December 16, 2018

Colorado Court of Appeals: Imposition of Valid Sentence Ends Criminal Court’s Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Chavez on Thursday, September 20, 2018.

Criminal Procedure—Post-Conviction Remedies—Search Warrant—Crim. P. 35—Return of Property—Sentencing—Jurisdiction.

In 2004, the police obtained a warrant to search Chavez’s house as part of an investigation and seized evidence they used to charge Chavez in five separate criminal cases, none of which underlie this appeal. In the case underlying this appeal, Chavez pleaded guilty to both sexual assault and kidnapping and was sentenced for those crimes. Three years later, Chavez moved the criminal court for the return of the items seized during the search of his house. The district court denied the motion on the merits.

On appeal, Chavez contended that the district court erred in denying his motion for return of property. The imposition of sentence ends a criminal court’s subject matter jurisdiction, with the sole exception of motions brought under Crim. P. 35. Because a motion for return of property is not authorized by Crim. P. 35, criminal courts do not have jurisdiction over such motions made after sentencing. Thus, the criminal court lacked jurisdiction to address the merits of Chavez’s motion.

The order denying Chavez’s motion was vacated for lack of jurisdiction.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Formerly Secretary of State Properly Subject to Jurisdiction of Independent Ethics Commission

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Gessler v. Smith on Monday, June 4, 2018.

Amendment 41—Independent Ethics Commission—Jurisdiction.

The supreme court considered whether Colorado’s Independent Ethics Commission (the IEC) had jurisdiction pursuant to article XXIX of the Colorado Constitution to hear a complaint based on allegations that then-Secretary of State Scott Gessler (the Secretary) breached the public trust by using money from his statutorily provided discretionary fund for partisan and personal purposes. The IEC investigated the complaint, held an evidentiary hearing, and determined that the Secretary’s conduct breached the public trust. The Secretary sought judicial review of the IEC’s ruling, arguing that the IEC lacked jurisdiction over the case, the relevant jurisdictional language must be narrowly construed to avoid unconstitutional vagueness, and the IEC violated his procedural due process rights. Both the district court and the court of appeals affirmed the IEC’s ruling.

The court held that relevant jurisdictional language in Colo. Const. art. XXIX, § 5 authorizes the IEC to hear complaints involving ethical standards of conduct relating to activities that could allow covered individuals, including elected officials, to improperly benefit financially from their public employment. The court further held that C.R.S. § 24-18-103 is one such ethical standard of conduct. This provision establishes that the holding of public office or employment is a public trust, and that a public official “shall carry out his duties for the benefit of the people of the state.” Because the allegations against the Secretary clearly implicated this standard, the court concluded that the complaint fell within the IEC’s jurisdiction and rejected the Secretary’s jurisdictional and vagueness challenges. Additionally, the court rejected the Secretary’s procedural due process claim because he failed to demonstrate that he suffered any prejudice as a result of the alleged violation.

The court of appeals’ judgment was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: District Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Respondent who Never Received Notice of Protective Proceeding

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in In the Interest of Spohr on Thursday, May 17, 2018.

Emergency Guardianship—Non-Emergency GuardianshipPersonal Service of Notice—Jurisdiction—Probate Code.

On July 15, 2016, the Fremont County Department of Human Services (Department) filed a petition for emergency appointment of a guardian for Spohr in the district court. Counsel was appointed for Spohr and an emergency hearing was held three days later. There was no transcript of the hearing and no indication that Spohr was present or that he received notice of the hearing. On July 19 the magistrate issued an order dispensing with notice under C.R.S. § 15-14-312 stating that Spohr would be substantially harmed if the appointment was delayed. The court appointed the Department as emergency guardian and required notice of the appointment to be personally served on Spohr within 48 hours, as required by C.R.S. § 15-14-312(2). There is no proof that service was made. Despite the C.R.S. § 15-14-312(1) requirement that an emergency guardian appointment may not exceed 60 days, the court did not hold another hearing for more than six months and the emergency guardianship remained in place during that time. A permanent guardian was appointed for Spohr at a February 2017 hearing, but there is no indication that he was served with notice of this hearing. The trial court record includes a finding that the “required notices have been given or waived.”

The court of appeals previously remanded this case to the district court to make findings as to whether any of the required notices were ever sent to Spohr. On remand, the Department presented no further information and the court found that the record remained unclear as to service.

On appeal, Spohr argued for the first time that he did not receive personal service of a notice of hearing on the petition for guardianship. As relevant to this case, the Colorado Probate Code requires personal service on the respondent of a notice of hearing on a petition for guardianship. The Probate Code would have allowed the appointment of an emergency guardian to be made without notice to Spohr only if the court found, based on testimony at the emergency hearing, that he would have been substantially harmed if the appointment were delayed. If the protected person was not present at the hearing, he must be given notice within 48 hours after the appointment. While the magistrate made this finding, the requisite notice within 48 hours of the appointment was never made.

The Probate Code does not contain provisions for how a transition is to be made from an emergency guardianship to a non-emergency guardianship. In the absence of such provision, the court concluded that after the 60-day limit on emergency guardianship, if a guardianship is still sought for the protected person, C.R.S. § 15-14-304, governing judicial appointment of a guardian on a non-emergency basis, must be followed. Among other requirements for this process, C.R.S. § 15-14-309(1) requires that a copy of the petition and notice of hearing on the petition must be served personally on the respondent. Further, the notice requirement is jurisdictional, and the lack of notice may therefore be raised at any time. Here, Spohr was not given notice within 48 hours after the appointment of his emergency guardian, nor did he waive notice of the appointment and the ability to request a hearing on the emergency guardian’s appointment. And the emergency guardian served long after 60 days had passed.

The record also fails to show that Spohr was provided with the required notice before his non-emergency guardianship. The failure to personally serve the respondent 14 days before the guardianship hearing is jurisdictional and respondent cannot waive service. Thus the court lacked jurisdiction to appoint a permanent guardian.

The judgment was vacated.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Water Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Constitutionality of Groundwater Statute

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Jim Hutton Educational Foundation v. Rein on Monday, May 21, 2018.

Water Law—Jurisdiction.

The Jim Hutton Educational Foundation, a surface-water user, claimed that a statute prohibiting any challenge to a designated groundwater basin that would alter the basin’s boundaries to exclude a permitted well is unconstitutional. The water court dismissed that claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the surface-water user had to first satisfy the Colorado Groundwater Commission that the water at issue was not designated groundwater. The supreme court concluded that, because jurisdiction vests in the water court only if the Colorado Groundwater Commission first concludes that the water at issue is designated groundwater, the water court properly dismissed the constitutional claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The court affirmed the water court’s ruling.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: District Court Retains Jurisdiction Over Allocation of Parental Responsibilities while Prior Order on Appeal

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning W.C. on Thursday, May 3, 2018.

Parental Responsibilities—Jurisdiction—Appeal—Motion to Modify—Changed Circumstances.

In this allocation of parental responsibilities case, father appealed the district court’s permanent orders granting mother sole decision-making authority and majority parenting time. Though his appeal is pending with this court, father filed verified motions to modify parenting time and decision-making in the district court. The district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider those motions while the appeal was pending; it decided to take no action on father’s motions unless and until the Court of Appeals finds that the district court has jurisdiction or remands and gives the court authority to consider the motions.

The Court determined that under Colorado’s Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act, a district court retains continuing jurisdiction over motions to modify parental responsibilities while the current allocation order is on appeal, as long as those motions are based on a material change in circumstances that occurred after the original order was entered.

Father’s motion to clarify was granted and the case was remanded.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: District Court Had Jurisdiction to Consider Wife’s Motion Filed One Day Before Expiration of Jurisdictional Period

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in In re Marriage of Runge on Thursday, February 22, 2018.

Dissolution of Marriage—Post-Decree—C.R.C.P. 16.2(e)(10)—Subject Matter Jurisdiction—Disclosures.

In this post-dissolution of marriage dispute, wife moved under C.R.C.P. 16.2(e)(10) to discover and allocate assets that she alleged husband did not disclose or misrepresented in the proceedings surrounding their 2011 separation agreement. Husband moved to dismiss wife’s motion and the district court granted the dismissal.

As an initial matter, husband contended that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under C.R.C.P. 16.2(e)(10) because the five-year period during which it may reallocate assets expired the day after wife moved for such relief. C.R.C.P. 16.2(e)(10) does not limit the court’s jurisdiction to rule on timely motions if the five-year period expires before the ruling. Therefore, the district court had jurisdiction to rule on the motion because wife’s motion was timely filed within the five-year period under the rule.

On appeal, wife contended that the district court erred by not applying the “plausibility” standard announced in Warne v. Hall, 2016 CO 50, when granting husband’s motion to dismiss. The Warne “plausibility” standard does not apply here because wife’s motion was not a pleading and husband’s motion to dismiss was not pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5).

Wife also contended that the district court erred by ruling that she did not state sufficient grounds in her motion and that the court should have allowed her to conduct discovery to prove her allegations. Wife did not allege that husband failed to disclose specific items mandated under C.R.C.P. 16.2(e)(10) and husband certified that he provided all such items. Instead, wife asserted suspicions and speculations that husband likely failed to disclose and misrepresented assets. In light of the information about husband’s assets that wife had pre-decree, and her choice to enter into a separation agreement rather than to evaluate this information, wife’s motion did not state sufficient grounds to trigger an allocation of misstated or omitted assets. Further, C.R.C.P. 16.2(e)(10) was not intended to create a right for an ex-spouse to conduct discovery into the other spouse’s assets post-decree.

The order was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Order Dismissing Dependency and Neglect Proceeding Not Final, Appealable Order

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People in Interest of M.R.M. on Thursday, January 25, 2018.

Dependency and Neglect—Final and Appealable Order—Lack of Jurisdiction.

The Garfield County Department of Human Services (Department) filed a petition in dependency and neglect, naming mother and M.M. (father of two children and stepfather to the third, M.A.M.) as respondents. The children were initially placed with their maternal grandmother, but then M.M. moved from Florida to Colorado and sought custody of all three children. The children were placed with him under the protective supervision of the Department. The court adjudicated the three children dependent and neglected with respect to mother. The court adopted treatment plans for mother and M.M., but shortly thereafter he moved to modify the order under which he shared custody of the children with mother and to dismiss the dependency and neglect case. M.M. shared custody of the two older children with mother under a domestic relations order and asserted he should have custody of M.A.M. as her psychological parent. The juvenile court entered an order allocating parental responsibilities for the children between M.M. and mother (the APR order). The court concluded it had jurisdiction to allocate parental responsibilities as to M.A.M. pursuant to C.R.S. 14-10-123(1)(d), which provides that a proceeding concerning allocation of parental responsibilities may be commenced by someone other than a parent who has been allocated parental responsibilities through a juvenile court order. Approximately two weeks later, the court entered an order terminating its jurisdiction and closing the case, from which order mother appealed.

The Colorado Court of Appeals requested supplemental briefs addressing whether mother’s appeal was timely and determined that the appealable order was the APR order. C.R.S. § 19-1-104(6) provides that entry of an order allocating parental responsibilities for a child who is the subject of a dependency and neglect proceeding requested by a party to the case, once filed in the county where the child will permanently reside, will be treated as any other decree in a proceeding allocating parental responsibilities. This action ends the dependency and neglect proceeding and transfers jurisdiction over the child to the district court. Such an order is final and appealable, and a party who wishes to appeal must file a notice of appeal within 21 days of entry of the order. Here, the juvenile court entered an APR order and ordered that it be certified into an existing custody proceeding in the district court as to M.M.’s children, and certified into a new domestic relations case as to M.A.M. Mother did not appeal from that order but rather appealed from the order purportedly terminating its jurisdiction and closing the dependency and neglect case. Mother’s appeal was untimely, and the court lacked jurisdiction to hear it.

However, mother argued the APR order wasn’t a final, appealable order because the juvenile court didn’t have jurisdiction to make the findings needed to grant APR to a nonparent. She contended that because the court did not adjudicate M.A.M. dependent and neglected with respect to her biological father, and the adjudication of the two older children with respect to father M.M. was still in “deferred” status, the APR order was invalid. The court rejected this argument, reasoning that the question was not whether the court had jurisdiction to enter the order, but whether it was final and appealable. The APR order here was final and appealable

Similarly, because mother failed to timely appeal the APR order, the court rejected mother’s argument that because the court failed to commence a paternity action it did not have independent jurisdiction under the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) to enter an order allocating parental responsibilities.

Finally, mother argued the APR order was not a final, appealable order because it did not fully resolve the right and liabilities of the parties as to paternity, support, and parental responsibilities with respect to M.A.M. Analyzing the issue under the UPA, the court concluded there was no need for a paternity proceeding as to M.A.M. The court rejected mother’s argument that the APR order did not fully resolve the rights and liabilities of the parties because it didn’t find anything else that needed to be resolved; the order addressed visitation, parenting time, and other matters relevant to the allocation or parental responsibilities between mother and M.M.

Mother also argued that the APR order was not final because it was subject to revision. Once it was entered and certified to the district court, jurisdiction to modify it was transferred to the district court, leaving nothing for the juvenile court to do. The court further noted that all orders concerning parenting time and decision-making responsibility may be modified when circumstances warrant a change.

Mother also raised an issue about noncompliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act. The court declined to address this because it lacked jurisdiction due to the untimeliness of the appeal.

The appeal was dismissed with prejudice for lack of an appealable order.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Tenth Circuit: Case Properly Remanded to State Court Under the Class Action Fairness Act

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Speed v. JMA Energy Company, LLC on Monday, October 2, 2017.

Plaintiff Speed filed a petition in the District Court of Hughes County, Oklahoma, asserting a class action against JMA Energy Company, alleging that JMA had willfully violated an Oklahoma statute that requires interest payments of revenue from oil and gas production. Speed further asserted that JMA fraudulently concealed from mineral-interest owners that JMA owed interest to the owners, intending to pay only those who requested the interest.

JMA removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, asserting that the district court had jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Speed then filed an amended motion to remand the case to state court. The district court granted this motion, relying on an exception to CAFA that permits a district court to decline to exercise jurisdiction over a class action meeting certain prerequisites based on consideration of certain factors.

JMA appealed, challenging the district court’s remand order. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found the district court properly considered the statutory factors and did not abuse its discretion by remanding to state court.

CAFA permits a class action to be brought in or removed to federal court if: (1) the proposed class includes at least 100 persons with claims; (2) the aggregate amount in controversy on all claims exceeds $5 million; (3) at least one proposed plaintiff and one defendant have diverse citizenship; and (4) the primary defendants are not governmental entities or officials against whom a federal court cannot order relief.

CAFA also recognizes three statutory exceptions. The exception at issue in this case is the discretionary exception. This exception allows a federal court to decline to exercise jurisdiction over a class action that is otherwise covered by CAFA based on six enumerated factors. The Tenth Circuit considered each factor in turn to determine if there was a legal error or other abuse of discretion by the district court.

The first factor is whether the claims asserted involve a matter of national or interstate interest. The Tenth Circuit found that JMA failed to explain how there could be a significant national interest in the mere allocation of interest between producers and royalty owners. The only thing national or interstate about this case is that some of the owners of Oklahoma property, who are basing their claims on alleged violations of an Oklahoma statute, happen to live in other states and receive their royalty checks there. The Tenth Circuit determined that was not enough to reverse the district court’s finding.

The second factor was whether the claims asserted would be governed by Oklahoma law or the laws of other states. The district court found JMA’s argument that a fraud claim against Oklahoma may be governed by the law of a different state unpersuasive and concluded that this factor weighed in favor of Speed’s motion to remand. The Tenth Circuit concluded that Oklahoma law controlled.

The third factor was whether the class action had been pleaded in order to avoid federal jurisdiction. JMA asserted that Speed attempted to avoid federal jurisdiction by excluding from the class any publicly traded companies and affiliated entities that produced, gathered, processed, or marketed oil and gas. The district court found this argument unpersuasive, reasoning that Speed had proposed a class that encompassed all the people and claims that one would expect to include in a class action. The Tenth Circuit agreed.

The fourth factor was whether the action was brought in a forum with a distinct nexus with the class members, the alleged harm, or the defendants. The Tenth Circuit found no abuse of discretion by the district court, as the factors of this case demonstrated the required nexus between Oklahoma and the class members, the alleged harms, and the defendant, including that the action was related to real-property interests in Oklahoma, the class members owned royalty interests in Oklahoma property, JMA is a citizen of Oklahoma, and the underlying alleged actions that gave rise to this suit took place in Oklahoma.

The fifth factor was whether the number of citizens of the state in which the action was originally filed is substantially larger than the number of citizens from any other state for plaintiffs in the class, and whether the citizenship of the other members of the proposed class was dispersed among a substantial number of states. The Tenth Circuit found the district court correctly determined that this factor weighed in favor of remand, as the number of Oklahoma citizens was about 2.5 times the number of citizens from any other state.

The sixth, and last, factor was whether, during the three-year period preceding the filing of the class action, one or more other class actions asserting the same or similar claims on behalf of the same or other persons had been filed. No other actions have been filed; therefore, this factor favors remand.

The Tenth Circuit determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that each factor supported remand.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the decision remanding the case to state court.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Juvenile Court Magistrate Has Jurisdiction to Consider Motion to Withdraw Previous Guilty Plea

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People in Interest of J.D. on Thursday, December 14, 2017.

Juvenile Delinquency—Plea Agreement—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel—Withdrawal of Plea—Magistrate—Jurisdiction.

J.D. appeared before a magistrate in a delinquency case. He was represented by counsel and signed an “advisement of rights in a juvenile delinquency proceeding” and pleaded guilty to acts that if committed by an adult would have constituted second degree criminal trespass. The magistrate accepted the plea and entered a one-year deferred adjudication. After the prosecution sought restitution and J.D. failed to file an objection within the deadline, the magistrate ordered restitution. Four months later and through new counsel, J.D. moved to withdraw his guilty plea under Crim. P. 32(d) based on ineffective assistance of plea counsel for improperly advising J.D. as to the likely restitution amount and the bankruptcy consequences of restitution, as well as failing to formally withdraw as J.D.’s counsel. The magistrate granted the motion and vacated the plea. On review, the district court judge held that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction to hear J.D.’s motion and vacated the order.

On appeal, J.D. argued that the magistrate had authority to enter the order withdrawing his guilty plea and the district court erred in vacating that order. Because the issue of which judicial officers have authority in particular cases is substantive, not procedural, the Children’s Code prevails over any conflicting provisions in the Colorado Rules for Magistrates. The Children’s Code authorizes the juvenile court to appoint magistrates “to hear any case or matter under the court’s jurisdiction, except where a jury trial has been requested . . . .” The magistrate had jurisdiction to consider J.D.’s Crim. P. 32(d) motion.

The district court’s order was reversed and the magistrate’s order vacating the plea was reinstated. The case was remanded to the district court to address the merits of the People’s petition to review the magistrate’s order under C.R.S. § 19-1-108(5.5).

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Plaintiff Established Sufficient Contacts Under Stream of Commerce Doctrine to Withstand Motion to Dismiss

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Align Corp. Ltd. v. Boustred on Monday, November 13, 2017.

Stream of Commerce Doctrine—Personal Jurisdiction

In this case, the supreme court considers the stream of commerce doctrine to determine the prerequisites for a state to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. The court concludes that World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), sets out the controlling stream of commerce doctrine. That doctrine establishes that a forum state may assert jurisdiction where a plaintiff shows that a defendant placed goods into the stream of commerce with the expectation that the goods will be purchased in the forum state. Applying that doctrine to this case, the court then concludes that the plaintiff made a sufficient showing under that doctrine to withstand a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the supreme court affirms the judgment of the court of appeals.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Tenth Circuit: Jurisdiction Over Crimes Committed in Indian Country is Properly Under the Federal Government

The Tenth Circuit of Appeals issued its opinion in Murphy v. Royal on Tuesday, August 8, 2017.

Petitioner-Appellant Murphy challenged the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma state court in which he was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. He contended he should have been tried in federal court because he is an Indian and the offense occurred in Indian country. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and remanded to the district court to issue a writ of habeas corpus vacating his conviction and sentence.

The Tenth Circuit addressed four issues in determining whether the state court had jurisdiction: (1) federal habeas corpus review; (2) Indian county jurisdiction generally; (3) Indian reservations; and (4) how a reservation can be disestablished or diminished.

The court found that Murphy’s crime occurred on the Indian Reservation, and therefore, the Oklahoma court lacked jurisdiction. The court reviewed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Section 2254(d) provides three ways to overcome AEDPA deference. The court focused on §2254(d)(1), which states that a state prisoner can qualify for habeas relief by showing a state court decision was “contrary to” federal law that was clearly established by the Supreme Court.

When a state court adjudicates a prisoner’s federal claim on the merits, review under § 2254(d)(1)’s contrary to clause proceeds in three steps: (1) whether there is clearly established federal law that applies to the claim; (2) whether the state court’s decision was contrary to that law; and (3) if the state court rendered a decision that was contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent by applying the wrong legal test, applying the correct law. The Circuit assumed that AEDPA supplied the standard of review, therefore the substantive law governing Indian country jurisdiction applies to these claims.

The Major Crimes Act is the jurisdictional statute at the heart of this case and applies to enumerated crimes committed by Indians in Indian country. The jurisdiction is exclusively federal, meaning the State of Oklahoma does not have jurisdiction over crimes committed by or against an Indian in Indian Country.

Congress has provided that “Indian Country” includes all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation. Therefore, all lands within the boundaries of a reservation have Indian country status.

Only Congress can disestablish or diminish a reservation. As Congress possesses plenary power over Indian affairs, including the power to modify or eliminate tribal rights, Congress also has the power to eliminate or reduce a reservation against a tribe’s wishes and without consent. Having recognized this power, the Supreme Court has developed a framework to determine whether Congress has exercised its power with respect to a given reservation.

First, there is a presumption against disestablishment and diminishment, and courts do not lightly infer that Congress has exercised this power. The Supreme Court has required that the congressional determination to terminate be expressed on the face of the Act or be clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative history.

Next is Congress’s pursuit of a policy called allotment and its relationship to reservation borders. Congress has historically adopted the view that the Indians tribes should abandon their nomadic lives on the communal reservations and settle into an agrarian economy on privately-owned parcels of land. This policy involved Congress dividing, or “allotting,” communal Indian lands into individualized parcels for private ownership by tribal members. Allotment on its own, however, does not disestablish or diminish a reservation, but may alter the boundaries of some reservations.

To distinguish congressional acts that changed a reservation’s borders from those that simply offered non-Indians the opportunity to purchase land within established reservation boundaries, the Supreme Court has developed a three-part framework:

  1. Courts must examine the text of the statute purportedly disestablishing or diminishing the reservation. No particular form of words, however, is necessary to diminish a reservation.
  2. Courts must consider events surrounding the passage of the statute. Courts have found that Congress altered the borders if evidence at step two unequivocally reveals a widely-held understanding that the affected reservation would shrink as a result of the proposed legislation.
  3. Courts must consider events that occurred after the passage of the statute. Evidence to be considered can include Congress’s own treatment of the affected areas, as well as the manner in which the Bureau of Indian Affairs and local judicial authorities dealt with unallotted open lands.

The Tenth Circuit applied the three-part framework described above and concluded that Congress did not disestablish the Reservation at issue in this case. The court found that the most important evidence, the statutory text, failed to reveal disestablishment at step one. Instead, the relevant statutes contain language affirmatively recognizing the Reservation’s borders. The evidence of contemporaneous understanding and later history, which was considered at steps two and three, is mixed and falls far short of unequivocally revealing a congressional intent to disestablish. Because the application of the framework shows Congress has not disestablished the Reservation, the crime in this case occurred within the Reservation’s boundaries. The State of Oklahoma accordingly lacked jurisdiction to prosecute Murphy.

After applying the three-part framework, the court concluded that Congress has not disestablished the Indian Reservation at issue in this case. The crime in this case occurred in Indian country, Murphy is an Indian, and the federal court has exclusive jurisdiction, not Oklahoma. Murphy’s state conviction and death sentence are thus invalid. The decision whether to prosecute Murphy in federal court rests with the United States and decisions about the borders of the Indian Reservation remain with Congress.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals REVERSED the district court’s judgement and REMANDED with instructions to grant Murphy’s application for writ of habeas corpus.

Colorado Court of Appeals: UCCJEA Required Trial Court to Conduct Further Inquiries Before Assuming Jurisdiction

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People in Interest of C.L.T. on Thursday, September 7, 2017.

Termination of Parental Rights—Dependency and Neglect—Jurisdiction—Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act—Emergency Jurisdiction.

C.L.T., a child, was adjudicated dependent and neglected. Thereafter, the Denver Department of Health and Human Services moved to terminate the parental rights of mother and father, alleging that they had not complied with their treatment plans and that both of them were unfit parents. The trial court found that although reasonable efforts had been made to rehabilitate mother, her treatment plan had not been successful, she was not fit to parent the child, and she was not likely to become fit within a reasonable period of time. The court made similar findings regarding father. Then it terminated the parental rights of both mother and father.

On appeal, mother contended that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to terminate her parental rights because it failed to comply with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). She argued that because a child welfare case remained open in Texas when the Colorado case was filed, the Colorado court could exercise only emergency jurisdiction unless and until it acquired ongoing jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. The information in the record, which was limited but contained at least some indication that the court may not have had the requisite jurisdiction, was insufficient to establish whether the trial court had jurisdiction to enter any order beyond the temporary emergency order.

The judgment was vacated, and the case was remanded for the trial court to undertake further inquiries about proceedings concerning the child in other states, confer with courts in other states as appropriate, and make express findings about its UCCJEA jurisdiction.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.