August 20, 2019

Colorado Court of Appeals: Ample Evidence in Record Supported Trial Court’s Findings of No Easement

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Gold Hill Development Co., L.P. v. TSG Ski & Golf, LLC on Thursday, December 22, 2015.

R.S. 2477—Easement Claims—Public Prescriptive Easement

Plaintiff (GHDC) owned several mining lode properties in the vicinity of various properties owned by defendants (collectively, TSG). GHDC alleged that access to its mining properties was historically made by means of the Gold Hill Road (route), which traverses a portion of TSG’s properties. GHDC claimed the right to use and maintain the route where it crossed over TSG’s mining lode properties.

GHDC brought claims against TSG, including express easement, implied easement, implied easement by prior use, way of necessity, public road pursuant to R.S. 2477, and public road pursuant to CRS §§ 43-2-201(1) and 43-1-202. San Miguel County (SMC) was added as a party and defended against some of the claims regarding a public highway.

Following a bench trial, the court granted TSG’s motion for a directed verdict as to GHDC’s express easement claim and dismissed all of GHDC’s other claims. The court also granted SMC’s R.S. 2477 counterclaims for a public road as to a portion of the road and a public prescriptive easement as to another portion of the road. On appeal, GHDC contended that the trial court erred in imposing additional requirements not supported by Colorado law for its R.S. 2477 claim across the TSG properties.

GHDC argued that the trial court erred in concluding that GHDC failed to show the public was using the route. However, the Court of Appeals found ample evidence in the record to support the court’s finding and perceived no error.

GHDC argued that the trial court was inconsistent because at times it credited the absence of certain trails to deny public use, while at other times it failed to acknowledge the absence of other trails on surveys and maps presented at trial. The trial court’s findings were based on maps and mineral surveys, as well as on extensive testimony regarding the use and nonuse of the various routes. Because there was support in the record for the trial court’s findings, the Court perceived no error.

GHDC contended that the trial court erred in finding a public prescriptive easement across GHDC’s properties. CRS § 43-2-201(1)(c) requires showing (1) a “claim of right,” (2) public use adverse to the landowner’s interest, (3) such use continued for 20 years, and (4) actual or implied knowledge of the public use by the landowner and no objection to such use. Again, the Court found ample support for the trial court’s findings in the record.

GHDC argued that trial court erred in failing to find a public highway across TSG’s property under CRS §§ 43-2-201(1)(e) and 43-1-202. The Court agreed with the trial court that GHDC had essentially the same burden of proof as for its RS 2477 claim and for the same reasons (lack of public use on the route before the relevant removal dates) it failed to meet its burden.

GHDC argued that it was error to dismiss its express easement claim for failing to demonstrate the intent to convey an express easement. The Court found no error in the trial court’s interpretation of the unambiguous language in the patents.

GHDC argued that the trial court had effectively created USFS trails. The Court disagreed. The finding that these were public roads granted no rights in them to the USFS. The judgment and order were affirmed.

Summary and full case available here, courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Tenth Circuit: Closure of Mines Justified Revocation of MSHA Modifications

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Mine Safety & Health Administration on Tuesday, July 7, 2015.

Andalex Resources operated two coal mines in Utah. During the course of its mining operations, Andalex requested and received several modifications to rules of the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). In 2008, Andalex ceased mining operations at both locations and sealed the mines, leaving some infrastructure in place and leaving some equipment underground. The MSHA revoked the modifications in response to Andalex’s sealing of the mines, considering the sealing a “change of circumstances” that would allow revocation under 30 C.F.R. § 44.52(c). Andalex appealed and was granted a hearing in front of an ALJ. Andalex moved for a summary decision, arguing revocation was improper because MSHA had not shown a change of circumstances and also that it was merely maintaining the mines in a “temporary idle status” rather than closing them permanently. The ALJ affirmed the MSHA’s decision to revoke the modifications, ultimately finding that the sealing of the mines was a change of circumstances warranting revocation.

Andalex appealed the ALJ’s decision to the MSHA Assistant Secretary, who affirmed the ALJ. The Assistant Secretary also concluded that the changed circumstances—the closure of the mines—justified revocation of the modifications. The Assistant Secretary further concluded Andalex’s inability to maintain the equipment was alone a change of circumstances sufficient to justify revocation of the modifications. Andalex timely petitioned for Tenth Circuit review.

The Tenth Circuit first noted that it owed wide deference to the agency determinations, particularly where they concern the agency’s area of expertise. The Tenth Circuit noted the evidentiary standard for reasonableness of the agency action was very low—more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance of the evidence. Andalex argued the agency’s action was arbitrary and capricious and that the Assistant Secretary misapprehended or misapplied the § 44.52(c) standards. MSHA countered the Assistant Secretary and ALJ properly applied the factors and correctly found a change in circumstances.

The Tenth Circuit noted that although the Assistant Secretary engaged in speculation, it could find no abuse of discretion in the Assistant Secretary’s conclusion that sealing the mines was a change in circumstances sufficient to support revocation of the modifications. The Tenth Circuit, according deference to the agency actions, also found substantial evidence supported the MHSA’s decisions.

The Tenth Circuit denied the petitions for review.

Tenth Circuit: Sole Shareholders Should Not Be Discouraged from Infusing Capital Into Failing Businesses

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in In re Alternate Fuels, Inc.: Redmond v. Jenkins on Friday, June 12, 2015.

Alternative Fuels, Inc. (AFI) is a Kansas corporation that formerly engaged in surface coal mining operations in Missouri. AFI filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in Kansas in 1992 and briefly continued operations while its bankruptcy was pending. John Warmack acquired 100% of AFI’s stock and formed Cimarron Energy Co. to continue the mining operations for which AFI still held permits. Mr. Warmack provided the State of Missouri with new reclamation bonds to assure that AFI would reclaim the mining land when its mining operations were finished. The bonds were secured with 24 certificates of deposit, worth approximately $1.4 million.

Mr. Warmack finished mining in 1999 and entered into an agreement with Mr. Jenkins where Mr. Jenkins would fulfill the reclamation obligations and obtain the proceeds of the 24 certificates of deposit and Cimarron’s remaining mining equipment. Mr. Jenkins paid Mr. Warmack $549,250 in exchange for 100% of AFI’s stock and 99% of Cimarron’s stock, certain equipment owned by Cimarron, and the 24 certificates of deposit. On the same day, AFI executed a promissory note for $500,000 to Mr. Jenkins. AFI executed three promissory notes to Mr. Jenkins altogether—two for $500,000 and one for $1,000,000. In 2002, AFI filed a lawsuit against certain state officers and employees, alleging tortious interference with the reclamation efforts. AFI assigned $3,000,000 of its potential recovery to Mr. Jenkins.

Judgment entered for AFI in the tort suit for $6.4 million, which, following an appeal and payment of attorney fees and costs, resulted in a recovery of about $5 million. AFI’s creditors began making claims against the proceeds, and in 2009 AFI applied for help from the bankruptcy court in distributing the funds. Mr. Jenkins filed a proof of claim against AFI’s estate for about $4.3 million. Exercising discretion and applying the Tenth Circuit test for recharacterization, the bankruptcy court recharacterized the transfers evidenced by the promissory notes as equity infusions and found he no longer held a claim secured by the alleged assignment of the suit proceeds. The bankruptcy court held in the alternative that Mr. Jenkins failed to provide sufficient documentation to prove the amount of his claim, and additionally held in the alternative that equitable subordination would be appropriate since Mr. Jenkins had acted inequitably to the detriment of AFI’s creditors and his claim should be subordinated to the level of an unsecured creditor. Mr. Jenkins appealed. The Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed, and Mr. Jenkins again appealed.

The Tenth Circuit first rejected Mr. Jenkins’ argument that two recent Supreme Court decisions overruled Tenth Circuit precedent in In re Hedged Investments. The two cases relied on by Mr. Jenkins dealt with disallowance, not recharacterization, so the Tenth Circuit found the 13-step Hedged Investments recharacterization test applied. The bankruptcy court found three steps superficially supported treating Mr. Jenkins’ advances as loans: the names given to the certificates evidencing indebtedness, no increased participation in management as a result of the advances, and the extent to which the advances were used to acquire capital assets. The Tenth Circuit agreed that these three steps supported treating the advances as loans, but averred they did so more than superficially.

The Tenth Circuit found little support for the bankruptcy court’s determination that other factors necessitated recharacterization. It discounted the bankruptcy court’s decision that the ninth factor, the identity of interest between creditor and shareholder, pointed to recharacterization, finding that because there was only one shareholder this factor did not apply. As for the second factor, the presence or absence of a fixed maturity date, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the court’s finding that the notes lacked a maturity date, finding instead they each required full payment after five years. The fact that Mr. Jenkins did not seek repayment did not render the requirement meaningless. Concerning the eighth factor, recapitalization, the Tenth Circuit found that placing too much emphasis on the factor could discourage investors from funding “rescue efforts” for failing businesses. As to the seventh factor, the intent of the parties, the Tenth Circuit found the parties intended the capital contributions to be treated as loans. The Tenth Circuit balanced the remaining factors and decided the bulk of the Hedged Investments factors weighed against recharacterization. The Tenth Circuit painted a picture of Mr. Jenkins as a sole shareholder loaning money to a failing business in hopes of keeping it afloat.

The Tenth Circuit similarly rejected the bankruptcy court’s alternative holding discharging Mr. Jenkins’ claim because he failed to meet his burden of persuasion as to amount. The Tenth Circuit found the copies of the three promissory notes proved his claim amount. The Tenth Circuit also declined to accept the bankruptcy court’s determination that if Mr. Jenkins’ claim were allowed to proceed it should be equitably subordinated. The Tenth Circuit noted that equitable subordination is an extraordinary remedy that should be employed sparingly and only if three factors are present: inequitable conduct, injury to the other creditors, and consistency with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The Tenth Circuit further noted that the inequitable conduct warranting subordination must be egregious, tantamount to fraud, or involving moral turpitude. The Tenth Circuit found no such conduct from Mr. Jenkins.

The Tenth Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court’s judgment, finding neither recharacterization nor equitable subordination appropriate to Mr. Jenkins’ claims. Judge Phillips wrote a thoughtful and detailed dissent.

Tenth Circuit: Petition for Review of Black Lung Benefits Act Award Denied

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in Antelope Coal Co./Rio Tinto Energy America v. Goodin on Monday, March 3, 2014.

Rolland E. Goodin worked at surface coal mines for 25 years and smoked cigarettes for more than 40 years. He developed a respiratory condition and filed for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act (“BLBA”). An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) awarded Goodin benefits. His employer, Antelope Coal Company/Rio Tinto Energy America (“Antelope”), appealed, and the Department of Labor Benefits Review Board (“Review Board”) affirmed the grant of benefits. Antelope filed this petition for review of the Review Board’s order.

Antelope’s primary argument was that the ALJ wrongly limited its options to rebut a regulatory presumption that Goodin’s work as a coal miner caused his respiratory condition. It argued 20 C.F.R. § 718.305(d), a rule limiting the type of evidence that may be used for rebuttal, should not apply to coal mine operators like Antelope.

The Tenth Circuit first held that to rebut the presumption that a coal miner is disabled under the BLBA due to a respiratory or pulmonary condition when he has worked for 15 years in underground coal mines or substantially similar conditions, the employer must rule out any relationship between the disability and the coal mine employment. This is known as the “rule-out standard.” The second method to rebut the presumption is to prove the claimant does not have the lung condition pneumoconiosis.

The court held there was substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusion that Antelope failed to rebut the presumption under either method and that the ALJ had not limited Antelope’s rebuttal evidence. It found Antelope’s remaining arguments lacked merit. The court denied Antelope’s petition for review.

Tenth Circuit: Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act Appeal Dismissed for Lack of Ripeness

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in Farrell-Cooper Mining Co. v. United States Dep’t of Interior on Thursday, September 5, 2013.

This dispute concerns reclamation requirements contained in surface coal mine permits for Farrell-Cooper’s Liberty Mine #5 and Liberty Mine #6. The terms and administration of such permits are governed by the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA). Oklahoma is a “primacy” state under SMCRA so the Oklahoma Department of Mines (ODM) has enforcement authority unless an exception exists, in which case the United States Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation and Enforcement (OSMRE) has enforcement authority.

In 2011, OSMRE issued a ten-day notice to ODM raising concerns that the Liberty sites had failed to achieve original contour in their reclamation. After various administrative actions, the OSMRE issued notices of violation (NOV) to Farrell-Cooper for both sites.

Farrell-Cooper applied for administrative review before the Department of Interior’s Office of Hearings and Appeals to contest both NOVs. In the midst of these administrative deliberations, Farrell-Cooper filed suit against the Federal Appellees in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma. Farrell-Cooper and ODM sought a declaratory judgment that ODM had “sole and exclusive permitting authority” under Oklahoma’s SMCRA program. The district court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction.

The issue of ripeness had been raised and fully briefed in the district court but the court did not rule on that issue. The Tenth Circuit held that because both Farrell-Cooper and ODM’s claims were conditioned on an ongoing administrative proceeding, and neither party faced harm as the proceeding progresses, their claims were not ripe for review and dismissed the appeal.

Tenth Circuit: ALJ’s Credibility Determinations Deserve Great Weight

The Tenth Circuit issued its opinion in Cordero Mining LLC v. Secretary of Labor on Thursday, November 15, 2012.

Cindy Clapp was a long time employee at a coal mine operated by Cordero Mining. She was terminated after making several complaints about safety issues. The Secretary of Labor filed a complaint of discrimination on her behalf, alleging Cordero violated § 105(c) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (the Act). An ALJ found Cordero had violated the Act and ordered Clapp be reinstated with back pay and imposed a civil penalty of $40,000. As the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission denied review, Cordero petitioned for review of the final decision.

The Tenth Circuit held the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence. Clapp had established a prima facie case of discrimination by 1) showing she engaged in the protected activity of raising safety concerns and 2) that she was terminated for that activity, not for insubordination. The ALJ’s credibility determinations deserved great weight.

The court also rejected Cordero’s challenge to the back pay award as Cordero failed to meet its burden of establishing Clapp “did not exercise reasonable diligence” in finding new employment and thereby mitigating her damages. Finally, the court found substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s civil penalty, including the chilling effect Clapp’s termination would have on other miners.

Tenth Circuit: Dismissal for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies Not Abuse of Discretion

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in Gilmore v. Weatherford on Tuesday, September 4, 2012.

Mine tailings piles known as “chat” have value as fill and gravel. Two piles at issue in this case consist of comingled property because they are owned partially by unrestricted owners and partially by “restricted” owners. The restricted owners are descendants of Quapaw Tribe members who were deemed incompetent and so are unable to freely alienate their property under federal law. Three restricted owners sued Bingham Sand and Gravel for conversion and an accounting for allegedly removing chat without compensating the restricted owners, and Weatherford, as representative of an estate that allegedly sold chat to Bingham. The plaintiffs claimed Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) approval was required for any sale or removal of chat from the piles. The plaintiffs also sued the Secretary of the Interior and BIA officials under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) seeking to compel agency action, and sought an accounting from the BIA.

The district court dismissed the claims against the federal defendants for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Although the accounting claim was not governed by the APA, the district court exercised its judicial discretion to require exhaustion of that claim as well. The Tenth Circuit held that was not an abuse of discretion.

Once the district court dismissed the claims against the federal defendants, it dismissed the claims against the private defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiffs claimed that the removal of the restricted chat required approval of the Secretary of the Interior. The Tenth Circuit reversed the dismissal of all claims regarding the private defendants because the “conversion claim presents a substantial and disputed question of federal law sufficient to confer federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.” With the federal question conversion claim reinstated, the district court could properly exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the accounting claim.


Spark the Discussion: Hemp for Victory

“Spark the Discussion” is a monthly Legal Connection column highlighting the hottest trends in the emerging field of medical marijuana law. This column is brought to you by Vicente Sederberg, LLC, a full-service, community-focused medical marijuana law firm.

By Brian Vicente, Esq. and Rachelle Yeung

In the final weeks of the Colorado legislative session, while House Democrats and Republicans were fiercely battling over same-sex civil unions, a landmark piece of drug policy reform legislation snuck through the Legislature nearly unopposed. The “Hemp Bill,” or HB 12-1099, sets up the framework for the study and use of industrial hemp, and seeks to use this “taboo” crop to clean up contaminated soil through a process called phytoremediation.

The passage of the Hemp Bill is a victory in a 70-year long battle against the prohibition of marijuana and a turning point towards a more sensible approach to drug policy. The regulation of marijuana is a topic of increasing importance to Colorado voters because of Amendment 64, the statewide ballot initiative to regulate marijuana like alcohol, which will be voted on in November. Amendment 64 would also make Colorado the first state in the nation to regulate the cultivation, processing, and sale of industrial hemp.

Historically, hemp production was encouraged in the United States – from being one of the most important crops in colonial America to being promoted by the federal government in a World War II film called “Hemp for Victory.” However, growing hemp has been outlawed since the Controlled Substances Act, because of its close association with marijuana.

Though it shares the same genus (“Cannabis sativa L.”) as its better-known cousin, industrial hemp is distinguished from marijuana by its low concentration of the psychoactive ingredient tetrahydrocannabinols, or THC. Industrial hemp contains no more than three-tenths of a percent of THC.

Several factors make Colorado a particularly compelling candidate for hemp-based phytoremediation. Extensive mining throughout the state has left vast tracts of land contaminated with toxic waste. Phytoremediation would remove those toxins from the ground, which could then be used for agriculture and cattle grazing which are cornerstones of the state’s economy. Finally, a plant requiring very little water to grow – like hemp – is a necessity in a water-constrained state like Colorado.

The use of industrial hemp in phytoremediation is not entirely novel. In 1986, the explosion at the Chernobyl Nuclear Plant caused severe radioactive contamination in areas up to 100 km away. Soil in that area became saturated with toxic waste and heavy-metals which rendered it useless for agriculture. In 1998, a group called PHYTOTECH began growing hemp in the area to decontaminate the soil and, according to Slavik Dushenkov, a research scientist with the company, “Hemp prov[ed] to be one of the best phytoremediative plants we have been able to find.”

Activists hope that phytoremediation is just the introduction of industrial hemp into mainstream use. Hemp is cheap and easy to grow, requiring few pesticides and no herbicides. It can be used in textiles, construction materials, paper products, and even body care products. Hemp seed is considered a “superfood” – a good source of protein and dietary fiber, high in B-vitamins and essential omega-3 and omega-6 fatty acids. Hemp can even be reduced to ethanol and biofuel, a boon to our petroleum-addicted society. Some activists go so far as calling hemp “the plant that could save the world.”

A similar bill was introduced in the Colorado Legislature in 1994 by then-Senator Loyd Casey, but received only a single, sad vote before disappearing into history. If Governor Hickenlooper gives this year’s HB-1099 his stamp of approval – and given its support in the Legislature, there is no reason he would not – Colorado could become the first state in the nation to grow industrial hemp since the 1930s.

Brian Vicente, Esq., is a founding member of Vicente Consulting, LLC, a law firm providing legal solutions for the medical marijuana community. He also serves as executive director of Sensible Colorado, the state’s leading non-profit working for medical marijuana patients and providers. Brian is the chair of the Denver Mayor’s Marijuana Policy Review Panel, serves on the Colorado Department of Revenue Medical Marijuana Oversight Panel, and coordinates the Colorado Bar Association’s Drug Policy Project.The opinions and views expressed by Featured Bloggers on CBA-CLE Legal Connection do not necessarily represent the opinions and views of the Colorado Bar Association, the Denver Bar Association, or CBA-CLE, and should not be construed as such.

Tenth Circuit: Panel Decision Affirmed Granting Lifetime and Survivor Benefits under Black Lung Benefits Act

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in Bridger Coal Co. v. United States Dep’t of Labor on Tuesday, February 28, 2012.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the panel decision. Under the Black Lung Benefits Act, a coal miner who is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis from coal mine employment is entitled to lifetime benefits. If the miner dies due to pneumoconiosis from coal mine employment, the miner’s surviving spouse is entitled to benefits. Pursuant to the Act’s administrative provisions, an Administrative Law Judge awarded lifetime benefits to Merrill D. Lambright and survivor benefits to his widow in 2005. Lambright’s claims arose out of his employment with Petitioner Coal Company. In 2006, a three-member panel of the U.S. Department of Labor Benefits Review Board vacated the ALJ’s decision and remanded for reconsideration. In 2008, the ALJ denied benefits on both the lifetime and survivor claims. In 2009, a three-member panel of the Board reversed this decision and reinstated the 2005 ALJ’s award of benefits. On reconsideration en banc, the full five-member Board was unable to reach a disposition in which at least three permanent members concurred. As a result, the 2009 panel decision stood. Petitioner appeals, challenging the scope of the 2009 panel’s authority to review the 2008 ALJ decision, the standard used in determining whether to award benefits, and the onset-date determination. The Court affirmed the 2009 panel decision.

Colorado Supreme Court: Statewide Voter Approval Not Required when Making Adjustments to the Tax Due on Coal Extracted from Colorado Lands

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Huber, Exec. Dir., Colorado Dep’t of Revenue v. Colorado Mining Assoc. on October 31, 2011.

CRS § 39-29-106—Amendement 1—Colo. Const. art. X, § 20—Taxation—Prospective Application of Constitutional Amendment.

The Supreme Court held that statewide voter approval is not required when the Department of Revenue implements quarterly adjustments to the tax due per ton of coal extracted from Colorado lands as required by CRS § 39-29-106. The court of appeals’ judgment was reversed.

The General Assembly adopted the coal severance tax of CRS § 39-29-106 in 1988, before approval of Amendment 1, Colo. Const. art. X, § 20. Amendment 1 requires advance voter approval for new taxes, tax rate increases, and tax policy changes that directly cause net revenue gains. CRS § 39-29-106 establishes a tax rate with two components to calculate the severance tax owed: (1) a base rate of $0.36 per ton of coal extracted; and (2) a quarterly 1% increase or decrease to the base rate calculated by changes to the index of producers’ prices, a federally prepared economic index that roughly tracks inflation.

After Amendment 1 became effective, the Department of Revenue suspended implementation of the statutorily required quarterly adjustments to the tax due, leaving in place a tax of $0.54 per ton of coal extracted. In 2007, the Department of Revenue concluded that implementation of the two-part tax rate formula was non-discretionary and did not conflict with Amendment 1, and it adjusted the tax due to $0.76 per ton. The court of appeals concluded that each time the Department of Revenue calculates an upward adjustment in the tax due, Amendment 1 requires statewide voter approval.

The Supreme Court concluded that Amendment 1 is prospective in application and that implementation of the two-part tax rate formula in CRS § 39-29-106 (the base rate plus the non-discretionary adjustment factor) is not a “tax rate increase.” Instead, collection of the tax as prescribed is a non-discretionary duty required of the Department of Revenue by a taxing statute that is not subject to Amendment 1’s voter approval requirements. Because the Department of Revenue has no discretion to increase or alter the tax rate formula of CRS § 39-29-106, Amendment 1’s prospective check on the legislature does not apply.

Summary and full case available here.

HB 11-1308: Distributing Federal Mineral Leasing Revenues Related to Naval Oil Shale Reserves

On April 27, 2011, Rep. Randy Baumgardner, R-Steamboat Springs, and Sen. Steve King, R-Grand Junction, introduced HB 11-1308 – Concerning the distribution of federal mineral leasing revenues related to naval oil shale reserves to affected counties in Colorado. This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.

The bill specifies that all moneys received by the state from the United States treasury out of the anvil points fund shall be directly transferred by the state treasurer to the county treasurers of the affected counties as follows:

  • 40% to Garfield county;
  • 40% to Rio Blanco county;
  • 10% to Mesa county; and
  • 10% to Moffat county.

Assigned to the Agriculture, Livestock, & Natural Resources Committee; the bill is scheduled for committee review on Wednesday, May 4, Upon Adjournment.

Since this summary, the bill was postponed indefinitely.

Summaries of other featured bills can be found here.