November 18, 2018

Colorado Court of Appeals: Sex Offender Registration Act Requires Registry for Individuals with More than One Conviction for Unlawful Sexual Behavior

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. McCulley on Thursday, June 28, 2018.

Sexual Assault—Deferred Judgment—Plea Agreement—Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act—Petition for Removal from Registry.

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of second degree sexual assault and one count of third degree sexual assault and entered into a plea agreement. Among other things, the plea agreement provided that the trial court would dismiss the felony charge once defendant complied with his deferred judgment. A condition of the deferred judgment was that defendant register as a sex offender pursuant to the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). Defendant completed his deferred judgment and the felony charge was dismissed. Years later, defendant filed a petition to discontinue the requirement that he register as a sex offender. The trial court denied the motion.

On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred by construing the term “conviction” under SORA to include a successfully completed deferred judgment. SORA’s plain language provides that the term “conviction” as used in C.R.S. § 16-22-113(3)(c) includes a successfully completed deferred judgment.

The order was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Bills Signed Changing Definition of “Similar Coverage” for Workers’ Compensation Coverage of Certain Commercial Vehicle Operators and More

On Friday, May 4, 2018, Governor Hickenlooper signed 12 bills into law. To date, he has signed 223 bills and sent two to the Secretary of State without a signature. The bills signed Friday include a bill changing procedures for recalls of directors of special districts, a bill changing the definition of “similar coverage” for workers’ compensation purposes for certain operators of commercial vehicles, and more. The bills signed Friday are summarized here.

  • SB 18-076 – “Concerning a Ban on Vote Trading,” by Sen. Kevin Lundberg and Rep. Jovan Melton. The bill makes it a misdemeanor criminal offense for a person to trade a vote or offer to trade a vote with another elector in this state or a person in another state in exchange for the other person’s vote for or against a particular candidate, ballot issue, or ballot question.
  • SB 18-143 – “Concerning Measures to Increase Revenue for the Parks and Wildlife Division, and, in Connection Therewith, Setting Certain Hunting, Fishing, Parks, and Recreation Fees,” by Sens. Steven Fenberg & Don Coram and Reps. Jeni James Arndt & James Wilson. The bill makes several changes to the statutes in the “Hunting, Fishing, and Parks for Future Generations Act.”
  • SB 18-178 – “Concerning the Definition of Similar Coverage for Workers’ Compensation for Certain Operators of Commercial Vehicles,” by Sen. Jim Smallwood and Rep. Tracy Kraft-Tharp. Current law requires independent operators of commercial vehicles to have workers’ compensation or a private insurance policy that provides similar coverage. The bill changes ‘private insurance policy’ to ‘occupational accident coverage insurance policy’ and specifies the requirements for when such a policy may be considered as providing similar coverage.
  • SB 18-207 – “Concerning Authority for the Department of Human Services to Retain Amounts from Certain Cash Funds for its Indirect Costs,” by Sen. Dominick Moreno and Rep. Bob Rankin. The bill authorizes the department of human services to retain money for its indirect costs, based on a federally approved cost allocation plan, from the older Coloradans cash fund and the nurse home visitor program fund.
  • HB 18-1040 – “Concerning Incentives for Provision of Sex Offender Services in the Department of Corrections,” by Rep. Adrienne Benavidez and Sen. Rhonda Fields. The bill requires the department of corrections to monitor the number of inmates who need sex offender treatment or services and the number who are not receiving such treatment or services, develop an incentive plan to contract for more mental health professionals to provide sex offender treatment or services in difficult-to-serve geographic areas, and report to the joint budget committee the number of inmates needing treatment or services, the number not receiving the treatment or services, and the impact of the incentive plan.
  • HB 18-1235 – “Concerning the Continuation of the Regulation of Custom Meat Processors, and, in Connection Therewith, Implementing the Recommendations of the 2017 Sunset Report of the Department of Regulatory Agencies,” by Reps. Chris Hansen & Hugh McKean and Sen. Ray Scott. The bill implements the recommendations of the Department of Regulatory Agencies in its sunset review and report on the ‘Custom Processing of Meat Animals Act.’
  • HB 18-1240 – “Concerning the Continuation of a Grant Program to Prevent Motor Vehicle Theft, and, in Connection Therewith, Implementing the Sunset Review Recommendations of the Department of Regulatory Agencies,” by Reps. Jeff Bridges & Jon Becker and Sen. John Cooke. The bill continues the automobile theft prevention authority and the automobile theft prevention board until 2029.
  • HB 18-1265 – “Concerning the Continuation of the Stroke Advisory Board in Accordance with the Recommendation in the Department of Regulatory Agencies’ 2017 Sunset Report,” by Reps. Susan Lontine & Susan Beckman and Sen. Larry Crowder. The Bill implements the recommendation in the department of regulatory agencies’ sunset review of the stroke advisory board by continuing the board but imposes a 10-year sunset period rather than continuing the board indefinitely, as was recommended.
  • HB 18-1268 – “Concerning the Procedures to Recall a Director of a Special District,” by Rep. Matt Gray and Sen. Bob Gardner. The bill requires the court as defined for the special district to appoint a designated election official to oversee the recall election. The director and the director’s spouse or civil union partner cannot serve as the DEO. The bill requires that recall petitions must be approved as to form by the DEO before being circulated.
  • HB 18-1305 – “Concerning a Voluntary Contribution Designation Benefiting the Young Americans Center for Financial Education Fund that Appears on the State Individual Tax Return Forms,” by Reps. James Coleman & Patrick Neville and Sen. Tim Neville. The bill creates the Young Americans Center for Financial Education fund in the state treasury. A voluntary contribution designation line for the fund will appear on the state individual income tax return form for the 5 income tax years following the year that the executive director of the Department of Revenue certifies to the revisor of statutes that there is space on the form and the fund is next in the queue.
  • HB 18-1329 – “Concerning a Supplemental State Payment to Qualified Providers of Durable Medical Equipment who Experienced a Decrease in Reimbursement in the 2017-18 State Fiscal Year as a Result of the Implementation of the Federal ’21st Century Cures Act,’ and, in Connection Therewith, Making an Appropriation,” by Rep. Bob Rankin and Sen. Dominick Moreno. The bill authorizes a supplemental payment of state-only money to qualified providers of durable medical equipment who experienced a decrease in reimbursement in the 2017-18 state fiscal year as a result of the implementation of the federal ’21st Century Cures Act.’
  • HB 18-1338 – “Concerning Transfers to Address the Reduction of Revenues in the Severance Tax Operational Fund,” by Rep. Bob Rankin and Sen. Kent Lambert. Under current law, money is transferred from the severance tax operational fund to certain cash funds to benefit programs that are commonly referred to as the tier 2 programs. On June 30, 2018, the bill requires the state treasurer to transfer money to the operational fund from specified cash funds to recoup money that was previously transferred in this fiscal year for tier 2 programs.

For a complete list of Governor Hickenlooper’s 2018 legislative decisions, click here.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Statutory “First Petition Filed with the Court” Language Does Not Encompass Later Additions

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People in Interest of I.S. on Thursday, December 14, 2017.

Juvenile—Sex Offender Registration—Exemption—C.R.S. § 16-22-103.

I.S., a juvenile, was originally charged in a delinquency petition with three felony counts of sexual assault on a child. Under a plea deal, the prosecution added a fourth misdemeanor count of unlawful sexual contact to its petition, to which I.S. pleaded guilty in return for the three felony counts being dismissed. At sentencing, I.S. argued that because the prosecution had added a misdemeanor offense to the first petition instead of filing a second petition, his misdemeanor offense had been charged in the first petition as required by C.R.S. § 16-22-103(5)(a)(III) and he was thus exempt from registering as a sex offender. Because the first petition filed with the court charged I.S. with the three felony counts of sexual assault on a child and not the misdemeanor, the district court ruled that I.S. must register as a sex offender.

On appeal, I.S. contended that the court erred in denying his request for exemption from sex offender registration. Under C.R.S. § 16-22-103(5)(a), a court may exempt a person from registering as a sex offender when five criteria are met, including the requirement that the first petition filed with the court must charge a misdemeanor offense of either unlawful sexual contact or indecent exposure. The “first petition filed with the court” does not encompass later amendments to that petition. Because the original petition in this case did not charge a misdemeanor offense of either unlawful sexual contact or indecent exposure, I.S. is not eligible for relief under this statute and must register as a sex offender.

The order was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Minimum Sentence for Indeterminate Range Should Be Three Times the Presumptive Maximum

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Isom v. People on Monday, December 18, 2017.

Sentencing—Statutory Interpretation.

In this case, the Colorado Supreme Court considered the minimum end of a habitual sex offender’s indeterminate sentence pursuant to C.R.S. § 18-3-1004(1)(c). The court held that the enhanced minimum end in a habitual sex offender’s sentence is set to three times the presumptive maximum unless the court makes a finding of extraordinary aggravating circumstances pursuant to C.R.S. § 18-3-401(6), in which case the enhanced minimum end of the offender’s indeterminate sentence may be set anywhere between triple and sextuple the presumptive maximum otherwise prescribed for the offense.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Tenth Circuit: Mandatory Minimum Sentence Provision in Child Pornography Statute Unconstitutional

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in United States v. Haymond on Thursday, August 31, 2017.

This appeal comes from the district court’s decision to revoke Andre Haymond’s supervised release based, in part, on a finding that Haymond knowingly possessed thirteen images of child pornography, which were found on his phone by his probation officer. On appeal, Haymond argued that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that he knowingly possessed child pornography, and he argued that the sentence imposed upon him is unconstitutional because it violates his right to due process. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s revocation of Haymond’s supervised release, but holds that the sentencing was unconstitutional.

In regards to Haymond’s sufficiency of the evidence argument, the Tenth Circuit found that the district court abused its discretion by relying on a clearly erroneous finding of fact that Haymond knowingly took some act related to the images that resulted in the images being on his phone in a manner consistent with knowing possession, as testimony supports only a finding that the images were accessible on Haymond’s phone, not that Haymond necessarily saved, downloaded, or otherwise placed them there. Nonetheless, the court found that the remaining evidence in the record was sufficient to support a finding that Haymond knowingly possessed the child pornography. The information the court relied on was (1) Haymond had nearly exclusive use and possession of his password-protected phone; (2) at some point, thirteen images of child pornography were accessible somewhere on Haymond’s phone; and (3) the sexual acts depicted in the images are consistent with the images forming the basis of Haymond’s original conviction. The court found the evidence supported a finding that it is more likely than not that Haymond downloaded the images and knowingly possessed child pornography, in violation of his release.

The Circuit then moved on to the constitutional question. Haymond’s original conviction, a class C felony, included a supervised release statute that requires a mandatory term of supervised release of five years to life under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k), which may be revoked if a court later finds that the defendant has violated the conditions of that release. If not for the mandatory sentence required by § 3583(k), the sentence Haymond would have received following revocation of his release would have been significantly lower — two years at the most. The Circuit concluded that § 3583(k) violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments because (1) it strips the sentencing judge of discretion to impose punishment within the statutorily prescribed range; and (2) it imposes heightened punishment on sex offenders, expressly based not on their original crimes of conviction, but on new conduct for which they have not been convicted by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt and for which they may be separately charged, convicted, and punished. The Circuit found that § 3583(k) violates the Sixth Amendment because it punishes the defendant with reincarceration for conduct of which he or she has not been found guilty by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and it raises the possibility that a defendant would be charged and punished twice for the same conduct, in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

The Circuit noted that the court must refrain from invalidating more of the statute than is necessary. There are two sentences under § 3583(k) that the court found to violate the Constitution by increasing the term of imprisonment authorized by statute based on facts found by a judge, not by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and by tying the available punishment to subsequent conduct, rather than the original crime of conviction. The court concluded that without the unconstitutional provision, all violations of the conditions of supervised release would be governed by a different statute, which the court finds to be more appropriate. The sentences at issue under § 3583(k) are found to be unconstitutional and, therefore, unenforceable.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the revocation of Haymond’s supervised release, VACATED his sentence following that revocation, and REMANDED for resentencing without consideration of § 3583(k)’s mandatory minimum sentence provision or its increased penalties for certain subsequent conduct.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Defendant Lacked Fixed Address and was Charged with Failure to Register as Sex Offender Under Incorrect Statute

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Jones on Thursday, September 7, 2017.

Sex Offender—Failure to Register—Evidence—Address—C.R.S. § 16-22-108(3)(i)—C.R.S. § 18-3-412.5(1)(g).

Jones was required to register as a sex offender. In 2011, he registered as a sex offender with the Aurora Police Department (Aurora P.D.) in Colorado. In August 2012, Jones was released from prison onto parole in an unrelated case, and he was given a voucher to stay at a particular motel in Aurora (and in Adams County). On August 12, 2012, Jones updated his sex offender registration with the Aurora P.D., listing the motel’s address as his new residence. On August 20, 2012, when the voucher expired, Jones left the motel and did not return. He did not report a change of address with the Aurora P.D. and did not register as a sex offender with any other local law enforcement agency in Adams County or in any other jurisdiction in Colorado until 2013. The People charged him with failure to register as a sex offender between August 26, 2012 and November 28, 2012.

At the close of evidence of his trial, Jones moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that (1) the prosecution presented no evidence of where he resided during the relevant time period, and (2) ceasing to reside at an address and thereafter lacking a fixed residence does not fall within the meaning of “changing an address” under C.R.S. 18-3-412.5(10(g). The trial court denied the motion, and Jones was convicted of the charge.

On appeal, Jones contended that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove that he failed to register “upon changing an address” under C.R.S. § 18-3-412.5(1)(g). The Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act (Act), C.R.S. §§ 16-22-101 to -115, requires sex offenders to register with the local law enforcement agency where the person resides. C.R.S. § 16-22-108(3)(i) criminalizes the failure to register upon “ceasing to reside at an address and [thereafter] lacking a fixed residence.” A violation of this section must be charged under the catchall provision in C.R.S. § 18-3-412.5(1). Here, the prosecution elected to charge Jones only under C.R.S. § 18-3-412.5(1)(g), which criminalizes the “[f]ailure to register with the local law enforcement agency in each jurisdiction in which the person resides upon changing an address, establishing an additional residence, or legally changing names.” Although Jones was required to register as a sex offender in each jurisdiction where he resided, there was no evidence that Jones had a fixed residence during any portion of the relevant time period. Because the evidence at trial did not establish a violation of C.R.S. § 18-3-412.5(1)(g), he was wrongfully convicted under that statutory provision.

The judgment was vacated.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Evidence Sufficient to Prove Defendant Knowingly Failed to Register as Sex Offender

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Wilson on Thursday, June 29, 2017.

Sex Offender—Registration—Evidence—Affirmative Defense—Uncontrollable Circumstances.

Wilson was required to register as a sex offender and failed to do so. He was then convicted of failure to register as a sex offender.

On appeal, Wilson contended that the evidence was insufficient to show that he knowingly failed to register as a sex offender. Wilson argued that because he was evicted from the motel he was staying at on the last day of the five-day period, he had an additional five days to register. A defendant is guilty of failing to register as a sex offender when, as relevant here, he does not register with his local law enforcement agency within five business days after being released from incarceration. The evidence is sufficient to support the fact that Wilson knowingly failed to register as a sex offender within five days of being released. Further, the statute required Wilson to register within five days of his release without regard to where he was living or whether his location changed during that five-day period.

Wilson next contended that the trial court erred in “disallowing the affirmative defense of uncontrollable circumstances.” However, lack of a fixed residence is not an uncontrollable circumstance, and Wilson did not present any credible evidence that uncontrollable circumstances existed that prevented him from registering as a sex offender. Thus, the trial court did not err in rejecting his affirmative defense.

The judgment was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Crime of Violence Sex Offense Sentence Cannot be Reduced to Probation

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Al-Turki on Thursday, April 6, 2017.

Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act—Probation—C.R.S. § 18-1.3-406(1)(a) and (b)—Crime of Violence—Sex Offender.

Al-Turki was convicted under the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act of 1998 (LSA) of 12 counts of unlawful sexual contact through use of force, intimidation, or threat. The district court ultimately sentenced him to indeterminate prison terms of six years to life. Al-Turki renewed his previously filed Rule 35(b) motion for reduction of sentence, arguing that he was eligible for a probationary sentence under C.R.S. § 18-1.3-406(1)(a). The trial court denied the motion.

On appeal, Al-Turki contended that he was eligible to have his indeterminate term of incarceration sentence, which was imposed under the LSA and the crime-of-violence statute, C.R.S. § 18-1.3-406(1)(b), modified to probation under C.R.S. § 18-1.3-406(1)(a). The mandatory sentencing for violent crimes statute, C.R.S. § 18-1.3-406(1), differentiates between crimes of violence that involve sex offenses (C.R.S. § 18-1.3-406(1)(b)) and those that do not involve sex offenses (C.R.S. § 18-1.3-406(1)(a)). C.R.S. § 18-1.3-406(1)(b) provides that defendants convicted of a sex offense that is a crime of violence “shall” be sentenced to an indeterminate term of incarceration. Thus, a crime-of-violence sex offender is not eligible for probation. Al-Turki was convicted of a sex offense that is a crime of violence. Therefore, the district court did not err in concluding that C.R.S. § 18-1.3-406(1)(b) precluded it from modifying Al-Turki’s sentence to probation.

The order was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: California Resident Required to Register as Sex Offender for Extended Visits in Colorado

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in In re Stanley v. District Attorney for the 18th Judicial District on Thursday, March 9, 2017.

Sex Offender Registration—California Conviction.

In 2001, Stanley was convicted and sentenced in California of “unlawful sexual intercourse with [a] person under 18.” Stanley successfully completed his California probation and his conviction was eventually reduced to a misdemeanor.

In 2014, the California Department of Justice notified Stanley that his statutory requirement to register as a sex offender under the California Penal Code had been terminated. In 2015, Stanley filed a petition to discontinue his sex offender registration in the Arapahoe County District Court for a non-Colorado conviction under C.R.S. § 16-22-113. Stanley, who resided in California but had family in Colorado that he wanted to visit with in Colorado for potentially long periods of time, recognized that travel would result in him being considered a temporary resident of Colorado for purposes of sex offender registration.

The district court denied the petition, concluding as a matter of law that Stanley was ineligible for relief under C.R.S. § 16-22-113(3) because his crime, if committed in Colorado, would have been a violation of C.R.S. § 18-3-402 and consequently required lifetime sex offender registration.

On appeal, Stanley argued that the district court erred as a matter of law in interpreting C.R.S. § 16-22-113(3). He conceded that if committed in Colorado, his offense would have been a violation of C.R.S. § 18-3-402(1)(e), which is a class 1 misdemeanor and an extraordinary risk crime. The Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that the plain language of C.R.S. § 16-22-113(3) precludes Stanley, as a matter of law, from discontinuing his sex offender registration in Colorado.

The order was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

SB 17-087: Allowing Courts Discretion to Set Determinate Sentences for Certain Sex Offenders

On January 18, 2017, Sen. Irene Aguilar introduced SB 17-087, “Concerning Granting Judicial Discretion to Sentence a Defendant to an Indeterminate or Determinate Sentence for a Sexual Offense, and, in Connection Therewith, Requiring the Criteria and Basis for the Sentencing Decision to be Articulated on the Public Record.”

Currently, a court is required to sentence certain sex offenders to an indeterminate sentence that is a maximum of the sex offender’s life.

The bill allows the court to choose either the indeterminate sentence or a determinate sentence in those cases. The bill addresses the factors related to punishment and treatment that a court must consider when deciding between an indeterminate or a determinate sentence. The court must specify its reasons on the record for choosing either a determinate or an indeterminate sentence.

The bill was introduced in the Senate and assigned to the Judiciary Committee. It is scheduled for hearing in committee on February 8 at 1:30 p.m.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Photos May Be Considered “Erotic Nudity” if Recipient Uses Them for Sexual Satisfaction

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People in Interest of T.B. on Thursday, October 20, 2016.

Juvenile Sexual Exploitation of a Child—Delinquency Adjudication.

T.B. used his cell phone to solicit, receive, and store nude photographs of teenage girls who were 15 and 17 years old. He also texted them photographs of his erect penis. Among other offenses, the prosecution charged T.B. with sexual exploitation of a child. The sexual exploitation counts were severed. A jury acquitted him of the remaining counts.

After a bench trial on the sexual exploitation counts, the court adjudicated T.B. delinquent, sentenced him to sex offender probation, and required him to register as a sex offender.

On appeal, T.B. asserted that the evidence was insufficient to support his delinquency adjudication. He argued that because the girls did not take the photos for their own sexual satisfaction, the photos did not depict “erotic nudity,” a necessary component of the crime of sexual exploitation of a child. He also contended that the statutory reference to “persons involved” in the definition of erotic nudity necessarily means that the people displayed in the photograph must be sexually stimulated. The Colorado Court of Appeals disagreed, citing the Colorado Supreme Court’s rejection of the contention that the focus of the overt sexual gratification component of the definition of erotic nudity could only be the persons depicted in the photograph. The court of appeals concluded that the statutory requirement was met.

T.B. also argued that the chain of custody was insufficient to show that he knew that he possessed the nude photos on his cell phone. He contended that the chain of custody linking his cell phone and the photographs was insufficient because it did not show that the photographs were accurate copies of the photographs that were on his phone. The court found that the photos were found by the police on the T.B.’s cell phone, they were identified by the girls as photos they had taken of themselves and texted to him, and T.B. had complimented one of them on the photos. A digital forensic officer testified that the data in T.B.’s phone had not been tampered with, and the photographs had been opened and viewed. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to prove that T.B. knowingly possessed the nude photos.

T.B. also argued that because there was no “sexual abuse of a child” in the photos, the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. The court found that the clear and unambiguous language of the statute does not contain such a requirement.

T.B. further argued that the statute does not cover “teen sexting.” The court found nothing in the language of the statute to support such an argument.

T.B. also contended that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his request for a jury trial. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because its decision fell within a range of reasonable options.

Finally, T.B. argued that he was being selectively prosecuted because he was a male and the trial court should have dismissed the sexual exploitation charges. The court found that the prosecution was not motivated by a discriminatory purpose and concluded that the trial court’s decision was not manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.

The delinquency adjudication was affirmed.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Supreme Court: Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Precludes Revocation of Probation

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Roberson on Monday, May 16, 2016.

Fifth Amendment—Probation Revocation.

The Supreme Court concluded that on the facts presented here, defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination precluded the district court from revoking his sex offender intensive supervision probation based on his refusal to answer a polygraph examiner’s question regarding his use or viewing of child pornography while he was on probation. On the record before the Court, however, the Court was unable to determine whether defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination precluded the district court from revoking defendant’s probation based on his refusal to answer questions concerning any post-trial sexual fantasies involving minors that he might have had within the six months immediately preceding the polygraph examination. Accordingly, the Court made its rule to show cause absolute and remanded the case to the district court with directions that the court conduct further proceedings as more fully set forth in this opinion.

Summary provided courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.