendant register as a sex offender pursuant to the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). Defendant completed his deferred judgment and the felony charge was dismissed. Years later, defendant filed a petition to discontinue the requirement that he register as a sex offender. The trial court denied the motion.

On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred by construing the term “conviction” under SORA to include a successfully completed deferred judgment. SORA’s plain language provides that the term “conviction” as used in C.R.S. § 16-22-113(3)(c) includes a successfully completed deferred judgment.

The order was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Trial Court Committed Plain Error by Not Giving Unanimity Instruction in Forgery Case

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Wester-Gravelle on Thursday, June 28, 2018.

Forgery—Jury Instructions—Unanimity Instruction—C.R.C.P. 12(b).

Defendant worked as a certified nursing assistant for Interim Healthcare (Interim), which provides in-home care to patients. In 2015, Interim assigned defendant to care for Moseley five days a week for two hours each day. Even though defendant had failed to show for her shift for three weeks, she had submitted weekly shift charts to receive payment for the preceding three weeks. The shift charts showed Moseley’s purported signatures acknowledging that defendant had arrived for her shifts. A jury convicted defendant of forgery, and the court sentenced her to two years’ probation.

On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred when it failed, on its own motion, to require the prosecution to elect a single forged shift chart as the basis for the conviction or to give a modified unanimity instruction. The People argued that defendant waived this issue by failing to object to the information under Crim. P. 12(b)(2) and (3), which requires a defendant to raise defenses or objections to an information and complaint within 21 days following arraignment. Colorado law is clear that Rule 12(b) does not require a defendant to object when the error stems from circumstances that are not apparent from the charging document. Here, on its face the charge does not evidence a defect, so Crim. P. 12(b)(2) does not apply. The unanimity issue arose only after the prosecution decided to introduce three different written instruments for the period charged. Therefore, defendant did not waive her claim.

The court of appeals determined that the prosecution’s evidence presented a reasonable likelihood that the jurors may have disagreed on which shift chart constituted the forgery charged. Thus, the court should either have (1) required the prosecution to elect an act on which it relied for a conviction, or (2) instructed the jury that to convict, it had to unanimously agree on the act committed or unanimously agree that defendant committed all of the acts. This error was substantial and obvious.

The conviction was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Double Jeopardy Implicated where Defendant Convicted of DARP at First Trial and ADARP at Second Trial

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Wambolt on Thursday, June 28, 2018.

Aggravated Driving After Revocation Prohibited—Driving Under the Influence—Driving Under Restraint—Driving After Revocation Prohibited—Driving While Ability Impaired—Lesser Included Offense—Merger—Double Jeopardy—Motion to Suppress—Illegal Arrest—Miranda—Fifth Amendment.

Defendant was charged with aggravated driving after revocation prohibited (ADARP), driving under the influence (DUI), and driving under restraint (DUR). During a first trial, the jury was instructed on the elements of driving after revocation prohibited (DARP) and given a special interrogatory verdict form on the ADARP charge. The jury returned guilty verdicts on DARP and DUR, but hung on the DUI charge, and thus did not complete the ADARP special interrogatory. Defendant was retried in a two-phase trial. In the first phase, the jury returned a guilty verdict on driving while ability impaired (DWAI), a lesser included offense of DUI. In the second phase, the jury completed a special interrogatory finding that the prosecution had proved the ADARP charge. The trial court entered convictions for ADARP, DUR, and DWAI.

On appeal, defendant contended that he was unconstitutionally tried twice for the same offense when he was retried on the ADARP charge after the first jury had convicted him of DARP. Here, defendant was effectively tried for DARP twice and he was not properly tried for ADARP. Thus, under the circumstances of this case, defendant was unconstitutionally tried twice for the same offense. This error was obvious and substantial and significantly undermined the reliability of defendant’s ADARP conviction.

Defendant also argued that the trial court plainly erred in entering convictions for DUR and DARP because those convictions should have merged. DUR is a lesser included offense of DARP. Thus, the trial court erred in entering both convictions. However, because the relevant law in this area has undergone significant recent change, the error here was not plain because it was not obvious. The trial court did not plainly err in entering the DUR and DARP convictions.

Defendant further contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made after being detained. He argued that his statements resulted from an unlawful detention and were taken in violation of his Miranda rights. Here, although the officer found defendant compliant and “very easy to get along with,” he handcuffed him at gunpoint and placed him in the back of the patrol car. Defendant thereafter was removed from the patrol car, his handcuffs were removed, and he was read his Miranda rights and voluntarily waived them. Although defendant was unconstitutionally arrested, the statements were admissible because they were sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful arrest.

The judgment of conviction for DWAI and DUR was affirmed, the conviction for ADARP was vacated, and the case was remanded for the trial court to reinstate the DARP conviction and correct the mittimus.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Trial Court Erred in Instructing Jury on Initial Aggressor Exception to Self-Defense With No Supporting Evidence

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Castillo v. People on Monday, June 25, 2018.

Self-Defense—Initial Aggressor—Jury Instructions.

Defendant fired a gun at several people in a parking lot. He asserted that he did this in self-defense. Over defendant’s objection, the trial court instructed the jury on two exceptions to the affirmative defense of self-defense: initial aggressor and provocation. The jury convicted defendant of several criminal charges. The supreme court concluded the division of the court of appeals erred when it determined that the trial court correctly instructed the jury on the initial aggressor exception to self-defense. The court further concluded the error was not harmless in light of the prosecution’s repeated references to the initial aggressor exception during closing argument. Accordingly, defendant is entitled to a new trial. The court of appeals’ judgment was reversed and the case was remanded.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Promissory Note is a Security, Therefore Conviction for Securities Fraud Appropriate

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Thompson on Thursday, June 14, 2018.

Securities Fraud—Jury Instruction—Double Jeopardy—Propensity Evidence—Theft—Sentencing.

Defendant was the sole member of SGD Timber Canyon LLC (SGD), which held an interest in 63 undeveloped lots in the Timber Ridge subdivision. The lots went into foreclosure, and in February 2010 SGD filed for bankruptcy. Defendant did not disclose these facts to the Witts, who later loaned defendant $200,000 to acquire a lot in Timber Ridge and another $200,000 for construction of a home on the lot, with the understanding that the loans would be repaid with a profit share of as much as $400,000 when the home was sold to a prequalified buyer. Later, at defendant’s urging, the Witts increased the loan to $2.4 million and converted their investment into a “bridge loan” to defendant, who represented that the proceeds would be used for continued development of Timber Ridge. The parties executed a promissory note and guarantee agreement. The promissory note was secured by defendant’s primary and secondary residences with collateral to convert the 24 lots in Timer Ridge upon closing and final purchase of Timber Ridge.

Defendant used the money on items not related to Timber Ridge and never developed the property there. Defendant defaulted on the note. He eventually repaid the Witts $70,000. Ultimately, the Witts sued defendant but did not recover any further monies from him. A jury found defendant guilty of two counts of securities fraud and one count of theft, and he was sentenced to 12 years in the custody of the Department of Corrections for each of the securities counts, to be served concurrently, and 18 years for the theft conviction, to be served consecutively to the other sentences.

On appeal, defendant claimed that the evidence was insufficient to support his securities fraud convictions because the promissory note and guarantee he provided to the Witts did not constitute a security. The “family resemblance test” applies to determine when a note is a security under the Colorado Securities Act (CSA). Under the family resemblance test, a note is presumed to be a security, but that presumption may be rebutted by a showing that the note strongly resembles other financial instruments. Here, the Witts’ investment, memorialized by the promissory note, was a transaction protected by the CSA and did not strongly resemble the family of transactions that are not securities. The evidence was sufficient to support the securities fraud convictions.

Defendant also argued that the trial court erred by tendering an inaccurate jury instruction regarding the definition of a security. Defendant did not object to the definition of security that was given to the jury, nor did he tender an alternative instruction. The law regarding the definition of a security was not well settled at the time of defendant’s trial, and thus any error in the jury instruction would not have been obvious or plain.

Defendant also claimed that his convictions and sentences for securities fraud violated double jeopardy because they are alternative ways of committing the same offense, and therefore the two counts should be merged. Defendant failed to raise this issue before the trial court. Here, defendant was charged with and convicted of multiplicitous counts of securities fraud because the evidence showed a sale of one security to one investor based on one set of false or misleading statements. But the law was not well-settled concerning the proper unit of prosecution, so there was no plain error.

Defendant further contended that there was insufficient evidence to support his theft conviction. Although the funds were supposed to be used to develop Timber Ridge, defendant used the funds to pay his own attorney fees, to improve the house that his wife continued to occupy at the time of trial, and for other personal expenses. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that defendant knowingly obtained the Witts’ money by deception and intended to permanently deprive them of it.

Defendant also argued that the court erred by admitting propensity evidence that defendant had previously attempted to sell a lot in Timber Ridge that he did not own. However, the evidence was logically relevant to prove identity, motive, knowledge, and lack of mistake, and the probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

Lastly, defendant argued that his sentence for theft must run concurrently with the concurrent sentences for securities fraud because the crimes are based on identical evidence. Here, different evidence supported each offense, so there was no sentencing error.

The judgment and sentence were affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Grand Jury Foreman’s Failure to Sign Indictment Did Not Deprive Court of Jurisdiction

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Tee on Thursday, June 14, 2018.

Criminal Procedure—Grand Jury—Attempt to Influence a Public Servant—Jury—Predeliberation—Waiver—Evidence.

Tee was convicted of multiple charges, including two counts of attempting to influence a public servant.

On appeal, Tee contended that because the indictment received by the district court did not contain the signature of the grand jury foreperson, it did not confer jurisdiction and all charges must be dismissed. However, the signature of the foreperson need not be provided to the district court, and the court had jurisdiction.

Tee also contended that because two jurors engaged in predeliberation, he is entitled to a new trial. Here, defense counsel waived any error as to predeliberation.

Tee further argued that the two convictions for attempting to influence a public servant must be vacated because there was insufficient evidence supporting the convictions. Here, Tee was convicted of two counts of attempting to influence a public servant based on evidence that he made false reports of car accidents. The evidence was sufficient to support one count of attempting to influence a public servant where Tee provided information in person to a police officer who created a report based on what Tee had told him. However, the evidence was insufficient as to the other count where Tee filled in an accident report form on a computer terminal at a kiosk in the police department, because it did not show that Tee was attempting to influence a public servant.

Lastly, the attorney general conceded that the trial court violated Tee’s double jeopardy rights because it orally announced a 12-year sentence but the mittimus showed an 18-year sentence. The mittimus also incorrectly showed a conviction on a count that was dismissed.

The judgment was vacated as to one count and otherwise affirmed. The case was remanded to correct the mittimus.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Jury’s Refusal to Convict on Pattern of Abuse Charge Does Not Necessitate Retrial on Only Single Act

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in In re People v. Stackhouse on Monday, June 18, 2018.

Double Jeopardy.

Pursuant to C.A.R. 21, the People challenged a district court order granting Stackhouse’s motion to compel the People to elect a particular allegation of sexual assault on a child as their sole basis for proceeding in Stackhouse’s retrial. The supreme court held that the district court erred when it concluded that the jury in Stackhouse’s first trial had necessarily concluded that he did not commit multiple acts of assault, and therefore that he could not be retried for more than a single assault. The court made the rule to show cause absolute, reversed the district court’s order, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Lieutenant Governor Lynne Signs Final Bills of 2018 Legislative Session

On Wednesday, June 6, 2018, Lieutenant Governor Donna Lynne signed the final bills of the 2018 legislative session into law in Governor Hickenlooper’s absence. Lt. Gov. Lynne signed 35 bills into law. During the 2018 legislative session, 421 bills were signed into law, 9 were vetoed, and 2 were sent to the Secretary of State without a signature. The bills signed Wednesday are summarized here.

  • SB 18-015 – “Concerning the ‘Protecting Homeowners and Deployed Military Personnel Act,'” by Sens. Bob Gardner & Owen Hill and Reps. Dave Williams & Larry Liston. The bill directs a peace officer to remove a person from a residential premises and to order the person to remain off the premises if the owner or owner’s authorized agent (declarant) swears to a declaration making specified statements concerning ownership of the premises and the lack of authority for the person or persons who are on the premises to be there.
  • SB 18-038 – “Concerning the Allowable Uses of Reclaimed Domestic Wastewater, and, in Connection Therewith, Allowing Reclaimed Domestic Wastewater to be Used for Industrial Hemp Cultivation and Making an Appropriation,” by Sens. Kerry Donovan & Don Coram and Reps. Daneya Esgar & Yeulin Willett. The bill codifies rules promulgated by the water quality control commission of the Colorado department of public health and environment concerning allowable uses of reclaimed domestic wastewater, which is wastewater that has been treated for subsequent reuses other than drinking water.
  • SB 18-068 – “Concerning Criminalizing False Reports,” by Sens. John Cooke & Kevin Van Winkle and Rep. Jeff Bridges. Under current law, there is a crime of false reporting to authorities. The bill creates a crime of false reporting of an emergency by criminalizing an act of false reporting to authorities that includes a false report of an imminent threat to the safety of a person or persons by use of a deadly weapon.
  • SB 18-225 – “Concerning the Definition of an Early College for Purposes of the ‘Concurrent Enrollment Programs Act,'” by Sen. Kent Lambert and Rep. Millie Hamner. Under the existing statute, an early college is not subject to the requirements of the ‘Concurrent Enrollment Programs Act’. The bill amends the definition of ‘early college’ to specify that an early college must provide only a curriculum that is designed to be completed within 4 years and includes concurrent enrollment in high school and postsecondary courses such that, when a student completes the curriculum, the student has attained a high school diploma and a postsecondary credential or at least 60 credit hours toward completion of a postsecondary credential.
  • SB 18-245 – “Concerning the Disposal of Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials,” by Sen. John Cooke and Rep. Jeni James Arndt. Current law allows the state board of health to adopt rules concerning the disposal of naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM) only after the federal environmental protection agency has adopted rules concerning the disposal of NORM. The EPA has not adopted the rules. The bill repeals this prohibition and requires the state board to adopt rules, which must also regulate technologically enhanced NORM (TENORM), by December 31, 2020.
  • SB 18-250 – “Concerning the Provision of Jail-based Behavioral Health Services, and, in Connection Therewith, Making an Appropriation,” by Sens. Bob Gardner & Kent Lambert and Reps. Pete Lee & Dave Young. The bill continues to allow the correctional treatment cash fund to be used to provide treatment for persons with mental and behavioral health disorders who are being served through the jail-based behavioral health services program.
  • SB 18-251 – “Concerning Establishing a Statewide Behavioral Health Court Liaison Program, and, in Connection Therewith, Making an Appropriation,” by Sens. Bob Gardner & Kent Lambert and Reps. Dave Young & Pete Lee. The bill establishes in the office of the state court administrator a statewide behavioral health court liaison program. The purpose of the program is to identify and dedicate local behavioral health professionals as court liaisons in each state judicial district to facilitate communication and collaboration among judicial, health care, and behavioral health systems.
  • SB 18-255 – “Concerning the Use of Electronic Formats in the Issuance of Certificates of Title for Vehicles,” by Sen. Jack Tate and Reps. Jeni James Arndt & Edie Hooten. Current law provides that a record may not be denied effect merely because it is electronic. The bill clarifies that this applies to documents needed to obtain a certificate of title and electronic signatures.
  • SB 18-259 – “Concerning the Taxation of Retail Marijuana by Local Governments, and, in Connection Therewith, Making an Appropriation,” by Sen. Jim Smallwood and Rep. Dan Pabon. The bill imposes general taxation requirements on local government.
  • SB 18-267 – “Concerning the Creation of the Justice Center Maintenance Fund,” by Sens. John Kefalas & Randy Baumgardner and Reps. Jon Becker & Chris Hansen. The bill creates the justice center maintenance fund that consists of money appropriated by the general assembly to the maintenance fund from the justice center cash fund to be used for controlled maintenance needs of the Ralph L. Carr Colorado judicial center.
  • SB 18-269 – “Concerning Providing Funding for Local Education Providers to Implement School Security Improvements to Prevent Incidences of School Violence, and, in Connection Therewith, Creating the School Security Disbursement Program,” by Sens. Tim Neville & Dominick Moreno and Reps. Patrick Neville & Jeff Bridges. The bill creates the school security disbursement program in the department of public safety. A school district, charter school, institute charter school, or board of cooperative services may apply for a disbursement by submitting an application to the department. A disbursement recipient may use the money for one or more of the purposes specified in the bill, which include building improvements to enhance security and training for school personnel.
  • SB 18-280 – “Concerning a Transfer from the General Fund to the Tobacco Litigation Settlement Cash Fund to be Allocated to the Programs, Services, and Funds that Currently Receive Tobacco Litigation Settlement Money,” by Sen. Kent Lambert and Rep. Millie Hamner. The bill requires the state treasurer to transfer $19,965,068 from the general fund to the tobacco litigation settlement cash fund on July 1, 2018. This money is allocated for the 2018-19 fiscal year to the programs, services, and funds that receive tobacco litigation settlement money to supplement the allocation of settlement money that those programs, services, and funds will otherwise receive.
  • HB 18-1042 – “Concerning the Creation of a Program to Authorize Private Providers to Register Commercial Vehicles as Class A Personal Property, and, in Connection Therewith, Making and Reducing an Appropriation,” by Reps. Jon Becker & Joann Ginal and Sens. Ray Scott & Rachel Zenzinger. The bill creates the expedited registration program. The program authorizes the department of revenue to promulgate rules authorizing private providers to register interstate commercial vehicles. The provider may collect and retain a convenience fee.
  • HB 18-1077 – “Concerning the Penalty for a Person who Commits Burglary to Acquire Firearms, and, in Connection Therewith, Making an Appropriation,” by Reps. Larry Liston & Donald Valdez and Sens. Leroy Garcia & Ray Scott. In current law, second degree burglary is a class 4 felony, but it is a class 3 felony under 2 specified circumstances. The bill designates a third type of second degree burglary as a class 3 felony: that is, a burglary, the objective of which is the theft of one or more firearms or ammunition.
  • HB 18-1146 – “Concerning the Continuation Under the Sunset Law of the Measurement Standards Law,” by Rep. Jovan Melton and Sen. Don Coram. The bill implements the recommendations of the department of regulatory agencies in its sunset review and report on the measurement standards law by extending the law for 15 years.
  • HB 18-1156 – “Concerning Limitations on Penalties for Truancy,” by Rep. Pete Lee and Sen. Chris Holbert. The bill clarifies in the Colorado Children’s Code and in the ‘School Attendance Law of 1963’ that a ‘delinquent act’ does not include truancy or habitual truancy. A child who is habitually truant and who refuses to follow a plan to rehabilitate his or her truancy may be subject to various sanctions by the court in a truancy proceeding.
  • HB 18-1200 – “Concerning Cybercrime, and, in Connection Therewith, Criminalizing Using a Computer to Engage in Prostitution of a Minor, Criminalizing Skimming Payment Cards, Making Changes to the Penalty Structure for Cybercrime, and Making an Appropriation,” by Reps. Paul Lundeen & Alec Garnett and Sens. Rhonda Fields & Don Coram. The bill changes the name of the crime computer crime to cybercrime. The bill makes soliciting, arranging, or offering to arrange a situation in which a minor may engage in prostitution, by means of using a computer, computer network, computer system, or any part thereof, a cybercrime.
  • HB 18-1218 – “Concerning the Definition of a Charitable Organization for Purposes of State Sales and Use Tax, and, in Connection Therewith, Removing the Limitation that a Veterans’ Organization Only Gets the Charitable Organization Exemption for Purposes of Sponsoring a Special Event, Meeting, or Other Function in the State, So Long as Such Event, Meeting, or Function is Not Part of the Organization’s Regular Activities in the State,” by Reps. Terri Carver & Jovan Melton and Sens. Nancy Todd & Larry Crowder. The bill makes state law consistent with federal law and will treat veterans’ organizations registered under section 501 (c)(19) of the federal internal revenue code the same way as veterans’ organizations registered under section 501 (c)(3) of the federal internal revenue code.
  • HB 18-1234 – “Concerning Clarification of the Laws Governing Simulated Gambling Activity,” by Reps. KC Becker & Paul Lundeen and Sen. Kent Lambert. The bill amends the definitions of key terms such as ‘gambling’, ‘prize’, and ‘simulated gambling device’ as used in the criminal statutes governing simulated gambling devices and specifies that unlawful offering of a simulated gambling device occurs if a person receives payment indirectly or in a nonmonetary form for use of a simulated gambling device.
  • HB 18-1302 – “Concerning the Allowance of the Department of Public Health and Environment to Waive Certification Requirements for Toxicology Laboratories that have been Accredited by an Entity Using Recognized Forensic Standards,” by Reps. Joann Ginal & Lois Landgraf and Sen. Vicki Marble. Current law allows the department of public health and environment to waive certain certification requirements for toxicology laboratories that are accredited by the American board of forensic toxicology or the international standards organization. The bill changes the waiver requirement to allow the department to waive certification requirements if the laboratory is accredited by an entity using nationally or internationally recognized forensic standards.
  • HB 18-1303 – “Concerning Exemption of Nonprofit Youth Sports Organization Coaches from the ‘Colorado Employment Security Act,'” by Reps. Cole Wist & Alec Garnett and Sen. Jack Tate. The bill exempts from the definition of ’employment’ under the ‘Colorado Employment Security Act’ nonprofit youth sports organization coaches if there is a written agreement between the coach and the organization that meets certain requirements, including a statement that the coach is an independent contractor.
  • HB 18-1313 – “Concerning the Allowance of a Pharmacist to Serve as a Practitioner under Certain Circumstances,” by Reps. Joann Ginal & Jon Becker and Sens. Irene Aguilar & Kevin Priola. The bill clarifies that a licensed and qualified pharmacist may serve as a practitioner and prescribe over-the-counter medication under the ‘Colorado Medical Assistance Act’ and a statewide drug therapy protocol pursuant to a collaborative pharmacy practice agreement.
  • HB 18-1314 – “Concerning Prohibiting the Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems to Obstruct Public Safety Operations,” by Reps. Joann Ginal & Polly Lawrence and Sen. John Cooke. The bill states that, as used in the existing criminal offense of obstructing a peace officer, firefighter, emergency medical service provider, rescue specialist, or volunteer, the term ‘obstacle’ includes an unmanned aircraft system.
  • HB 18-1335 – “Concerning the Colorado Child Care Assistance Program, and, in Connection Therewith, Establishing Eligibility Requirements for All Counties and Creating a New Formula to Determine the Amount of Block Grants to Counties,” by Rep. Dave Young and Sen. Kevin Lundberg. For providers under the Colorado child care assistance program, the bill requires the state department of human services, in consultation with the counties, annually to contract for a market rate study of provider rates for each county.
  • HB 18-1342 – “Concerning a Requirement that a Common Interest Community Created in Colorado Before July 1, 1992, Comply with a Provision of the ‘Colorado Common Interest Ownership Act’ that Allows a Majority of the Unit Owners in a Common Interest Community to Veto a Budget Proposed by the Executive Board of the Common Interest Community,” by Rep. Jovan Melton and Sen. Nancy Todd. The bill requires a common interest community that predates the Act to allow its unit owners to veto, by majority vote, a budget proposed by the common interest community’s executive board; except that the bill does not apply to a common interest community that predates the Act if the common interest community’s declaration sets a maximum assessment amount or provides a limit on the amount that the common interest community’s annual budget may be increased.
  • HB 18-1350 – “Concerning the Sales and Use Tax Treatment of Equipment Used to Manufacture New Metal Stock from Scrap or End-of-Life-Cycle Metals, and, in Connection Therewith, Making an Appropriation,” by Rep. Tracy Kraft-Tharp and Sen. Kevin Priola. Purchases of machinery or machine tools to be used in Colorado directly and predominantly in manufacturing tangible personal property are currently exempt from state sales and use tax. Manufacturing is currently defined to include the processing of recovered materials. The bill expands the definition of recovered materials to include materials that have been derived from scrap metal or end-of-life-cycle metals for remanufacturing, reuse, or recycling into new metal stock that meets applicable standards for metal commodities sales.
  • HB 18-1363 – “Concerning Legislative Recommendations of the Child Support Commission, and, in Connection Therewith, Making an Appropriation,” by Reps. Jonathan Singer & Lois Landgraf and Sen. Larry Crowder. The bill implements several recommendations from the child support commission.
  • HB 18-1373 – “Concerning the Use of the State Telecommunications Network by Private Entities Through Public-Private Partnerships, and, in Connection Therewith, Relocating Laws Related to the State Telecommunications Network from the Department of Public Safety’s Statutes to the Statutes Regarding Telecommunications Coordination within State Government,” by Reps. Jon Becker & Chris Hansen and Sens. Randy Baumgardner & John Kefalas. The bill authorizes private entities to use the state telecommunications network through public-private partnerships considered, evaluated, and accepted by the chief information officer and relocates laws related to the state telecommunications network from the department of public safety’s statutes to the statutes regarding telecommunications coordination within state government.
  • HB 18-1402 – “Concerning Authorization for the State Treasurer to Invest State Money in Investment Grade Securities Issued by Sovereign, National, and Supranational Entities,” by Reps. Polly Lawrence & Dave Young and Sens. Bob Gardner & Angela Williams. The bill authorizes the state treasurer to invest state money in securities issued by a sovereign, national, or supranational entity that are rated at least investment grade by a nationally recognized rating organization.
  • HB 18-1405 – “Concerning an Exception from the Mandatory Reporting Requirements for Persons Providing Legal Assistance to Area Agencies on Aging,” by Rep. Pete Lee and Sen. Bob Gardner. Under current law, staff, and staff of contracted providers, of area agencies on aging are mandatory reporters of the mistreatment of an at-risk elder or an at-risk adult with an intellectual and developmental disability. The bill creates a mandatory reporter exception for attorneys at law providing legal assistance to individuals pursuant to a contract with an area agency on aging, the staff of such attorneys at law.
  • HB 18-1410 – “Concerning Measures to Address Prison Population Increases,” by Reps. Pete Lee & Leslie Herod and Sens. Kevin Lundberg & Daniel Kagan. The bill requires the department of corrections to track the prison bed vacancy rate in both correctional facilities and state-funded private contract prison beds on a monthly basis. If the vacancy rate falls below 2% for 30 consecutive days, the department shall notify the governor, the joint budget committee, the parole board, each elected district attorney, the chief judge of each judicial district, the state public defender, and the office of community corrections in the department of public safety.
  • HB 18-1421 – “Concerning the Procurement Process for Major Information Technology Projects Undertaken by State Agencies, and, in Connection Therewith, Making an Appropriation,” by Rep. Bob Rankin and Sens. Kent Lambert & Jack Tate. The bill requires internal process changes in connection with the procurement process for major information technology (IT) projects as specified.
  • HB 18-1422 – “Concerning Requirements for Marijuana Testing Facilities,” by Rep. Matt Gray and Sen. Cheri Jahn. The bill requires medical and retail marijuana testing facilities to be accredited pursuant to the International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission 17025:2005 standard by a body that is itself recognized by the International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation by January 1, 2019.
  • HB 18-1429 – “Concerning the Exemption of the Workers’ Compensation Cash Fund from the Maximum Reserve,” by Rep. Millie Hamner and Sen. Kent Lambert. Prior to July 1, 2017, the workers’ compensation cash fund was exempt from the maximum reserve for a cash fund, which limits the year-end uncommitted reserves in a cash fund to 16.5% of the amount expended from the cash fund during the fiscal year. The bill once again exempts the workers’ compensation cash fund from the maximum reserve.
  • HB 18-1437 – “Concerning Eliminating the Requirement that a Person who Participates in College-level Academic Programs through the Correctional Education Program in the Department of Corrections must Bear Entirely the Costs Associated with such Programs,” by Rep. Leslie Herod and Sen. Tim Neville. Under current law, the correctional education program in the department of corrections is required to provide every person in a correctional facility who demonstrates college-level aptitudes with the opportunity to participate in college-level academic programs that may be offered within the correctional facility. The bill removes this stipulation concerning costs and states instead that such costs may be borne through private, local, or federally funded gifts, grants, donations, or scholarships, or by such persons themselves, or through any combination of such funding.

For a list of the governor’s 2018 legislative decisions, click here.

Colorado Supreme Court: Defendant’s Statements Admissible Under Two-Part Seibert Test

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Verigan v. People on Monday, June 11, 2018.

Suppression of Statements—Two-Step Interrogation—Plurality Supreme Court Opinions—Miranda Warnings.

This case required the supreme court to decide (1) whether the U.S. Supreme Court’s fractured opinion in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), created a precedential rule that could be applied to future cases, and (2) whether statements made by petitioner after she was given Miranda warnings should be suppressed because the statements were made after petitioner provided unwarned, incriminating statements to the police.

The court concluded that Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Seibert, which created an exception to the framework established in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), for cases involving a deliberate two-step interrogation aimed at undermining the efficiency of the Miranda warning, is the controlling precedent to be applied. Applying Justice Kennedy’s test here, the court concluded that the officers in this case did not engage in a two-step interrogation in a deliberate attempt to undermine the effectiveness of Miranda warnings provided to petitioner. Therefore, the court concluded that the Elstad framework applies, and because petitioner’s pre- and post-warning statements were indisputably voluntary, the court concluded that the division correctly determined that petitioner’s post-warning statements were admissible.

Accordingly, the court affirmed the court of appeals division’s judgment.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Public Defender Lacks Statutory Authority to Represent Defendant in Civil Forfeiture Action

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in In re People v. Shank on Monday, June 11, 2018.

Public Defender Representation—Statutory Interpretation.

In this case, the supreme court determined whether the Office of the State Public Defender has statutory authority to represent an indigent defendant in a civil forfeiture matter. Reviewing the plain language of the relevant statutes, the court concluded that the Office of the State Public Defender was not statutorily authorized to enter its appearance in the underlying civil forfeiture matter.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.