April 24, 2019

Colorado Court of Appeals: Express Consent Statute Does Not Require Paramedic Drawing Blood Sample To Be Directly Supervised by Physician at Time of Draw

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Neppl v. Department of Revenue on Thursday, February 21, 2019.

Driver’s License Revocation—Express Consent—Supervision of Blood Draw.

A police officer stopped defendant’s vehicle after he twice failed to use his turn signal. The officer noticed signs of intoxication and defendant admitted to drinking four beers. Defendant failed to satisfactorily perform voluntary roadside maneuvers and the officer advised him of his options under the express consent law. Defendant chose a blood test, which showed a blood alcohol content of .188 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood. The Colorado Department of Revenue subsequently issued defendant a notice of license revocation. Defendant requested a hearing, and the hearing officer sustained the revocation. The district court affirmed.

On appeal, defendant argued that the statute requires on-the-spot supervision, and the paramedic’s supervisor was not present and supervising him when he conducted the blood draw. Under the plain language of the express consent statute, C.R.S. § 42-4-1301.1(6), a paramedic does not have to be directly supervised by a doctor at the time of the blood draw. Also, the record established that the paramedic was supervised by a doctor. Here, the paramedic was authorized to draw defendant’s blood. Even assuming the statute did require a doctor’s supervision of a paramedic, “under the supervision” is not synonymous with “on-the-spot” supervision. Further, even if the blood draw did not strictly comply with statutory requirements, such deficiency would go to the weight of the test results, not the admissibility.

The judgment was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: DUI, Fourth Offense, is Class 4 Felony Therefore Defendant Entitled to Preliminary Hearing

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in In re People v. Tafoya on Tuesday, February 19, 2019.

Sentencing and Punishment—Criminal Law—Preliminary Hearings

In this original proceeding pursuant to C.A.R. 21, the supreme court reviewed the district court’s ruling denying petitioner a preliminary hearing when she was charged with Driving Under the Influence (DUI)—fourth or subsequent offense, a class 4 felony under C.R.S. § 42-4-1301(1)(a), and was being held in custody on that charge.

The court issued a rule to show cause and now makes the rule absolute. C.R.S. § 16-5-301(1)(b)(II) provides that a defendant who is accused of a class 4, 5, or 6 felony and is in custody for that offense “may demand and shall receive a preliminary hearing.” The legislature amended the DUI statute to provide that DUI is a class 4 felony if the violation occurred after three or more prior convictions arising out of separate and distinct criminal episodes. Here, the complaint and information accused petitioner of committing a class 4 felony and she was being held in custody on that charge. Accordingly, under the plain language of the statute, petitioner was entitled to a preliminary hearing, and the district court erred in denying her request for such a hearing.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Detective’s Testimony About Odor of Metabolized Alcohol Improperly Admitted as Lay Testimony

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Kubuugu on Monday, January 28, 2019.

Witness Qualification—Expert Testimony— Harmless Error.

This case, which involves charges of driving under the influence and child abuse, required the court to determine whether the trial court erred by admitting expert testimony under the guise of lay testimony and whether such error was harmless. Here, the trial court allowed a police officer to testify at trial, without being qualified as an expert, about the ability to detect the smell of metabolized alcohol and that he could, based on that odor, opine about the volume of alcohol ingested and the timing of when it was consumed. The officer testified that this ability was learned through specialized training and years of experience as a police officer.

The court held that the police officer’s testimony about the odor of metabolized alcohol was expert testimony under the guise of lay testimony because an ordinary person would be unable to offer the same opinion. Admitting this evidence was not harmless because it was the only evidence that specifically refuted defendant’s testimony that he only began drinking alcohol after he had parked his car.

Accordingly, the court of appeals’ judgment was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Police Officer Authorized to Request Suspect to Complete Drug Test Even If Suspect Already Completed Alcohol Test

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Fuerst on Thursday, January 10, 2019.

Driving Under the Influence—Driving While Ability Impaired—Express Consent Statute—Breath and Blood Tests—Confrontation Rights.

Defendant backed his car into a pickup truck. A bystander told a police officer on the scene that after the accident, defendant asked her if she wanted his beer because he needed to hide it. Defendant performed several roadside sobriety tests. Based on his performance on these tests and the bystander’s statement, the officer believed defendant was under the influence of alcohol. Defendant then elected to take a breath alcohol test, which showed that defendant’s blood alcohol content was zero. The officer then asked defendant to take a blood test to test for drugs. Defendant initially refused, but after an officer told him his license would be revoked if he refused, defendant consented to the test. The blood test revealed 101 nanograms of Alprazolam, which is near the upper limit of the therapeutic range.

Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the blood test results. The trial court denied the motion. At trial, the jury found defendant not guilty of driving under the influence but found him guilty of driving while ability impaired and unsafe backing.

On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the blood test because the officer violated his constitutional rights by requiring him to complete the blood test after he had already selected and completed the breath test. Defendant argued that the Expressed Consent Statute doesn’t authorize an officer to request a drug test if the officer has already requested, and the suspect has completed, an alcohol test. Under the Expressed Consent Statute, if a police officer has probable cause to believe that a driver is under the influence of alcohol or drugs, the officer may request either the applicable alcohol tests, the applicable drug tests, or both, and the driver is obligated to complete them. The statute doesn’t say an officer can only do one or the other. Accordingly, the procedure the officer employed didn’t violate the Expressed Consent Statute. Because defendant’s statutory claim fails, his constitutional claim necessarily fails. The trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.

Defendant also contended that the trial court violated his confrontation rights and C.R.S. § 16-3-309(5) by admitting a laboratory report containing his blood test results. He contended that the witness who testified about the report and the blood test results wasn’t sufficiently involved in the process of testing the blood sample and certifying the results. Here, the Colorado Bureau of Investigation (CBI) toxicologist, who was qualified as an expert in forensic science and forensic toxicology, testified about the report. The toxicologist led the process of reviewing the test results, employed the CBI’s quality control process, and certified the results by signing the laboratory report. That fell within the meaning of “accomplishing” the report under C.R.S. § 16-3-309(5). The laboratory report was admissible.

The judgment was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy ofColorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Police Officer’s Observation of Vehicle Weaving in Lane Sufficient to Create Reasonable Suspicion of DUI

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Johnston on Thursday, November 29, 2018.

Constitutional Law—Fourth Amendment—Search and Seizure—Motor Vehicles.

A sheriff’s deputy noticed defendant’s car continuously weaving within the right-hand lane while traveling on Interstate 70. The deputy followed defendant for five to six miles before stopping him for suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol. During the stop, the officer noticed signs of intoxication, administered roadside tests, and arrested defendant. Defendant was charged with aggravated driving after revocation prohibited and driving under the influence (DUI). Defendant filed a motion to suppress, which the trial court denied. A jury found defendant guilty of aggravated driving after revocation prohibited and the lesser included offense of driving while ability impaired.

On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. He argued that his weaving within a single lane, without more, did not create a reasonable suspicion of DUI. The Fourth Amendment does not require that a police officer see the defendant commit a traffic violation before stopping him, and repeated intra-lane weaving can create reasonable suspicion of impaired operation. Whether there exists reasonable suspicion of intoxicated driving is based on the totality of the circumstances. Here, under the totality of the circumstances, the police officer’s observation of defendant’s vehicle weaving continuously within its own lane for over five miles was sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that the driver was intoxicated. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress.

The judgment was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Four-part Gallion Test Properly Applied in Determining Driver’s Attempt to Retract Refusal Untimely

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Schulte v. Colorado Department of Revenue on Thursday, September 20, 2018.

Criminal Law—Motor Vehicle—Express Consent—Blood or Breath Test—Refusal Untimely as a Matter of Law.

Police responded to a report of a car parked in the middle of a field. When an officer arrived, he found Schulte asleep in the car with the engine running. A deputy sheriff contacted Schulte and had him perform voluntary roadside maneuvers. Schulte did not perform the tests like a sober person, so the deputy asked him to submit to a chemical test under Colorado’s express consent law. Schulte refused. The deputy later arrested him, drove him to jail, turned him over to booking officers, and drove back to the scene. When the deputy returned to the jail, he completed the license revocation paperwork and began to serve Schulte with the notice of revocation. Before he could do so, Schulte asked to take a blood test. The deputy told him that it was too late. Schulte requested a Division of Motor Vehicles hearing to contest his license revocation. The hearing officer revoked his driving privileges, and the district court upheld the revocation.

On appeal, Schulte contended that the hearing officer and the district court erred when they decided, as a matter of law, that his retraction of his refusal was untimely. Colorado’s express consent law requires a driver to cooperate with law enforcement’s request to take a blood or breath test. If a licensee refuses to submit to a test, law enforcement must serve a notice of revocation on him or her and then take possession of the driver’s license. If a licensee does not offer to retract an initial refusal while the officer remains engaged in requesting or directing the completion of the test, the attempted retraction is untimely as a matter of law. Here, substantial evidence supports the hearing officer’s determination that Schulte did not cooperate with the deputy while the deputy was engaged in requesting or directing the test. The retraction of the refusal was untimely as a matter of law.

The order was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Social Host Must Have Actual Knowledge that Specific Guest Underage to be Held Liable for Injuries

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Przekurat v. Torres on Monday, September 10, 2018.

Statutory Construction—Colorado Dram Shop Act.

The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that, under the plain language of C.R.S. § 12-47-801(4)(a), a social host who provides a place to drink alcohol must have actual knowledge that a specific guest is underage to be held liable for any damage or injury caused by that underage guest.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: DUI Defendant Not Entitled to Have Jury Decide Existence of Prior Convictions for Sentence Enhancement

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Gwinn on Thursday, September 6, 2018.

Criminal Law—Driving While under the Influence of Alcohol—Evidence—Impeachment—Direct Examination—Jury Instruction—Search Warrant—Prior DUI Convictions—Sentence Enhancer—Preponderance of the Evidence.

Gwinn rear-ended another car while driving home from work and was arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Gwinn admitted drinking four beers before the accident occurred. After a jury convicted Gwinn of DUI and careless driving, the trial court, in a separate proceeding, found that Gwinn had three prior DUI convictions, adjudicated him a felony DUI offender, and sentenced him to 30 months of probation, two years of work release, and 90 days in the county jail.

On appeal, Gwinn first contended that the trial court’s refusal to allow the testimony of eight current and former Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) employees deprived him of his constitutional right to present a defense. Gwinn sought to introduce this testimony to show that the Intoxilyzer 9000 breath test machine did not produce accurate results. The trial court did not err when it granted CDPHE’s motion to quash the witness subpoenas, finding that the testimony was irrelevant to Gwinn’s refusal because it failed to establish Gwinn’s knowledge of the Intoxilyzer 9000’s alleged deficiencies at the time he refused to submit to chemical testing. Because the accuracy of the breath test machine was not relevant, Gwinn was not deprived of the right to present a defense.

Gwinn next contended that the trial court erroneously permitted the prosecutor to lead a friendly witness, Officer Perez, “under the guise of impeachment” where no impeachment occurred. Because Officer Perez’s direct testimony that Gwinn’s speech “sounded normal” was contradicted by his previous statement in the sobriety examination report that Gwinn’s speech was “mumbled,” no error occurred when the trial court allowed impeachment with leading questions about a prior statement.

Gwinn next argued that the trial court erroneously admitted People’s Exhibit 1, an express consent affidavit and notice of revocation form, under CRE 403. Officer Perez testified that he reviewed the express consent affidavit with Gwinn, which made the affidavit relevant to Gwinn’s knowledge of the consequences of his refusal to take a chemical test. Here, the trial court properly admitted the exhibit under CRE 803(6).

Gwinn also contended that the trial court erroneously rejected a tendered instruction informing the jury that law enforcement may obtain a search warrant to compel a defendant to submit to a blood test and instructing the jury that it was permitted to draw an inference from an officer’s failure to employ this procedure that the officer did not believe there was evidence to support a search warrant. However, the officer was not required to obtain a search warrant, and the officer testified that he does not usually do so in DUI cases. Therefore, there was no error.

Gwinn last contended that his prior DUI convictions trial, conducted by the trial court, violated his federal constitutional right to a jury trial. The General Assembly intended prior DUI convictions to constitute a sentence enhancer rather than an element of DUI. A defendant is not entitled to have a jury determine the existence of the prior DUI convictions used to enhance his sentence from a misdemeanor to a felony. Further, the prosecution’s burden of proving prior convictions is by a preponderance of the evidence not, as Gwinn argued, beyond a reasonable doubt.

The judgment was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Double Jeopardy Implicated where Defendant Convicted of DARP at First Trial and ADARP at Second Trial

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Wambolt on Thursday, June 28, 2018.

Aggravated Driving After Revocation Prohibited—Driving Under the Influence—Driving Under Restraint—Driving After Revocation Prohibited—Driving While Ability Impaired—Lesser Included Offense—Merger—Double Jeopardy—Motion to Suppress—Illegal Arrest—Miranda—Fifth Amendment.

Defendant was charged with aggravated driving after revocation prohibited (ADARP), driving under the influence (DUI), and driving under restraint (DUR). During a first trial, the jury was instructed on the elements of driving after revocation prohibited (DARP) and given a special interrogatory verdict form on the ADARP charge. The jury returned guilty verdicts on DARP and DUR, but hung on the DUI charge, and thus did not complete the ADARP special interrogatory. Defendant was retried in a two-phase trial. In the first phase, the jury returned a guilty verdict on driving while ability impaired (DWAI), a lesser included offense of DUI. In the second phase, the jury completed a special interrogatory finding that the prosecution had proved the ADARP charge. The trial court entered convictions for ADARP, DUR, and DWAI.

On appeal, defendant contended that he was unconstitutionally tried twice for the same offense when he was retried on the ADARP charge after the first jury had convicted him of DARP. Here, defendant was effectively tried for DARP twice and he was not properly tried for ADARP. Thus, under the circumstances of this case, defendant was unconstitutionally tried twice for the same offense. This error was obvious and substantial and significantly undermined the reliability of defendant’s ADARP conviction.

Defendant also argued that the trial court plainly erred in entering convictions for DUR and DARP because those convictions should have merged. DUR is a lesser included offense of DARP. Thus, the trial court erred in entering both convictions. However, because the relevant law in this area has undergone significant recent change, the error here was not plain because it was not obvious. The trial court did not plainly err in entering the DUR and DARP convictions.

Defendant further contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made after being detained. He argued that his statements resulted from an unlawful detention and were taken in violation of his Miranda rights. Here, although the officer found defendant compliant and “very easy to get along with,” he handcuffed him at gunpoint and placed him in the back of the patrol car. Defendant thereafter was removed from the patrol car, his handcuffs were removed, and he was read his Miranda rights and voluntarily waived them. Although defendant was unconstitutionally arrested, the statements were admissible because they were sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful arrest.

The judgment of conviction for DWAI and DUR was affirmed, the conviction for ADARP was vacated, and the case was remanded for the trial court to reinstate the DARP conviction and correct the mittimus.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Probationary DUI Sentence Inappropriate Where Defendant Convicted of a Felony

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Coleman on Thursday, May 17, 2018.

Aggravated Driving After Revocation Prohibited—Driving Under the Influence—Careless Driving—Department of Corrections—Probation—Miranda—Motion to Suppress—Prosecutorial Misconduct—Illegal Sentence.

Coleman was convicted of aggravated driving after revocation prohibited—driving under the influence (ADARP); driving under the influence (DUI)—third or subsequent alcohol related offense; and careless driving. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of one year in the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC) on the ADARP conviction; one year of jail and one year of additional jail, suspended subject to completion of four years of probation, on the DUI conviction; and 90 days in jail on the careless driving conviction.

On appeal, Coleman contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He argued that because he was in custody when he first said he wanted to be taken to bond out and had not yet been given a Miranda advisement, that statement should have been suppressed. However, Coleman was not in custody during the brief traffic stop for Miranda purposes. Therefore, it was not error to deny the motion to suppress.

Coleman next contended that the prosecutor’s comments in summation on his pre-arrest and post-arrest silence violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination. Because defense counsel opened the door on the subject, Coleman’s pre-arrest silence was at issue, and the prosecutor’s comment was not error. Additionally, although the prosecutor’s comment on Coleman’s post-arrest silence was error, it was brief and did not materially contribute to defendant’s conviction. Therefore, there was no reversible error for this comment.

Lastly, Coleman contended that his probationary sentence is illegal under the DUI sentencing statute, C.R.S. § 42-4-1307. C.R.S. § 42-4-1307(6) prohibits a trial court from imposing probation on a defendant sentenced to DOC custody where that defendant has been sentenced to prison on a felony. Because Coleman cannot be sentenced to both the custody of the DOC and probation, his sentence was improper.

The judgment of conviction was affirmed. The entire sentence was vacated and the case was remanded for resentencing.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Finding of Half-empty Schnapps Bottle in Vehicle Did Not Negate Police Officers’ Reasonable Suspicion

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Kessler on Thursday, May 3, 2018.

DUI—Evidence—Possession of a Controlled Substance—Search and Seizure—Search Incident to Arrest—Motor Vehicle—Reasonable Suspicion—Cross-Examination.

Defendant was pulled over by the police for speeding. Upon approaching the car with a flashlight, an officer spotted a half-empty schnapps bottle on the floor behind the passenger’s seat. The officer asked defendant for his license, registration, and proof of insurance multiple times before defendant presented his registration and proof of insurance. Defendant admitted he did not have a valid driver’s license. Because defendant showed signs of intoxication, the officer asked him to step out of the vehicle. Defendant needed to use the car door for support to get out of the car, and he eventually admitted he had drunk from the schnapps bottle. Defendant performed roadside sobriety maneuvers unsatisfactorily, and his breath test registered .154g/210L. Defendant was arrested for DUI and placed in the back of the police car. Two other officers then searched the car for further evidence of alcohol consumption and found a bag of cocaine in the console, inches from where defendant sat. Among other things, defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine).

On appeal, defendant contended that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of possessing a controlled substance (cocaine). He argued that he was not in exclusive possession of the car on the date in question and denied knowing the cocaine was on the car. The possibility that someone else was in the car earlier that day does not change the fact that defendant was in exclusive possession of the vehicle when it was stopped and searched, making him subject to the inference that he knowingly possessed the cocaine. Further, the location of the cocaine and defendant’s testimony that no one else had interacted with the console support the inference. There was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict him on this charge.

Defendant next contended that the trial court should have suppressed evidence related to the recovery of cocaine from his car because the police lacked sufficient grounds to search the car once they seized the half-empty bottle of schnapps. The police are permitted to search a vehicle incident to a lawful arrest. Here, the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant on a DUI charge, defendant initially denied consuming alcohol, and it was likely the officers would find evidence of alcohol while searching defendant’s vehicle. The officers’ reasonable suspicion that the car contained alcohol did not evaporate once the officers found some alcohol. Therefore, the search that uncovered the cocaine was proper.

Finally, at trial, the amount of alcohol in the schnapps bottle when the officer discovered it was contested: the officer said it was half full, while defendant testified it was two-thirds full. During cross-examination, the prosecution asked defendant if the officer “made up” the amount of schnapps in the bottle. Although the prosecution’s question was improper, it did not cast doubt on the reliability of the conviction. The error was not substantial and did not warrant reversal under the plain error rule.

The judgment of conviction was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Bills Signed Regarding Fiduciary Duties of Title Insurance Entities, Public Official Oaths and Affirmations, and More

On Thursday, March 29, 2018, the governor signed 17 bills into law. He also signed 16 bills into law on Monday, April 2, 2018. To date, Governor Hickenlooper has signed 114 bills this legislative session and sent one to the Secretary of State without a signature. The bills signed Thursday and Monday include a bill concerning the fiduciary duties of title insurance entities with regard to funds held for closing, a bill exempting physicians who treat patients with rare disorders from non-compete agreements, several bills updating outdated statutory language, bills regarding financing broadband for rural areas, a bill requiring reporting when title to a motor vehicle has been transferred, and more. The bills signed Thursday and Monday are summarized here.

  • HB 18-1012 – “Concerning Vision Care Plans for Eye Care Services,” by Reps. Jon Becker & Susan Lontine and Sens. Kevin Lundberg & Irene Aguilar. The bill prohibits a carrier or entity that offers a vision care plan from requiring an eye care provider with whom the carrier or entity contracts to provide services at a set fee, charge a person for noncovered services, or participate in a carrier’s other vision plan networks.
  • HB 18-1091 – “Concerning Dementia Diseases, and, in Connection Therewith, Updating Statutory References to Dementia Diseases and Related Disabilities,” by Reps. Susan Beckman & Joann Ginal and Sens. Jim Smallwood & Nancy Todd. The bill updates statutory references to Alzheimer’s and other dementia diseases and reflects that dementia diseases have related disabilities impacting memory and other cognitive abilities.
  • HB 18-1099 – “Concerning Criteria that the Broadband Deployment Board is Required to Develop with Regard to an Incumbent Telecommunications Provider’s Exercise of a Right to Implement a Broadband Deployment Project in an Unserved Area of the State Upon a Nonincumbent Provider’s Application to the Broadband Deployment Board to Implement a Proposed Broadband Deployment Project in the Unserved Area,” by Reps. Marc Catlin & Barbara McLaughlin and Sen. Don Coram. The bill requires that the Broadband Deployment Board’s criteria include requirements that an incumbent telecommunications provider exercising its right to implement a broadband deployment project for the unserved area agree to provide demonstrated downstream and upstream speeds equal to or faster than the speeds indicated in the applicant’s proposed project and at a cost per household that is equal to or less than the cost per household indicated in the applicant’s proposed project.
  • HB 18-1103 – “Concerning the Ability of a Local Government to Require a Driver to Meet Safety Standards for the Use of an Off-highway Vehicle,” by Rep. Barbara McLaughlin and Sen. Don Coram. The bill clarifies that a local government does not violate state rules if it imposes certain requirements on a driver of an off-highway vehicle.
  • HB 18-1130 – “Concerning Increasing the Availability of Qualified Personnel who are Licensed in Another State to Teach in Public Schools,” by Reps. Dave Williams & Jeni James Arndt and Sen. Bob Gardner. The bill changes requirements for special education teacher requirements from 3 years of continuous experience to 3 years of experience within the previous 7 years.
  • HB 18-1137 – “Concerning the Scheduled Repeal of Reports to the General Assembly, and, in Connection Therewith, Continuing the Requirements for Reports by the Department of Transportation and the Department of Public Safety,” by Rep. Hugh McKean and Sen. Rachel Zenzinger. The bill continues reporting requirements of the Departments of Transportation and Public Safety.
  • HB 18-1138 – “Concerning Standardizing Public Official Oaths of Office, and, in Connection Therewith, Providing a Uniform Oath Text and Establishing Requirements for Taking, Subscribing, Administering, and Filing Public Oaths of Office,” by Rep. Jeni James Arndt and Sen. Rachel Zenzinger. The bill establishes a single uniform text for swearing or affirming an oath of office and the requirements regarding how and when an oath or affirmation of office must be taken, subscribed, administered, and filed.
  • HB 18-1139 – “Concerning the Removal of Outdated Statutory References to Repealed Reporting Requirements that were Previously Imposed on the Parks and Wildlife Commission with Regard to its Rule-making Authority to Set Fees,” by Rep. Edie Hooten and Sen. Rachel Zenzinger. The bill removes obsolete references to a statutory subsection that was repealed on September 1, 2017.
  • HB 18-1158 – “Concerning a Supplemental Appropriation to the Department of Corrections,” by Rep. Millie Hamner and Sen. Kent Lambert. The bill makes a supplemental appropriation to the Department of Corrections.
  • HB 18-1171 – “Concerning Adjustments in the Amount of Total Program Funding for Public Cchools for the 2017-18 Budget Year, and, in Connection Therewith, Making and Reducing an Appropriation,” by Rep. Millie Hamner and Sen. Kevin Lundberg. The bill adjusts the minimum amount of total program funding specified in statute to reflect this intent for the actual funded pupil count and the actual at-risk pupil count.
  • HB 18-1196 – “Concerning Authorization to Verify the Disability of an Applicant to the Aid to the Needy Disabled Program,” by Rep. Tony Exum and Sens. Nancy Todd & Beth Martinez Humenik. Under current law, in order to receive assistance under the aid to the needy disabled program, an applicant must be examined by a physician, physician assistant, advanced practice nurse, or registered nurse. The bill adds to the list of persons authorized to perform an examination a licensed psychologist, or any other licensed or certified health care personnel the department of human services deems appropriate.
  • HB 18-1233 – “Concerning a Consumer Reporting Agency’s Placement of a Security Freeze on the Consumer Report of a Consumer who is Under the Charge of a Representative at the Request of the Consumer’s Representative,” by Reps. Crisanta Duran & Polly Lawrence and Sens. Stephen Fenberg & Bob Gardner. The bill authorizes a parent or legal guardian (representative) to request that a consumer reporting agency place a security freeze on the consumer report of either a minor less than 16 years of age or another individual who is a ward of the representative (protected consumer).
  • SB 18-002 – “Concerning the Financing of Broadband Deployment,” by Sens. Don Coram & Jerry Sonnenberg and Reps. KC Becker & Crisanta Duran. The bill amends the definition of ‘broadband network’ to increase the speed of downstream broadband internet service from at least 4 megabits per second to at least 10 megabits per second and the definition of ‘unserved area’ to refer to an area that is unincorporated, or within a city with a population of fewer than 7,500 inhabitants, and that is not receiving federal support to construct a broadband network to serve a majority of the households in each census block in the area, and requires the PUC to allocate money.
  • SB 18-028 – “Concerning the Repeal of Certain Requirements for Where a License Plate is Mounted on a Motor Vehicle,” by Sen. Ray Scott and Rep. Jeff Bridges. Current law requires each license plate to be at the approximate center of a motor vehicle and at least 12 inches from the ground. The bill repeals this requirement for the front license plate and replaces it with a requirement that the front license plate be mounted horizontally on the front in the location designated by the manufacturer.
  • SB 18-073 – “Concerning Reporting to the Department of Revenue when Ownership of a Motor Vehicle has been Transferred,” by Sen. Jim Smallwood and Reps. Kim Ransom & Leslie Herod. The bill creates a voluntary program administered by the Department of Revenue that authorizes the owner of a motor vehicle to report a transfer of ownership of the motor vehicle. If the previous owner reports the transfer to the Department, the previous owner is not subject to liability for the misuse of the vehicle.
  • SB 18-074 – “Concerning Adding Individuals with Prader-Willi Syndrome to the List of Persons with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities,” by Sen. Nancy Todd and Rep. Chris Hansen. The bill adds Prader-Willi syndrome to the list of persons who have mandatory eligibility for services and supports and also to the definition of an ‘intellectual and developmental disability’ for the purpose of receiving services and supports.
  • SB 18-082 – “Concerning a Physician’s Right to Provide Continuing Care to Patients with Rare Disorders Despite a Covenant Not to Compete,” by Sen. Rachel Zenzinger and Sen. Chris Kennedy. The bill exempts physicians who provide care to patients with rare diseases from non-compete agreements.
  • SB 18-090 – “Concerning ‘Rights of Married Women,'” by Sen. Rachel Zenzinger and Rep. Edie Hooten. The bill modernizes the language in statutory sections concerning the “rights of married women” to be inclusive of married men and women.
  • SB 18-095 – “Concerning the Removal of Statutory References to the Marital Status of Parents of a Child,” by Sens. Rachel Zenzinger & Beth Martinez Humenik and Reps. Edie Hooten & Hugh McKean. The bill removes or modernizes outdated statutory references to a ‘legitimate’ or ‘illegitimate’ child and a ‘child born out of wedlock’. Colorado only recognizes parentage of a child and acknowledges that the parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents.
  • SB 18-098 – “Concerning Amending a Statutory Provision Relating to Interest on Damages that was Ruled Unconstitutional by the Colorado Supreme Court,” by Sens. Jack Tate & Rachel Zenzinger and Reps. Edie Hooten & Dan Thurlow. The bill amends C.R.S. § 13-21-101 (1), concerning interest on damages, to reflect a 1996 decision made by the Colorado Supreme Court that ruled certain language in that subsection violated the equal protection clause of the constitution.
  • SB 18-099 – “Concerning the Alignment of Early Childhood Quality Improvement Programs with the Colorado Shines Quality Rating and Improvement System,” by Sens. Michael Merrifield & Kevin Priola and Reps. Brittany Pettersen & James Wilson. The bill amends the application and eligibility requirements for the school-readiness quality improvement program and the infant and toddler quality and availability grant program to align with the Colorado shines quality rating and improvement system to streamline the administration of the programs.
  • SB 18-102 – “Concerning the Requirement for an Odometer Reading when a Motor Vehicle’s Identification Number is Physically Verified,” by Sens. Jack Tate & Rachel Zenzinger and Reps. Edie Hooten & Dan Thurlow. The bill repeals the requirement that the odometer be read when a motor vehicle’s identification number is physically verified.
  • SB 18-104 – “Concerning a Requirement that the Broadband Deployment Board File a Petition with the Federal Communications Commission to Seek a Waiver from the Commission’s Rules Prohibiting a State Entity from Applying for Certain Federal Money Earmarked for Financing Broadband Deployment in Remote Areas of the Nation,” by Sen. Kerry Donovan and Reps. Yeulin Willett & Barbara McLaughlin. The bill requires the broadband deployment board, on or before January 1, 2019, to petition the federal communications commission (FCC) for a waiver from the FCC’s rules prohibiting a state entity from applying for federal money earmarked for broadband deployment in remote areas of the nation through the remote areas fund created as part of the connect America fund established by the FCC.
  • SB 18-111 – “Concerning the Removal of an Obsolete Date in the Law that Designates State Legal Holidays,” by Sen. Jack Tate and Rep. Jeni James Arndt. Current law specifies that if executive branch employees who are in the state personnel system are required to work on a state legal holiday, the employees shall receive an alternate day off or be paid in accordance with the state personnel system or state fiscal rules in effect on April 30, 1979. The state fiscal rules in effect in 1979 have been amended numerous times since that time and are no longer applicable or relevant. The bill removes the reference to April 30, 1979.
  • SB 18-121 – “Concerning Certain Expenses Allowed to a State Employee when the Employee is Required to Change his or her Place of Residence in Connection with a Change in Job Duties,” by Sen. Jack Tate and Rep. Jeni James Arndt. Current law allows an employee in the state personnel system his or her moving and relocation expenses if an appointing authority requires the employee to change his or her place of residence due to a change in job duties. The bill specifies that moving expenses, including the reasonable expenses of moving household goods and personal effects and the reasonable costs of traveling to a new residence, are reimbursable in accordance with rules promulgated by the state controller and in compliance with the regulations of the federal internal revenue service.
  • SB 18-125 – “Concerning Fiduciary Responsibilities of Title Insurance Entities to Protect Funds held in Conjunction with Real Estate Closing Settlement Services,” by Sens. Bob Gardner & Daniel Kagan and Rep. Pete Lee. The bill requires title insurance entities and affiliates or subsidiaries to hold funds belonging to others in a fiduciary capacity. ‘Fiduciary funds’ means all funds received in conjunction with real estate closing and settlement services.
  • SB 18-131 – “Concerning Modifications to the “State Employees Group Benefits Act,” by Sen. Jack Tate and Rep. Edie Hooten. The bill modifies several provisions of the State Employees Group Benefits Act to bring it into compliance with current state and federal law and to eliminate obsolete provisions.
  • SB 18-134 – “Concerning the Exemption of Nonprofit Water Companies from Regulation by the Public Utilities Commission,” by Sen. John Cooke and Rep. Jeni James Arndt. Under current law, the public utilities commission is directed to grant simplified regulatory treatment to water companies that serve fewer than 1,500 customers. The bill expands on this concept by deregulating water companies that are registered as nonprofits, so long as their rates, charges, and terms and conditions of service are just and reasonable.
  • SB 18-135 – “Concerning Updates to the Colorado Code of Military Justice,” by Sen. Bob Gardner and Reps. Terri Carver & Pete Lee. The bill updates several parts of the Colorado Code of Military Justice.
  • SB 18-138 – “Concerning Authorization for Retail Sellers of Alcohol Beverages for On-premises Consumption to Sell Remaining Inventory to Another On-premises Retail Seller of Alcohol Beverages with whom there is Common Ownership when No Longer Licensed to Sell Alcohol Beverages for On-premises Consumption,” by Sens. Bob Gardner & Andy Kerr and Reps. Matt Gray & Larry Liston. The bill allows persons with certain retail licenses to purchase alcohol beverages from another retail licensee when there is common ownership between the licensees and the seller has surrendered its license within the last 60 days.
  • SB 18-160 – “Concerning the Authority to Operate Certain Teacher Development Programs, and, in Connection Therewith, Establishing Alternative Licensure Programs and Induction Programs,” by Sen. Kent Lambert and Rep. Millie Hamner. Under existing law, school districts are permitted to operate induction programs for teachers, special services providers, principals, and administrators, and alternative licensure programs for teachers and principals, who do not hold professional licenses. The bill clarifies that charter schools and the state charter school institute may operate such programs.
  • SB 18-165 – “Concerning Requirements for Public Administrators,” by Sens. Tim Neville & Nancy Todd and Reps. Faith Winter & Lori Saine. The bill The bill increases the amount of bond public administrators are required to maintain to $100,000 and clarifies additional requirements.
  • SB 18-173 – “Concerning the Ability of Certain Establishments Licensed to Sell Alcohol Beverages for On-premises Consumption that Serve Food to Allow a Customer to Remove One Opened Container of Partially Consumed Vinous Liquor from the Licensed Premises,” by Sen. Bob Gardner and Rep. Leslie Herod. Currently, certain liquor licensees may sell one opened container of partially consumed vinous liquor to a customer if the licensee has meals available for consumption on the licensed premises. The bill expands the requirement to include licensees that makes sandwiches and light snacks available for consumption on the premises.

For a list of all of Governor Hickenlooper’s 2018 legislative actions, click here.