November 15, 2018

Colorado Supreme Court: Dead Man’s Statute Now Applies in “All Civil Actions”

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Estate of Brookoff v. Clark on Monday, September 24, 2018.

Statutory Interpretation—Dead Man’s Statute.

In this case, the supreme court interpreted Colorado’s “Dead Man’s Statute” in light of recent amendments that removed language limiting the statute’s applicability to matters in which a decedent’s estate was a party. Discerning no ambiguity in the current version of the statute, the court held that these amendments expand the scope of the statute such that it is now applicable “in all civil actions.” The court also held that because the statute applies irrespective of the potential impact of a judgment on an estate, the existence of insurance coverage is not a factor militating for or against the applicability of the statute.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Rules for Magistrates and Colorado Appellate Rules Amended

On Tuesday, September 11, 2018, the Colorado State Judicial Branch announced Rule Changes 2018(13) and 2018(14), amending the Colorado Rules for Magistrates and the Colorado Appellate Rules, respectively.

Rule Change 2018(13) amends C.R.M. 6, “Functions of District Court Magistrates,” to update references to the Colorado Rules of Probate Procedure in subparagraph (e)(1)(A). Rule Change 2018(14) amends C.A.R. 3.4, “Appeals from Proceedings in Dependency or Neglect,” to update a cross-reference to C.A.R. 53(h) in subparagraph (l).

For the redlines and clean copies of Rule Change 2018(13) and Rule Change 2018(14), click here. For all of the Colorado Supreme Court’s adopted and proposed rule changes, click here.

Updated Colorado Rules of Probate Procedure Adopted by Colorado Supreme Court

On Friday, August 31, 2018, the Colorado State Judicial Branch released Rule Change 2018(11), adopted June 28, 2018, and effective September 1, 2018. The rule change adopts the proposed revisions to the Colorado Rules of Probate Procedure. The changes to the Probate Rules were proposed by a task force that included many members of the CBA Trust & Estate Section. The task force reworked, renumbered, and revised the Rules.

The new Probate Rules are available here. In addition to the adoption of the new Probate Rules, the court also adopted changes to several of the probate JDF forms. These changes are also available here. The special mental health forms were not adopted.

For a redline and clean version of Rule Change 2018(11), click here. For all of the Colorado Supreme Court’s adopted and proposed rule changes, click here.

Colorado Supreme Court: Colorado Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Award Attorney Fees for Foreign Action

The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Roberts v. Bruce on Monday, June 18, 2018.

Attorney Fees—Statutory Interpretation.

In this case, the supreme court considered whether a trial court may award attorney fees under C.R.S. § 13-17-102 for conduct occurring outside Colorado courts. Reviewing the plain language of 13-17-102, the court concluded that an award of attorney fees pursuant to that section is limited to conduct occurring in Colorado courts and therefore affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: District Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Respondent who Never Received Notice of Protective Proceeding

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in In the Interest of Spohr on Thursday, May 17, 2018.

Emergency Guardianship—Non-Emergency GuardianshipPersonal Service of Notice—Jurisdiction—Probate Code.

On July 15, 2016, the Fremont County Department of Human Services (Department) filed a petition for emergency appointment of a guardian for Spohr in the district court. Counsel was appointed for Spohr and an emergency hearing was held three days later. There was no transcript of the hearing and no indication that Spohr was present or that he received notice of the hearing. On July 19 the magistrate issued an order dispensing with notice under C.R.S. § 15-14-312 stating that Spohr would be substantially harmed if the appointment was delayed. The court appointed the Department as emergency guardian and required notice of the appointment to be personally served on Spohr within 48 hours, as required by C.R.S. § 15-14-312(2). There is no proof that service was made. Despite the C.R.S. § 15-14-312(1) requirement that an emergency guardian appointment may not exceed 60 days, the court did not hold another hearing for more than six months and the emergency guardianship remained in place during that time. A permanent guardian was appointed for Spohr at a February 2017 hearing, but there is no indication that he was served with notice of this hearing. The trial court record includes a finding that the “required notices have been given or waived.”

The court of appeals previously remanded this case to the district court to make findings as to whether any of the required notices were ever sent to Spohr. On remand, the Department presented no further information and the court found that the record remained unclear as to service.

On appeal, Spohr argued for the first time that he did not receive personal service of a notice of hearing on the petition for guardianship. As relevant to this case, the Colorado Probate Code requires personal service on the respondent of a notice of hearing on a petition for guardianship. The Probate Code would have allowed the appointment of an emergency guardian to be made without notice to Spohr only if the court found, based on testimony at the emergency hearing, that he would have been substantially harmed if the appointment were delayed. If the protected person was not present at the hearing, he must be given notice within 48 hours after the appointment. While the magistrate made this finding, the requisite notice within 48 hours of the appointment was never made.

The Probate Code does not contain provisions for how a transition is to be made from an emergency guardianship to a non-emergency guardianship. In the absence of such provision, the court concluded that after the 60-day limit on emergency guardianship, if a guardianship is still sought for the protected person, C.R.S. § 15-14-304, governing judicial appointment of a guardian on a non-emergency basis, must be followed. Among other requirements for this process, C.R.S. § 15-14-309(1) requires that a copy of the petition and notice of hearing on the petition must be served personally on the respondent. Further, the notice requirement is jurisdictional, and the lack of notice may therefore be raised at any time. Here, Spohr was not given notice within 48 hours after the appointment of his emergency guardian, nor did he waive notice of the appointment and the ability to request a hearing on the emergency guardian’s appointment. And the emergency guardian served long after 60 days had passed.

The record also fails to show that Spohr was provided with the required notice before his non-emergency guardianship. The failure to personally serve the respondent 14 days before the guardianship hearing is jurisdictional and respondent cannot waive service. Thus the court lacked jurisdiction to appoint a permanent guardian.

The judgment was vacated.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Bills Signed Enacting Uniform Trust Code, Creating Civil Rape Shield Law, Helping Preserve Family Units with Parents with Disabilities, and More

On Wednesday, April 25, 2018, Governor Hickenlooper signed nine bills into law. On Thursday, April 26, 2018, he signed five bills into law. To date, he has signed 183 bills and sent one bill to the Secretary of State without a signature. The bills signed Wednesday and Thursday include a bill enacting the Colorado Uniform Trust Code, a bill enacting a civil rape shield statute, a bill amending family preservation safeguards for parents with disabilities, a bill requiring free-standing emergency rooms to post certain consumer notices, and more. The bills signed Wednesday and Thursday are summarized here.

  • SB 18-071 – “Concerning an Extension of the Repeal of the State Substance Abuse Trend and Response Task Force, and, in Connection Therewith, Making an Appropriation,” by Sens. Cheri Jahn & Larry Crowder and Rep. Daneya Esgar. The state substance abuse trend and response task force is scheduled to be repealed effective July 1, 2018. The bill extends the repeal for 10 years to September 1, 2028.
  • SB 18-146 – “Concerning a Requirement that a Freestanding Emergency Department Inform a Person who is Seeking Medical Treatment about the Health Care Options that are Available to the Person, and, in Connection Therewith, Making an Appropriation,” by Sens. John Kefalas & Jim Smallwood and Reps. Lang Sias & Jonathan Singer. The bill requires a freestanding emergency department (FSED), whether operated by a hospital at a separate, off-campus location or operating independently of a hospital system, to provide any individual that enters the FSED seeking treatment a written statement of patient information, which an FSED staff member or health care provider must explain orally.
  • SB 18-154 – “Concerning a Requirement for a Local Juvenile Services Planning Committee to Devise a Plan to Manage Dually Identified Crossover Youth,” by Sen. Rhonda Fields and Rep. Joseph Salazar. The bill requires local juvenile services planning committees to devise a plan to manage dually identified crossover youth. A dually identified crossover youth is a youth involved in both the juvenile justice system and the child welfare system. The plan must contain descriptions and processes.
  • SB 18-169 – “Concerning Offenses Against Witnesses in Noncriminal Proceedings,” by Sen. Bob Gardner and Rep. Terri Carver. The clarifies that the offenses of intimidating a witness or victim and retaliation against a witness or victim apply to witnesses in criminal, civil, and administrative proceedings.
  • SB 18-180 – “Concerning the Colorado Uniform Trust Code,” by Sen. Bob Gardner and Reps. Cole Wist & Matt Gray. The bill enacts the Colorado Uniform Trust Code and repeals many sections of the Colorado Probate Code.
  • SB 18-187 – “Concerning Transferring Marijuana Fibrous Waste for the Purpose of Producing Industrial Fiber Products,” by Sens. Vicki Marble & Jack Tate and Rep. Jeni James Arndt. The bill gives the state licensing authority rule-making authority to address conditions under which a medical or retail marijuana licensee is authorized to transfer marijuana fibrous waste to a person for the purpose of producing only industrial fiber products.
  • HB 18-1104 – “Concerning Family Preservation Safeguards for Parents with Disabilities,” by Rep. Jessie Danielson and Sens. Dominick Moreno & Kent Lambert. The bill establishes that family protection safeguards for a parent or prospective parent with a disability are critical to family preservation and the best interests of the children of Colorado. These safeguards include that a parent’s disability must not serve as a basis for denial or restriction of parenting time or parental responsibilities in a domestic law proceeding, that a parent’s disability must not serve as a basis for denial of participation in a public or private adoption, or for denial of foster care or guardianship, and that the benefits of providing supportive parenting services must be considered by a court when determining parental responsibilities, parenting time, adoption placements, foster care, and guardianship.
  • HB 18-1132 – “Concerning the Amount that the Department of Corrections is Required to Reimburse a County or City and County for the Confinement and Maintenance in a Local Jail of any Person who is Sentenced to a Term of Imprisonment in a Correctional Facility,” by Rep. Dafna Michaelson Jenet and Sen. Larry Crowder. Under current law, the General Assembly establishes in its annual general appropriations bill the amount that the Department of Corrections is required to reimburse any county or city and county for a portion of the expenses and costs incurred by that county or city and county for the confinement and maintenance in a local jail of any person who is sentenced to a term of imprisonment in a correctional facility. The bill states that, to assist the General Assembly in determining such rate of reimbursement, each county and each city and county shall report to the joint budget committee the average cost of confining and maintaining persons in a local jail for more than 72 hours after each such person has been sentenced to the custody of the department.
  • HB 18-1147 – “Concerning the Continuation of the Regulation of People who Modify the Weather, and, in Connection Therewith, Implementing the Sunset Review Recommendations of the Department of Regulatory Agencies,” by Reps. Joann Ginal & Kim Ransom and Sen. Don Coram. The bill continues the regulation of people who modify the weather.
  • HB 18-1211 – “Concerning Controlling Medicaid Fraud,” by Reps. Cole Wist & Mike Foote and Sens. Irene Aguilar & Jim Smallwood. The bill establishes the medicaid fraud control unit in the department of law. The unit is responsible for investigation and prosecution of medicaid fraud and waste, as well as patient abuse, neglect, and exploitation. Prior to initiating a criminal prosecution, the unit must consult with the district attorney of the judicial district where the prosecution would be initiated.
  • HB 18-1237 – “Concerning the Continuation of the Requirements Regarding the Preparation of a Cost-Benefit Analysis as Administered by the Department of Regulatory Agencies, and, in Connection Therewith, Implementing the Recommendations Contained in the 2017 Sunset Report by the Department of Regulatory Agencies,” by Reps. Tracy Kraft-Tharp & Kevin Van Winkle and Sen. Tim Neville. The bill implements the recommendations of the Department of Regulatory Agencies’ sunset review and report on requirements and procedures regarding the preparation of a cost-benefit analysis.
  • HB 18-1243 – “Concerning Enactment of a Civil Rape Shield Law,” by Reps. Mike Foote & Cole Wist and Sens. Don Coram & Rhonda Fields. Under Colorado criminal law there is a rape shield law that presumes that evidence of a victim’s sexual conduct is irrelevant and not admissible except for evidence of the victim’s prior or subsequent sexual conduct with the defendant or evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or origin of semen, pregnancy, disease, or any similar evidence of sexual intercourse offered for the purpose of showing that the act or acts were or were not committed by the defendant. The bill creates a similar presumption in a civil proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct. If a party wants to introduce sexual conduct evidence, it must file a confidential motion with the court at least 63 days prior to trial. Prior to ruling on the motion, the court shall conduct an in camera hearing and allow the parties and alleged victim to attend and be heard.
  • HB 18-1275 – “Concerning the Repeal of the Craig Hospital License Plate Donation Requirement,” by Rep. Jeff Bridges and Sen. Daniel Kagan. Current law requires an applicant to make a donation to Craig Hospital in order to be issued a special Craig Hospital license plate. The bill repeals the $20 donation requirement.
  • HB 18-1282 – “Concerning a Requirement that a Health Care Provider Include Certain Identifying Information on all Claims for Reimbursement for Health Care Services,” by Reps. Susan Lontine & Lang Sias and Sens. Jim Smallwood & John Kefalas. The bill requires an off-campus location of a hospital to apply for, obtain, and use on claims for reimbursement for health care services provided at the off-campus location a unique national provider identifier, commonly referred to as NPI. The off-campus location’s NPI must be used on all claims related to health care services provided at that location, regardless of whether the claim is filed through the hospital’s central billing or claims department or through a health care clearinghouse. It also requires all medicaid providers that are entities to obtain and use a unique NPI for each site at which they deliver services and for each provider type that the department of health care policy and financing has specified.

For a complete list of Governor Hickenlooper’s 2018 legislative decisions, click here.

Colorado Court of Appeals: District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Conversion and Unjust Enrichment Claims

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Scott v. Scott on Thursday, February 22, 2018.

Torts—Conversion—Unjust Enrichment—Life Insurance Proceeds—Motion to Dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) and (6)—Attorney Fees and Costs.

Roseann’s marriage to Melvin Scott was dissolved. Their separation agreement provided that Melvin’s life insurance policies were to be maintained until Roseann remarried, and at that time the beneficiaries could be changed to the children of the parties. Upon emancipation of the children, if Roseann had remarried, Melvin could change the beneficiary to whomever he wished. A Prudential life insurance policy was the policy at issue in this case.

After the divorce, Melvin married Donna and remained married to her until his death. Roseann never remarried. A few years before Melvin died and decades after his divorce from Roseann, Melvin changed the named beneficiary on his life insurance policies to Donna. Melvin died and Donna received the proceeds from his life insurance policies. Roseann sent a demand letter to Donna, requesting the proceeds pursuant to the separation agreement. The proceeds were placed in a trust account pending the outcome of this litigation.

Roseann sued Donna in Mesa County District Court, alleging civil theft, conversion, and unjust enrichment/constructive trust. Donna did not answer but removed the case to federal district court based on administration of the veteran life insurance policies by the federal government. She then moved to dismiss Roseann’s claims under a theory of federal preemption. Ultimately, the federal court agreed with the preemption argument and dismissed Roseann’s claims with prejudice as to the veteran policies but remanded the remaining claims to the Mesa County District Court for resolution regarding the Prudential policy.

Donna filed a motion in the district court to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) and (6), arguing that Roseann’s claims failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that she had failed to join Melvin’s estate, a necessary party. The district court granted the motion and a subsequent motion for attorney fees and costs.

On appeal, the court of appeals first examined whether Roseann had stated claims sufficient to withstand the plausibility standard required to survive a motion to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5). To state a claim for civil theft, a plaintiff must allege the elements of criminal theft, which requires the specific intent of the defendant to permanently deprive the owner of the benefit of his property. Roseann made a single, conclusory allegation, repeating the language in the statute, that Donna acted with the requisite intent to state a claim for civil theft. The court concluded that, without more, the allegation was not entitled to the assumption of truth, and the district court did not err in dismissing the civil theft claim.

Conversion, unlike civil theft, does not require that the convertor act with the specific intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property. Even a good faith recipient of funds who receives them without knowledge that they belonged to another can be held liable for conversion. Here, Roseann adequately alleged that Donna’s dominion and control over the Prudential policy proceeds were unauthorized because of the separation agreement language and Donna’s refusal to return the allegedly converted funds. Roseann pleaded each element of conversion sufficiently for that claim to be plausible and withstand a request for dismissal under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5).

Similarly, the court concluded it was error to dismiss Roseann’s claim for unjust enrichment and constructive trust. In general, a person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is subject to liability in restitution. Here, Roseann alleged that Donna received a benefit that was promised to Roseann in the separation agreement and it would be inequitable for Donna to retain the funds. Roseann asked the court to impose a constructive trust on the assets. While this may be a difficult case in that two arguably innocent parties are asserting legal claims to the same insurance proceeds, resolution should be left to the fact finder and not resolved under a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss.

It was not clear whether the district court had dismissed the claims for failure to join a necessary party under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), so the court addressed this issue as well. Here, the court held that Melvin’s estate was not a necessary party because Donna has possession of the proceeds at issue, and thus complete relief can be accorded between Roseann and Donna. In addition, the life insurance proceeds were never a part of Melvin’s estate assets and therefore the estate has no interest in those proceeds. Further, this is not an action for enforcement of the separation agreement, but is essentially an action in tort. The district court erred by dismissing the case under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).

Lastly, Roseann contended that Donna is not entitled to attorney fees and costs because the court erred in granting Donna’s motion to dismiss. The court agreed.

The judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case was remanded with directions. The award of attorney fees and costs was vacated.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Guardian Who Diverted Assets for his Own Family Subject to Treble Damages

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People in Interest of Black on Thursday, January 25, 2018.

Probate—Disability—Conservator—Fiduciary Duty—Conflict of Interest—Jurisdiction—Civil Theft.

Black is the former conservator for his mentally-ill sister, Joanne. When he filed his petition to be appointed conservator, he did not tell the probate court that he sought the appointment to disclaim Joanne’s interest in payable-on-death (POD) assets so that they could be redistributed in accordance with his and his children’s expectations of his mother’s estate plan. Nor did he disclose this conflict of interest when he requested authorization to disclaim Joanne’s assets. Black later admitted this conflict. The probate court found that Black breached his fiduciary duties and committed civil theft by converting his sister’s assets for his own benefit. Specifically, the court concluded that Black failed to adequately disclose his intent to use a disclaimer to divest his sister of one-third of the (POD) assets, and therefore did not have the court’s authorization to redirect the assets. The court determined that his actions were undertaken in bad faith and satisfied the elements of civil theft. Based on its findings, the court surcharged Black in the amount of the converted funds and then trebled those damages under the civil theft statute.

On appeal, Black first argued that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to enter the hearing order because only a C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion, and not a motion to void the disclaimer, could undo the court’s order authorizing the disclaimer. However, the motion to void the disclaimer did not seek relief from a final order. Instead, the motion alleged that Black had breached his fiduciary duties to Joanne while acting as conservator, and it sought to unwind a transaction based on this breach. Thus, the probate court’s jurisdiction was based on the court’s authority to monitor fiduciaries over whom it has obtained jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the allegations and issues raised by the motion to void the disclaimer. Additionally, Black had sufficient notice of the proceedings.

Black next argued that he could not have breached his fiduciary duty to Joanne because his conversion of one-third of her POD assets was disclosed to and approved by the probate court in accordance with C.R.S. § 15-14-423. C.R.S. § 15-14-423 allows a fiduciary to engage in a conflicted transaction only when the fiduciary has disclosed the conflict of interest and demonstrated that the conflicted transaction is nonetheless reasonable and fair to the protected person. Black received authority to transfer the POD funds to a Supplemental Needs Trust (SNT) for Joanne’s benefit. Instead, he redistributed the POD funds two-thirds to the SNT and one-third to the Issue Trust, which benefited himself and his children. Because Black did not disclose the conflict of interest or demonstrate that this proposed redistribution was reasonable or fair, he did not have safe harbor under the statute. Thus, the probate court did not err in finding that Black breached his fiduciary duties.

Next, Black contended that the probate court erred in finding him liable for civil theft, arguing that the probate court lacked jurisdiction over the claim; the claim was time-barred; and that, in any event, the evidence was insufficient to establish civil theft. The civil theft claim is coterminous with the breach of fiduciary duty claim and thus directly related to Black’s duties as conservator. The probate court had jurisdiction over the civil theft claim, of which Black had notice. The record amply supports that the civil theft claim was timely asserted. As to the sufficiency of the evidence, Black did not dispute that he obtained control over Joanne’s assets with the intent to permanently deprive her of them; he disputed only the probate court’s finding of deception. The record supports the probate court’s finding that Black made misrepresentations or misleading statements or that he concealed material facts. When a conservator allegedly commits theft from a protected person by deception on the probate court, reliance is established if that court relied on the misrepresentation in authorizing the theft. Here, the court relied on Black’s misrepresentations in authorizing the disclaimer, and it would not have authorized the transaction had it known the true facts. The evidence was sufficient to support the finding that Black committed civil theft.

Black also contended that reversal is required because the probate court committed a series of errors that made the evidentiary hearing unfair. The court of appeals was unpersuaded by these arguments.

Lastly, Black contended that the court erred in concluding that he lacked authority to create a separate trust for Joanne’s workers’ compensation and Social Security disability benefits. The court discerned no error.

Joanne cross-appealed, contending that the court erred by failing to make explicit findings denying her request to void the disclaimer. The court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a surcharge rather than ordering that the disclaimer transaction be unwound.

The order was affirmed and the case was remanded for determination of reasonable appellate attorney fees.

Summary provided courtesy of Colorado Lawyer.

Frank Hill Honored with Richard N. Doyle CLE Award of Excellence

On Monday, December 4, 2017, CLE hosted its annual Faculty and Author Thank You Reception. The Richard N. Doyle CLE Award of Excellence was presented to Frank T. Hill, a solo practitioner from Lakewood. Frank Hill has been a stalwart member of the CBA’s Trust and Estate Section since his admission to practice in 1973. Frank has been active on the Orange Book Forms Committee and Rules and Forms Committee of the CBA Trust and Estate Section for many years. He welcomes all attorneys to the meetings, treating the newest attorneys with the same dignity and respect as he treats his long-standing colleagues. He is kind and humble, frequently referring to himself as the “committee curmudgeon,” but he is intelligent and thoughtful, and he gracefully guides committee discussions while demonstrating the utmost respect for his peers.

Frank was instrumental in the redesign of the CLE publication, Orange Book Forms: Colorado Estate Planning Forms. He redesigned the book in order to help educate lawyers from the moment they open the book. He altruistically donated his time and energy to the redesign with the hope that it would be useful to the attorneys of tomorrow.

Frank is also a frequent speaker at CLE programs, and will be presenting at Friday’s “Orange Book Forms” program, in which all attendees receive a copy of the book as their course materials. He has also presented at Trust & Estate Retreats and many of the spring and fall Trust & Estate Updates. He is a fixture at CLE, and we are honored to be able to present him with the Richard N. Doyle CLE Award of Excellence for 2017.

Introduction, and Lessons from Alzheimer’s Disease

Editor’s Note: CBA CLE Legal Connection welcomes Aaron Eisenach to the blog. Aaron Eisenach has specialized in long-term care planning and insurance-based solutions for 20 years. Read more below.

I am very excited to submit my first blog on CBACLELegalConnection.com! Some of you will recognize me from recent Elder Law and Estate Planning Retreats. Others may have heard me lecture at Senior Law Day or provide CLE courses on long-term care planning. Or perhaps you have read my chapters in Elder Law in Colorado and Senior Law Handbook. But in case our paths have never crossed, please allow me to further introduce myself.

I am a long-term care planning specialist representing myriad insurance companies and products that help people protect their family and finances from the greatest risk left in life: needing extended care.  I wear three hats in my professional life. First, I assist other advisors and agents that do not specialize in long-term care insurance and choose to trust me with their clients.  Second, I serve as a wholesaler of LTC planning products to agents in Colorado and many other states. And third, as an educator I am certified by the Colorado Division of Insurance to teach state-mandated continuing education courses that all resident agents must complete in order to offer LTC coverage. Whichever hat I’m wearing my goal is to help families mitigate the emotional, physical and financial consequences of an extended care event.  My steadfast belief is that everyone deserves a serious conversation about the potentially devastating emotional, physical and financial consequences needing long-term care can cause.

My passion for this niche in the insurance industry stems from witnessing my father’s and grandfather’s battles with Alzheimer’s disease and the lasting impact on family and finances. I remember occasionally visiting my grandfather, usually after Sunday morning church services, in the skilled nursing facility in which he lived for 10 years. I can still breathe the smells and hear the groans from residents in the hallways of the facility. I could hardly wait to get in the car and escape the image of the man that I only knew as a prisoner to a crippling, horrific disease.

Imagine the heartbreak when we started to realize that my father was beginning to show symptoms of the same condition. Thankfully, before signs of dementia crept in to rob him of his cognition, he took my advice and purchased long-term care insurance. Because of his familial experiences, my father realized that the coverage was not for him per se. It was for my mom, and his children and grandchildren more than it was ever for him. When dad resigned from a prestigious job, a few newspaper articles, banquets and receptions honored him while he was still mostly aware of his surroundings. When dad could no longer be left alone, my mom also quit her job and began her new vocation: full-time caregiver.

Dad’s long-term care insurance policy was structured to cover care at home, in an assisted living or skilled nursing facility, adult day care or hospice. Its benefits were unlimited: the coverage could never be exhausted regardless of how long he might have needed care.  Mom resisted turning on the benefits for many months (it seems she held sacred the “…for better or worse, for richer or poorer, in sickness and in health” part of the wedding vows) until she finally realized that she needed help in caring for dad. Eventually a home care agency was hired to help take care of him a few hours per day, freeing her to go to the grocery store, the doctor’s office, or see a grandchild’s piano recital. In other words, the long-term care insurance gave her some of her life back.

Eventually the combined care provided by mom and the agency wasn’t enough. After a health scare of her own, mom called me and wanted to know my feelings about placing dad in a nursing home permanently. Realizing that my dad’s chronic care needs were making my mother chronically-ill herself, I told her that she had my absolute encouragement to do so. At that point she said that she had already talked to the other children and that they also agreed. A facility was chosen that was close to the homes of three of the four children. Mom and dad’s house was sold, allowing mom to live closer to the facility so that she could be there every day possible as his loving wife and his personal care advocate, which is so vitally important regardless of the quality and reputation of the facility in which your loved one resides. As an example of her compassion, after dad had passed away in the very early morning hours she fed his roommate breakfast later that morning. All but $20 per day of dad’s 18-month stay was paid-for by his insurance policy. In fact, not a single penny of mom or dad’s retirement plans was spent on care.

These experiences and God’s hand led me to my passion for, and career in, telling others about the importance of planning ahead for the possibility of needing extended care services. For more than 20 years I have listened to clients tell me of their own stories of caregiving. The stories lead to similar conclusions: the emotional and physical strains and pressures of being a caregiver are devastating, adult children often do not contribute equally to the care needs of the parent(s) which can lead to resentment and in-fighting, the lifetime savings of the care recipient was depleted much quicker than ever imagined, relying on Medicaid should be avoided, the lack of planning leads to chaos, and more.

My next blog will focus on the premise that everyone needs a plan for care (not necessarily insurance), the components of a care plan, and common planning goals. I will also present the latest cost of care data for Colorado. Until then, if there is anything I can do for you or your clients, please visit www.AaronEisenach.com or call 303-659-0755.

 

Aaron R. Eisenach has specialized in long-term care planning and insurance-based solutions for 20 years. His passion for this topic stems from losing both his father and grandfather to Alzheimer’s Disease. As an insurance wholesaler, Mr. Eisenach represents ICB, Inc., the nation’s first general agency specializing in LTC insurance. As an educator, he provides workshops to consumers and teaches state-mandated continuing education courses to Colorado insurance agents selling LTC products. As a broker, Mr. Eisenach is the proprietor of AaronEisenach.com and partners with financial advisors and agents who trust him to work with their clients. He is the immediate past president of the Producers Advisory Council at the Colorado Division of Insurance, serves as president of the nonprofit LTC Forum of Colorado, Inc, and has appeared on 9News and KMGH Channel 7. He recently served as an expert witness in a court case and was a contributing author to the American College curriculum on long-term care insurance.

JDF Forms in All Categories Amended by State Judicial

The Colorado State Judicial Branch has been amending its JDF forms in August. To date, there are 246 forms with an August revision date, including forms in every major category.

The JDF forms are being revised to include the following language:

□ By checking this box, I am acknowledging I am filling in the blanks and not changing anything else on the form.
□ By checking this box, I am acknowledging that I have made a change to the original content of this form.
(Checking this box requires you to remove JDF number and copyright at the bottom of the form.)

For a complete list of the Colorado State Judicial Branch’s JDF forms, including those with August 2017 revision dates, click here.

Colorado Court of Appeals: Trial Court Within Discretion to Impose Surcharge in Protective Proceeding

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Becker v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. on Thursday, August 24, 2017.

Aaron Becker was the conservator on an account set up for his daughter after she was the beneficiary of settlement funds from a personal injury claim. The trial court’s order to set up the restricted account specified that “no funds could be withdrawn from the account except by ‘separate certified order of this court.'” However, due to a “coding error,” Wells Fargo failed to set up the account as a restricted account. The account balance was $56,642.46 as reported in August 2013. Wells Fargo allowed Becker to make unauthorized withdrawals until the balance was negative, then closed the account.

The trial court issued an order to show cause in August 2016 to both Wells Fargo and Becker regarding the withdrawn funds. At the show cause hearing, Becker testified that he used the funds for his personal expenses, as well as to pay rent, groceries, utilities, sports activities expenses, and other expenses for the beneficiary. The court ordered Becker to file an accounting of how the funds were used from August 2013 until the account was closed. He agreed to do so, but never filed the accounting.

The court ordered Becker and Wells Fargo to restore to the account the last amount reported and found them jointly and severally liable for breach of fiduciary duty. The court ordered Wells Fargo to restore $56,642.46 to a new restricted account. 

Wells Fargo appealed, arguing the court should have apportioned liability per C.R.S. § 13-21-111.5. Wells Fargo also requested a hearing to determine the amount of the funds used to benefit the protected person so as not to afford her a double recovery. The trial court denied Wells Fargo’s motion.

On appeal, the court of appeals disagreed with Wells Fargo that C.R.S. § 13-21-111.5 applied, ruling instead that the court properly determined that it was a surcharge action under C.R.S. §§ 15-10-501 to -504. The court noted that the trial court had authority to impose a surcharge on Wells Fargo for failing to correct its error. The court of appeals agreed with Wells Fargo, however, that requiring the bank to restore the full amount of the settlement funds could potentially result in an impermissible double recovery to the protected person, and remanded for a determination of how the conservatorship funds were spent.