September 25, 2018

Colorado Court of Appeals: DUI Defendant Not Entitled to Have Jury Decide Existence of Prior Convictions for Sentence Enhancement

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Gwinn on Thursday, September 6, 2018.

Criminal Law—Driving While under the Influence of Alcohol—Evidence—Impeachment—Direct Examination—Jury Instruction—Search Warrant—Prior DUI Convictions—Sentence Enhancer—Preponderance of the Evidence.

Gwinn rear-ended another car while driving home from work and was arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Gwinn admitted drinking four beers before the accident occurred. After a jury convicted Gwinn of DUI and careless driving, the trial court, in a separate proceeding, found that Gwinn had three prior DUI convictions, adjudicated him a felony DUI offender, and sentenced him to 30 months of probation, two years of work release, and 90 days in the county jail.

On appeal, Gwinn first contended that the trial court’s refusal to allow the testimony of eight current and former Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) employees deprived him of his constitutional right to present a defense. Gwinn sought to introduce this testimony to show that the Intoxilyzer 9000 breath test machine did not produce accurate results. The trial court did not err when it granted CDPHE’s motion to quash the witness subpoenas, finding that the testimony was irrelevant to Gwinn’s refusal because it failed to establish Gwinn’s knowledge of the Intoxilyzer 9000’s alleged deficiencies at the time he refused to submit to chemical testing. Because the accuracy of the breath test machine was not relevant, Gwinn was not deprived of the right to present a defense.

Gwinn next contended that the trial court erroneously permitted the prosecutor to lead a friendly witness, Officer Perez, “under the guise of impeachment” where no impeachment occurred. Because Officer Perez’s direct testimony that Gwinn’s speech “sounded normal” was contradicted by his previous statement in the sobriety examination report that Gwinn’s speech was “mumbled,” no error occurred when the trial court allowed impeachment with leading questions about a prior statement.

Gwinn next argued that the trial court erroneously admitted People’s Exhibit 1, an express consent affidavit and notice of revocation form, under CRE 403. Officer Perez testified that he reviewed the express consent affidavit with Gwinn, which made the affidavit relevant to Gwinn’s knowledge of the consequences of his refusal to take a chemical test. Here, the trial court properly admitted the exhibit under CRE 803(6).

Gwinn also contended that the trial court erroneously rejected a tendered instruction informing the jury that law enforcement may obtain a search warrant to compel a defendant to submit to a blood test and instructing the jury that it was permitted to draw an inference from an officer’s failure to employ this procedure that the officer did not believe there was evidence to support a search warrant. However, the officer was not required to obtain a search warrant, and the officer testified that he does not usually do so in DUI cases. Therefore, there was no error.

Gwinn last contended that his prior DUI convictions trial, conducted by the trial court, violated his federal constitutional right to a jury trial. The General Assembly intended prior DUI convictions to constitute a sentence enhancer rather than an element of DUI. A defendant is not entitled to have a jury determine the existence of the prior DUI convictions used to enhance his sentence from a misdemeanor to a felony. Further, the prosecution’s burden of proving prior convictions is by a preponderance of the evidence not, as Gwinn argued, beyond a reasonable doubt.

The judgment was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Noncustodial Escape Convictions Precluded from Use as Current Conviction for Habitual Offender Purposes

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Jompp on Thursday, September 6, 2018.

Criminal Law—Speedy Trial—Insufficient Evidence—Robbery—Assault—Noncustodial Escape—Jury Instructions—Lesser Nonincluded Offense—Resisting Arrest—Sixth Amendment—Habitual Criminal.

Jompp, the victim, and an acquaintance, B.B., were driving around one evening in a stolen car while high on methamphetamine. After they picked up C.P., they later pulled the vehicle over and a fight broke out between Jompp and the victim. Jompp, B.B., and C.P. left the victim unconscious on the ground, and the victim later died of his injuries. Days later, police found Jompp. After the police handcuffed Jompp, he took off running. After a short chase he was caught and taken to jail. A jury convicted Jompp of third degree assault, robbery, and escape. The trial court adjudicated Jompp a habitual criminal and sentenced him to 48 years in prison.

On appeal, Jompp contended that the court violated his speedy trial rights by continuing his jury trial, over his objection, beyond six months after he pleaded not guilty and 13 months after he was arrested. Here, the trial court acted within its discretion by relying on the prosecution’s offer of proof that they were diligently trying to find B.B. to secure her testimony at trial and by finding that there was a reasonable possibility that B.B. would be available to testify. Therefore, there was sufficient record evidence to support the court’s granting of the prosecution’s request for a continuance. Further, the trial court didn’t plainly err because Jompp’s constitutional right to a speedy trial wasn’t obviously violated.

Jompp also contended that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence that he committed robbery, as either a principal or accomplice. Here, after Jompp attacked the victim, B.B. said she then saw C.P. get out of the car, go over to the victim, and start digging through his pockets. C.P. admitted that she went through the victim’s pockets to get money at Jompp’s direction and she gave him the money she found. Further, the court of appeals rejected Jompp’s argument that the prosecution had to show that the force he used against the victim was calculated to take the victim’s money. The record contained sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that Jompp robbed the victim.

Jompp next contended that the court erred by failing to instruct the jury that it could convict him of the lesser nonincluded offense of resisting arrest. Here, the undisputed record evidence showed that Jompp was in custody. He had already submitted to the police officer’s instructions, was handcuffed, searched, and led by the arm to a patrol car for transport to jail before he ran from the officer. Therefore, the court didn’t abuse its discretion by declining to instruct the jury on the crime of resisting arrest.

Finally, Jompp contended that the court convicted him in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial when, at sentencing, it, not the jury, found that he had prior convictions and increased his sentence under the habitual criminal sentencing statute. Jompp failed to preserve this issue at trial, and the prior conviction exception remains well-settled law, so the trial court did not err.

Finally, Jompp contended that his sentence is illegal because his noncustodial escape conviction can’t be deemed a current offense under the habitual criminal statute. The court held that C.R.S. § 18-1.3-801(5) (2013) precluded a noncustodial escape conviction from being used as a current conviction for adjudicating a defendant a habitual criminal under subsection (2) of that section. Therefore, the trial court erred in adjudicating Jompp a habitual criminal on his noncustodial escape conviction.

The judgment of conviction was affirmed. The part of the sentence based on Jompp’s escape conviction was vacated and the case was remanded for resentencing on that conviction. The remainder of the sentence was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Criminal Mischief Included in First Degree Arson if Both Offenses Based on Same Conduct

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Welborne on Thursday, September 6, 2018.

Criminal Law—First Degree Arson—Criminal Mischief—Theft—Double Jeopardy—Merger—Lesser Included Offense.

Welborne and his mother were charged with setting fire to their rented house and then filing false insurance claims based on the fire damage. Welborne was convicted of first degree arson, criminal mischief, theft, and attempted theft. The court of appeals previously rejected his challenges to his convictions based on Reyna-Abarca v. People, 2017 CO 15. After this decision, the Colorado Supreme Court clarified Reyna-Abarca and vacated the court’s judgment here as to the included offense statute and remanded this case.

On appeal, Welborne contended that criminal mischief is an included offense of first degree arson and, therefore, those convictions must merge under both statutory and double jeopardy dictates. Criminal mischief is included in first degree arson where both offenses are based on the same conduct. Here, when Welborne knowingly burned the rented house without the owner’s consent, he committed both criminal mischief and first degree arson. The failure to merge the convictions was plain error.

The criminal mischief conviction and sentence were vacated. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. The case was remanded for the trial court to correct the mittimus.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Convictions for Introducing and Possessing Contraband Should Have Merged at Sentencing

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Jamison on Thursday, August 23, 2018.

Criminal Law—Jury Instructions—Lesser Nonincluded Offense—Evidence—Prosecutorial Misconduct—Merger—Double Jeopardy—Possessing Contraband—Introducing Contraband by Making.

Jamison was an inmate at a Department of Corrections detention facility. During a random search of his cell, a corrections officer found an altered toothbrush behind Jamison’s mattress. The toothbrush had been sharpened at one end and a razor blade had been affixed to the other end. Jamison was found guilty of introducing contraband in the first degree and possessing contraband in the first degree.

On appeal, Jamison contended that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the two lesser nonincluded offenses, second degree introducing contraband and second degree possession of contraband. However, there was no evidence that the altered toothbrush could cut fence or wire, which was needed to convict Jamison of either second degree offense. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the defense-tendered instructions on the lesser nonincluded offenses.

Jamison also argued that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to refer to the toothbrush as a dangerous instrument and to elicit testimony to the same effect. Although the prosecutor’s pervasive references to the toothbrush as a dangerous instrument were largely improper, there was no basis for reversal because the evidence against Jamison was overwhelming.

Finally, Jamison contended that his convictions for introducing contraband in the first degree and possessing contraband in the first degree should have merged at sentencing. First degree possession of contraband is a lesser included offense of first degree introducing contraband by making, and the convictions should have merged. The trial court erred in entering convictions for both offenses.

The conviction for introducing contraband in the first degree was affirmed. The conviction for possessing contraband in the first degree was vacated and the case was remanded for correction of the mittimus.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Penalty Enhancer Applies to Any Conduct in Furtherance of Offense that Occurs in Close Proximity to Victim

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Trejo Lopez on Thursday, August 23, 2018.

Criminal Law—Theft—At-Risk-Adult—Challenge for Cause—Jury—Presumption of Innocence—Sentence Enhancer.

Defendant and the 70-year-old victim had been neighbors in a mobile home park. While visiting the victim in his trailer, defendant asked to use the bathroom, took a gun that was hanging on the bathroom wall and put it into his backpack, and then left the premises. The jury convicted defendant of theft from an at-risk adult under C.R.S. § 18-6.5-103(5).

On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred when it denied his challenge for cause to prospective juror H.S. Defense counsel challenged H.S. for cause because she seemed confused about the presumption of innocence and expressed anti-gun views. H.S.’s comments about the presumption of innocence revealed confusion rather than evinced a bias or inability to follow and apply the law, and she was articulate in explaining her views. When she did not respond to the court’s final questions, it was reasonable for the court to conclude that she would follow the law. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s challenge for cause to H.S.

Defendant also contended that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed any element or portion of the theft in the presence of the victim. Defendant argued that the theft was completed when he took possession of the gun in the bathroom and outside the presence of the victim. C.R.S. § 18-6.5-103 enhances the penalties for theft when any element or portion of the offense is committed in the presence of an at-risk person, which is any person 70 years of age or older. “Portion of the offense” means conduct taken in furtherance of the crime that occurs in temporal proximity to an element of the offense and is physically close to the victim. Here, immediately after taking possession of the gun, defendant left the bathroom and walked a few feet away from the victim as he left the trailer, and defendant spoke with the victim before leaving with the gun. Therefore, defendant committed a portion of the theft in the victim’s presence.

Defendant also argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it rejected his tendered jury instruction on “presence” and declined to issue an alternate instruction defining the term. Providing the jury with defendant’s instruction, which required proof of additional elements not found in the charged crime, would have been an inaccurate instruction. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.

The judgment was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Consecutive Sentence Lawful Beyond Life with Possibility of Parole After 40 Years for Juvenile Offender

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Davis on Thursday, August 8, 2018.

Criminal LawJuvenileMotion to SuppressWaiverRight to TestifySentencingEighth Amendment.

When Davis was 17 years old, he and McGrath robbed the victim, McGrath’s former coworker. The victim was transporting money to a bank from the restaurant at which he and McGrath had worked. In the course of the robbery, the victim was shot and killed. Davis was convicted of first degree murder after deliberation, felony murder, aggravated robbery, aggravated motor vehicle theft, conspiracy to commit first degree murder, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. As required by statute, the trial court sentenced him to life in the custody of the Department of Corrections with the possibility of parole after 40 years (LWPP-40) on the murder after deliberation count. Additionally, the trial court imposed a consecutive sentence of eight years and one day on the aggravated robbery count. The sentences imposed for the remaining counts were ordered to run concurrently with the sentences to life plus eight years and a day. The felony murder conviction was merged with the conviction for murder after deliberation. Davis filed two Crim. P. 35(c) motions, which the district court denied in a series of orders.

On appeal, Davis contended that the trial court violated his constitutional rights when it denied his motion to suppress statements he made during police interrogation, arguing that the Denver detective violated his right to counsel by continuing an interrogation after he asked for an attorney. Davis’ statements were admissible because although Davis had previously asked for an attorney, he had voluntarily reinitiated the interrogation by asking the Denver detective whether McGrath had been arrested. Even assuming that the trial court erred in denying the motion, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the relative insignificance of the statements to the People’s case and the substantial evidence of guilt.

Davis also argued that reversal is required because he never executed an on-the-record waiver of his right to testify. Where the trial court’s on-the-record advisement includes the five essential elements set forth in People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504, 514 (Colo. 1984), as occurred here, the record conclusively demonstrates that defendant made a valid waiver of the right to testify. Further, Davis did not present any evidence to show that despite the Curtis advisement, his waiver was nonetheless invalid. Thus, the district court did not err in concluding that Davis knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to testify.

Davis next contended that his sentence of LWPP-40 together with a sentence of eight years plus one day is unconstitutional. LWPP-40 is a constitutional sentence, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Davis to eight years and one day to run consecutively to his LWPP-40 sentence. Further, Colorado’s parole system provides juveniles sentenced to LWPP-40 a meaningful and realistic opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.

The orders were affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: 32-Year Habitual Offender Sentence Does Not Raise Inference of Gross Disproportionalilty

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Loris on Thursday, July 26, 2018.

Criminal Law—Possession—Intent to Distribute—Controlled Substance—Manslaughter—Habitual Criminal Statute—Sentencing—Drug Felonies—Gross Disproportionality.

Defendant sold methamphetamine to three individuals. As part of the deal, she agreed to accept a handgun for the drugs. After the parties had been drinking and smoking methamphetamine, defendant handled the gun and it went off. The bullet struck the victim in the head, killing him. Defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, manslaughter, and four habitual criminal counts. The four habitual criminal counts were based on prior state felony convictions. Applying the habitual criminal sentence multiplier, the district court sentenced defendant to concurrent sentences of 32 years for possession with intent to distribute and 24 years for manslaughter.

On appeal, defendant contended that her 32-year sentence raises an inference of gross disproportionality and therefore requires a remand for an extended proportionality review. Here, defendant’s triggering offense of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance was per se grave or serious. Defendant’s underlying conviction for conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance is also a per se grave or serious offense. The gravity of defendant’s offenses as a whole compared to the severity of her 32-year habitual criminal sentence does not merit a remand for an extended proportionality review. Defendant’s 32-year sentence does not raise an inference of gross disproportionality.

Defendant also contended that the district court lacked authority under the habitual criminal statute to sentence her to a 32-year sentence for a level 2 drug felony. The sentence multiplier of the habitual criminal statute applies to convictions “for any felony.” The district court had authority to sentence defendant to a term of 32 years under the habitual criminal statute.

The sentence was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Probationary DUI Sentence Inappropriate Where Defendant Convicted of a Felony

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Coleman on Thursday, May 17, 2018.

Aggravated Driving After Revocation Prohibited—Driving Under the Influence—Careless Driving—Department of Corrections—Probation—Miranda—Motion to Suppress—Prosecutorial Misconduct—Illegal Sentence.

Coleman was convicted of aggravated driving after revocation prohibited—driving under the influence (ADARP); driving under the influence (DUI)—third or subsequent alcohol related offense; and careless driving. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of one year in the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC) on the ADARP conviction; one year of jail and one year of additional jail, suspended subject to completion of four years of probation, on the DUI conviction; and 90 days in jail on the careless driving conviction.

On appeal, Coleman contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He argued that because he was in custody when he first said he wanted to be taken to bond out and had not yet been given a Miranda advisement, that statement should have been suppressed. However, Coleman was not in custody during the brief traffic stop for Miranda purposes. Therefore, it was not error to deny the motion to suppress.

Coleman next contended that the prosecutor’s comments in summation on his pre-arrest and post-arrest silence violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination. Because defense counsel opened the door on the subject, Coleman’s pre-arrest silence was at issue, and the prosecutor’s comment was not error. Additionally, although the prosecutor’s comment on Coleman’s post-arrest silence was error, it was brief and did not materially contribute to defendant’s conviction. Therefore, there was no reversible error for this comment.

Lastly, Coleman contended that his probationary sentence is illegal under the DUI sentencing statute, C.R.S. § 42-4-1307. C.R.S. § 42-4-1307(6) prohibits a trial court from imposing probation on a defendant sentenced to DOC custody where that defendant has been sentenced to prison on a felony. Because Coleman cannot be sentenced to both the custody of the DOC and probation, his sentence was improper.

The judgment of conviction was affirmed. The entire sentence was vacated and the case was remanded for resentencing.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Absent Statutorily Authorized Order Reserving Restitution, Final Judgment Finalizes Restitution Amount

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Belibi on Monday, April 9, 2018.

Sentencing—Restitution.

The People petitioned for review of the court of appeals’ judgment reversing the amended restitution order of the district court, which substantially increased Belibi’s restitution obligation after his judgment of conviction. See People v. Belibi, No. 14CA1239 (Colo. App. May 14, 2015). Following the acceptance of Belibi’s guilty plea, the imposition of a sentence to probation (including a stipulation to $4,728 restitution), and the entry of judgment, the district court amended its restitution order to require the  payment of an additional $302,022 in restitution. The court of appeals held that in the absence of anything in the court’s written or oral pronouncements reserving a final determination of the amount of restitution, the initial restitution order had become final  and could not be amended. The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. A judgment of conviction, absent a statutorily authorized order reserving a determination of the final amount of restitution due, finalizes any specific amount already set. Therefore, the sentencing court lacked the power to increase restitution beyond the previously set amount of $4,728.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Annotation “RR” on Form Guilty Plea Insufficient to Reserve Final Restitution

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Meza v. People on Monday, April 9, 2018.

Sentencing—Restitution.

Meza petitioned for review of the judgment of the district court (sitting as the court of direct appellate review pursuant to the simplified procedure for county court convictions), which affirmed the county court’s order granting a motion for additional restitution. See People v. Meza, No. 14CV33017 (Denver Dist. Ct. May 15, 2015). The county court ordered the requested additional amount of restitution, finding that the victim had suffered a loss of $936.85 that was not known to the People nor the court at sentencing, when restitution was initially, but not finally, set at $150. On appeal, the district court found that the annotation “RR” on the form guilty plea was sufficient to reserve the final amount of restitution and that the record supported the county court’s finding of an additional loss not known at sentencing; and it therefore affirmed the increase as having been sanctioned by C.R.S. § 18-1.3-603(3)(a). The supreme court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case to the district court with directions to order reinstatement of the $150 restitution order entered prior to judgment of conviction. A judgment of conviction, absent a statutorily authorized order reserving a determination of the final amount of restitution, finalizes any specific amount already set. Because the court ordered no reservation in this case, it lacked the power to increase the amount of restitution it had previously set.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Trial Court Did Not Abuse Discretion by Failing to Appoint GAL Sua Sponte

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Ybanez v. People on Monday, March 12, 2018.

Ybanez petitioned for review of the court of appeals’ judgment affirming his conviction of first degree murder and directing that his sentence of life without the possibility of parole be modified only to the extent of permitting the possibility of parole after forty years. See People v. Ybanez, No. 11CA0434 (Colo. App. Feb. 13, 2014). In an appeal of his conviction and sentence, combined with an appeal of the partial denial of his motion for postconviction relief, the intermediate appellate court rejected Ybanez’s assertions that the trial court abused its discretion and violated his constitutional rights by failing to sua sponte appoint a guardian ad litem; that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel both because his counsel’s performance was adversely affected by a non-waivable conflict of interest under which that counsel labored and because he was prejudiced by a deficient performance by his counsel; and that he was entitled to an individualized determination regarding the length of his sentence rather than merely the possibility of parole after forty years.

The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case with directions to return it to the trial court for resentencing consistent with the supreme court opinion, for the reasons that Ybanez lacked any constitutional right to a guardian ad litem and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not appointing one as permitted by statute; that Ybanez failed to demonstrate either an adverse effect resulting from an actual conflict of interest, even if his counsel actually labored under a conflict, or that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s performance, even if it actually fell below the required standard of competent representation; and that Ybanez is constitutionally and statutorily entitled only to an individualized determination whether life without the possibility of parole or life with the possibility of parole after forty years is the appropriate sentence.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Indeterminate Sentence for Juvenile Illegal Pursuant to Children’s Code

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People in Interest of J.C. on Thursday, February 22, 2018.

Juvenile—Delinquency—Indeterminate Sentence—Mandatory Sentence Offender—Repeat Juvenile Offender—Multiple Adjudications—Illegal Sentence.

J.C., a juvenile, pleaded guilty to charges in three separate cases, pursuant to a global plea agreement, on the same day during a hearing addressing all three cases. She pleaded guilty first to a third-degree assault charge, then to a second-degree criminal trespass charge, and finally to a second-degree assault charge. The court accepted the pleas and adjudicated J.C. delinquent in all three cases. The juvenile court sentenced J.C. to an indeterminate one-to-two-year term of commitment in the custody of the Division of Youth Corrections (DYC), with a mandatory minimum term of one year.

J.C. filed a motion to correct illegal sentence, arguing that the court lacked authority to sentence her to a mandatory minimum period of confinement as a mandatory sentence offender because the three adjudications required for the relevant statute to apply had all occurred at the same hearing. The court denied the motion. J.C. then filed for postconviction relief, alleging that she received ineffective assistance of plea counsel and that she hadn’t knowingly, voluntarily, or intentionally pleaded guilty. In denying the motion, as relevant here, the court ruled that because it was not shown that the court relied on the “mandatory sentence offender” classification, J.C. did not show prejudice.

On appeal, J.C. argued that the juvenile court erred by summarily denying her petition for postconviction relief because she had alleged that neither her lawyer nor the court had advised her that she would be sentenced as a repeat juvenile offender. She alleged that she was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance and the court’s failure to advise her because she wouldn’t have pleaded guilty if she’d known she would be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of confinement. The court of appeals reviewed the entire juvenile sentencing scheme and concluded that a court may not sentence a juvenile to DYC for an indeterminate term. Because the court sentenced J.C. to one to two years in DYC, her sentence is indeterminate and therefore illegal.

Because the issue will likely arise on remand, the court also addressed whether the juvenile court may sentence J.C. to a mandatory minimum period of commitment. A mandatory minimum sentence to DYC commitment is authorized only if the juvenile qualifies as a special offender under C.R.S. § 19-2-908. Two categories of special offenders are relevant here: mandatory sentence offenders and repeat juvenile offenders. However, a juvenile doesn’t qualify as a mandatory sentence offender under C.R.S. § 19-2-516(1) or a repeat juvenile offender under C.R.S. § 19-2-516(2), when, as in this case, the multiple adjudications required by those provisions occurred in the same hearing. Therefore, the juvenile court couldn’t have legally sentenced J.C. to a mandatory minimum term of commitment as a mandatory sentence offender or repeat juvenile offender and cannot do so on remand.

The sentence was vacated and the case was remanded with directions to resentence J.C.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.